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A B S T R A C T
This thesis is an analysis of the politics of political transition in Hong Kong, giving 
special attention to the politicization of specific sectors of the society during the crucial 
period immediately before and after the signing of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declara­
tion on the future of Hong Kong. My study begins with a broad comparative approach, 
which applies the key concepts, ‘politicization’ and ‘depoliticization’, to explain the 
processes of decolonization in Asia and Africa in the post-1945 period, and to the specific 
situation of Hong Kong.
It is argued throughout the thesis that many decolonizing societies have ex­
perienced varying degrees of politicization during the course of transition to indepen­
dence. Many of them passed through a phase of mass mobilization and revolutionary 
struggle for independence in the immediate postwar period. Hong Kong has, however, 
been experiencing a unique course of political transition in the 1980s within a quite dis­
tinctive international and domestic environment, with sovereignty about to be trans­
ferred not to the local people but to Beijing. Still, Hong Kong society has been under­
going a significant degree of politicization since 1982-83. although the scale of political 
mobilization there is not likely to be intensified to become a large-scale nationalist move­
ment as in other cases.
Throughout the thesis, I argue that the politicization process in Hong Kong is to 
be discussed mainly in terms of China’s increasing involvement in local politics. The 
politicization process began in about 1983-84 with the increased participation of a small 
group of middle-class professionals and grassroots organizations who called for 
democratic self-government and minimum Chinese intervention in the internal affairs of 
Hong Kong. The ‘democratic movement’ was not a united one, however. Opposing the 
democrats was the group of conservative businessmen and professionals who defended 
the status  quo. By 1985, the latter were being co-opted by the PRC officials to support 
the Chinese position on the m atter of political reform. As the influence of the conser­
vative sector became more dominant, the democrats had to fight much harder than 
previously to maintain even the possibility of a more open and accountable system of 
government for Hong Kong.
I conclude that the degree of politicization in Hong Kong society is likely to remain 
limited, since China’s increasing influence in local affairs is becoming the most important 
factor affecting the scope of political activity. In the initial stages of the political tran­
sition, the governments of both Britain and the PRC were ready to tolerate a limited 
degree of politicization in order to ensure the co-operation of the people of Hong Kong in 
maintianing prosperity and stability. But if the degree of political mobilization goes fur­
ther than what China will tolerate, it is highly likely tha t  the PRC officials will crack 
down on criticism or political dissent when they take over formal control in Hong Kong 
after 1997.
1M ap 1. The Territories of Hong Kong.
2I N T R O D U C T I O N
It wasn’t much of a meeting compared to the lively political gatherings 
common in much of the rest of Asia. But for Hong Kong it was a milestone. As 
the territory anxiously awaited the unveiling of a Sino-British agreement 
outlining its post-1997 status as a capitalist Special Administrative Region 
within an overwhelmingly socialist China, a coalition of unions, grassroots 
groups, community leaders and social activists joined in an unprecedentedly 
forceful call for direct elections to the Legislative Council (Legco), the 
territory’s appointed legislature. At the end of the meeting, held inside a large 
theatre, some 1,000 participants representing 89 different organizations clapped 
loudly three times and raised their right hands twice to show their support for 
the conclave’s demands. “The objective” , proclaimed the resolution, “is to 
prepare for the establishment of a democratic and highly autonomous system of 
self-administration to progress beyond 1997 in a smooth and stable manner, so 
as to promote prosperity, stability and the development of the community” .1 2
The meeting described above, held at Kao Shan Theatre on 16 September, 1984, 
was the first time in the political history of Hong Kong tha t  a coalition of political forces 
operating outside the framework of the colonial administration had come together to call 
for democracy^ and self-government. The nature of their demands was essentially very 
moderate and the meeting could not be regarded as the birth of an anti-colonial or a 
nationalist movement of any kind. The gathering, generally known as the Kao Shan 
Meeting, was held just 10 days before the draft agreement between Britain and the PRC 
on the future of Hong Kong was about to be announced. The meeting also came as a 
climax to two months of public debate about a “Green Paper” published by the Hong 
Kong government in July 1984 in order to stimulate public discussion on “The Further
1. Asiaweek  (28 September, 1984), p.23.
2. In this thesis, 1 am not using the word ‘democracy’ to refer to a particular form of political 
arrangements or processes, but applying the term, in the broad everyday sense, to refer to a 
system in which the government is accountable to the ordinary citizens through some kinds of 
electoral processes. In fact, the term was mentioned very frequently by the interviewees during my 
field research in Hong Kong, who generally referred to ‘democracy’ (minzu), and a similar word 
‘democratization’ (minzu hua), as the processes of liberalizing the political system through greater 
public participation. It is perhaps noteworthy, as Gillespie says, that “political systems experienc­
ing democratization may not be at present or even in the future ‘democratic’. Likewise, 
democratic political systems may not be experiencing further democratization, or the process 
through which democratic attributes are acquired. Hence, democratic systems may not be ex­
periencing democratization, and democratizating systems may not be democratic” . See J.V. Gil­
lespie, “Introduction: Studies on Democratization” , in J.V. Gillespie and B.A. Nesvold (eds), 
Macro-Quant i ta t i ve  Analysi s:  C o n f l i c t s , Development and Democra t i za t ion  (Beverly Hills, Cal­
ifornia: Sage Publications, 1971), pp.375-376.
3Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong” , which proposed the 
introduction for the first time of indirectly elected members to the Colony’s Legislative 
Council in September 1985. In any other British colony proceeding along the path 
towards self-government, the introduction of elected members into an essentially 
advisory legislative council has usually been one of the first of several steps in the 
direction of some form of representative government. In the case of Hong Kong, it may 
prove to be the last.
Similar demands for democracy and self-government have been a common 
phenomenon in many other decolonizing societies in which power has been transferred 
from the colonial authorities to indigenous hands. In Hong Kong, the process of political 
transition has been very different from other cases of decolonization, primarily because 
local people have not had any real expectation of independence or even substantial 
self-government. The transitional period is commonly referred to as the period between 
the signing of the Sino-British agreement in 1984 and 30 June, 1997. It is also the 
period during which the two signatory powers are to make arrangements for the smooth 
transfer of government, with a view to enabling the Chinese government to resume the 
exercise of sovereignty over Kong Kong on 1 July, 1997. In view of an anticipated 
communist takeover, control over its society is not expected to be transferred to the 
local government and people themselves, but prospectively to Beijing. Nevertheless, a 
movement demanding democratic reforms and greater participation in decision-making 
has quickly manifested itself in Hong Kong since the two years of Sino-British talks 
(1982-84), arising out of the complex and ambivalent attitudes among the local people 
towards the prospects of decolonization by the British and incorporation into the PRC. 
The governments of both Hong Kong and the PRC have to come to terms with that 
process, even though neither of them found it particularly convenient or congenial to 
their own immediate interests. Because of the unique situation of Hong Kong in the 
international arena, the domestic dynamics underlying the politics of transition have 
here proved very different from the patterns observable elsewhere in other cases of 
decolonization in Asia and Africa.
This thesis is an analysis of the political transition in Hong Kong during the 
crucial period 1982-85, giving special attention to the politicization of certain sectors of 
Hong Kong society before arid after the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration on the future 
of Hong Kong. My study is based on a broad comparative analysis of the processes of 
decolonization elsewhere in Africa and Asia in the postwar period and the application of 
the key concepts, ‘politicization’ and ‘depoliticization’, to explain the specific features of 
Hong Kong’s development. By placing Hong Kong's political transition in a comparative 
perspective, the author hopes tha t  an account of the processes of decolonization in some 
other cases will throw light on the distinctiveness of Hong Kong’s political dynamics.
4Throughout the thesis, I will argue that Hong Kong society has been undergoing a 
significant degree of politicization since 1982-83, although the scale of political 
mobilization there could never be compared with that of many other newly independent 
nations. It tends to be commonly assumed th a t  the process of politicization was 
precipitated by the 1997 issue of Hong Kong’s future status. I believe tha t  the whole 
politicization process was also due to the obviously increased involvement of the PRC in 
the internal affairs of Hong Kong during and after the two years of Sino-British talks. 
My focus will be mainly on the participation of a small, but significant, group of 
middle-class professionals and businessmen, whose emergence was largely stimulated by 
a common concern about the future of Hong Kong, and China’s role in particular. I will 
also be examining various issues tha t  arose during 1985, the first year of political 
transition in Hong Kong, as the newly emerging groups began to participate more 
actively in various types of political activity.
In Chapter One, I will firstly discuss the key concepts ‘politicization’ and 
‘depoliticization’ and some similar terms. Then 1 will look more closely at other 
examples of politicization and depoliticization in Asia and Africa, giving special 
attention to the processes of decolonization in various South and Southeast Asian 
countries in the post-1945 period and the role of mass mobilization politics in the various 
nationalist movements there. Chapter Two will be a survey of the various 
interpretations put forward and debates tha t  have arisen about the nature of the 
changes occurring in Hong Kong’s socio-political structure in the early 1980s. Chapter 
Three will deal with the Sino-British talks of 1982-84 which precipitated the process of 
politicization in Hong Kong in 1984-85 and stimulated the emergence of various political 
forces. In Chapter Four, I will analyze the interactions between these groups and the 
Hong Kong administration after the Green Paper on “The Further Development of 
Representative Government’" was proposed in July 1984. In Chapters Five, Six, and 
Seven. I will discuss the participation of various political groups in the elections to the 
district boards and the Legislative Council in March and September 1985, focussing 
mainly on the characteristics of the electoral campaigns within the changing context of 
Hong Kong politics. In Chapter Eight, I will switch to an account of the response of the 
PRC towards the emerging political activities in Hong Kong, analyzing, in particular, 
the interaction between the PRC and the political groups during the setting up of the 
Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) and Basic Law Consultative Committee 
(BLCC) in the second half of 1985. From this survey of developments in 1982-85, it can 
be observed tha t  the politics of political transition in Hong Kong were not merely 
affected by a response of the local people to the initiatives of the colonial authorities, but 
were also shaped increasingly by the influence of the PRC officials who, in order to 
control more effectively the course of political transition in the run-up to 1997, started 
to mobilize local support more obviously than ever before.
5In the last chapter, I will conclude that Hong Kong society has been politicized to 
a modest degree in the post-1984 period. However, it will be surprising if the intensity of 
politicization is increased in future to involve large-scale mass mobilization, since 
China’s increasing involvement in local politics is now becoming the most important 
factor affecting the degree of political activity and conflict. If the politicization process 
advances further than what China will tolerate, the PRC officials are likely to repress 
political participation when they take over formal control in Hong Kong after 1997.
6CH APTER 1
THE POLITICS OF DECOLONIZATION: PROCESSES  
OF POLITICIZATION AN D  DEPOLITICIZATION
POLITICIZATION, PARTICIPATION AND MOBILIZATION:
SOME THEORETICAL ISSUES
The term politicization can simply be defined as to be ‘made more political’, or ‘to 
become more political’, and it is often applied to a broad range of political, social and 
cultural situations with different connotations. Very often, its meanings vary according 
to the context in which the term is used. In this study, I will argue that the term 
‘politicization' can usefully be applied to explain the dynamics and vicissitudes of 
political change in the decolonizing societies, and to the politics of political transition in 
Hong Kong in particular. Before discussing the applicability of the concept in the 
context in which this thesis is used, I shall firstly clarify the differences between 
politicization and other related concepts, like political participation, political 
mobilization and political consciousness.
Many scholars, such as Almond and Verba (1963), Milbrath (1965). Verba and 
Sydney (1972) and Verba and Nie (1972) consider politicization as the “political 
awakening and the activation of an individual in political life” 1 2and discuss the term in 
the c o n te x t . of increased political participation in modern societies, the U.S.A. in 
particular. Verba and Nie. for example, refer to political participation as “those 
activities by private citizens tha t  are more or less directly aimed at influencing the 
selection of governmental personnel and/or action they take” /  In this light, a 
politicization process can be examined in terms of two distinct but related approaches: 
(1) the individual’s psychological involvement in politics, and (2) the kind of political
1. G.A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy m  Five 
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p.12. See also H.D. Lasswell and 
A. Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); L.W. Milbrath, 
Political Participation  (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965); S. Verba and N. Nie, 
Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality  (New York: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1972); S. Verba, B. Ahmed and A. Bhatt, Caste, Race and Politics (Beverly Hills, 
California: Sage Publications, 1971); P.E. Converse, G. Dupeux, “Politicization of Electorate in 
France and the United States”, in L. Bowman and G.R. Boynton, (eds.), Political Behavior and 
Public Opinion, Comparative Analysis  (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974).
2. S. Verba and N. Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality, 
p.3.
7activity being undertaken (including affiliation to political organization and the act of 
voting). These approaches tend to focus on micro-level studies, and emphasize the 
psychological and behavioural aspect of individual’s participation in politics. 
Consequently, some of these studies focus mainly on the cognitive and affective elements 
of an individual’s state of mind and examine the socio-economic, cultural and 
institutional background to an individual’s attitude towards political participation. 
Others assess such behaviour as membership of organizations, attendance at political 
rallies, and voting as indicators of politicization at an individual’s level.
Scholars like Halper and Hartwig (1975), on the other hand, have broadened the 
application of the concept beyond the psychological and behavioural aspects, to a 
discussion of politicization at two separate levels, the individual and the societal. 
Individual politicization may be considered as a behavioural process, which involves the 
individual’s heightened consciousness or activith, or boty. Societal politicization refers to 
“an expansion of the value allocating process” and “is a process or a result of such 
process, by which social collectivities exhibit greater political conflict and enlarged 
public sectors.” 0 Thus societal politicization can be assessed by the relationship between 
the size of the public realm and the level of political conflict. Halper and Hartwig 
consider tha t  societal politicization may initially begin with the individual’s heightened 
consciousness, but they contend that “though individuals can and do participate in the 
process, it is the societal and not the individual perspective that is central.”3 4 5 Similarly, 
Rogers (1975) defines politicization as “the process of becoming involved in politics” , but 
in fact, regards it as a change in the nature of the process of allocating resources in 
society. Rogers explains in his words that:
politicization expands the political elite and broadens the stra tum  of the 
population whose opinions and expectations cannot be ignored by those in 
power. It multiplies demands for government services, which in turn generate 
pressures to increase governmental capabilities. Further, while it may intensify 
interest in local needs, it usually leads to a shift in concern from local to 
regional or national issues.^
In this thesis, I shall refer to politicization as a societal phenomenon, which 
explains the dynamic relations between increased political participation and the 
evolution of the political systems. Politicization can be explained by the growth of the 
functions of the state coupled with the heightening of political consciousness in a 
significant sector of the population who become aware of the relevance of the
3. T. Halper and R. Hartwig, “Politics and Politicization: An Exercise in Definitional Bridge- 
Building” , Political Studies, 23 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p.77.
4. Ibid., p.72.
5. Marvin L. Rogers, “The Politicization of Malay Villagers” , Comparative Politics 7(2) 
(January 1975), p.209.
8government’s activities to their private life. By recognizing the possibility of influencing 
the processes of decision-making, this group of people become involved more actively in 
various kinds of political activities. Thus politicization is itself a process in the course of 
which an increasing number and variety of problems in society become part of the arena 
of political conflict. In other words, former socio-economic and administrative issues are 
now ‘made more political’, thereby contributing significantly to an expansion in the 
extent of political activity and even of political struggle. One major feature of 
politicization has been an increase in the number of people who have no prior experience 
in political participation being brought into political life, either inside the established 
framework of the political system (such as through elections), or outside it (for example, 
through political campaigns and mass protests or even participation in clandestine or 
outlawed organizations).^ Such participation, in its more active forms, can also have the 
effect of altering the processes of interest articulation, or even the distribution of 
political and economic resources in society, if it is strong enough to compel governments 
to accommodate their policies to the group pressures involved.
In this light, politicization can be understood as a consequence of the change in the 
public’s perceptions of the possibility of influencing the government’s decision-making 
processes. Such perceptions could have two opposing effects on the politicization process, 
and indeed the stability of the political system. In the first instance, political decisions 
are increasingly accepted by the citizens as binding, and so politicization leads to more 
political stability. In the second instance, the governmental powers are seen to be 
increasingly ineffective and illegitimate. More people seek to acquire political power, 
with the public sector now becoming the focus of political conflict. In this situation, the 
deeper and broader the level of political conflict, the more politicized the society.
Studies on societal politicization, and theories of the modernizing and developing 
societies in particular, have often been much concerned about the consequences of rapid 
politicization on political and social stability. Scholars like Deutsch (1961) and 
Huntington (1968) have suggested tha t  rapid social and economic development may 
facilitate the process of social and political mobilization which in turn can generate new 
demands for political participation. Thus the degree of politicization and political 
stability is closely related to the pace of political and social mobilization. Indeed, 
politicization in developing areas is often discussed in the context of mass mobilization 
of low-income people. In his study of the poblador in Cuba, Goldrich uses the example of 
mass protest against the policies of the state in suggesting tha t  urban policy measures, 
such as the provision of low-cost housing, stimulate a widespread perception of the
6. Examples of the clandestine or outlawed organizations are the Narodiks and Bolsheviks in 
Tsarist Russia, to some extent African National Congress or Solidarity in contemporary Poland 
(although not officially banned).
9personal relevance to the poor people of a government’s actions as they affect them. 
These people become involved in political organizations in a situation of acute needs, so 
tha t  they are mobilized to resist or modify the government’s policies under a common 
cause of action.^
Deutsch discusses mobilization in the context of social and economic moder­
nization, and identifies the key indicators - expansion of literacy, per capita income,
o
communications and voting - as the agents of social mobilization.0 Social mobilization 
has an important impact on the politicization process, since it generates pressures for an 
expansion of governmental services. Huntington has elaborated on this theme, 
expounding the view that  traditional political institutions were incapable of channelling 
increased participation, so tha t  rapid mobilization and politicization in pre-modernized 
societies was likely to bring about political instability. His notion of a ‘praetorian 
society’, for example, characterizes the outcome of an extremely politicized and unstable 
situation, wherein none of the traditionally accepted political authorities are capable of 
resolving social and political conflicts.
Deutsch and Huntington are in fact discussing social and political mobilization as 
an almost inevitable consequence of modernization, since more and more people are 
becoming aware of the possibility of access to those participatory channels which could 
provide effective influence upon the decision-making processes. In many situations, 
however, modernizing elites have seen the need to mobilize the collective efforts of the 
masses to achieve various kinds of political, social and economic development; hence 
they have regarded the process of mass politicization as an instrument of political 
mobilization. In his study of the Indian political system in the 1960s, Field (1980) uses 
the term politicization to refer to an orderly process of mobilization of the electorate 
within the framework of an essentially non-revolutionary form of political in­
stitutionalization. During this process, ordinary citizens were deliberately encouraged to 
involve themselves in political activities in order to strengthen the operation of a 
competitive party system.7 89 In other words. Field sees political institutionallization here 
as an important factor in maintaining long-term political stability, suggesting that 
politicization of the electorate and channellization of social and political conflicts into
7. D. Goldrich, “Political Organization and the Politicization of the Poblador” , Com para tive  
Polit ical Studies  3(2) (July 1970). He also emphasizes the role of the political organizations 
insofar as it enables individuals to withstand any political sanctions imposed by the government, 
and hence sustain a high level of politicization.
8. K.VV. Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development” , The Am erican  Political  
Science Review  L V (3)  (September 1961), p.494, defines social mobilization as “the process in 
which major cluster of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken 
and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior.”
9. J.O. Field, C onso lida tin g  Democracy  - Polit icization  and P ar t isan sh ip  in  Jndia (New 
Delhi: Manohar, 1980).
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regular party structures would help to consolidate the still unsettled political system. 
This particular set of circumstances, however, was one in which the process of 
politicization was almost deliberately planned and developed by the modernizing elites in 
India in order to facilitate political and social development.
A mobilization system, however, represents another situation within which 
extreme politicization is manifest, with the national elites consciously mobilizing 
individual citizens to support the cause of modernization in a highly fluid and unstable 
political environment. Yet such mobilization systems are different from praetorian 
societies in tha t  the former are often under the leadership of a single charismatic 
personality who is capable of appealing to the mass bulk of the population for some kind 
of irrational political support. Apter explains that in a mobilization system
authority derives from the mobilized public, as embodied in some particular 
instrumentality of the state, such as the single party or the army, within which 
the functions of government center on a single political leader. If a mobilization 
system has hierarchical authority and a high degree of consummatory values, 
each act acquires a sacred significance. More important, the goals of the leaders 
come to be endowed with these consummatory values. The effects are the 
stimulation of the population to great efforts, the development of their 
creativity and sense of excitement, and the liberation and ennoblement of 
individuals . 10
Under these conditions, as Apter describes it, extensive political conflicts in society are 
deliberately broadened by the political leaders who seek to stimulate mass participation 
by nation-wide political campaigns. These leaders often call for the drastic restructuring 
of the existing socio-political system, with the objective of establishing a more 
egalitarian society. A dominant political party becomes an important agent, serving to 
activate the participation of every individual citizen in order to facilitate the 
implementation of central policies. Indeed, many other extreme cases of mobilization 
(including revolutionary and totalitarian systems, notably communist) also develop in 
cases where a small and authoritarian group of leaders have been able to utilize 
techniques of mass mobilization to serve their own objectives by strengthening the power 
of government vis-a-vis other groups in society.
The discussion above suggests that different levels of societal politicization could 
perhaps be explained in terms of varying degrees of political and social mobilization, 
which may be either unplanned or planned, unintentional or intentional, spontaneous or 
deliberate. Mobilization can be both a cause and a consequence of the politicization 
process, and will sometimes even constitute part of that process. In this study, the 
author will be using the term mobilization to refer to a process of “forming crowds,
10. D A. Apter, The Politics o f  Modernization  (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1965), 
p.379.
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groups, associations and organizations for the pursuit of collective goals” .11 I consider 
tha t  in almost all situations of politicization, the political actors (or political leaders) are 
inclined to become involved in varying degrees of political mobilization in order to gain 
popular support for the achievement of certain political goals, or in order to act against 
certain actions tha t  they perceive as a threat to their interests. The level of
politicization, and hence the degree of political stability in a society, will vary from one 
situation to another, but will generally depend on the particular combination of factors 
under which the process operates. Amongst these factors will be: (1) the nature of the 
international and domestic socio-political environment (such as revolutions and wars) in 
which any particular political movement has developed;12 (2) the response of the 
governing elite (e.g. political repression, political reforms, or deliberate mobilization of 
the masses) towards increased participation;1  ^ (3) the types of demand and nature of the 
political activity undertaken by the new participants (including riots, demonstrations, 
strikes, petitions and protests); and (4) timing.
The term ‘politicization’ is to be applied to explain the dynamics of political 
change in the decolonizing societies and to the politics of transition in Hong Kong in 
particular. As discussed in the above, the term ‘politicization’ is closely related to 
several other concepts, namely ‘political participation’ and ‘mobilization'. In this thesis, 
politicization is referred to as a societal phenomenon which can be understood as a 
consequence of the change in the public’s perception of the possibility of influencing the 
government’s decision-making processes through political actions of various kinds (as 
distinct from political passivity). Increasing political participation is a major feature of 
the politicization process, generally involving an increase in the number of people who 
become involved more actively in politics than they previously did; but the forms of 
participation may differ from demonstrating, rioting, or rebelling to voting in different 
political systems. Hence there are conceivably increasing numbers and varieties of issues 
which are becoming the arena of political conflict. Thus increased political participation 
is a major phenomenon in the entire process of politicization.
11. A. Oberschall, Social Conf lic t  and Social Movements  (N.J.: Englewood Cliffs, 1973),
p.102. For a sociological analysis of the concept, see also J.P. Nettl, Poli t ical  Mobil izat ion:  A 
Sociological Analys i s  o f  Methods  and Concepts  (London: Faber <V Faber, 1967), A. Etzioni, 
“Mobilization as a Macrosociological Conception” , Brit ish Journal  o f  Sociology.  19 (September 
1968), pp.243-253. J.R. Mathiason and J.I). Powell. “Participation and Efficacy: Aspects of 
Peasant Involvement in Political Movement” , Comparat ive Polit ics,  4 (April 1972), pp.303-330.
12. See S.Huntington, Polit ical  Order in Changing Societies  (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1968), who explains different kinds of political situations in which a high level of mobiliza­
tion and politicization develops.
13. See M. Weiner, “Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process” , in L. Binder, J.S. 
Coleman, J. La Palombara, L.W. Pye, S. Verba, M. Weiner (eds), Crises  and Sequences in 
Polit ical  Development  (N.J.: Princeton Univeristy Press, 1971), pp.192-204, who explains dif­
ferent types of elite responses towards increased participation.
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Different levels of politicization occur in different societies, which can be explained 
in the context of varying degrees of political and social mobilization. Sometimes, the 
concepts of ‘politicization1 and ‘mobilization1 may be used interchangeably. Indeed, a 
highly politicized society is often accompanied with a high level of social and political 
mobilization, as in the situation of domestic wars and revolutions, but ‘mass 
mobilization1 or even mobilization of support by a political party is only one form of the 
more general phenomenon of politicization of a society.
One obvious phenomenon is that many cases of rapid politicization, particularly 
when they occur in highly turbulent and revolutionary environments, have very often 
been followed by abrupt depoliticization, such as military suppression or authoritarian 
control. In such circumstances, leaders of the communist, populist, or totalitarian 
systems quickly switch from being radical supporters of social revolutions to become 
authoritarian and conservative elites who often prove to be highly intolerant of political 
dissent.
DEPOLITICIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION
The concepts ‘depoliticization1 and ‘demobilization1, which may briefly be defined 
as reversals of the politicization and mobilization processes, have rarely been discussed 
as separate theoretical topics. In his study of the politicization of the Latin American 
societies. Goldrich shows that the politicization process has bv no means been 
irreversible, especially when extreme coercion has been used to deactiviate and 
depoliticize the society thoroughly.14 Similarly, in his study of political demobilization 
in Chile between 1973-78, Remmer (1980) urges us to pay attention to the study of 
regime consolidation as a dynamic process which involves “changes in the pre-existing 
levels of political organization, activity or consciousness11.1 °  According to Remmer, 
demobilization can be defined as “the process through which subordinate groups lose 
their capacity to pursue collective goals’1. 0 In Chile, political demobilization was 
characterized by high levels of coercion and political repression as well as the closure of 
the existing channels for the expression of popular demands and interests, the result 
being a thorough-going process of depoliticization after the highly politicized Allende 
regime, and the deactivation of the majority of the citizens in political life.
Both Goldrich and Remmer discuss depoliticization and demobilization in the
14. D. Goldrich, “Towards the Comparative Study of Politicization in Latin America”, in D.B. 
Heath and R.N. Adams (eds), Contemporary Culture and Societies of Latin America (New 
York: Random House, Inc., 1965), p.363.
15. K.L. Remmer, “Political Demobilization in Chile, 1973-78”, Comparative Politics, 12(3) 
(April 1980), p.277.
16. Ibid., p.276.
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context of extreme political suppression or imposition of authoritarian control, under 
which the channels for political participation are deliberately closed. There have been 
cases where depoliticization and even political demobilization have been brought about 
with rather little repression or coercion, most notably in situations where authoritarian 
rulers have been able to buy off opposing groups with funds or jobs, or play off one 
group against another, thereby stymying them into immobility (A taturk’s Turkey, 
Nigeria, and even New Order Indonesia may be examples of this), but the element of 
authoritarian control is usually crucial. If we consider whether depoliticization and 
demobilization can occur in any other circumstances - for example, as a ‘natural’ or 
spontaneous process without any great degree of repression or coercion - we must 
probably conclude tha t  while something of that kind may be at least theoretically 
possible, it is in fact so unlikely as to be almost inconceivable.
Indeed, depoliticization and demobilization very often occur in those situations 
where opportunities for political participation become increasingly limited. Either people 
are repressed and intimidated, or they become cynical about the possibility of exercising 
effective political influence over the decision-making processes. The result is that more 
and more people are disillusioned with political participation. A depoliticization process 
is marked by a withdrawal of the significant segment of the population from political 
life, either sharply or gradually, over a period of time. A depoliticized society is 
characterized by very little public participation in the political system, and hence very 
often associated with authoritarian or coercive political systems.
In some situations, significant groups of people in society may become increasingly 
dissatisfied with the lack of participatory channels and become involved in various kinds 
of clandestine and outlawed political organizations, such as Marcos’ Philippines and 
South Korea in the 1980s. Either the authoritarian leaders are capable of suppressing 
resistances or they open up some channels for limited participation. 1 believe that these 
recurring processes of politicization and depoliticization could also be applied fairly 
satisfactorily to discuss the dynamics of political change in decolonizing societies and in 
the period immediately after national independence. I also consider tha t  many 
decolonizing societies have passed through different levels of politicization (even 
depoliticization in some situations) at different stages of the decolonization process, 
although each of them was confronted with particular socio-political problems. In the 
following section, I would like to examine the politics of decolonizing societies in terms of 
various politicization-depoliticization processes, giving special attention to four factors - 
the international and domestic environment; the response of the colonial authorities; the 
kind of activity undertaken, and timing.
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THE POLITICS OF DECOLONIZATION: PR O C ESSES  
OF POLITICIZATION A N D  DEPOLITICIZATION
Tiie mass of the population in most colonial societies used to be considered as 
basically rather non-political in character because the colonial governments tended to 
discourage political activity, and provided limited, if any, channels for formal 
participation in the administration. During the course of decolonization, nationalist 
leaders often came to demand increasingly greater opportunities for public participation 
in the political system. Hence, they emerged as prominent political actors either through 
whatever channels were opened up by the colonial administration, or through radical, 
sometimes revolutionary political movements. One of the clearest examples of this was 
the Congress Party  in India. Another was the emergence of United Malay National 
Organization (UMNO) in 1946 as a Malay nationalist organization in response to the 
perceived threat from the Malay Union proposal in 1945-46. In both situations, colonial 
societies became politicized with different scales at various stages of the processes of 
decolonization, either by some form of mass electoral campaign or by nationalist 
mobilization. Yet nationalist leaders of both countries w-ere able to generate a certain 
level of popular support, thus exerting strong pressure on the colonial government to 
concede political power to indigenous hands. During the course of decolonization, many 
issues, such as religion, race, language, or education, became the focus of public debates, 
and even the arena of political conflict. Many people, lower-income employees, labourers 
and peasants in particular, who had never been part of national politics in the colonial 
system, were now brought into the political processes and became major supporters of 
the nationalist movements.
Since nearly all of the decolonization processes we are discussing here occurred in 
the course of the first two decades after World War II, they operated in a highly 
unstable international and domestic environment, and passed through different levels of 
politicization and mobilization, ranging from little or no popular participation at all in 
some cases to the orderly involvement of ordinary citizens in participation in national 
political life in others, and in several extreme cases to large-scale mass mobilization, as 
in situations of intensive political struggle and revolutionary wars such as in Vietnam 
and Indonesia. The degree of politicization and political instability varied in individual 
situations, depending on the response of the colonial rulers and the nature of the 
nationalist movements. One feature that is observable in the case of several countries 
which reached extremely high levels of nationalist mobilization was th a t  their societies 
were very quickly and substantially depoliticized after some time or soon after 
independence by some form of authoritarian control or political repression. The transfer 
of power in Ghana between the 1940s and 1960s represented a classic example which 
oscillated between the two extremes of politicization and depoliticization in the period 
immediately before and after independence.
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In the case of Ghana, economic and unemployment problems stimulated the 
political consciousness of the people of the colony then know as the Gold Coast in the 
postwar period. Various political organizations, which developed in the 1940s, the 
Convention People’s Party  (CPP) in particular, emerged out of a situation of social and 
economic dislocation as significant vehicles for expressing popular discontents. In 1950, a 
representative system was first established, which provided for representatives in the 
Legislative Council. In the first general election for the Legislative Council in 1951, 
many candidates were, in Apter’s words, ^moderate in outlook and had little or no 
popular appeal and carried on virtually no campaigning” .1' But the first elections 
proved to have great impact on the political development of Gold Coast society, since 
the elections provided greater opportunities for the new groups to get themselves 
organized and participated in various political activity. More significantly, the CPP 
stood out as constituting the most well organized mass party at tha t  time and, as a 
result, formed the majority government. The position of the CPP, which was formerly 
regarded by the British colonial authorities as radical and irresponsible, came to be 
legitimized as a- political actor by the electoral process. Subsequently, the newly elected 
legislature became highly politicized, especially when it found itself overwhelmed by 
disputes over various transitional isues, in particular regarding the representation of 
various traditional and specific interests; namely, the territorial groups, the chiefs and 
the economic groups. But under the charismatic leadership of Nkrumah and his CPP, all 
these traditional and specific representatives suffered a gradual eclipse of their dominant 
position in the election process, and by the time of independence in 1957, these 
representatives of traditional authority were simply abolished in the legislature of 
Ghana.
Political instability soon became endemic, however, in post-independence Ghana. 
Its causes, according to Apter’s analysis, wrere the removal of the chiefs from the 
legislature without providing them with any symbolic role in, for example, an upper 
house; for this simply drove the chieftaincy to join forces with other opposition groups in 
the National Liberation Movement tha t  soon threatened civil w'ar and secession of the 
North and the Ashanti area. In order to consolidate his political power, Nkrumah 
consciously socialized the masses of the populace on the basis of political programmes 
that were indistinguishable from sheer indoctrination into a new political ideology, 
propagated by the organs of the C P P , the trade unions and the youth movement. One 
result of this was th a t  almost every aspect of an individual’s private life, including 
marriage, traditions, churches, schools and universities, came to be in some degree 
politicized. But as Nkrumah’s political control increased, the political system
17. D.A. Apter, Ghana in Transition (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p.200.
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degenerated into a form of totalitarian autocracy under which political opposition was 
suppressed. The society of Ghana could be considered as thoroughly demobilized and 
depoliticized when opposition groups were not allowed to take effective actions against 
the government and the ordinary people were intimidated from expressing their own 
political views a t  all.
G hana’s decolonization represents an extreme case of politicization and 
depoliticization, but it illustrates one set of conditions in which the politicization- 
depoliticization processes may evolve. The following section will focus on the different 
levels of politicization observable in various South and Southeast Asian countries, with a 
view to illustrating some of the various patterns of decolonization discernible there. 
Special attention will be paid to the circumstances under which various political 
movements emerged - both anti-colonial or pro-colonial - and the interactions between 
those political groups and the colonial authorities at different stages of the 
decolonization processes.
THE POLITICS OF DECOLONIZATION  
IN SOUTH A N D  SO U TH EA ST ASIA
The declaration of independence by Soekarno in Indonesia and Ho Chi Minh in 
Vietnam in August 1945 marked the beginning of two decades of decolonization in South 
and Southeast Asia. But it was the Philippines (1946) and India, Pakistan and Ceylon 
(1947) and Burma (1948) that were the first Asian countries to a tta in  independence 
from America and Britain respectively. In these five cases, power was transferred from 
the ex-colonial authorities to the indigenous nationalist leaders without serious military 
conflict, although political tensions existed there both before and after independence. In 
Indonesia (1949) and Vietnam (1954), however, independence was won only after periods 
of bitter armed struggle against the ex-colonial powers.
The patterns of decolonization in Asia can be characterized by either peaceful or 
violent processes of transition. Bastin and Benda, for example, have proposed a useful 
classification of two types of decolonization processes in Southeast Asia. Those countries 
which won independence through violent and revolutionary means, such as Indonesia. 
Vietnam and Burma (where the violence was directed against the Japanese rather than 
the British except as a latent threat to the latter), were led by what Bastin and Benda 
call ‘revolutionary intelligentsias’, i.e. leaders “who had started to move from peripheral 
and in the main oppositional places in the colonial times towards the centre of political 
power during the Japanese occupation.” Other countries, like Malaysia and the 
Philippines, which attained independence peacefully were characterized by a high degree 
of ‘elite continuity’, meaning that immediately after independence, “political power 
came to be wielded by groups which had already well been established and socially
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IRprominent before 1942” .10 Whereas the ‘established elite1 in these countries inherited the 
social order established in colonial times and tended toward social and political 
conservatism, the ‘intelligentsia leaders’ in the former group of countries had to cope 
with a legacy of social disruption and were more inclined to espouse radical or ‘populist1 
courses.
The categorization of decolonization into peaceful and revolutionary patterns, 
however, tends to over-generalize the differing levels of social order and political stability 
in individual cases. Bastin and Benda say little about the process of peaceful 
decolonization in those countries like Singapore where power was transferred to leaders 
who only emerged after World War II; yet Singapore society also experienced a period of 
acute civil disobedience and political instability in the 1950s. We can see more clearly 
today that almost all South and Southeast Asian countries experienced varying degrees 
of politicization after World War II. In some situations, the Japanese occupation had 
itself provided an opportunity for the nationalist leaders to build up effective popular 
support and military forces after the drastic departure of the colonial authorities. In the 
case of Indonesia, the Japanese-created BETA later came to constitute part of the 
nucleus of the Indonesian republican army which was subsequently engaged in sporadic 
fighting against the Dutch colonial forces, while the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom 
League (AFPFL) became a nationalist front opposing the British in Burma; likewise, Ho 
Chill Minh was able to use the opportunities created by World War II to develop a 
military base in Northern Tonkin before he seized power in 1945. After the successes of 
the Russian and Chinese revolutions in 1917 and 1949 respectively, many nationalist 
movements, such as those in Vietnam, were greatly influenced by the revolutionary 
social theories and techniques of Marxism and, later. Maoism. The diverse levels of 
social and economic dislocation which occurred in the various Southeast Asian countries 
during and immediately after the war created conditions in which mass mobilization of 
hostility to colonial governments was easily achieved in some cases. Virtually, all the 
instances of power transfer we investigate in South and Southeast Asia turn out to have 
occurred in an unstable international and domestic environment. The varying degrees of 
politicization and political mobilization that characterized the differing patterns of 
decolonization during this period can be seen, with hindsight, to have been significant 
variables affecting the early success or failure of the newly independent regimes.
The Philippines was the first Asian country to be granted independence. The 
transfer of power there was smooth, peaceful and straight-forward. Nevertheless, politics 
in the Philippines have undergone different stages of politicization and depoliticization
18. J. Bastin and H.J. Benda, A History of Modern Southeast Asia (Sydney: Prentice-Hall, 
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during the course of the last eighty years. As early as 1898, almost the entire population 
had been highly politicized when its people were mobilized to fight against, first, the 
Spanish, and then, the American colonial regimes. Under American rule, a two-party 
system was developed and in 1935 a ten-year transition to ultimate independence was 
promised, an experience which created a strong commitment to constitutionalism that 
has become one of the most striking political characteristics of Filipino leaders since well 
before World War II. This has meant tha t  unlike most other colonial societies, the 
colony of the Philippines was much more oriented towards political participation from 
the outset. It experienced a high degree of initial political stability because the national 
leaders, regardless of their political affiliations, came from a fairly homogeneous class - 
the ilustrados  and the local landlords - whose fortunes were closely tied to American 
economic and political interests. Even while the two parties - the Nacionalista and the 
Federalista - condemned each other for being pro-American, they were both loyal to the 
Americans, believing tha t  political power would eventually be transferred to the 
Filipinos. Political reforms continued during the decades of American tutelage so that 
even by 1935, the Philippines had already acquired a high degree of self-government 
under an indigenous president. There were no fundamental disruptions in the basic 
power structure in the Philippines society prior to or during the Japanese war. As a 
result, the republican system was restored immediately after the war, with Roxas being 
elected as the first president of the Philippine Republic.
Thus we can say th a t  the history of the Philippines’ decolonization was marked by 
various forms of politicization, ranging from a nationalist war in 1898-1902, to a more 
orderly evolution of a two-party system, which finally led, after the turbulent phase of 
Japanese occupation, to a peaceful transfer of power. Nevertheless, political conflict 
broke out immediately after independence over the intertwined issues of collaboration 
with the Japanese agrarian relations, economic structure, and the Philippine’s still 
semi-colonial relationship with the Americans. The transfer of power was superficially 
peaceful, but communist influence rapidly infiltrated among the poorer, more dislocated 
peasants, giving rise to the Hukbalahap rebellion of 1947-54. The student movements of 
the 1960s also gave rise to another nationalist and anti-colonialist upsurge which was 
expressed in the form of anti-Americanism and opposition to neo-colonialism, thereby 
sustaining a high level of nationalist sentiment and mass support for radical movements 
in the two decades after independence, which later found new expression in the New 
People’s Army’s resort to guerilla warfare against the Marcos regime in the 1970s.
The transfer of power in India was also a smooth one, in which almost no armed 
conflict occurred between the Indian nationalists and the British colonial authorities. 
Like the Philippines, the power transfer in India was also a very long process 
characterized by differing levels of mass politicization. Indian nationalism could be dated
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back to the Hindu revivalist movement in the mid nineteenth century and the creation 
of the Congress Party in the 1880s. The partition of Bengal in 1905 led to civil 
disobedience, giving rise to demands for self-government from the anglicized elite at the 
Indian National Congress in 1909. During the period 1917 to 1937, the British colonial 
authorities responded to the nationalist movement by gradually extending the franchise 
and conceding ministerial responsibility in the provincial legislatures. The principle of 
direct elections was introduced to the legislatures in 1919, and although only 3% (7 
million) of the population were enfranchised, the change did mark the beginning of mass 
electoral politics, because the political leaders were now required to appeal to the vast 
mass of voters in order to gain support for their effective participation in the political 
process.
With the emergence of Gandhi, the nationalist movement became transformed 
from an essentially middle-class group of politicians into a much broader mass 
movement relying on a strategy of mass mobilization. Other key national leaders, such 
as Vallabhbhai Patel and the Nehrus, were English-educated professionals. And it was 
this group of what Jeffrey called the “wealthy peasants - not the great aristocratic 
landlords - (who) had come to a key position in the Congress Party  and ultimately in 
the post-independence government.” *  ^ By resolving upon the tactic of non-co-operation, 
these national leaders were able to mobilize huge masses of the peasantry from time to 
time as their source of electoral support, with the campaigns against the payment of salt 
tax and land revenue in the 1930s leading to civil disobedience and social chaos. Yet, the 
Congress Party was also closely linked to the industrialists, businessmen and the small 
and middle landlords, as well as the peasant masses.
During World War 11, India was not directly attacked by the Japanese, but the 
nationalist movement was able to exploit the emergency situation to gain momentum 
and leverage against the British, who now had to negotiate with the nationalist leaders 
for Indian military support in the Asia-Pacific. Thus by the end of the war, the 
nationalist leaders who were emerging in the 1930s and 1940s had already secured a 
leadership position in India which they continued to exercise throughout the almost first 
twenty years of independence without serious challenge. But the predominant problem in 
India was that because of the prolonged period of mass mobilization, religious rivalries 
were intensified, thus making the partition of Pakistan almost unavoidable at the time 
of independence in 1946-47.
The Indian example illustrates a pattern of politicization in which the masses were 
mobilized by the national leaders in order to help them gain legitimacy and support in
19. R. Jeffrey, (ed.), Asia  - The Win ning  o f  Independence (London: MacMillan Press, 1981), 
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both the electoral politics of the late colonial era as well as in the various campaigns to 
win concessions from the British. Although there was nothing like a nationalist war of 
independence, uneasy relations persisted between the national leaders and the British 
colonial authorities throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. While the 
common goal of independence served as a stimulant to political consciousness, religious 
and ethnic differences among the Indians themselves became an important factor which 
sustained a high level of mass politicization throughout the society well into the 
post-independence era.
Burma also attained independence from Britain in 1948, following closely in the 
footsteps of India. Yet Burm a’s experience of decolonization and of mass mobilization 
proved to be completely different from that of India. Before the war, politics in Burma 
was characteristically colonial, being dominated by pro-British commercial interests and 
with a limited level of self-government. Burmese nationalism emerged out of the student 
movement in the 1930s, but it was able to develop only during the Japanese war. The 
Burmese case typifies what Bastin and Benda describe as a situation where the old 
pro-colonial indigenous leaders were replaced by socio-revolutionary nationalists during 
the Japanese occupation. Albertini also argues that the Japanese occupation of 
Southeast Asia fundamentally altered the situation within Burma.
British prestige had suffered and the colonial administration was temporarily
out of action. There had been a political, social and psychological landslide;
Japanese rule had produced an entirely new class of nationalists who
established themselves as the legitimate representatives of the Burmese people.
9 0Their claim had to be taken seriously in 1945/
As the colonial power collapsed, the young revolutionaries gained enough popular 
support, including military power (through the AFPFL), to enable them to face the 
returning colonial forces with a strong nationalist organization demanding immediate 
independence. In order to re-establish their residual influence there, the colonial 
authorities had to come to terms with the new nationalist leaders, despite continued 
tensions and mutual distrust. Thus Burma finally attained independence without actual 
conflict with the British but under the leadership of the revolutionary leaders whose 
power was based on the military force and political support of the AFPFL.
Nevertheless, the a ttitude  of other imperial powers in other parts of Asia was quite 
different from that of Britain in India and Burma. Whereas the British did take notice of 
the nationalist movements spreading elsewhere throughout Asia before and during the 
war, the French in Indochina and the Dutch in Indonesia were, on the contrary, seeking 
to re-establish their old colonial regimes which they hoped could subsequently be
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maintained more or less indefinitely with only limited concession to nationalist 
sentiments.
In Indonesia, as in Burma, a group of nationalist leaders emerged into prominence 
during the Japanese occupation. Various Indonesian nationalist movements, including 
the Islamic groups, the Marxist groups, and the student groups which developed since 
the 1920s had been suppressed by the Dutch colonial administration. Although the 
nationalists were not yet fully united among themselves, these sporadic movements 
paved the way for the emergence of mass-based nationalist organizations during the 
Japanese occupation. The Japanese promised ultimate independence for Indonesia and 
under their encouragement, the quasi-military organization, PETA, was organized, 
which inculcated a radical and an anti-Western political attitude. But the Japanese 
occupation did give a chance for the nationalist leaders to organize the masses, as Feith 
argues that
it was through the leaders who co-operated with the Japanese tha t  Indonesian 
nationalism was given its strongest stimulus. The Japanese authorities made 
possible an unprecedented degree of organizational contact between the urban 
national leaders who worked with them and the mass of the village 
population.
When Soekarno and H atta  proclaimed independence in 1945, they were supported by 
almost all political groups, including the anti-Japanese underground societies. But the 
Republican government was not a stable one because it had to fight against the Dutch 
intermittently between 1946-49 and simultaneously established its authority in all parts 
of the country at a time when a virtual power vacuum existed in many regions. After 
independence was finally conceded by the Dutch in 1949. the various coalition 
governments of the 1950s continued to be seriously divided by internal conflicts between 
the various parties - and even between different factions inside each party - the result 
being frequent changes of cabinets between 1950 and March 1957, and the increasing 
political involvement of President Soekarno and the army in parliamentary politics. By 
the end of 1957, Indonesia was on the verge of civil war as a result of two regional 
revolts. Martial law was declared and the power of the military and the President 
increased vis-a-vis the political parties and parliament; and finally, in 1959, Soekarno 
proclaimed a new regime of ‘guided democracy’ as a means to restore national unity and 
social stability.
The situation in Indochina was similar to that of Indonesia in tha t  nationalist 
movements before the war could only survive in the form of underground activities. But
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the position of the Viet Minh, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, was both 
anti-French and anti-Japanese. Putting aside agrarian reform and class struggle, the 
Viet Minh stressed national liberation during the Japanese occupation, thus prompting 
itself to concentrate on expanding mass support and military organization. Yet when Ho 
Chi Minh proclaimed independence in 1945, the nationalist government was far from 
united because the Viet Minh was unable to bring various factions of the anti-colonial 
resistances, especially those in the south, under its leadership, and so it was unable to 
mobilize a  united front against the French. After negotiations between the Indochinese 
Communist Party  and the French collapsed in 1946, the French resorted to force to 
crush the independence movement and they formed a new puppet government under the 
ex-emperor Bao Dai in 1949. Whereas Bao Dai’s position depended entirely on French 
military support, Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh followers were able to maintain a 
position in the north by unifying various sectors in society under the slogan of 
‘independence’ and ‘unity’. After seven years of guerilla warfare, the Geneva conference 
of 1954 created a short period of peace by providing for a provisional division of South 
and North Vietnam at the 17th parallel. But the truce was only temporary. The 
continued infiltration of communist guerilla influence into the south led to increasing 
American involvement in the internal affairs of Vietnam after 1955, thus giving rise to 
the second Indochinese war in the 1960s until the final victory of the communists in 
1975.
In contrast with the revolutionary nature of Indonesian and Vietnamese 
nationalism, the processes of decolonization in Malaya and Singapore were essentially 
peaceful. Yet Malayan society was also in a highly unstable condition immediately after 
World War II because the economy had been completely disrupted by the war and the 
communists, predominantly Chinese, proved remarkably effective in organizing support 
among the mainly Chinese and Indian working class. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
influence of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was confined to the Chinese working 
class, while the majority of the Malayan peasantry remained loyal to the Malayan 
sultans, greatly complicated the politics of nationalism in Malaya by making it 
impossible for the MCP to gain an exclusive claim to the mantle of nationalism or 
anti-colonialism in Malaya-Singapore, as they had been able to do in Vietnam (and 
failed to do in Indonesia). But the dramatic spread of communist influence in Malaya 
and Singapore in 1945-49 did serve to stir up political consciousness enormously in 
Malaya, especially through the various mass actions of 1946-48 and the open conflict 
against the British Military Administration (BMA) which broke out in 1948, commonly 
called ‘the Emergency’.
Khong Kim Hoong's study of the winning of Merdeka in Malaya argues that “the 
Second World War had been an agent of political consciousness and political
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activism” . Nevertheless, the nationalist movements, which did not emerge until 
1946-48, were partly brought into being by the change in British policy towards Malaya 
in the postwar years. The introduction of the new policies by the BMA after 1946 
greatly intensified the politicization of the various ethnic groups within the Malayan 
community. The proposed introduction of the Malayan Union in 1946 aroused the 
political consciousness even of conservative Malay leaders and led to the formation of 
the UMNO as an unprecedented agglomeration of aristocrats, civil servants and ordinary 
Malays. Nevertheless, the anti-Malayan Union movement organized by the UMNO was 
not, in Khong’s words, just  ‘anti-British’ because they did not demand the British 
withdrawal from Malaya; in fact it was also directed in part against the threat posed by 
the Chinese power in Malaya and Singapore in 1945-46. For at the same time, left-wing 
political parties such as the Malayan Nationalist Party  (MNP) and the Malayan 
Democratic Union (MDU), predominantly non-Malays, were starting to organize on a 
wide scale to assert demands for a more democratic form of self-government in which 
they hoped to play a leading part.
Because of Malay opposition to the Malayan Union proposal of 1945-46, the 
British authorities modified their policy and in 1948 introduced a new scheme for a 
Federation of Malaya in which the paramountcy of the Malays was clearly recognized. 
But this generated yet another anti-British movement, this time from the MCP and the 
frustrated Chinese who felt excluded from power under the new arrangements. From the 
formation in 1946 of the broadly-based anti-colonial Council of Joint Action (CJA) and 
the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action (PM CJA), to the la t te r’s coalition with the 
Pusat Tengara Rayat (PUTERA) (February 1947) and the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce (July 1947), the campaign against British plans for Malaya’s future 
facilitated the reorganization and realignment of political groups along diverse 
communal lines and very different political principles. The MNP withdrew from the 
PM CJA because a Chinese was elected as the leader. Moreover, the AMCJA-PUTERA 
grouping was more m ilitant, agitational and mass-oriented, so that their short-lived 
co-operation with the more compromising Chinese Chamber of Commerce remained an 
uneasy one. So even though a Hartal was organized in 1947 as a nation-wide campaign, 
the movement was essentially disunited, and the nature of the demands made was 
basically very moderate, so tha t  it failed to exert sufficient pressure on the British 
administration to withdraw the Federation Plan in 1948. But after this agitation, the 
communists changed tactics and incited armed revolt in 1948, thus providing a new 
source for continued mass mobilization on the basis of an anti-colonialist and
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anti-imperialist struggle, in line with the other communist uprisings of 1948 throughout 
Southeast Asia.
After 1951-52, politics in Malaya began to change as the British introduced a 
ministerial system and elections to the municipal councils. In Khong’s analysis, although 
the Constitution of 1951 remained an essentially colonial one, the introduction of the 
ministerial system did help the government to accommodate the expectations of these 
leaders with whom it wished to work. In his description
most of the Malay leaders who had led the protest movement had been 
co-opted into the government. Appointed as ‘Ministers’ or Legislative Council 
members in the Federal government, Mentri Besars or councillors in the state 
administration and various advisory boards, they have found different channels 
to articulate their interests. Demonstrations and protests, measures taken 
usually by the ‘out groups’, were no longer applicable. ... This participation 
helped them to identify with the decisions. Thus the policy did not arise 
suddenly and did not appear to be imposed from London.
The unexpected alliance between the UMNO and the MCA at the electoral level 
and their successes in the 1952 elections greatly changed the British a ttitude  towards the 
Malayan national movement. Having succeeded in the Kuala Lumpur municipal 
elections, the UMNO-MCA Alliance gathered enough momentum to demand a definite 
timetable for progress towards independence. During the 1955 federal election 
campaign, the Alliance Party  was able to co-opt the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), 
thus entering the electoral campaign as a national front which dared to stand up against 
the colonial government in demanding self-government and ultimate independence. After 
its sweeping victory in the 1955 elections, the Alliance became the leading political force 
in the nationalist movement, with Tunku Abdul Rahman emerging unrivalled as the 
first Chief Minister of Malaya.
In the 1950s, Malayan nationalism illustrated a pattern of nationalist movement in 
Southeast Asia, which was a non-communist and non-radical one, yet able to win 
support of the people generally. More importantly, the Alliance Party  was able to 
present itself as representative of a cross section of various sectors of the community, 
capable of advancing the interests of the Malay, Chinese as well as Indian groups. This 
was perhaps a major reason why the transfer of power here was so smooth. In 1957, 
independence was proclaimed in Malaya, and the Alliance Party continued to dominate 
the government immediately after independence.
While a basically moderate and non-revolutionary group of leaders came to power 
in Malaya, politics in Singapore followed a very different course of development, 
although we should recall th a t  the radical movements organized by the MCP and MDU
24. Ibid., pp. 166-167.
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in the Malayan hinterland had also been active in Singapore in the 1940s. Before 1955, 
the Constitution of Singapore was slightly more liberal than tha t  of Malaya. As early as 
1948, there had already been elections to the legislative council, but owing to the limited 
franchise, it was the narrowly-based Progressive Party (PP), representing English- 
educated professionals and businessmen, who dominated the colony’s political life. While 
the PP  aimed at co-operating with the British to work out an eventual plan for 
self-government within Malaysia, the British also expected to transfer power ultimately 
to them regarding them as able to ensure a stable system of self-government without 
upsetting the sta tus quo. But at this stage, electoral politics failed to take into account 
the significance of the division in Chinese society between the English-educated and the 
Chinese-educated, who being disenfranchised in the national elections, continued to 
agitate  a t  the grassroots level concerning the issues of education, language and 
citizenship.
The introduction of the Rendel Constitution (1953) extended the franchise to the 
majority of the Chinese-speaking labourers, and led to an intense process of 
politicization through the mass electoral campaigns. The introduction of a cabinet 
system also encouraged the formation of political parties, such as the Labour Front (LF) 
and the People’s Action Party (PAP), whose support derived largely from the 
Chinese-educated labourers, as well as a bunch of English-educated Chinese intellectuals 
at its head. As a result, the election of 1955 saw the end of those days in which members 
of the various chambers of commerce were able to dominate the Singapore 
administration. The Rendel Constitution also gave rise to the emergence of a new 
generation of more aggressive politicians pushing for immediate self-government. While 
the coalition government was negotiating with the British, the PAP gained ground on 
the basis of its broadly Socialist and anti-colonialist platform, as Mackie describes
Ever since Lee Kuan Yew and his colleagues had founded the PAP in 1954 as 
an anti-colonialist, Socialist party on the far left of the political spectrum, it 
had drawn its support mainly from the Chinese-educated working class of 
Singapore and from a handful of English-educated intellectuals attracted by its 
reputation for efficiency and honesty. According to Lee, the former group 
included under-cover Communists and open-front pro-Communists who were 
both using the PAP a t tha t  time in the common struggle against colonial rule
o r
and trying to gain control of it from the non-Communists.
By m id-1957, the influence of the pro-communist groups expanded at an unprecedented 
rate. But they suffered a severe setback from the arrest of their radical leaders by the 
Lim Yew Hock government in 1957, although the PAP moderates continued to agitate 
for the release of their colleagues, and thereby strengthened their leadership position
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within the party while also maintaining their popularity with the masses. After its 
sweeping victory in the elections of 1959, the PAP assumed office under a constitution 
which provided for a virtual internal self-government, except over the m atter  of national 
security, with an understanding tha t  complete independence for Singapore would 
probably be conceded when the constitution was reviewed again in 1963.
The PA P had long been calling for ‘independence through merger with Malaya’. 
But although the new government espoused this slogan quite vigorously in 1960, the 
Tunku was initially most reluctant to consider an immediate merger a t all, worrying 
tha t  Singapore might become a ‘Chinese Cuba’ in view of the increasing influence of the 
communists there. Politics in Singapore remained unstable and intensely politicized 
indeed between 1961 and 1963 because of the tug-of-war going on within the PAP 
between the pro-communist and the anti-communist groups for the allegiance of the 
Chinese-speaking masses, especially after 1961. The issue of a merger precipitated the 
formation of the Barisan Socialis, which left the PAP leadership with the support of only 
a small group of moderate English-educated middle-class professionals and a bare 
majority in the parliament. The position of the PAP moderates appeared to be under 
serious challenge after the PAP left wing succeeded in defeating the official PAP 
candidate in the July 1961 Anson by-election. Yet Lee Kuan Yew’s success in handling 
the campaign for a merger during the lead-up to the referendum of September 1962 had 
the effect of reviving political support for the PAP moderates and isolating the Barisan 
as an opposition force. Thus in 1963, shortly after the PAP declared ‘independence 
within Malaysia’ for Singapore, it called a snap election in which the PAP moderates 
proved overwhelmingly successful in regaining political control over the government. In 
Turnbull’s analysis, the main reason for the P A P ’s victory in the 1963 elections was that
it offered the best hope of orderly government to the business and professional 
community and had provided social and economic benefits to the middle and a 
large part of the working class. Many former right wing and moderate 
opponents now backed the PAP as the best guarantees for stability, law and 
order.26
While radical movements gained momentum almost everywhere in Southeast Asia 
in the 1950s and early 1960s, the examples of Malaya and Singapore demonstrated a 
quite distinctive pattern of decolonization in South and Southeast Asia, one in which the 
radicals eventually lost. Although there were not the same sort of radical anti-colonial 
mobilization that existed in Indonesia and Vietnam, there were substantial pressures on 
the British authorities to concede ultimate self-government. At one time, the nationalist 
movements in these two places were radicalized because of the ability of the Communists
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to take advantage of the postwar political vacuum, coupled with disturbed economic 
conditions, to infiltrate among the lower-income working classes. Although the radical 
movements failed to organize successful revolutions in Malaya and Singapore, they were 
able to activate the political consciousness of the masses in the period immediately after 
World War II. In both situations, however, the moderate and the non-revolutionary 
nationalist leaders were eventually able to command ultimate support a t  various levels 
of society. In Malaysia, peaceful transfer was made possible by the alliance of the two 
main racial parties - the UMNO and the MCA - while each of them maintained their 
own distinct sources of political support in their respective constituencies. In Singapore, 
peaceful transfer was made possible by the emergence of the PAP as the strongest 
anti-colonialist, but non-revolutionary, party. By manipulating the political power it 
wielded as it did in the case of the Singapore referendum on a merger in 1962, the PAP 
left almost no scope for its opponents to offer any convincing political alternatives, 
thereby enabling it to mobilize effective popular opinion among the predominantly 
Chinese masses in Singapore society to support the course of political independence.
What can be concluded from this account of the experiences of these South and 
Southeast Asian countries in the course of their various decolonization processes? In the 
highly unstable international environment of the first postwar decade, the processes of 
decolonization were accompanied by various degrees of mass mobilization, widespread 
politicization and considerable political disorder. World War II had caused tremendous 
disruption to the colonial political order by stirring up the political consciousness of the 
people in the colonial societies and, in some situations, providing the opportunity for the 
anti-colonial leaders to move to the centre of power and claim legitimacy before the 
colonial authorities returned after the war. Nationalism was, however, not a single 
united movement. In most countries, the goal of national independence was complicated 
by social, communal and ethnic struggles. Foreseeing the ultimate withdrawal of the 
colonial powers, various groups emerged either to protect their own vested interests or to 
protest against the domination of the imperialist governments. Because of the disunity 
among those groups themselves, the colonial powers were able in some cases to maintain 
a leadership role in the transitional period by manipulating one group against another, 
as in the case of the British in Malaya or the French in Vietnam until 1954. Some 
nationalist groups, such as the Indian Congress Party might successfully put pressure on 
the colonial administration to develop various channels for greater political 
participation, but they also had to pay attention to their counterparts, who might 
become allies or opponents to each other, the result being the intensification of internal 
rivalries. After independence, the Indian, as well as the Philippines and Indonesian 
governments, continued to be confronted with the problems of political conflict and
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political struggles from within. But while some of these post-colonial societies continued 
to suffer from a high level of politicization, others came to be ultimately depoliticized in 
various degrees after the authoritarian governments arose, as in Burma after 1960, 
Indonesia after 1965 and the Philippines after 1972.
In the Indonesian situation, for example, military government became a solution to 
societal chaos, the result being authoritarianism and political control. In the case of 
Singapore, the country remained stable after independence and tha t  stability was 
maintained by the ability of the PAP to legitimize its rule through administrative 
efficiency. While the PAP established the Citizens Consultative Committees at the 
community level in order to promote more effective communications with the people a t  
the grassroots level, it also carried out a whole series of suppressive measures against the 
opposition, the result being th a t  all political activities which were not organized by the 
PA P  were very strictly limited. W hat eventuated was tha t  many of those Southeast 
Asian societies which had once experienced a high level of mass mobilization, had to be 
depoliticized after independence either by the emergence of an authoritarian government 
or a semi-authoritarian regime. It was those same nationalist leaders, as in the cases of 
Singapore and Indonesia, who had once emerged from the mass movements, but who 
later came to perceive politicization as a threat to their own political power, as well as 
to the stability and economic growth of the countries. So they took steps to suppress 
protest and to depoliticize the society as effectively as they could.
H O N G  K O N G ’S POLITICAL TRANSITIO N
To what extent could the experiences of other decolonizing societies be applied to 
an analysis of the political transition of Hong Kong that  began in 1984-85? On the basis 
of my research on this topic, 1 believe that the dynamics of the political transition tha t  
s tar ted  in Hong Kong in 1984-85 can be usefully compared in general terms with the 
initial stages of the decolonization process in some other ex-British colonies. The 
introduction of various kinds of local councils and legislatures in the British colonies has 
traditionally been the first of several steps along the path towards a more representative 
form of self-government. In India, elections were introduced for the municipal councils as 
early as the 1880s. In Ghana, representative government was planned soon after World 
W ar II. with the first general elections to the Legislative Council being held in 1951. 
Similarly, elections to the municipal and legislative councils were introduced well before 
independence in Singapore and Malaya, in 1948 and in 1951 respectively.
Initially, many of these elections were held with a very limited franchise and the 
elected bodies were given very limited legislative and executive powers, with the final 
responsibility for policy-making still resting with the Governor. Many of the candidates 
running in those earliest elections were not very experienced at organizing mass electoral
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campaigns. In the case of Ghana, most of the candidates in the elections of 1951 were 
described by Apter as ‘moderate independents’ who carried out virtually no campaigning 
a t  all. In the case of the critically important Kuala Lumpur municipal elections in 
Malaya in 1952, in which UMNO and the MCA formed into the ‘Alliance’, Khoong Kim 
Hoong has found tha t  most of the campaigning was centred almost entirely on local 
issues and on the personalities of the candidates themselves, with the discussion of major 
national issues being played down. One phenomenon th a t  could be almost universally 
observed, however, as a consequence of enhanced public representation in the political 
process, was tha t  those groups which were better organized for electoral campaigns, such 
as the C PP in Ghana (1951) and the Alliance Party in Malaya (1952) or the PAP in 
Singapore, were able to take advantage of the introduction of elections to get themselves 
entrenched wdthin the political system then evolving in the respective countries. This 
enabled them to exert increasingly powerful pressures on the colonial governments to 
speed up the process of self-government. Thus even though the elected members were not 
given full administrative powers, they managed to exercise an influence well beyond the 
scope of the limited advisory functions allotted to them by virtue of their ability to 
claim to represent a popular mandate. Indeed, these first steps towards political reform 
marked the beginning of the politicization process, which brought into being various new' 
groups of political participant w'ho in turn brought up many of the same kinds of issues 
(e.g. language, religion, race, education) for public debate during the course of 
decolonization.
In Hong Kong, elections to the Colony's district boards and Legislative Council 
w'ere also carried out in the first year of the 1984-85 political transition. Although the 
elected council members were merely playing an advisory role in the overall political 
process, these elections needed to be seen in the context of a rapidly changing political 
system. Various political groups emerged to take advantage of the elections in the first 
year of the political transition, w-ith a view to participating more effectively in the future 
political processes. Thus, the outcome of the electoral campaigns could have been 
expected to have w'ide implications for future political reforms. The remarkable success 
of the grassroots and pressure-group members in the district elections, for example, 
indicated that those people who were most effective in mobilizing the electorate would 
be able to dominate electoral politics, if, in the future, direct elections were introduced 
to the Legislative Council. And some of the candidates w'ho were elected to the 
Legislative Council through some form of direct elections, even under a very limited 
franchise, were much more aggressive than others in pushing for more rapid 
constitutional changes. Hence, even with the participation of only a small number of 
‘radical’ elements, the newly elected district boards, as well as the Legislative Council of 
1985, proved to be strikingly different from their predecessors in former days, when they
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were composed almost entirely of appointed members. In 1985-86, the demands of the 
progressive members were still essentially moderate and were not meant to be at all 
anti-British; yet the progressives made use of every controversial issue to stir up public 
campaigns at th a t  time, thereby exerting considerable pressure on the colonial 
government to further liberalize the political system before 1997.
As in the case of many other nationalist movements, the demands made for 
democracy and self-government in Hong Kong did not come from a single united 
movement, but from a rather broad and heterogeneous group of newly merging activists. 
Yet, the democratic movement was operating in a socio-political environment so unique 
th a t  the nature of public campaigning was, indeed, essentially different from any that we 
can observe in other cases of the political transition. In the case of Hong Kong, the 
absence of mass mobilization was hardly surprising in the initial stages of the political 
transition, or even in the later ones. One reason is tha t  Hong Kong has simply not been 
an independent entity in fact or in prospect; hence political power is not expected to be 
transferred from the British to the local people, but to another sovereign power, China. 
Hong Kong is not an entirely unique case in Asia in this respect: Singapore before 1963 
also appeared to be undergoing a process of decolonization without independence, but it 
also had several basic differences from the situation of Hong Kong in the 1980s.
The possibility of Singapore achieving independence in the form of a merger with 
Malaysia had been considered by the British colonial authorities from time to time for 
both strategic and economic reasons. But no positive steps were taken in that direction 
and, in fact, the British had no firm policy on the m atter  until 1961, when the initiative 
was taken by Lee Kuan Yew and Tunku Abdul Rahman, actually at Lee’s urging
97because of the exigencies of the domestic political situation he was facing at that t im e /  
It was by no means pre-ordained tha t  when Singapore achieved ‘independence’ it would 
be in the form of incorporation into Malaysia; yet there was no strong demand in Kuala 
Lumpur for either merger or national unification. In fact, the Tunku’s call for Malaysia 
incurred a lot of opposition amongst both Malays and Chinese - and even the UMNO 
(since he did not consult the UMNO Council beforehand). But the dynamics of 
Singapore’s entry into Malaysia in 1961-63 were entirely different in various ways from 
the dynamics of Hong Kong’s transition towards incorporation into the PRC in 1997. 
The former involved intense political controversy and mass mobilization politics between 
the advocates of ‘independence through merger with Malaya’, much of which centred 
around the issues of anti-colonialism and communism. Neither of these issues, the two 
most potent elements in the various witches’ brews of nationalist sentiment fuelling the
27. For an account of Lee’s handling of the merger issue, see J. Minchin, No Man is an Island,  
a S tudy  o f  S i ngapore ’s Lee K u a n  Yew (Sydney: Allen &: Unwin, 1986).
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drives towards independence in the Southeast Asian countries between 1945-63, could be 
exploited in the Hong Kong situation in the 1980s.
Indeed, the postwar international environment in the Asia-Pacific region remained 
unstable until 1969-70, which was related mainly to a profound shift in the balance of 
power caused by the emergence of the anti-colonial and nationalist movements in 
individual countries. The rapid withdrawal of the colonial authorities and the sudden 
elimination of the Japanese influence in Asian politics left behind a perceived power 
vacuum in East and Southeast Asia. Although the military-economic hegemony of the 
United States seemed unchallengeable, the growth of the ‘New China’ (backed by the 
spread of communism worldwide) loomed as a great ideological threat; the latter 
provided inspiration for a number of domestic uprisings and major revolutions between 
1945 and 1970. The involvement of the United States in the domestic affairs of various 
countries like South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam aroused further 
anxiety among the new nations who seemed so vulnerable both to external interference 
and domestic insurgencies a t  the time of independence.
Almost none of these conditions could be applied, however, to the situation in the 
1970s when the newly emerged political elites gradually consolidated their political 
powers. Compared with the pre-1970 situation, the international environment of the 
1970s and early 1980s has become more stabilized. The general economy of the 
Asia-Pacific region was also growing steadily without major dislocation.
Thus Hong Kong’s political transition occurred in a particular international and 
domestic environment in a rather unique way. There were no major social and economic 
dislocations to provide a basis for large-scale mass mobilization. There were also no 
widespread anti-communist or anti-colonial activities to invigorate mass participation. 
In 1980, Hong Kong still remained a colony of Britain, and also a free port, with its 
people enjoying a high rate of economic growth and multiple employment opportunities. 
There were virtually no local demands, or only insignificant ones, for either 
independence or merger with China, although the territory was always considered by the 
Chinese inhabitants living there as in some sense a part of Chinese territory.
No one could seriously challenge the inevitability of Hong Kong’s incorporation 
into the PRC in 1997. But Beijing’s insistence on recovering Hong Kong’s sovereignty 
during the two years of Sino-British talks (1982-84) indicated that the Chinese leaders 
were determined to exercise actual, not simply nominal, control over Hong Kong. Any 
‘anti-communist’ activities organized in Hong Kong are readily conceived by the Chinese 
leadership as ‘anti-nationalist,’ in nature. Hence what makes the decolonization process 
in Hong Kong and Singapore very different was tha t  the former cannot expect to 
exercise the same degree of internal self-government before 1997 as the latter was in fact
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exercising before 1963. More significantly, any discussion of Hong Kong’s political future 
has to be qualified by the consideration tha t  the territory is to be incorporated into 
China which is a communist system and which has had extensive experience in its own 
special forms of political and social mobilization in the past thirty years. In contrast, 
Hong Kong is a  capitalist society which has had no revolutions or discernible political 
struggles in the past. The contrast between the experiences of the people of China and 
Hong Kong tells us a lot about the level of politicization in Hong Kong society in the 
1980s.
Although China was not, strictly speaking, a colonial society, it did undergo a 
period of very high degree of national mobilization during and after World War II 
similar to anti-colonial movements elsewhere. The Japanese invasion (1937-45) gave rise 
to a nation-wide resistance movement, in the course of which vast masses of Chinese
o q
peasants became politically involved in a pitch that had never been experienced be fo re /0
Townsend considers tha t  the high level of political mobilization of the Chinese 
masses brought about by World War II and the Japanese occupation contributed greatly 
to the communist victory in 1949. But after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
established its authority on the mainland, it initiated an even more thorough-going 
mobilization process in order to build up popular support for various party policies and 
reform programmes. A series of campaigns were launched continously in the decade after 
1949, namely ‘the Land Reform Movement’, the ‘Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries’ 
Campaign, the ‘Three A nti’ and ‘Five Anti" Movement, ‘Reform of Intellectual Ideology’ 
Campaign, the 1955-57 campaign oriented towards increasing production, and the Great 
Leap Forward of 1957-59, each aimed at mobilizing popular participation in a 
nation-wide attack upon a particular political or social problem. In Townsend's words, 
“the structural channels for articulation are therefore extensive, and they carry a large
on
volume of popular political debate and discussion” /  But the scope for participation was 
strictly controlled under the leadership of the CCP, enabling the C C P ’s authority to 
extend without significant limits into all areas of individual life, and denying political 
opposition the right to express demands which deviated from the C C P ’s general line. For
28. Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant N a tion a lism  and C o m m u n is t  Power, The Emergence o f  
R evolu tionary  C h in a ,  J937-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p.156. In his study 
of peasant nationalism Chalmers Johnson explains that uapproximately 100,000,000 Chinese 
peasants, concentrated for the most part north of Yangtse River (Changjiang), reacted to the 
invasion of their territory in a manner unprecedented in recent Chinese history: they combined 
into new political and military associations in order to offer effective military defense against the 
invader” .
29. James R. Townsend, Polit ical P artic ipa tion  in C o m m u n is t  C h in a  (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1967), pp.51-64.
30. James R. Townsend, Polit ics in  China,  second edition, (Boston: Little Brown &. Company, 
1980), p.228.
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example, the short period of liberalized debate arising out of the ‘Hundred Flowers’ 
Campaign (May-June, 1957) went beyond the limits of what the CCP leaders regarded 
as tolerable opposition and propelled the Party to move back to a tough political line, 
purging those who suggested greater freedoms and individual liberties.
The emphasis on social consciousness and the extensive mobilization of the masses 
soon encouraged intensive political conflict and factional rivalry among the ruling elite. 
The destabilizing effect of mass campaigns was, however, regarded by the radical elite as 
a means to legitimize open class struggle. In Townsend’s analysis
here at least one faction - possibly more - tries to mobilize popular support as a 
weapon against its opponents. Organizations are politicized, some in common 
support of an elite position, but some possibly resisting the faction tha t  has the 
initiative. Mass mobilization encourages some spontaneous action, with local 
issues or popular cleavages intermingling with elite cleavages. In extreme form, 
violent conflict arises between rival organizations, which go beyond what their 
patrons want; extensive purges, organizational reform or suppression, and 
lingering factional hostilities follow. ... this ... is more likely to activate worker 
and peasant groups, and to exacerbate latent class conflicts. It may produce 
social disorder and sharp policy fluctuations tha t  interfere with economic
O  1
development.
A clear example of intensive political struggle was the large-scale mass campaigns 
organized during the Cultural Revolution (1965-69) which eventually led to complete 
political and social chaos. Repeated attem pts by rival leaders to mobilize mass support 
were also seen in the post-Cultural Revolutionary period, culminating in the various 
mass movements th a t  emerged in the 1970s and even in the post-Mao period. So, unlike 
the relative lack of political participation in most other communist or authoritarian 
regimes, there had at times been high levels of popular mobilization in the PRC. Such 
participation was, however, mobilized consciously by the ruling elite to justify political 
struggles at the top level.
By the early 1980s, Chinese leaders began to denounce mass campaigns as an 
appropriate means to atta in  national unification and economic development. Chinese 
society has become demobilized and stabilized in many respects because the 
revolutionary elements have now beome conservative and authoritarian leaders who 
emphasize economic modernization, peaceful unification and peaceful coexistence with 
the Western society. But because it remains a communist regime, it does not permit free 
expression of political views and genuine articulation of private interests, the elements 
which were highly appreciated by representative democracies in Western societies. 
According to the PRC Constitution (1977), all the major political bodies in China are to 
“be elected by their members or congresses, report to those members and congresses, and
31. Ibid., p.358.
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listen to their opinions and criticisms” . Y e t  because all candidates standing for any 
elections are scrutinized by the CCP leaders, there is basically a lack of electoral choice.
T hat is what today worries the people of Hong Kong about a communist takeover 
in 1997, since they know tha t  ‘real’ representative government does not occur within the 
P R C ’s political processes, although there may be a degree of significant popular 
participation in some lower level organizations. People of Hong Kong also know that the 
Chinese leaders are highly intolerant of any political opposition or spontaneous 
movements organized from below. Under the communist regime, individual freedoms and 
personal liberties are very limited. No one is allowed to criticize, or seek to change, the 
policies of the central government. There is basically a lack of institutional processes 
through which citizens are able to exercise effective control over top-level 
decision-makers in the communist political systems. Consequently, political attitudes of 
the people of Hong Kong and their response to a communist takeover are very much 
overshadowed by their apprehensions about the radical campaigns and political 
repression tha t  have occurred since 1949 in mainland China.
THE POLITICIZATION PR OC ESS IN HONG K O N G ,  1982-85
Forebodings about the authoritarian character of the communist regime in China 
have undoubtedly had a significant effect on the level of political participation in Hong 
Kong in the 1980s. Hong Kong has remained a relatively non-political commercially- 
oriented society. Yet there has been almost no protest against the prospect of a 
communist takeover in 1997. Indeed, there is no way of knowing the reasons why the 
vast mass of the Hong Kong populace remains so apathetic and willing to acquiesce in 
the determination of their post-1997 destiny by others; whether they simply feel 
powerless to affect the outcome, or have no strong feelings on the m atter, or are afraid 
to speak out, or are too inexperienced politically to know how to respond differently.
Most recent studies on the future of Hong Kong have come to the conclusion that 
C hina’s claim to sovereignty, together with ultimate control over the local 
administration, will have the effect of intimidating the people of Hong Kong and hence, 
discouraging public participation in the political processes even more thoroughly. In this 
study, I will take a rather different view, however, arguing tha t  Hong Kong society has 
been undergoing an unprecedented degree of politicization in the period immediately 
after the signing of the Sino-British agreement, with China becoming the most 
influential actor involved in the entire process.
1 consider that, Hong Kong’s politicization process has been sparked off by the
32. Ilnd., p.91.
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sudden awareness of a small but significant group of middle-class professionals and 
businessmen who began to recognize tha t  greater opportunities for political participation 
may be opened to them in the course of Hong Kong’s incorporation into the PRC. In this 
respect, Hong Kong’s politicization can be explained in terms of the changing 
perceptions of this small segment of the Hong Kong population regarding the 
possibilities of influencing the policies of the PRC and Hong Kong officials in the 
transitional period. One aspect of the politicization process itself was made manifest in 
the rapid emergence of this small group of middle-class professionals and businessmen 
since the two years of the Sino-British talks (1982-84). By 1984-85, there was also an 
expansion in the number of political organizations in Hong Kong and an increase in 
public debate on the issues of political reforms. These newly emerging groups continued 
to participate actively in the on-going debates of major issues happening in Hong Kong 
society in the post 1984-85 period. Subsequently, many other socio-economic issues, 
which had previously been regarded as purely administrative and non-political matters, 
became controversial topics of public discussion.
The politicization process was not a totally spontaneous one. however. The 
response of the governing elite in Hong Kong, as well as the British and Chinese officials, 
to the various kinds of public debates taking place was itself an important factor that 
had a significant influence on the level of politicization. Consequently, all parties - the 
newly emerging political activists, the Hong Kong officials and the Chinese authorities - 
mobilized their respective supporters to speak up for a particular course of action, or to 
speak against particular views in order to attain at least a share, or even a leadership 
role, in whatever changes were taking place in Hong Kong in the transitional period. 
Thus the politicization process has to be analyzed in the light of the interaction between 
these newly emerging groups, the Hong Kong officials as well as the Chinese authorities.
M ETH O D O LO G Y
This thesis mainly covers the two years of Sino-British talks (September 1982 - 
September 1984) and the first year of the political transition in Hong Kong (1984-85). 
The research is concerned primarily to analyze the major political issues tha t  occured in 
Hong Kong society between 1982-85. Special attention is given to the involvement of the 
newly emerging political groups and individuals in the major public debates of the day. 
A central theme of my study is the participation of the newly emerging activists in the 
1985 elections to the district boards (March) and the Legislative Council (September), 
with particular attention given to the patterns of political alignments tha t  developed 
during and after the two elections.
My fieldwork occupied almost a year in Hong Kong in 1985, which was devoted 
mainly to interviewing as well as to collecting secondary data  and official statistics. By
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being in Hong Kong at that time, I hoped to be able to observe the election processes at 
first hand and get some feeling for the political atmosphere and major issues taking place 
immediately after the official signing of the bilateral agreement in December 1984. 
During this period, I also attended various open forums and discussions, as well as 
reading diverse sets of local reports, including leftist, rightist and independent English 
and Chinese newspapers and magazines.
Interviews constituted the major part of my field research, with the greatest efforts 
being spent on discussions with candidates who were running for the elections either to 
the district boards or to the Legislative Council. (For the list of persons being 
interviewed, see Appendix J.) Since full-scale campaigning to the district board elections 
began in January 1985, I was originally hoping to s tar t  interviewing some of the 
candidates at th a t  time, but I found it very difficult to make contact with the candidates 
at all. In fact, it would have been impossible to interview all 501 candidates running in 
the elections. After some early discussions with various Hong Kong officials, I decided to 
narrow the scope of my field study on the district elections by concentrating on three 
districts; namely, Central and Western in the Hong Kong Island, Sham Shui Po in 
Kowloon Peninsula, and Tuen Mun in the New Territories, each being characterized by 
the rapid emergence of the new political activists in different local situations (see 
Chapter Six). Even then, I found tha t  many candidates were reluctant to talk about the 
campaign while it was still in progress, although most of those who got elected were 
w'illing to do so later. The same problem arose at the time of the elections to the 
Legislative Council in September, so my research could not be completed until early 
November.
I also conducted interviews with politically active individuals, members of the 
political groups, Hong Kong officials, and a few Chinese officials in the Hong Kong office 
of New' China News Agency (NCNA) which w'as an unofficial diplomatic organization of 
the PRC under the control of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office in Beijing. 
Altogether, I interviewed no less than 120 individuals, most of them only once, but some 
of them more frequently if they were willing. Because of the need to gain the confidence 
of interviewees first, my initial plans to use questionnaires extensively had to be 
abandoned. Consequently, interview's were not based on a specific questionnaire, apart 
from my owm general guideline for each discussion, most of them taking about one to 
three hours.
1 discussed with these people their positions on various leading issues of the time, 
such as political reforms, the basic law', and other controversial topics. When dealing 
w'ith candidates running in the elections, I gave more attention to the topics such as 
their election campaigning, political plans and existing affiliations. When dealing w'ith 
members of political groups, I asked the spokesmen or chairmen about their origins,
37
developments and future plans of their group. I also discussed with them their relations 
with other groups, and attitudes towards the Hong Kong government, and also the 
PRC, wherever possible. When interviewing Hong Kong and Chinese officials, I had to 
confine myself to discussing certain general policies and, where possible, discovering their 
feelings towards the overall politicization process and the emergence of the new groups.
There were, of course, various other difficulties in conducting this kind of in-depth 
interview', one being that many interviewees tended to be sceptical of my intentions, 
despite my attem pts to provide them w'ith clarifications or reassurances about the 
purposes of my study. Some talked about their views only in very general terms, while 
others declined to see me a t  all. All I could do to ensure the accuracy of what I was told 
w'as to counter-check and corroborate the answers of various individuals of the same 
district or group against one another and, at the same time, scrutinize their public 
statements and local reports very closely. As the interviews continued, I was able to 
establish a network of contacts, through which other interview's w'ere obtained, usually 
making the arrangements through a mutual acquaintance so that the interviewee might 
be more prepared to meet and talk with me quite frankly.
This kind of macro-level study is of course not sufficient to enable me to 
comprehend the attitudes of the full range of Hong Kong citizens about politics in 
general or about the issues involved in Hong Kong’s future; but it did equip me to 
understand the dynamics of both the electoral process and the political transition then 
occurring from a reasonably broad perspective. Indeed the interview data , newspaper 
and magazine articles, published as w'ell as unpublished documents of the various 
political groups, together with some official statistics constituted the bulk of my research 
materials. My approach in this thesis is, therefore, mainly analytical and qualitative, 
with only a limited a ttem pt to examine quantitative information in Chapters Five and 
Six. My main purpose is to tell the story of the way the emerging political activists in 
Hong Kong reacted to the unfolding events of 1982-85 and to explain the scope and 
limitations of their response to those events then evolving.
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C H A PT E R  2
A N  IN T R O D U C T IO N  TO POLITICS IN 
H O NG  KONG: PRO CESSES OF DEPOLITICIZATION
A N D  POLITICIZATION
INTRO DUCTIO N
The previous chapter briefly introduces the thesis th a t Hong Kong society 
underwent an unprecedented degree of politicization in the period immediately after the 
signing of the Sino-British agreem ent, with China becoming the most im portant actor 
involved in the entire process. Before describing the m anifestations of the politicization 
process, I w ant first to refer to the various interpretations th a t have arisen about the 
level of local autonomy and public participation th a t the people of Hong Kong were then 
experiencing. Differing opinions towards the level of politicization then developing in 
Hong Kong society will also be discussed.
This chapter will also draw atten tion  to  the nature of the changes occurring in the 
socio-political structures of Hong Kong society in the period immediately before the 
Sino-British talks was held in September 1982. A review of various studies of Hong 
Kong society a t tha t tim e suggests an interesting phenomenon in its political 
development: there was a rather low level of politicization occurring in Hong Kong
society, which had been well conditioned by a non-democratic colonial adm inistrative 
system and a non-participatory Chinese tradition . However, it is also revealed in those 
studies th a t by the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was an evident, though slow and 
gradual, process of politicization occurring, coupled with the introduction of limited 
representation and election by the British adm inistration in 1980-82. W hether or not 
such changes were British-inspired or locally-inspired, the forces a t work were 
undoubtedly paving the way for further m anifestation of the politicization process of the 
kind th a t became apparent after the 1984 agreement.
THE COLONY OF HONG KONG BEFORE 1980:
A “N ON-POLITICIZED” SOCIETY?
Hong Kong was acquired by Britain from China under the Treaty of Nanking 
(1842) and the two Conventions of Peking (1860 and 1898). Under the term s of the 
treaties, Hong Kong Island (32 sq.m.) and Kowloon Peninsula (3.75 sq.m.) were ceded
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perm anently to Britain. The New Territories (375 sq.m.), consisting of part of the 
m ainland plus 235 adjacent islands between China and Kowloon Peninsula, were leased 
for 99 years. Accordingly, the New Territories, covering over 90% of the whole of Hong 
Kong, were to be returned to China on 30 June, 1997.
Under the um brella of British sovereignty, Hong Kong survived the Chinese 
revolution, as well as the political upheavals of the decades since the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Therefore, Hong Kong became the major 
gateway between m ainland China and the outside world, which perhaps made China 
unwilling to upset this arrangem ent. Since the 1960s, Hong Kong’s economic growth has 
been one of the fastest in Asia1 2 and by the 1980s, she became a leading international 
m anufacturing and financial centre. After the opening up of the Chinese economy in the 
1970s, Hong Kong-PRC economic ties were enhanced and Hong Kong became the major 
foreign trading partner of the PRC.
in M iners’ analysis (1981), because of the m utually beneficial economic relations 
between Hong Kong and the PRC, there was a ‘tripod of consent’ between London and 
Beijing to m aintain the sta tus quo of Hong Kong, based on an assum ption tha t each 
would try not to provoke or intervene in the affairs of the other. In his words
the colony continues to exist only because it suits the interests of Britain, 
China and its own citizens th a t this should be so. Any one of these three could 
initiate or force a change in the sta tus quo, but each would refrain from making 
any move, for fear th a t the results would be more detrim ental to it than the 
present equ ilib rium /
So long as Hong Kong remained in Chinese eyes a Chinese territory temporarily 
occupied by the British authorities, the PR C could choose to resume her sovereignty 
over Hong Kong whenever she wanted to make a claim. Yet the PRC has avoided 
mobilizing any sort of leftist movement in Hong Kong in the past decades. Even during 
the turm oil of the Cultural Revolution in 1967, when some leftists in Hong Kong were 
organizing anti-colonial protests, there was no significant a ttem p t by the government in 
Beijing to encourage mass actions there. The local people were glad to be dissociated 
from the political rivalries of the m ainland and, according to Miners, preferred to be 
governed by a foreign adm inistration. In order to avoid pushing the PRC government 
tow ard reclaiming Hong Kong, the Hong Kong authorities also tried not to introduce 
any substantial constitutional changes in the territo ry , with an understanding that
1. For the dynamics of economic growth in Hong Kong between the 1960s and 1970s, see 
D. Lethbridge, The Business Environment in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 
1980).
2. N.J. Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, third edition (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1981), p.xv.
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any change, either in its economic profitability or its constitutional structure, 
m ight lead to a reappraisal in Peking followed by a decision to occupy the 
colony. As long as Britain finds it profitable and convenient to remain in Hong
o
Kong no move will be made which might provoke such a reappraisal.
M iners’ argum ent basically explains why the constitution of Hong Kong has remained 
both colonial and bureaucratic in character over the past few decades without any 
fundam ental reforms, which has inter alia contributed to the low level of politicization 
in Hong Kong society generally.
The constitution of Hong Kong is made up by the Letters Paten t and the Royal 
Instruction which provide for the establishm ent of a Governor, who is the appointed 
representative of the Queen in Hong Kong, the head of the Hong Kong adm inistration 
and the Chairm an of the Executive Council and Legislative Council. The adm inistration 
is run by the executive officers, namely the Colonial Secretary and the Secretariats, 
under whom the heads co-ordinate the functions of various government departm ents but 
are responsible directly to the Chief Secretary and the Governor. The Governor is 
required to consult the Executive Council on all im portant m atters of policy, but he is 
under no obligation to follow the la tte r’s advice in the processes of decision-making. All 
policies are required to be debated and passed by the Legislative Council, yet they 
cannot become bills w ithout the Governor’s assent. W ithin this consultative framework, 
the  Legislative Council does serve as a sounding board for public opinion, and for the 
m ost p a rt the Governor usually abides by the Council’s decisions. In other words, the 
Executive and Legislative Council are merely advisory bodies, and together with the 
o ther advisory committees, constitute the consultative system which serves to facilitate 
the day-to-day adm inistration of the Colony under the ultim ate authority  of the 
G overnor (see Appendix A).
Prior to 1985, there were no elections to the policy-making bodies. Yet some 
m em bers of the public had been appointed to the advisory committees and the two 
Councils. As in Singapore before 1948, the appointed members were generally prominent 
figures in economic and professional circles. Occasionally, some appointed unofficial 
m em bers m ight attack the government on particular policies, but such criticisms were 
to lerated  on the ground th a t these people were loyal and responsible citizens. So the 
B ritish adm inistration could assume th a t it was generally supported by a group of 
m em bers of the ‘respectable classes’ of Hong Kong who were virtually drawn from a 
small m inority of conservative upper-income businessmen and professionals. The normal 
enactm ents, debates and questionings in the Legislative Council were thus quite remote 
from the day-to-day concerns of the vast mass of the population and, practically
3. N.J. Miners, The Governm ent and Polit ics o f  Hong Kong,  second edition (1978), pp.27-28.
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speaking, the people of Hong Kong had no real means of participation at all in the 
decision-making processes of the colonial government.
Since 1952, there had been some ‘quasi-elections’ to the Urban Council, a 
municipal body responsible for cultural, recreational and other suburban m atters like 
street cleansing, refuse collection and food and environm ental hygiene. But prior to 
1983, the elections to the Urban Council had never aroused much public interest, 
prim arily because the franchise was very strictly limited to what the Report o f  the 
W orking Party on the Urban Council Franchise and Electoral Registration Procedure 
describes as those “who make a valuable contribution to Hong Kong through service to 
the com m unity, professional knowledge and skill, or educational standard” . In 1977 it 
was estim ated th a t only 37,174 people were eligible to vote, accounting for less than 1% 
of the population. But the turn-out rate  was very low, with only 7,308 (19.7%) of the 
qualified voters actually voting in 1977 and merely 6,195 (18%) in the 1981 Urban 
Council elections.4
It has been argued th a t the lack of public interest in the Urban Council elections 
in the 1970s was an indication of the political apathy of the people of Hong Kong. 
Hoadley (1972 and 1973) explains th a t the people of Hong Kong, the m ajority of them 
Chinese, were characterized by a parochial political culture - one in which the majority 
were oriented primarily toward traditional (i.e. familistic, religious, neighbourhood) 
interaction and social controls - and thus most of them were indifferent towards politics. 
Besides, he argues, many local people were refugees who had fled from the mainland to 
Hong Kong in the 1950s and the 1960s. While they had little enthusiasm  for returning to 
China under the Communist system , they also tended to disengage from political 
activities altogether. In accordance with his ‘life boat theory’, he further explains that 
a ttitu d es  of escapism and a psychology peculiar to transient residents were factors 
inhibiting the people of Hong Kong from active participation in politics.
Rear (1971) and Davies (1977) have analyzed the political orientation of the Hong 
Kong people from a different perspective, concluding th a t the elitist and homogeneous 
natu re  of the political system itself basically discouraged public interest in political 
participation, so th a t political apathy actually developed out of a feeling of 
powerlessness. King (1981) elaborates this argum ent, contending th a t public apathy was 
brought about by the essentially bureaucratic character of the political system. In his 
opinion, the foremost goal of the government was to achieve a maximum level of 
political stability and economic growth, the key to  th a t goal being the 
‘departm entalization’ and ‘adm inisterization’ of politics, i.e. the very antithesis to
4. Ibid., pp.176-180.
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politicization.^ All these studies, however, commonly conceived an informal alliance 
between the government and the big businessmen who tended to dissociate themselves 
from the masses of the general public.
Lau even contends th a t there was no need on the part of the power elite to 
deliberately mobilize the mass of familial groups. A free economic environm ent in Hong 
Kong had effectively opened up plenty of opportunities for all and therefore individual 
Chinese were happy to be left undisturbed to pursue their own m aterial satisfaction. As 
a result, a ‘boundary’5 6 78was developed between the government and the governed in a 
‘m inim ally-integrated society’, wherein the government and the people were fairly 
content to enjoy their own autonom y. In other words, the political and social structures 
them selves actually reinforced a low degree of politicization in Hong Kong society. In a 
way, King’s theory of adm inistrative absorption of politics a t the top is supplemented by 
Lau’s theory of social absorption a t the bottom . The result is th a t there was an almost 
deliberate inclination towards ‘depoliticization’ by both the colonial government and the 
Chinese society itself, each regarding political activities as “malicious plots, violence,
o
dirty  tricks, instability and self-seeking” .
Both King and Lau perceive, however, th a t their theories were tenable only so long 
as the governm ent was able to insulate itself from social pressure and avoid the necessity 
to  provide widespread public services. But, starting  in the 1970s, the Hong Kong 
governm ent gradually became increasingly, although still minimally, committed to 
large-scale public welfare programmes. The provision of public housing was an example 
of active governm ent intervention in social and economic development, which increased 
the relevance of decisions made by the governm ent to the lives of private citizens. In his 
later works (1980 and 1984), Lau started  to recognize th a t a politicization process was
5. King explains depoliticization in terms o f ‘adm inistrative absorption of politics’. The concept 
is defined as “a process by which the governm ent co-opts the political forces, often represented by 
elite groups, into an adm inistrative decision-m aking body, thus achieving some level of elite in­
tegration: as a consequence, the governing authority is made legitim ate, a loosely integrated 
political com m unity is established.” See A .Y .C . King, “Adm inistrative Absorption of Politics in 
Hong Kong: Em phasis on the Grassroots Level” , in A .Y .C . King and R .P.L . Lee, (eds.) Social 
L ife  and  Developm ent in  Hong K on g  (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1981), p.130.
6. S.K . Lau, Society  and Politics in  Hong K on g  (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 
1982), p .167. According to Lau’s explanation, both the bureaucratic polity and Chinese society 
are boundary-conscious. Each is worrying about intrusion by the other. Consequently, there 
develops a “high degree of m utual insulation between each other. In calling the politics in Hong 
Kong ‘boundary p olitics’, he means that “resolution of political issues would tend to rest the 
social-political system  at peace, while preserving the ‘cordial’ though ‘d istan t’ relationship be­
tween the bureaucracy and the Chinese society .”
7. Lau conceptualizes Hong Kong as a ‘m inim ally-integrated social-political system ’. He writes 
that, “the basic process at work is depoliticization ... what result in Hong Kong is a Chinese 
society w ith low political m obilizability .” Ibid., pp .18-19.
8. Ibid., p .18.
43
developing in Hong Kong0 because of the increasing saliency of the government as a 
problem-solver. Although most of the people were not ‘anti-system ’ and were still 
relatively unconcerned with the political processes, they were gradually becoming aware 
of the need to organize among themselves in order to defend or advance their interests 
on the m atter of access to governm ent services.
While public expectations about political participation were slowly increasing, the 
adm inistrative system remained highly centralized and bureaucratic, without any 
effective channels to absorb public opinion. As a result, most of the participatory 
activities th a t developed occurred outside the formal political system in the form of 
pressure-group activities. In Hong Kong, pressure groups, such as the Society for 
Com m unity O rganization, the Christian Industrial Com m ittee, and the People’s Council 
on Public Housing Policy, came to public notice in the 1970s mainly as a result of 
organizing social actions and mass protest against policy injustices. Members of the 
pressure groups commonly put the blame for the sufferings of the poor people on an 
uneven distribution of social and economic resources, and the unequal access of various 
groups to  the adm inistrative m achinery.9 10 The study by Lui and Kung (1985) of the 
social m ovem ents in Hong Kong reveals th a t there was a proliferation of pressure-group 
activities in the second half of the 1970s and they explain th a t social actions in Hong 
Kong represented a spontaneous response of the lower-income people towards policy 
injustices. In other words, urban movements and social actions served as a primary 
mechanism of politicization within Hong Kong society.
All these studies also reveal in common an interesting situation in the political 
developm ent of Hong Kong in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. There was a gradual 
process of politicization occurring, yet there were no politics in the conventional sense; 
there were some sporadic social actions, yet they did not pose a th rea t to the general 
social order. A study by Hong Kong University students (1983) explains this 
phenomenon in term s of H untington’s ‘technocratic model’, contending th a t there was 
rapid economic growth in Hong Kong without a compatible political system. Social
9. Lau explains that governm ent’s efforts at urban developm ent and the growing number of 
people living in public housing lead to more direct interaction between the people and the ad­
m inistration. See “The G overnm ent, Interm ediate O rganizations and Grassroots Politics in Hong 
K ong” , A s ia n  Survey,  X X I(8 )  (August 1981), p.879. See also “Social Change, Bureaucratic Rule, 
and Em ergent Political Issues in Hong Kong” , World P o li t ic s , X X X V (4 )  (July 1984), 
p p.544-562.
10. ‘Pressure group’ is defined as those groups which are organized to influence the policy­
m aking processes w ithout attem pting to seek political power. In Hong Kong, the system  of 
governm ent virtually does not allow the alternation of political powers. Thus pressure groups in 
Hong Kong are always referred to as those groups which are organized for a particular cause of 
action with the aim of defending the interests of the poor people. Since these groups always apply 
the tactics of social actions and mass protests, they alm ost regard them selves as an opposition  
against the established interests and the ruling elite.
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inequalities therefore stim ulated pressure groups to organize the lower-income groups in 
order to put pressure on the governm ent for greater public participation in the political 
processes. This raises a question about how the government responded to such changes. 
It was generally believed th a t the introduction of the District Adm inistration Scheme in 
1980 by the Hong Kong governm ent was a response to rising expectations within the 
Hong Kong society.11
THE IN T R O D U C T IO N  OF THE D IST R IC T  
A D M IN IST R A T IO N  SCH EM E 1980
According to the Green (1980) and W hite (1981) Papers on the subject, the 
principle of introducing d istrict adm inistration was “to improve the impact of 
adm inistration a t the d istrict level and to stim ulate a greater degree of local
. . . 1 9participation.” Accordingly, 18 district boards were set up in 1980-81 and their 
composition was expanded to allow half of the  unofficial members to be directly elected
I  o
in 1982. Nevertheless, the district boards were only advisory in function, and the 
im plem entation of the governm ent’s program mes continued to be centrally directed.
Being not allowed any real decision-making power, the district board members 
were left to struggle with “peripheral issues, minor policies, and non-essential 
m atters” .14 Although half of the unofficial members were elected, they were unable to 
m uster enough popular support, basically because their views were subordinated to those 
of the official and the appointed members, the latter generally identifying themselves 
with the government. As the elected members readily succumbed to official pressure, 
they also discredited themselves ultim ately in the eyes of the voters. Thus, the elected 
members were unable to prom ote the idea th a t such district boards might serve as a 
representative element in the political system of Hong Kong.
The introduction of the d istrict adm inistration policy was often criticized as 
nothing more than yet another means to depoliticize and contain Hong Kong politics.15
11. S.K. Lau, “The Governm ent, Interm ediate Organizations and Grassroots Politics in Hong 
Kong” , p.861. See also B. Hook, “The Governm ent of Hong Kong: Change within Tradition” , The 
C h in a  Q u a r te r ly , 95  (Septem ber 1983), p.505.
12. W hite Paper on D is tr ic t  A d m in is t r a t io n  in  Hong Kong  (January 1981), p.4.
13. For the period 1982-85, there were altogether 132 elected unofficial members, 135 appointed  
unofficial members and 167 official members in the 18 district boards.
14. S.K. Lau com m ents that “in a certain sense, the local adm inistrative reform intentionally  
sets out to ‘dem ocratize’ politics at the local level while sim ultaneously confining it there. The 
local people and local celebrities are encouraged to participate along with local assigned officials 
in an advisory capacity for m undane decision-m aking affecting their districts. However, they are 
largely denied the right to partake in decision-m aking on substantive issues either within the 
district or the Colony as a w hole.” See “Local A dm inistrative Reform in Hong Kong”, p.867.
15. S.K. Lau, “The Governm ent, Interm ediate Organizations and Grassroots Politics in Hong 
K ong” , p.861. See also R. Chan, Is the Hong K on g  D is tr ic t  Board a Channel for  Popular 
C it ize n  P a r t ic ipa t ion ?  (Hong Kong: Research and Resource Press, 1982).
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W hether or not th a t was a fair comment on the intentions of the adm inistration, this 
criticism  revealed a suspicious a ttitu d e  among the local people towards the colonial 
adm inistration. It was also true th a t by co-opting the pressure groups and social leaders 
into the local adm inistration, the Hong Kong officials hoped th a t their dissenting views 
would gradually be contained within the governm ent’s decision-making structures. And 
after universal franchise was introduced to  the district boards, the elections did provide 
an outlet for people to choose whoever was available.
W hether expected or not, the elections a t the district level did prove to be a 
stim ulant to a politicization process. Prim arily , the discontent of the low-income people 
living in public housing areas were exploited in the electoral process, and from the early 
1980s onwards, political activities could be related to much larger groups of people in 
different types of housing. Moreover, conflict was generated a t the d istrict level between 
the officials and the unofficials, with the unofficials generally organizing themselves to 
form a bloc in order to act jointly against the official members. So there was often a 
potential to confront the government with a ‘confederation’ of unofficials from differing 
boards, who linked together for lobbying purposes. But such conflicts could still be 
contained very easily a t the district level, so th a t the Colony’s broader policy-making 
processes were little affected. At the Legislative Council level, the bureaucrats, the 
businessmen and professionals still dom inated, constituting a sort of ‘strategic elite’, 
whereas the general public were basically uninvolved in the overall policy-making 
processes.
By 1980, Hong Kong was essentially a very stable society. Trade unions were 
weakly organized and did not in the least constitu te a source of political demands. Social 
m ovem ents w'ere confined only to sporadic actions which were incapable of threatening 
the power centres of the British colonial structure.^® Some opinion groups, such as the 
Hong Kong Observers and the Hong Kong Belongers Association, commented 
occasionally on the unresponsiveness of the colonial adm inistration, but while they only 
constitu ted  the views of a limited num ber of educated middle-class professionals, their 
criticism s a ttrac ted  relatively little mass interest. O ther ‘quasi-political groups’, such as 
the Reform Club and the Civic Association, which had been in existence since the 1950s, 
were nothing more than liaison groups, which provided technical assistance to 
candidates running in the Urban Council elections in the 1960s and 1970s. There were
16. See J.Y .S. Cheng, “Hong Kong Citizens Push for Power” , Asia  Week,  8 (31 December, 
1982), p p .49-50; and Hong Kong:  In Search o f  a Future  (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 
1984). See also N.J. Miners, Government  and Poli t ics o f  Hong Kong  (second edition). They 
explain in their studies the weaknesses of sporadic activities. In general, it is concluded that social 
actions are issue-oriented. Thus, there were no formal political organizations to sustain the par­
ticipation  of the members. Moreover, social activists are disunited among themselves. They fail 
to provide effective leadership.
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virtually  no large-scale political organizations through which effective communication 
and participation in political solidarity could be expressed in Hong Kong, least of all any 
m ovem ent calling for an imm ediate transfer of power.
Nevertheless, the first elections to the district boards (1982) were carried out in 
the same year as the Sino-British talks on the future of Hong Kong were opened in 1982. 
This gave rise to a controversial issue: whether the introduction of the district 
adm inistration of 1980 was designed as the first step to “serve as a possible foundation 
upon which to build for the future w ithdrawal of the British adm inistration” .1 An 
answer to th a t question was eventually given in part in the Sino-British Joint 
D eclaration in 1984, which determined Hong Kong’s ultim ate destiny by stipulating tha t 
the British colonial authorities would w ithdraw from the Hong Kong adm inistration in 
1997 and the PRC would recover sovereignty of the territory. In the same agreement, 
the PR C  also promised the Hong Kong people th a t the capitalist mode of living would 
rem ain unchanged there for 50 years after 1997 and th a t Hong Kong, as a special 
adm inistra tive region (SAR) of PRC, would enjoy a high degree of local autonomy. The 
PR C  authorities also verbally assured the Hong Kong people on various public occasions 
th a t their participation in the drafting of the future constitution (the Basic Law) for the 
territo ry  would be provided for. In the same year, the Hong Kong government published 
a policy paper on the “Further Development of the Representative Governm ent” , which 
kindled a much higher degree of public interest and enthusiasm  for electoral politics and 
constitu tional changes than  had ever been aroused previously.
D E C O L O N IZ A T IO N  W IT H O U T  SOV ER EIG NTY :
PO LITIC IZA TIO N  OR DEPO LITIC IZA TIO N ?
The events described above all have some bearing, too, on the further question of 
how far the China factor has affected the on-going politicization process in Hong Kong. 
Some studies, like Emmons, consider th a t there had been a marked politicization of
1 Q
political associations during the period 1982-84. O thers contend th a t there was only a 
slightly heightened interest in political participation after the talks began,19 and tha t
17. I. Peggs, The A dm in is tra tive  Consequences o f  Public Participation: A n  Evaluation o f  
D is tr ic t  A d m in is tra t io n  in  Hong Kong  (Hong Kong: M.Soc.Sc. Dissertation, University of Hong 
Kong, 1983), p.31.
18. C.F. Emmons, “Public Opinion and Political Participation in Pre-1997 Hong Kong” , a 
paper presented at the conference, “Hong Kong and 1997: Strategies for the Fu tu re” , organized by 
the Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 6-8 December, 1984, p.7.
19. S.K. Lau compares a pre-talks (December 1982-January 1983) and post-talks survey. He 
finds out th a t  “not much has changed substantially except a slightly heightened interest in elec­
tions as a democratic procedure, a greater awareness of the relevance of governmental activities on 
the livelihood of the people, and an increased willingness to speak out. Otherwise their basic 
political outlook remained more or less unchanged” . See “The 1985 District Board Election in 
Hong Kong: The Limits of Political Mobilization in a Dependent Polity” , Occasional Paper, no.8 
(Hong Kong: Centre for Hong Kong Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, July 1985), p.18.
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the Hong Kong people’s political outlook remained basically unchanged. Hicks suggests, 
in fact, th a t the presence of the PRC has had an intim idating effect on popular 
participation because people have not felt able to speak up freely on im portant issues.LKi
Indeed, most writers on Hong Kong’s future have been convinced th a t the PRC 
will impose limits on the extent to which Hong Kong’s constitution can be liberalized. 
Such a belief is generally based upon the assum ption th a t the capitalist and the 
comm unist system are fundam entally incom patible with each o th e r /1 McMillen argues 
th a t there are bound to be conflicts during the process of Hong Kong’s incorporation 
into the PRC. Although the PRC has promised to allow Hong Kong to  enjoy a high 
level of local autonom y, the claim to sovereignty will ultim ately ensure the supremacy of 
the S tate over the SAR. As Ngok Lee writes, “the Chinese People’s Congress which 
prom ulgates the constitution will become the supreme body under which Hong Kong will 
hope to remain prosperous” . W hatever local autonom y the Hong Kong people may 
enjoy, people’s rights “are subsumed under the interests of the sta te” /  Moreover the 
term  ‘local autonom y’ can be interpreted and applied quite differently by the PRC, as 
M iners has shown
The PRC contains a num ber of autonom ous regions, prefectures, and counties, 
and the constitution provides (Article 14) th a t the heads of government in 
these autonomous areas m ust be indigenous inhabitants. However, this does not 
mean th a t the policies of these governments conform to the wishes of the local 
population. ... The centralized organization of the Com m unist Party  negates 
the formal guarantees of autonom y given in the constitution and the 
autonom ous regions such as Tibet differ very little in their subordination to the 
authorities in Beijing from any other part of C h in a /4
Thus the P R C ’s past practice provides some indications about Hong Kong’s 
political future. McMillen believes th a t Hong Kong will gradually be incorporated into 
the centrally planned political and economic system, and so the politics of Hong Kong 
will also be absorbed into the very conservative political procedures of the PRC. Ngok 
Lee conceives th a t “China would allow Hong Kong people to ‘rule’ Hong Kong only if it 
is clearly understood th a t the rules of the games are strictly observed” . In order to
20. G. Hicks, “Hong Kong on the Eve of Communist Rule”, a paper prepared for the panel 
discussion on the “Future of Hong Kong as a Market Economy” in the Annual Meeting of Wes­
tern Social Science Association, 24-27 April, 1985, at Fort Worth, p.15.
21. D. McMillen, “Hong Kong, China - Transformation in Transition?: Implications for 
Australia”, a paper presented at the Asian Studies Association of Australian 6th Biennial Con­
ference, University of Sydney, Sydney, 11-16 May, 1986.
22. N. Lee, “Nur noch 13 fette jahre?” ( “1997: The Case of Hong Kong’s Reunification with 
China”) GEO, no.5 (15 October, 1984), pp.58-59.
23. Ibid.
24. N.J. Miners, Government and Politics of Hong Kong, 4th edition, p.249.
25. N. Lee, “Nur noch 13 fette jahre?”.
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bring Hong Kong policies more into line with those in the PRC, the PRC authorities 
would seek to have some say in the decision-making processes of the local administration 
even before 1997/°  Such pressures would not encounter much resistance so long as the 
P R C ’s demands do not infringe upon specific parts of the Agreement. The British 
authorities, who will be withdrawing in 1997, would be unwilling to jeopardize 
Sino-British friendship just for the sake of insisting on adherence to provision of the 
Agreement as they interpret it. Logically, there would not be a ‘genuine’ autonomous
o  o
government for the Hong Kong SAR.
Indeed, the introduction of the principle of representative government in 1984 has 
been widely regarded as merely cosmetic and far from realizing true ‘local autonomy’. 
Walden criticizes it as a democratic m i r a g e ,b e c a u s e  the reforms amount to nothing 
more than replacing the appointed members with a few elected ones. Without 
redistributing any real power to the elected members, the executive has continued to 
control the political process. u Hicks takes the same view in his comment tha t
With one hand, the government encourages politicization through the massive 
promotion of elections but with the other it practically guarantees apathy by
o - i
ensuring that those elected are little more than powerless puppets. 1
In the short run, public expectations may be misled by the ‘democratic-autonomy 
illusion’. In the long run, public demands are not likely to be fulfilled, the result being 
“disappointments, disillusionment, loss of public confidence, and withdrawal of public 
support and participation” .*^ Seeing this, many people have come to believe that there 
is a Sino-British conspiracy behind the whole facade of political activity. Journalists like 
Derek Davies, Harvey Stockwin and Walter Easey have criticized the British for selling 
out the interests of the Hong Kong people. Chalmers Johnson has argued tha t  rising 
public expectations have been ‘mousetrapped’ in the ‘nationalist-unification dynamics’ of 
the P R C ’s united front strategies. Hicks has portrayed a ‘PRC-British-UMELCO 
alliance’, which allows the conservative Hong Kong business sectors to control the 
politicization process. Bueno de Mesquita has elaborated the notion further by 
predicting tha t  the Hong Kong big business firms will be willing to sacrifice civil liberties 
for the sake of preserving commercial freedom, drawing the conclusion tha t  the Hong 
Kong Agreement has only paved the way for an erosion of civil liberties, the prohibition
26. N.J. Miners, G overnm en t and P olit ics  o f  Hong K on g  4th edition, p.249.
27. Ibid. See also Robert Adley, All Change Hong K on g  (Poole: Blandford, 1984).
28. N. Lee, “Nur noch 13 fette jahre?” .
29. J. Walden, “Hong Kong Chases a Democratic Mirage” , A s ia n  Wall Street Journal  (7 
March, 1985).
30. Ibid. Walden considers that the civil servants were unwilling to relinquish power.
31. G. Hicks, “Hong Kong on the Eve of Communist Rule” , p.31.
32. Ibid.
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of political dem onstrations and open criticisms of the Chinese government.
W hat can be concluded on these m atters of judgem ent and speculation? Most 
studies of the subject agree th a t Hong Kong will not be allowed to  experience the kind of 
mobilization that was realized by other decolonizing societies because a ‘high level’ of 
local autonomy is unlikely to be attained. The presence of the PRC will alm ost certainly 
impose constraints on the degree of public participation in local adm inistration.
This study takes a slightly different view, arguing th a t the P R C ’s actions in 
1985-86 did serve to stim ulate further the politicization of the Hong Kong society in a 
rather unique way. While a highly literate, W estern-oriented populace has been created 
by the British educational system over a long period, a substantial class of well-off 
middle-class businessmen and professionals has emerged by taking advantage of the 
various economic opportunities available to them. These people are well aware tha t they 
have been enjoying many social and economic freedoms which are not enjoyed by the 
hundreds of millions of Chinese living under the Com m unist system. There is, indeed, a 
general awareness among the people of Hong Kong th a t their cultural, social, economic 
and political life is distinctly different from th a t of the PRC. The politicization process 
th a t developed in 1985-86 was precipitated, therefore, by a general feeling of 
apprehension about the incorporation of the territory into a Communist system and a 
widespread belief th a t any opportunities to influence the nature of th a t outcome should 
be seized while they are still open to the inhabitants of Hong Kong.
Since 1984-85, people in Hong Kong are increasingly concerned about the means by 
which the P R C ’s intervention in local affairs could be minimized. Their responses have 
shown th a t the local people are highly sceptical, if not suspicious, about the ultim ate 
intentions of the leadership in Beijing. Politically, this is expressed in terms of the 
debates over political reforms and some concrete adm inistrative issues. Economically, it 
is expressed in term s of m aintaining the prevailing laissez-faire  trading regime. This 
gives rise to a paradoxical, if not contradictory, situation. On the one hand, people 
expect the government to play an increasing role to improve the quality of life. On the 
other hand, they are highly suspicious of any over-expansion of governmental powers 
which may curb individual freedoms in the post-1997 situation. Moreover, any 
differences in the in terpretation of the Agreement can readily be perceived by the local 
people as a sign of a Sino-British conspiracy which might pave the way for political 
harassm ent in the future.
Arising out of this sense of uncertainty and lack of confidence in their future, 
various political forces have emerged with a view to influencing the course of political
33. B. Bueno de Mesquita, D. Newman and A. Rabushka, Forecasting Political Events, The 
Future o f  Hong Kong  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p.126.
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change. In order to attain  the highest possible level of local autonom y, the new emerging 
political activists have had to deal with two sets of authorities - the British-Hong Kong 
government and the PRC officials. While the more liberal members are putting pressure 
on the Hong Kong government for political reforms, they are trying to convince the PRC 
authorities th a t changes in the transitional period will not adversely affect China’s 
control over the SAR after 1997. However, if there is such a thing as a new ‘Hong Kong 
nationalism ’, of which there were some signs in 1985-86, it cannot be conceived as a 
united movement. Opposing the emergence of the liberal members are the conservative 
economic and professional sectors, who prefer to m aintain the sta tus quo with only 
minimal changes to the existing constitutional arrangem ents by 1997. The conservatives 
seek guarantees, however, not merely from B ritain, but increasingly from the PRC also, 
for the m aintenance of an essentially undemocratic and executive-oriented system of 
governm ent. In any case, various political forces have already been emerging since the 
two years of Sino-British talks, either to protect their vested interests or to protest 
against the dominance of the establishm ent. As a result, all those issues which were once 
socio-economic and adm inistrative in character have then become a source of political 
controversy.
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C H APTER 3
THE SINO-BRITISH TALKS ON THE F U T U R E  
OF HONG KONG A N D  THE EM ERG ENCE OF 
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN HONG K O NG  1982-84
IN T R O D U C T IO N
Mrs Thatcher’s visit to Beijing in September 1982 sparked off a chain of events 
which can now be seen as having precipitated an economic and political crisis in Hong 
Kong. Immediately after her visit, the British and Chinese governments became locked 
in contention over the question of sovereignty over Hong Kong. The British tried to 
convince the PRC authorities tha t  any change in the status quo of Hong Kong would 
upset the successful functioning of the economic system. The PR C side, however, 
revealed its determination to exert political control over Hong Kong from 1997 on, 
arguing that Hong Kong would continue to experience prosperity after China recovered 
sovereignty over the territory. No further negotiations were held for nearly a year, when 
Mrs Thatcher finally accepted defeat and acknowledged the PR C ’s claim to sovereignty 
over Hong Kong in July 1983 in a letter to Deng Xiaoping.* Yet the deadlock continued 
even after that date, with the British still attempting to negotiate the retention of some 
form of official presence in the territory after 1997. The impasse was broken only in late 
1983 when Britain recognized that there was no chance at all for her to retain 
administrative control over Hong Kong in the post-1997 period. At the beginning of 
1984, the two powers began to focus on a means of delineating a new political and 
administrative framework for Hong Kong that would provide for the maintenance of 
Hong Kong as a ‘flourishing and dynamic society’.
Throughout the period of diplomatic deadlock, the two powers were engaged in a 
war of words which seriously disturbed public confidence within the Hong Kong society. 
Public confidence was shaken not merely by the prospect of losing economic 
opportunities, however, but also by the fear that control would be exercised by a 
communist government under which the kinds of freedoms and liberties that the people 
were accustomed to enjoying would be taken away.
1. Except those Cantonese names used commonly in Hong Kong, romanization of the Chinese 
names and terms is based on the Pinyin system.
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Although Beijing continued to proclaim tha t  the future government of Hong Kong 
would exercise a high degree of local autonomy, people in Hong Kong slowly began to 
realize during 1983-84 that it was unrealistic to think of a local government in which the 
PRC did not attempt to exert some control. Still, political activists in Hong Kong 
hoped to exercise a certain degree of influence over any decisions about Hong Kong’s 
future by manipulating the bilateral relationship between the two governments. They 
also a ttempted to get themselves entrenched as a key element within the Hong Kong 
political system by playing off Britain and the PRC against one another. The former 
political passivity of Hong Kong now gave way to a modest degree of politicization of a 
very unconventional kind. While some people in Hong Kong looked towards the two 
powers to protect the status quo, others called for rapid political reforms in the 
transition period under the umbrella of the British administration. The controversy that 
arose between them was stimulated partly by the fact that until the end of the talks in 
September 1984, the two powers had failed to reach any consensus over the form of the 
future political system, thus leaving a lot of room for public debate about political 
reform in 1984-85.
THE B A C K G R O U N D  TO THE TALKS: SOCIETY  
A N D  POLITICS IN H O NG K O NG  BEFO R E 1982
Up to 1980, Britain continued to assert that the British administration in Hong 
Kong was established by the three treaties signed in the nineteenth century. The PRC 
had repudiated the unequal treaties, however, and claimed that Hong Kong was part of 
China’s sovereign territory. After becoming a member of the United Nations, the PRC's 
representative at the United Nations, Huang Hua, clarified in 1972 the PRC's policy 
regarding the territory, whose future, he said, would be settled uin an appropriate way
o
when conditions were ripe” /  But no formal arrangements were made between the two 
governments on the future of Hong Kong. In any case, the Hong Kong government 
continued to sell leases of land in the New Territories only for the period of the lease, 
which was to expire on 30 June. 1997. and property developers and owners of land had 
no guarantees tha t  their leases would be renewed after that date. This continued to cast 
a shadow over the policies and plans of the Hong Kong administration regarding 
economic projects within the territory.
With 1997 approaching, the colonial administration became more and more 
concerned that there might be a withdrawal of capital if the property developers were 
not assured of the extension of their holdings beyond that date. The former Governor of 
Hong Kong, Sir Murray MacLehose, made the first visit to Beijing by a member of the
2. Letter sent to the United Nations Special Committee of Colonialism by Ambassador Huang 
Hua, then China’s permanent representative at the United Nations, on 10 March, 1972.
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Hong Kong administration in March 1979 and brought back the words of Deng 
Xiaoping, the senior Vice-Premier, asking the investors in Hong Kong “to put their heart 
a t  ease” . In October of the same year, Hua Guofeng, then Chinese Premier, reassured 
the British in London tha t  China “would take into consideration the interests of the
9
investors there” in deciding the future of Hong Kong.°
Despite various verbal assurances from PRC and British diplomats, there was still 
no official arrangement on either side regarding Hong Kong’s future. Until 1981, indeed, 
this lack of confidence was not yet a major issue affecting the confidence of the investors 
in the territory. But in 1981, Hong Kong was experiencing the fifth year of an economic 
boom, particularly in the property market, which resulted in land in the New Territories 
being sold at unprecedentedly high prices. In 1981, the overall growth rate of GDP in 
Hong Kong was 10.4%, with a five-year average of 10.7%. Hong Kong’s real per capita 
income had risen bv 44% since 1975.3 4 5Then came a severe slump in the property market 
which triggered widespread concern about the future of the Hong Kong economy.
Towards the end of 1981. the economy of Hong Kong was seriously upset by the 
world economic recession. Exports of manufacturing goods to Europe, particularly to 
West Germany, declined dramatically by 11%. Protectionism developed in Europe, with 
the EEC imposing restrictions on imports from Hong Kong which it cut back by about 
10%.^ The property market started to be weakened and as many as 27,000 flats became 
vacant. Uncertainty about the future now gathered momentum, partly because of doubts 
aroused by the economic recession, but mainly because of the announcement in early 
1982 of Mrs Thatcher's intention to visit Beijing in September of that year to hold 
diplomatic talks on Hong Kong’s future. In the first three quarters of 1982, the 
stockmarket fluctuated considerably, although the Hang Seng index was able to 
maintain a level of between 1,100 and 1.400. After Mrs Thatcher's visit to Beijing in 
September, however, the index plunged to below 800.
Indeed, various other sources of British-Hong Kong tensions were already building 
up in Hong Kong, quite apart from the economic recession, thus accentuating the feeling 
of uncertainty about Hong Kong’s future. Matters like the resettlement of Vietnamese 
refugees in Hong Kong to Britain created frictions between the British government and 
the Hong Kong people. The unwillingness of the British to resettle the Vietnamese 
refugees in the United Kingdom called into question British claims to moral
3. In October 1980, Huang Hua met Lord Carrington and emphasized again the economic links 
between Hong Kong and Guangdong.
4. Far Eastern Econom ic Review, Year Book, 1980-1983.
5. Countries like France imposed restrictions on watch imports; after some unsuccessful negotia­
tions, Hong Kong brought the dispute to the G A T T  for settlement. A new international MFA was 
reached and Hong Kong concluded a bilateral agreement with the United States under it, al­
though the EEC cut back Hong Kong imports by 10 /U
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responsibility over Hong Kong. The White Paper on the British Nationality Bill which 
was issued on 30 July 1980 and enacted in October, further exaggerated the feeling of 
the Hong Kong people tha t  Britain was about to abandon its moral obligations to the 
people of the territory. According to the Bill, 2.6 million Hong Kong passport holders 
were categorized as British dependent territory citizens (BDTC), who had no right of 
entry to or abode in the United Kingdom. In view of political uncertainties of tha t  time, 
this aroused great resentment in Hong Kong because of the potential problems it posed 
for Hong Kong people travelling abroad after 1997. Grievances towards the introduction 
of the British Nationality Bill also indicated the unwillingness of the people of Hong 
Kong to be returned to PRC rule.
Distrust of the British gradually developed further in Hong Kong in 1981-82. 
Feelings about a ‘British sell-out/ were reinforced by other issues, such as the British 
refusal to support Hong Kong’s demand for more generous textile quotas from the EEC 
countries and the increase in charges for Hong Kong students studying in the United 
Kingdom. Indeed, the shelving of several major multi-million dollar projects which might 
have had to be extended beyond 1997 was also interpreted in the light of a presumed 
British retreat. For example, a proposal to construct a second airport at Cheklapkok off 
Lantau Island was dropped, pending the PR C ’s decision about another international 
airport in neighbouring Guangdong. The development of a new town at Tin Shui Wai in 
the northwestern part of the New Territories was shelved in 1981, even though the 
government had to buy itself out for HK$ 1.56 billion to the majority equity-holder in 
the China Resources Consortium in Hong Kong. Furthermore, a prime Central District 
site was sold to the Bank of China at about half of the then market price. All these 
incidents were immediately related bv the local press to their presumed political 
implications rather than simply to economic considerations.
Thus an atmosphere of uncertainty accentuated by economic recession and uneasy 
Sino-British relations was already building up in Hong Kong prior to Mrs Thatcher's 
visit to Beijing in September 1982. Public anxieties now began to grow over the prospect 
of Hong Kong’s incorporation into a communist ‘ty ranny’ when the talks began in 1982.
THE TALKS: M RS T H A T C H E R ’S VISIT TO BEIJING , S E P T E M B E R  1982
At the beginning of 1982, the agenda of the talks started to a t t rac t  public 
attention. A few months later, Britain became engaged in the Falklands War, which 
raised similar issues of self-determination and territorial sovereignty in the cases of 
British residual colonial territories. But it was generally believed that, Britain would be 
sensible enough not to apply the Falklands analogy to the solution of the Hong Kong 
problem, simply because the territory was inhabited mainly by the Chinese, whereas the 
Falklands Island was not inhabited by Argentinians. Moreover, Britain had never openly
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disputed China’s claim to sovereignty over Hong Kong. W hat concerned the British was 
that if no formal arrangements were made before the 1997 reversion of the New 
Territories, the British administration there would have to be terminated in accordance 
with the expiry date of the 1898 Convention of Peking. Thus, initiatives for talks over 
the 1997 lease came mainly from Britain.0
The PRC seemed to be less bothered about the m atter of the expiry date than the 
British, because it had already declared the unequal treaties nullified and sovereignty 
restored to China. The Chinese leaders attached more weight to the principle of 
territorial integrity, how'ever, although they regularly announced th a t  they would 
carefully take into account the special position of Hong Kong in any future 
arrangements. Actually, there were some signs in 1982 indicating th a t  the Chinese 
leaders might be prepared to maintain the status quo of Hong Kong into the post-1997 
period. The then Party Secretary-general. Hu Yaobang, for example, spoke in February 
1982 about the principle of ‘one-country, two systems’ as the basic approach for 
maintaining the status quo of Hong Kong as well as achieving territorial unification with 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau.
Prior to Mrs Thatcher’s visit to Beijing, there were high hopes indeed among the 
local people that Beijing might be willing to reach a compromise to let Hong Kong run 
as it was, although it was generally understood that China’s strategy toward Hong Kong 
was part of a high-priority policy to achieve national unification and territorial integrity. 
It was also believed tha t  China was preoccupied with economic and political 
modernization at home, and given Hong Kong's contribution to the success of the Four 
Modernization, Beijing was prepared to modify its priority in national unification. In 
May, Humphrey Atkins, deputy to then British Foreign Secretary. Lord Carrington, was 
reported as saying that
The Chinese ... did not give any assurances beyond the fact that the particular 
attributes of Hong Kong, its free port and its centre of business and commerce 
and trade, were going to be taken very much into account."
In regard to this statement, Chalmers Johnson analyzed British thinking at this time as 
follows
In this view, the British government, with the strong backing of the Hong Kong 
Chinese establishment, undertook to negotiate Hong Kong’s future in 1982 
because the timing seemed especially propitious. There was a Tory government 
in London, Mrs Thatcher had just fought and won the Falklands war, Deng 
Xiaoping seemed to be at the peak of his power, and China had launched a 
major campaign of economic reform and opening to the democracies. The
6. Far Eastern  Econom ic Review  (21 May, 1982), p.24.
7. Ibid.
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conditions seemed perfect to negotiate a perpetuation of British administration
o
in Hong Kong after the lease expired.
In September, the Sino-British talks on Hong Kong’s future were opened officially, 
with Mrs Thatcher making a three-day visit to Beijing between 22nd and 24th. But 
quite contrary to the general expectation that ‘something’ promising would be achieved 
a t  the negotiations, the two powers arrived at nothing more than an uninformative joint 
communique after the meeting which said that
The leaders of the two countries held far-reaching talks in a friendly 
atmosphere on the future of Hong Kong. Both leaders made clear their 
respective positions on the subject. They agreed to enter talks through 
diplomatic channels with the common aim of maintaining the stability and 
prosperity of Hong Kong.
Although the communique stated that the negotiations were held in a ‘friendly 
atmosphere’, there was apparently a good deal of uneasiness between them, for the New 
China News Agency (NCNA) reiterated on the same day tha t  “the Chinese 
government’s position on the recovery of the entire territory of Hong Kong was 
unequivocal and known to all” . The public quickly understood what was going wrong 
when Mrs Thatcher emphasized in a press conference in Hong Kong on the following day 
tha t  British rule in Hong Kong was established by the three treaties and could not be 
abrograted unilaterally by China. She w'as reported as saying that
Britain has three treaties. Two of those refer to sovereignty in perpetuity, one 
of them refers to a lease which ends in 1997. ... I believe they are valid as 
international law, and if countries try to abrograte treaties like tha t ,  then it is 
very serious indeed.9
Mrs Thatcher’s emphasis on the legality of the nineteenth century treaties 
surprised the local press in Hong Kong. The Far Eastern Economic Review  contended 
that too much emphasis on treaties was creating problems since it “would arouse 
Chinese nationalist sensibilities, awakening memories of imperialist humiliation of 
China” .10 In Britain. Roy Jenkins, Social Democratic Party leader, criticized Mrs 
Thatcher’s performance as “worse than would have been expected from any reasonably 
competent foreign secretary.” * 11 Johnson looked into the situation, writing that
It (the validity of the unequal treaties) was a subject tha t  should never have 
been mentioned. But once Thatcher raised the issue, Deng had to move at once 
to seize the high ground before his opponents could use it against him.
8. Chalmers Johnson, “The Mousetrapping of Hong Kong, a Game in Which Nobody Wins” , 
A sian  Survey, X X I V ( 9 )  (September 1984), p.895.
9. A siaw eek  (8 October, 1982), pp.27-28.
10. Far Eastern Economic Review  (1 October, 1982), p.10.
11. Far Eastern Economic Review  (8 October, 1982), p.9.
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According to this view, the real issue is not unification of the motherland but 
factional politics in Beijing, in which conflicting claims of patriotic purity are 
important weapons for both Deng and his opponents. As soon as Deng and 
Thatcher started talking about the legality of the treaties, all rationality about
1 o
the future of Hong Kong and its usefulness to China flew out the window.
Thus, Mrs Thatcher’s disastrous diplomatic position precipitated a war of words 
between Britain and the PRC, with PRC spokesmen at the NCNA (29 September) and 
Foreign Ministry (30 September) rebuking Mrs Thatcher for her public statements in 
Hong Kong, the result being tha t  the once optimistic public mood in Hong Kong 
suddenly changed and anxieties immediately developed among the Hong Kong people, 
who were already concerned over the secrecy of the talks. A so-called ‘crisis of 
confidence’ developed as a result of this strained diplomatic atmosphere. In the month 
after September 1982, the economic issue was overshadowed by this political 
uncertainty. Funds were quick to move offshore and on 5 October, the Hong Kong 
dollar hit its low'est record since 1973, falling to HK$ 6.47 to US$ 1. In the first week of 
October, the stockmarket collapsed, dropping 280 points in six trading days. Since then, 
the Hang Seng stock exchange index has fluctuated in accordance with the progress of 
the talks (see figure), generally reflecting the lack of public confidence about the 
on-going negotiations.
THE N O-TALKS PERIOD: SE PT E M B E R  1982 TO JULY 1983
The first round of official talks foreshadowed in the Deng-Thatcher communique 
was. in fact, not held until July 1983. During the 10 month interval that elapsed, no 
substantial negotiations occurred and each side firmly maintained its basic bargaining 
position. Instead of negotiating directly at this stage, the two governments endeavoured 
to strengthen their own positions by trying to win over public support among the Hong 
Kong people.
The M obilization Process: the British Side
Soon after the talks were held in September, several opinion groups, such as the 
Hong Kong Observers and the Hong Kong Belongers Association, called for greater 
respect for the Hong Kong people’s right to participate in any future talks (for further 
information of some of the groups and individuals, see Appendix I). Yet both powers 
refused to consider any direct participation by Hong Kong representatives in the 
negotiations in any way explaining tha t  Hong Kong was not, and would not, become an 
independent entity. Instead, the two governments now found themselves drawn into
12. Chalmers Johnson, “The Mousetrapping of Hong Kong. A Game in Which Nobody Wins” , 
p.896.
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competition with each other in their claims to represent the interests of the Hong Kong 
people. Mrs Thatcher, for example, reiterated the British commitment to and 
responsibility for the people of Hong Kong when she addressed a press conference held in 
Hong Kong on 25 September, 1982. This led the NCNA to criticize her comments, 
stating on 6 October that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China alone is in 
a position to make a statement to tha t  effect.” However, neither power mentioned any 
formal channels through which public opinion could be effectively solicited.
While Mrs Thatcher was in Hong Kong, she had claimed to be attentive to the 
views of the Hong Kong people from all walks of life. Yet the only people she met were 
the unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative Council (UMELCO) and 
representatives of the major business community, namely the Hong Kong General 
Chamber of Commerce, the Chinese Manufacturers’ Association and the Federation of 
Hong Kong Industries. The then Hong Kong Governor, Sir Edward Youde, in his annual 
policy speech to the Legislative Council on 6 October, also emphasized tha t  the process 
of public consultation had already begun through the UMELCO. although he indicated 
on 23 January, 1983, that only the Executive Council would be consulted on the 
progress of the negotiations, with the result that ordinary citizens never knew what 
views were being exchanged between the British side and the Hong Kong Executive 
Council.
In the annual debate on the policy speech of the Governor on 6 October, several 
Legislative Council members raised the 1997 issue; yet almost all of them failed to 
highlight the lack of confidence that was developing among the Hong Kong people. Some 
people like William Brown simply expressed their support for the position of Mrs 
Thatcher. Senior members like Lydia Dunn, Ho Kam-fai and Chan Kam-c.huen urged the 
local people to be patient and to have faith in the British negotiators as representatives 
of the interests of the Hong Kong people. John Swaine even suggested that the common 
aim of maintaining prosperity and stability could only be achieved by the continuation 
of British administration and maintenance of the existing institutions. Generally 
speaking, the debate at the Legislative Council failed completely to reflect the public 
mood, for it turned out to be merely supporting the British negotiators.
The Urban Council might have served as a sounding board for public opinion, 
since it had a longer history of elected representation. Yet its functions were limited to 
urban and civic affairs and the Hong Kong government made no attem pt to utilize this 
group of elected members in support of the British. Some of them, like Hilton 
Cheong-leen and Edmund Chow, who were also members of the Civic Association, spoke 
out in favour of a 30-year post-1997 transition period under the British administration. 
Yet various other members kept silent in order to avoid alienating either the British or 
the PRC authorities. In the annual debates in the Urban Council of January 1983, many
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councillors simply commented that they wanted to maintain the status quo regarding 
the future of Hong Kong, without giving that term any specific meaning.
If the British had been seriously interested in communicating with the people of 
Hong Kong on the 1997 issue, the 18 district boards which had just been set up in 1982 
might also have been used as an important channel to solicit local views on the future of 
Hong Kong, since one-third of the members were unofficial representatives elected at the 
district level. Yet up to the end of 1983, the Hong Kong government repeatedly refused
•I o
to allow district boards to discuss the future of Hong Kong.10 The Hong Kong officials 
believed tha t  the elected district members might make comments which would be 
embarrassing for the British and thus jeopardize the talks with Beijing. So the more 
outspoken elected members could only put forward their views in their individual private 
capacities.
All these facts indicated that the British side was not seriously concerned to utilize 
effectively its established consultative channels in Hong Kong to generate public support 
for its negotiating position, in part because it did not want to antagonize Beijing with 
such a provocative tactic. The weakness of the consultative system in Hong Kong was 
made very clear at the start of 1983 by the very fact that none of the advisory bodies 
were able to speak up for the interests of the local people. Even if these consultative 
bodies had been responsive to local wishes, they would have been rendered ineffective as 
channels of protest over the negotiations simply because their members were not allowed 
to participate in any way in the colonial government's preparations for further talks 
with Beijing. Moreover, those individuals who did speak up as members of the district 
boards, Urban Council or UMELCO found themselves criticized by the pro-PRC groups 
for being pro-British, precisely because their political status was regarded as a 
by-product of the colonial system.
Yet while the British authorities failed to utilize public opinion in support of their 
position, the Hong Kong administration did allow free and unfettered discussion of the 
1997 issue among the Hong Kong people to develop to a quite unprecedented degree. But 
these debates generated contradictory views, for opposed to those who were demanding a 
continued British presence were others who identified themselves with nationalism and 
the goal of self-administration under China’s sovereignty.
The Hong Kong Observers, for example, did serve to embarrass those who were 
calling for a continued British presence, when its members expressed support for 
‘autonomy within China’. This group primarily felt tha t  the territory should eventually
13. In October 1982, the Governor, Sir Edward Youde, explained that the district boards were 
only responsible for discussing district affairs. Unlike the Legislative Council, they were not a 
forum for the expression of opposition views.
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become part of China, but it also called for the people’s right of participation in 
preparing for local autonomy. In August 1982 it stated that
our plea is for autonomy within China, a voice for shaping our future ... The 
most important issue is to find an administrative solution which will preserve 
and enhance the confidence of Hong Kong people so that they can have a 
postive role to play ... the views of the people must be taken into account.14
The most fundamental question addressed by the Observers was how to ensure that 
Hong Kong people could play a role in deciding their own future. Nevertheless, the 
Observers still could not counter the prevailing communist-phobia among the people of 
Hong Kong at tha t  time. Indeed, the views of the Hong Kong people turned out at this 
time to be so diverse that the PRC authorities found themselves in a position to 
manipulate this disunited public opinion fairly easily to their own advantage.
The M obilization Process: the PR C  Side
Whether local people were aware of it or not, the PRC authorities started  to play 
a more active role in the politics of Hong Kong soon after Mrs Thatcher’s visit to Beijing 
in September 1982. Although there was a general reluctance among the local people to 
be ruled by the PRC, the Chinese authorities demonstrated much skill in steering 
various elements within the Hong Kong community to echo their policies and strategies 
at different stages of the talks. Over the two years of talks tha t  followed, the PRC 
proved very successful in drawing some local people away from their earlier support for 
the British administration. Their task was made easier by the fact tha t  the Hong Kong 
government was deliberately maintaining such a low profile on the m atte r  of soliciting 
public opinion.
During the period between 1982-84, the PRC authorities effectively established a 
dialogue with the local people by (l) inviting groups of people to Beijing; (2) releasing 
unofficial information to the local Chinese media in order to test public reactions; 
(3) urging any pro-PRC groups, individuals or other ‘nationalists’, to endorse the PRC's 
recovery of sovereignty over Hong Kong.
The PRC authorities invited various delegations from Hong Kong to Beijing with 
the aim of improving mutual understanding between the Hong Kong people and the 
Beijing policy-makers (see Appendix C). The first group to be invited to Beijing went in 
June 1982, when Deng Xiaoping met 12 Hong Kong representatives from various 
professional and economic sectors, assuring them that  the return of Hong Kong to the 
PRC would be accomplished in such a way that the kind of lifestyle and economic 
system to which the Hong Kong people were accustomed would be preserved. This first
14. South China Morning Post (13 August, 1982).
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‘summons’ became the model for subsequent visits by various delegations to Beijing. At 
tha t  time, this group’s visit did not receive much attention from the mass media, since 
its members were mainly regarded as ‘leftists’ in Hong Kong who represented only a very 
“small and atypical group from an overwhelmingly conservative society” . Among the 
local media, only one Chinese magazine, Pai Shing , reported the June 1982 delegation. 
Nevertheless, it was the first such exercise in a PRC campaign to tap ‘mass’ opinion. It 
was also the beginning of what seemed to be “a sincerely motivated effort to sound out 
the views of Hong Kong citizens on their own future to find a workable solution to the 
‘1997’ problem” .15
During the month after the September talks with Mrs Thatcher, Beijing 
authorities continued to sell their ideas to other delegations from Hong Kong. During his 
visit to Beijing on 31 October, 1982, Denny Huang, an Urban Councillor, was told of the 
possibility of a high level of autonomy for Hong Kong. On 1 November, 1982, Xi 
Zhongxun, Secretary-general of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, spoke, for the first time, about ‘gangren zhigang’ (‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong 
Kong’) with the delegates of the Trade Development Council of Hong Kong. By ‘gangren 
zhigang’, he meant tha t  the social and economic systems of Hong Kong would remain 
unchanged after China recovered its sovereignty over the territory. In late November, a 
factory owner, Huang Jian, was told by Liao Chengzhi, then head of the Hong Kong and 
Macau Affairs Office of the State Council, tha t  the PRC would recover sovereignty over 
Hong Kong no later than 1997, and he spoke of self-administration within a special 
administrative region. This was regarded as one of the major announcements on the 
subject by a Beijing official. By telling this to a commercial group, the PRC showed that 
it was anxious about maintaining the confidence of this vital sector of the economy, 
w'hich had become seriously disturbed by the uncertainty over Hong Kong’s future.16
The Chinese government continued to make use of these visits to Beijing to send 
back particular messages to the Hong Kong people unofficially. By doing so, it sought to 
stimulate public discussions of ‘gangren zhigang' in Hong Kong in order to convince the 
people of Hong Kong that this could be an acceptable solution for their future system of 
government. The concepts ‘gangren zhigang’ and ‘self-administration’ w'ere further 
elaborated to a group of the Hong Kong Federation of Students on 29 July, 1983, the 
first time that Beijing publicly expounded its plan for Hong Kong in substantial detail. 
It was as follows
1. Apart from defence and diplomatic issues. China will not interfere in Hong
Kong’s internal affairs, w'hich are the responsibility of the local administra­
tion.
15. A siaw eek  (16 July, 1982), p.10.
16. Far Eastern Economic Review  (26 November, 1982), p.24.
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2. Beijing will not send representatives to Hong Kong. Under certain 
conditions, it would be best if Hong Kong residents elect the future mayor or 
chief administrator, who would be approved by the central government. 
Approval is subject only to one condition - tha t  the person is a patriot ( that 
is, a supporter of China’s reunification) - who has prestige and public 
support but who does not have to be pro-Beijing. A pro-Taiwan rightist or 
even a Trotskyite could qualify as long as he has public support in the form 
of votes.
3. Hong Kong’s legal system can be retained and the territory will have its own 
legislative powers. The territory’s legislative structure can be negotiated, and 
as long as its highest court of appeal is within Hong Kong, it can have its 
own independent legal system. China’s legal system will not be applied to 
Hong Kong and vice versa.
4. Hong Kong’s way of life will not change.
5. The people of Hong Kong can keep their freedoms - of the press, speech, 
assembly, movements and others.
6. Activities of Guomindang followers, Trotskyites and others will not be 
restricted unless they engage in sabotage.
7. Internal security will be the responsibility of the local administration and the 
existing Hong Kong police force.
8. Hong Kong’s capitalist system, free port and financial-centre sta tus will be 
maintained. It can issue its own currency and the Hong Kong dollar will 
remain freely convertible. However, the design of notes and coins (which now 
carry the word 'colony’ and the head of Queen Elizabeth 11) will change.
9. While diplomatic issues will be handled by Beijing, Hong Kong will have a 
great deal of power to deal with its own foreign affairs in economic and 
cultural m atters and other international activities. The local authority can 
also issue its own travel documents.
10. Social reforms will not, be imposed by Beijing but will be carried out when
1 7there is general consensus among local residents from all walks of life.
Chinese-language magazines, such as the Wide Angle , The Mirror. Cheng Ming  
and The N ine ties , were also used occasionally to release PRC policy sta tem ents to test 
public opinion and arouse public attention on various unofficial proposals. Some of these 
magazines became active supporters of the PRC campaign. For example, the September 
1982 issue of The Mirror , a pro-PRC magazine, published 10 points suggesting how 
capitalism could be maintained in Hong Kong after 1997.^  Another one, the Wide 
Angle ^  emphasized that Hong Kong’s status quo could be preserved by practising
17. See English version, translated in the Far Eas tern Economic Review  (18 August, 1983), 
p. 14.
18. Towards 1997: Special Issues on the Future o f  Hong Kon g  (Tongxiang 1997: Xianggang  
qiantu wenti zhuanji) (Hong Kong: The Mirror Publishers, 1983), pp.30-31.
19. The Wide Angle (16 October, 1982), no.121, p p .10-18.
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‘gangren zhigang’. The Wide Angle also published an opinion poll indicating that a 
majority (61%) of the Hong Kong respondents favoured ‘gangren zhigang1 under China's 
sovereignty. Sometimes, these magazines also refuted the call for a continued British 
administration. The December 1982 issue of Cheng Ming  raised doubt about the 
argument tha t  prosperity could only be enjoyed under the British administration, 
pouring cold water on the idea tha t  only the colonial government was capable of 
maintaining the prosperity of the territory. It also accused the Hong Kong government 
and financiers of aggravating the financial crisis in order to lend force to the British 
government’s tactics at the negotiating table, thus enabling the British side to keep the 
initiative in arguing for a continued British administration in Hong Kong. In echoing 
this view, the pro-PRC Hong Kong Chinese Chamber of Commerce condemned the Hong 
Kong government’s economic policy wrhich gave rise to excessive land price rises and 
general inflation in Hong Kong. All these unofficial channels helped to promote a belief 
in a British conspiracy among the local people, thus playing down Beijing’s role in 
bringing about the economy’s collapse during the last quarter of 1982, and pushing the
o n
blame on to the British and their accomplices/0
E m ergence o f P o lit ica l A ctiv it ie s  from  the 1997 Issu e
Generally speaking, the PRC officials launched effective mobilization processes 
which enabled them to establish close dialogue and communication with a wide spectrum 
of the population in Hong Kong society. Gradually, people in Hong Kong began to 
accept the Chinese proposal ‘gangren zhigang’ as a possible solution to the future of 
Hong Kong. The British mobilization tactic was much weaker, emphasizing the opinion 
of only a small group of appointed unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative 
Councils, and tha t  of the big businessmen in particular. Thus the British approach left 
the general public panicking over the on-going negotiating process. In fact, both British 
and PRC officials were able to generate different levels of support (as well as distrust) 
from among the people of Hong Kong.
The PRC campaign primarily attracted the support of those who upheld the 
principle of Chinese sovereignty. In October 1982, the Student Union of the Hong Kong 
Polytechnique supported the PR C ’s reassertion of sovereignty over Hong Kong. This 
statement was treated as of little significance in Hong Kong, yet it was published in full 
in the NCNA press released in Beijing. Many people in Hong Kong then began to 
suspect that Beijing “might use the issue of national integrity to whip up anti-British
nt
sentiments if the talks go wrong. *
20. Far Eas tern  Economic Review  (29 January, 1983), p.32.
21. Far Eas tern  Economic Review  (8 October, 1982), p.9.
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The group known as the Meeting Point, inaugurated in January 1983, was the first 
among the political organizations to be formed to focus on the 1997 issue. It was also the 
first group to endorse the feasibility of the ‘gangren zhigang’ formula. Yet it went a step 
further in proposing more concretely ‘gangren minzu zhigang’ or ‘Hong Kong people 
democratically governing Hong Kong’. The view of the Meeting Point was then taken up 
by another group, the New Hong Kong Society (NHKS). But unlike the Hong Kong 
Observers, who mainly represented opinions of the educated middle classes and 
professionals, these two groups could be considered as grassroots organizations. As such, 
they were mainly pressure groups which claimed to represent the interests of 
lower-income people. While the Observers called for the maintenance of the existing 
socio-economic system, the grassroots organizations argued that substantive social 
reforms should be brought about by the future Hong Kong government. In Spring 1983, 
the NHKS sent a delegation to Beijing to propose a socio-political reform programme for 
the post-1997 government. In arguing tha t  the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong 
should be based on the satisfaction of all groups of people in society, the NHKS called 
for democratic elections to the future political processes.
The established business sectors in Hong Kong were very suspicious of the various 
grassroots organizations’ demands for social reforms, however. The Hong Kong 
Economic Journal accused the Meeting Point of betraying the interests of the Hong 
Kong people, while the Far Eastern Economic Review  commented that, “the Meeting
• • . . . . . 99Poin t’s invocation of Chinese nationalism stirred more anger than support.” Groups 
such as the Hong Kong Belongers Association, which consisted of members of the civil 
service and the establishment, also expressed their reservations about the democratiza­
tion of the administration in Hong Kong.
The PRC authorities could be said to have stirred up considerable local discussion 
of the ‘gangren zhigang’ concept in 1983. By their propaganda about the role Hong Kong 
people could play, they were able to help in formulating the concept of a special 
administrative region. This gave rise to hopes that Hong Kong might still be able to 
keep its way of life and economic system under the P R C ’s sovereignty. Some people 
started to believe tha t  the PRC was determined to re-establish its sovereignty while 
allowing the preservation of Hong Kong’s prosperity.
Nevertheless, the PRC authorities were still unable to convince those people in 
Hong Kong, particularly many of the local businessmen, entrepreneurs and the educated 
middle classes, who believed that the existing social and economic system could not 
survive without a British ad m in is t ra t io n /0 For these people, the basic question 
remained: Could “self-administration under the PR C’s sovereignty” work?
22. Far E astern  Econom ic Review  (3 February, 1983), p.22.
23. A siaw eek  (23 August, 1983), p.23.
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Anxiety among these groups of people continued to build up as the PRC 
progressively spelled out its plans for Hong Kong. In December 1982, the National 
People’s Congress passed a new national Constitution, Article 31 of which provided for 
the setting up of any special administrative regions (SARs) when necessary. The 
endorsement of the new constitution was widely perceived in terms of its relevance to 
Hong Kong’s future. Yet it was generally regarded by many local people “as an
n  i
inadequate assurance of Peking’s intention to maintain prosperity and stability’’/ 4 
Besides, a B eijing Review  article was quoted by the NCNA on 19 April, 1983, to the
o r
effect that “no nation can sacrifice sovereignty for prosperity” / 0 This statement 
immediately reinforced the doubts prevailing in Hong Kong about the P R C ’s claim to 
‘maintain prosperity and stability’ there.
In 1983, it was widely reported that an exodus of professionals and executives from
o / »
Hong Kong had b e g u n /0 for political uncertainty was still the major factor contributing 
to the lack of confidence in economic investment. In the first quarter of 1983, exports of 
manufacturing goods continued to decline and the value of the Hong Kong dollar 
dropped again to a new low of 6.83 against the US dollar.
A group of ‘Young Professionals' was invited to Beijing in May 1983 at a time of 
such an atmosphere of doubt. In their position paper, they expressed a lack of confidence 
in the PR C ’s offer of ‘gangren zhigang', stating tha t  the present capitalist system in 
Hong Kong could not be maintained after Hong Kong was returned to a communist 
regime. They argued that the shadow of communism had given rise to the crisis of 
confidence, and thus the political uncertainty prevailing had led to economic fluctuations 
and a serious brain drain. They therefore contended that Beijing's proposals for 
self-administration were not feasible.^'
The significance of the Young Professionals’ trip lay not so much in the content of 
their discussions as in the nature of the contacts involved. The members of this group 
consisted of leading figures of the various professions and businesses in Hong Kong, 
including industrialists, bankers, lawyers and journalists. More importantly, the group 
was led by three Hong Kong Legislative Councillors, Allen Lee. Selina Chow, and 
Stephen Cheong. Although the PRC authorities accepted them only in their private
24. Far Eastern  Econom ic Review  (5 May. 1983). p.12.
25. Ibid.
26. The O rien ta l  D a ily  reported on 11 August, 1983, that in 1982-83, 3,000 people immigrated  
to Britain, which was a 51% increase over the figure for 1981. The same report claimed that at 
least 80% of the doctors in Hong Kong were planning to leave because of uncertainties about the 
future. On 25 August, 1983, the Wah K i v  Yat Po reported the results of a survey produced by the 
Hong Kong University Convocation. It, said that less than 40% of the Hong Kong University 
graduates would remain in Hong Kong if Hong Kong was returned to China after 1997.
27. See position paper submitted by the Young Professionals Group to Xi Zhongxun during 
their visit to Beijing, May 1983.
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capacities, the trip became an unofficial contact between the PRC authorities and the 
appointed unofficial members of the Hong Kong government.
The position paper put forward by the members of this group proved extremely 
embarrassing to the PRC authorities at a time of continued diplomatic deadlock. 
Various pro-PRC groups in Hong Kong, like the Hong Kong Federation of Trade 
Unions, therefore condemned the Young Professionals as pro-British and stated their 
confidence in ‘Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong’. Thus the views of the 
Legislative Council group initiated yet another surge of debates among the local people 
about the feasibility of ‘gangren zhigangb
Soon after the position paper of the Young Professional group was published, the 
students of the Chinese University of Hong Kong expressed their nationalist sentiments 
and confidence in the feasibility of ‘gangren zhigangb The statement of the students was 
immediately quoted by a PRC paper, Zhongguo Ribao; their views were utilized by the 
pro-PRC commentators, however, to attack the Young Professionals, adding tha t  these 
people had expressed their confidence in ‘managing’ their future affairs, thus disputing 
the continuation of a British presence in Hong Kong. But in its efforts to mobilize 
support, the PRC simply classified the opinions of the local people into two types: those 
‘nationalists’ who supported the PR C ’s claim to sovereignty over Hong Kong, and those 
‘pro-British’ elements who expressed a lack of confidence in the PR C ’s sovereignty. This 
left little scope for those groups which were seeking to find an intermediate position.
The PRC side continued to elaborate unilaterally what now seemed to be an 
increasingly complete set of policies for Hong Kong’s future. However, its assurances of 
‘gangren zhigang’ could not calm the public anxiety in Hong Kong about a communist 
takeover. The British, in contrast to the PRC's increasingly active mobilization of public 
opinion in Hong Kong, remained silent in the public debates during this stage of 
proceedings, a ttem pting merely to press the PRC into agreeing to a continued British 
presence after 1997. And gradually they came to realize tha t  the stance Mrs Thatcher 
had adopted in September 1982 was untenable in the face of China’s new assertiveness 
on the sovereignty issue. So in order to enable the negotiations to be resumed, Mrs 
Thatcher finally acknowledged the PR C ’s claim over Hong Kong's sovereignty in July 
1983.
THE TALKS: JU LY  1983 TO J A N U A R Y  1984
When the talks between the two governments were resumed on 12 July, 1983. the 
general state of Sino-British relations was still very uneasy. It was widely believed that 
Britain and the PRC were still locked in contention over the issues of administration
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o  o
and sovereignty, with Britain still seeking to retain a role after 1997.
The first round of the talks (12-13 July) was briefly described in a joint statement 
as ‘constructive and beneficial’, but the second round only as ‘beneficial’, signifying that 
no progress had been made. The third and fourth rounds on 2-3 August and 22-23 
September respectively, were reported as merely ‘discussing’ the issues, which were taken 
to indicate a deadlock in the negotiations (see Appendix B). In response, the Hong Kong 
dollar dropped to a record low of of HK$ 9.5 against the US dollar on 24 September, and 
the price of gold sprang up to HKS 4,750 a tael. The Hang Seng stockmarket index fell 
by 63.58 points, hitting its lowest point since January 1982. In order to prevent a total 
collapse of the economy, the Hong Kong Financial Secretary, Sir John Bremridge, 
announced that the Hong Kong dollar would be pegged to the US dollar at HK$ 7.80.
In spite of public anxiety in Hong Kong, the war of words continued between the 
two negotiating teams. Public opinion in Hong Kong now became an im portant part of 
the propaganda war, with each side claiming to be attentive to the wishes of the Hong 
Kong people. More significantly, both sides now started to take note of grassroots 
support as an important part of the public opinion game. This manipulation contributed 
significantly to the emergence of a democratic movement in Hong Kong, with various 
groups now beginning to demand greater public participation in the political processes.
T h e E m erg en ce  o f  th e  D e m o c r a t ic  M o v e m e n t
After July 1983, Hong Kong officials began to modify their former low profile in 
the public debates about Hong Kong’s future. They started to accept public invitations 
to exchange opinions on the question of political reform. Some UMELCO members met 
district board members to discuss each others’ views about the future of Hong Kong. It 
was commonly believed tha t  the Hong Kong government was trying to be more ‘open' in 
order to correct the prevailing impression that it was disregarding public opinion. 
Whether intentional or not, the active participation of the Hong Kong government in 
public discussions of political reforms had the effect of generating much enthusiasm in 
the matter.
A seminar organized bv the Hong Kong Federation of Students Unions in August 
1983 represented the first open dialogue between Hong Kong officials, UMELCO 
members and grassroots leaders. During the debate, a member of the UMELCO, Selina 
Chow, reiterated the general position of the Young Professionals, casting doubts on the
28. Asiaweek  (16 September, 1983). p.49. See also Far E as tern  E conom ic Review  (20 October, 
1983), p.29, which wrote that uthe British negotiators’ line is that an administrative role for 
Britain is necessary to ensure the continuation of the current system which has allowed Hong 
Kong to become an economic success. Without some form of British participation in the post-1997 
civil machinery of Hong Kong, Hong Kong cannot continue to prosper.”
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O Q
P R C ’s sincerity about respecting local op in ion / Other participants in the seminar 
expressed the opposite view, one of them, the chairman of Meeting Point, Lau 
Nai-keung, even asserting that Chow could not claim to represent the opinions of the
9  r\
Hong Kong people because she was appointed rather than elected/' That view was 
supported by other groups a t the seminar, like members of the New Hong Kong Society, 
the People’s Council on Public Housing Policy, the Society for Community 
Organizations, the Hong Kong Observers, the Association for Democracy and the 
Society for Social Research. With the exception of the Hong Kong Observers, all of these 
were members of grassroots organizations or pressure groups.
The democratic movement started to gain ground as it gathered support from 
other groups with different political backgrounds. The pro-GMD groups were not 
officially supported by the Taiwan government and only some of their individual leaders 
were in fact connected with the Taiwan officials. Groups like the UI Love Free Hong 
Kong” Campaign Committee and the Hong Kong Self-Salvation Action Movement
o  I
claimed to represent the refugees from the PRC and were basically just 
anti-communist. Others like the Association for Democracy, the Alliance for Democracy 
and Freedom, and the Alliance for Democracy and Self-government were ideologically 
closer to the Sun Yet Sen philosophy of unification according to the Three People's 
Principles. Sometimes, it was difficult to perceive the pro-GMD orientation of these 
groups. The U1 Love Free Hong Kong” Campaign C om m ittee^  supported the sta tus  
quo. national unification, human rights and political freedom /' '  stressing tha t  the Hong 
Kong people were unwilling to accept communist rule. And it also supported the British 
position in the talks, saying tha t  Britain had a moral responsibility to represent the 
interests of the Hong Kong people. The group also supported the grassroots’ demands for
9 a  m
democracy and reform, with its chairman, Chan Kun-wah, stating in an interview that 
he considered the Hong Kong people should make use of their British connection to 
sustain their existing social and economic status as well as to promote democratic 
reforms.
The Marxist Revolutionaries and the Trotskyite October Review  also supported 
the demand for democracy and reform, although they were not associated with the
29. Asiaweek  (30 September, 1983), p.44.
30. Lau Nai-keung, “How to Realize a Democratic Local Autonomy” , a speech to the Hong  
Kong Week Seminar ,  organized by the Students Unions of the University of Hong Kong (28 
August, 1983).
31. Interview with its chairman, Chou Hing-chuen (20 September. 1985).
32. Interview with Chan Kun-wah, Chairman of the “I Love Free Hong Kong” Campaign Com­
mittee (25 September, 1985).
33. See the Love Free Hong K o n g ” Campaign Commi t t ee ,  Special Issue,  no.l (November  
1983). See also a statement by the Committee at a public gathering (29 October, 1983).
34. Interview with Chan Kun-wah (25 September. 1985).
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grassroots organization; but their arguments were also predicated upon mass actions. It 
was sometimes difficult to distinguish them, too, from the grassroots organizations. 
Although the grassroots organizations were ‘anti-official’ in attitude, their politics of 
community movement emphasized their ‘non-political’ nature. They claimed to represent 
the welfare of the people, but they were not organized to promote an anti-colonial 
ideology. The Marxist Revolutionaries and the Trotskyites were different from the 
grassroots organizations in tha t  they put forward anti-colonial slogans when they were
o r
involved in the social movements. However, in the debates on democratization, they 
approached and supported the grassroots organizations. °
By the end of 1983, the middle-class organizations also began to add support to 
the democratic movement. The Hong Kong Observers’ position paper sent to Beijing in 
December probably reflected the fundamental concerns of this group of the Hong Kong 
people. Their position paper called for the British to accept the obligation to ensure that 
they did not leave behind a political vacuum when departing. Such an obligation would 
mean, they asserted, (l)  securing an agreement that was acceptable to the people of 
Hong Kong: (2) facilitating a smooth transition from one government to another 
through internal reforms, and (3) securing recognition of Hong Kong’s future status with 
the assistance of the PRC government and the continued participation by Hong Kong in
<9 *r
the international community as a separate en tity .01 It also put forward an interpretation 
of the term ‘local autonom y’, which it interpreted as entailing a promise th a t  the central 
government in Beijing would not interfere in the administration of Hong Kong after 
1997. Logically, it followed from this that the administration should be democratically 
elected, hence truly representative of and accountable to the people of Hong Kong.
This view was commonly adopted by the middle-class groups, who would have 
preferred to see the existing system unchanged after 1997, but they had no real 
confidence in the PRC's promises. Thus, they looked for guarantees of the PRC's 
non-intervention in the internal administration of Hong Kong. Members of the Young 
Professionals, for example, said they would accept the feasibility of ‘gangren zhigang’ if, 
and only if, they were convinced that the PRC was prepared not to intervene in the 
internal affairs of Hong Kong after 1997. These people therefore supported democracy
35. On 10 October, 1983, the Marxist Revolutionaries protested at the office of the New China 
News Agency in Hong Kong. They displayed anti-colonial slogans and demanded democratic self- 
rule.
36. In September 1984, about 90 grassroots organizations called for direct elections. The central 
committee of the mass gathering rejected the request by the members of the Trotskyist October 
R eview  to participate. In 1985, after a member of the October R eview  was elected as a member of  
the Kwun Tong district board, individual grassroots members began to change their attitude  
towards the Trotskyites. So, the people at large found it difficult to distinguish the Marxists and 
the Trotskyites from the grassroots leaders.
37. The Hong Kong Observers, Position  Paper (5 May, 1984).
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and reform because they felt tha t  a future government should be able to represent local 
interests and to bargain with the PRC on the terms of local autonomy.
There had earlier been a popular belief amongst some Hong Kong people that the 
PRC authorities would be the major obstacle to the democratization of the political 
system in Hong Kong, since they would suspect such change as a  colonial conspiracy. 
Yet the PRC authorities themselves had to be careful to avoid alienating those who 
supported China’s sovereignty. In fact, the PRC officials were at this time actively 
mobilizing the support of the nationalists in Hong Kong, thus they were not at this stage 
trying to discredit the calls from the grassroots organizations for democracy and reform. 
At one time the leftist papers made use of these ‘local views’ to support the P R C ’s 
recovery of Hong Kong’s sovereignty in order to criticize the pro-British interests as 
‘colonial’. Backing for the Meeting Point, for example, was given by the local pro-Beijing
oo
press, although while highlighting the nationalist appeal of the Meeting Point, the 
leftist papers played down the demand for democracy. In a way, the democratic 
movement was helping the PRC in 1983 to discredit the legitimacy of the colonial 
authorities and their right to speak on behalf of the Hong Kong people.
But the PRC officials did not spell out a consistent policy regarding Beijing’s 
a ttitude towards democratic self-government. At a reception for an NHKS delegation in 
February 1983, Liao Chengzhi was non-committal about progressive socio-economic, 
changes and democratization of the future Hong Kong administration. In responding to 
the NHKS’s demands, Liao Chengzhi passed the message in March, via a group of Hong 
Kong educationalists, tha t  China preferred consultation rather than elections in Hong 
Kong. However, some PRC officials also claimed to support ‘democracy’ for the future 
Hong Kong government towards the end of 1983. In his reply to an open letter of the 
Students Union of the Hong Kong University, Zhao Ziyang supported the students in 
their claims for ‘Hong Kong people democratically governing Hong Kong’.39 In 
December 1983, the Hong Kong Observers returned from their delegation to Beijing with 
an impression that the PRC had agreed to allow the future government to be formed bv 
‘elections’. Likewise, on their return from a trip to Beijing in June 1984, a group of 
so-called ‘social activists’ said they believed that PRC officials would not object to a
38. Far E astern  Economic Review  (3 February, 1983), p.23.
39. Hong Kong LJniversity Students Unions, Open Letters to Xu Jiatun, and Sir Phillip 
Hadden-Cave, see Pai S h in g , no.55 (1 September, 1983), p.7. See also Wen Wei Pao (15 Septem­
ber, 1983), whose editorial recounted an interview with Xu Jiatun, the Director of the New China 
News Agency in Hong Kong, with the Hong Kong University students on 12 September, 1983. It 
reported that Xu interpreted the term ‘democracy’ as meaning freedom of speech, association and 
meetings. But strikes would affect the stability of the society. ‘True democracy’ was only made 
possible under the socialist system.
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democratic government if the Hong Kong people themselves so d em anded .^  All these 
evidences created an impression among some ‘democrats’ tha t  the PRC authorities were 
not opposed to a significant degree of popular participation in the administration of the 
capitalist system before and after 1997.41
The inconsistent views on democracy expressed at this time by various Chinese 
leaders cast doubt among the people of Hong Kong, however, about China’s promises for 
‘gangren zhigang’. Yet, the PRC officials were well aware that the campaign for 
democratic self-government in Hong Kong was not a united movement, but was deeply 
divided by differences in individual perceptions about the incorporation of Hong Kong 
into a communist system. The grassroots members, for example, disagreed among 
themselves about how far they should go in co-operating with the PRC. Some members 
like Fung Kin-kee, Director of the People’s Council, and Yeung Sum, Vice-chairman of 
the Meeting Point, were more optimistic about convincing the PRC officials over the 
development of democratic self-government, whereas other people, like Lau Chin-sek, 
Director of the Christian Industrial Committee, were still suspicious of the communists’ 
motives in allowing true local autonomy. Although these people had a common goal in 
the major socio-economic reforms they were seeking, the debates on the feasibility of 
‘gangren zhigang’ immediately had the effect of splitting them.
It was the grassroots leaders who promoted a democratic movement most actively, 
believing that their strength depended primarily on mass actions. But these people, 
while emphasizing their mass base, proved unable to mobilize mass support effectively in 
taking any significant action over the 1997 issue. In fact, they were as yet unable even to 
transform the issues relating to material welfare into effective political issues involving 
the public at large, 1 and thus they could do little more than address the specific needs 
of ordinary citizens concerning their quality of life.
Still, these different political elements were becoming amalgamated into a single,
40. Upon their return, the members of the delegation concluded that the PRC officials did not 
have a clear picture about ‘democracy’. They were still very suspicious about its ‘western5 con­
notations. The PRC officials replied to the group that “under the British administration, Hong 
Kong people would not enjoy true democracy. In Hong Kong, democracy would begin with the 
drafting of the Basic Law. During the process, local people would arrive at common goals and 
principles55. In their interpretation, the PRC suspected that democratization before 1997 would 
only develop pro-British elements as influential figures in the post-1997 SAR. So a member asked, 
“Would it be possible to develop a democracy if Hong Kong people themselves (not the British) 
demanded democratization?” In view of this situation, the PRC authorities had to support it 
because they claimed to respect local opinion. From author’s interviews with Chang Ka-man, 
chairman of the NHKS, and Fung Kin-kee, Director of the People’s Council, in 1985.
41. Being interviewed by the As iaweek , Fung Ho-lap, the head of one of the pressure groups, 
Society for Community Organization, said that “if by 1997, Hong Kong is effectively run by an 
Executive Council and Legislative Council which have elected members, Peking will be the more 
easily persuaded that it is best to leave the system intact” (4 November, 1983), p.43.
42. Interview with Lau Chin-sek in the Wide Angle , no .122 (16 November, 1982), pp.28-29.
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though highly volatile, democratic movement by the end of 1983. This was made 
possible by the fact tha t  public opinion had started to shift towards focussing on the 
creation of a highly autonomous local government on the basis of recognizing the PR C’s 
sovereignty. Nevertheless, various supporters of the democratic movements failed to 
come into association with each other because of mutual distrust and suspicion. 
Basically, the grassroots organizations distrusted the middle-class members as 
representing established interests, believing tha t  they had been co-opted by the Hong 
Kong government in order to exploit the rights of the poor people. The grassroots 
organizations themselves were in turn distrusted by the Hong Kong establishment, the 
commercial sectors, as well as by the PRC authorities for touting for changes in the 
status quo before 1997. Thus the debates over the 1997 issue began to reveal potential 
tensions among different groups in Hong Kong society, particularly because there was a 
lack of effective leadership among various groups of political activists a t  this crucial time 
of incipient changes in Hong Kong. The situation in 1984 was to prove even more 
confusing when various UMELCO members tried to take initiatives to gain the 
leadership in order to revive their discredited public image. But in the course of their 
taking these initiatives, tensions between the UMELCO members, political groups and 
the PRC and the British authorities became more apparent, thus worsening the crisis of 
leadership still further.
THE TALKS IN EARLY 1984
Around the end of 1983 and early 1984, the Sino-British talks entered a new stage. 
In January 1984, The Sunday T im es  (22 January) and The International Herald 
Tribune (24 January) reported that Mrs Thatcher had concluded tha t  there was no 
chance for Britain to retain administrative control over Hong Kong after 1997. She was 
advised that, given the impossibility of defending Hong Kong, it was better to accept 
Chinese demands and then get the best guarantees possible for Hong Kong from Beijing. 
Thus the British were said to be pressing for some sort of arrangement which would 
protect Hong Kong from direct administrative intervention by Beijing. Britain now 
started to talk about how best to preserve Hong Kong's future as a ‘liberal 
Western-style economy in a communist setting*.
At this stage the British officials themselves started to welcome the demand for 
democratic reform. As such, it was widely suggested tha t  the British negotiators were 
trying to ensure that the territory would survive the transfer back to the PRC with 
something like the existing system still intact. In order to avoid criticism from members 
of Parliament that the British government was selling out Hong Kong to a communist 
tyranny, some reform of the political system was now believed to be necessary to allow 
the Hong Kong people a greater say in the run-up to 1997. In February, The Times  
(London) editorial represented this line of thought in Britain at tha t  time by saying that
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Britain should replace the colonial system of government in Hong kong with a 
form of democracy before it returns the colony to China ... Before China takes 
overall control of Hong Kong, steps should be taken to create a suitable 
political framework for the local self-government to which Peking says it is 
committed. More democracy in Hong Kong will give the people of the colony 
strength and self-confidence in their future dealings with China. It will also
i  o
enable the Chinese government to deal more easily with Hong Kong. °
In Hong Kong, even the colonial officials now started to propagate the possibility 
of political reforms. In January, the Financial Secretary, Sir John Brembridge, said that 
“direct election to the main government bodies was only a question of time” .44 In mid 
February, the Chief Secretary, Sir Philip Haddon-Cave, announced th a t  there would be 
elections to the Legislative Council, the district boards and the Urban Council. 
Elections would also be introduced to a newly proposed Regional Council in the New 
Territories, the function of which was similar to the Urban Council. Then various 
members of the UMELCO, like Selina Chow and Allen Lee, came out with calls for the 
active participation of the Hong Kong people so that their views could be more 
effectively represented.
All these developments gave new stimulus to the democratic movement. After 
January 1984, some grassroots members actively discussed among themselves the 
possibility of forming an alliance.45 Although these groups had different goals behind a 
democratic system, they were able to echo each other in supporting broadly the notion of 
political reform.
THE FINAL STAGE OF THE TALKS: APRIL-SEPTEMBER 1984
On 21 April, 1984, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, declared officially tha t  it would not. be realistic to think of an 
agreement th a t  would provide for continued British administration in Hong Kong after 
1997. In a press conference, Howe explained that the British objectives were, instead, to 
look for an arrangement based on the Chinese concept of a high degree of local 
autonomy for Hong Kong for 50 years. This meant that a framework of arrangements 
would be devised which provided for the maintenance of Hong Kong as a flourishing and 
dynamic society, based on an international agreement that would be formally recorded.
The talks then entered into a final stage in which discussions were focussed on the 
concrete details for arranging the transition. Public attention was now' guided by the
43. The Tim es  (London) (24 February. 1984).
44. Interview with Sir John Brembridge in The G uardian  (18 January, 1984), p.7.
45. There were discussions among the New Hong Kong Society, the Society for Community  
Organization, the Meeting Point and some other religious and student bodies to form into an 
alliance of grassroots members.
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basic reality that Britain had virtually conceded to the PRC standpoint on the issue of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, attention shifted to a search for guarantees 
from both powers about the maintenance of the existing life-style. Between April and 
September, many more local professional groups and associations organized delegations 
to Beijing, most of them now hoping to obtain guarantees from the top Chinese officials 
to allow the specific practices of their professions to be maintained. Political activists 
argued more assertively than before tha t  the existing system should be reformed in order 
to allow greater public participation in the preparation for future self-government. More 
significantly, when UMELCO attempted to act on behalf of the Hong Kong people, its 
members were criticized by the two powers as unrepresentative of the interests of the 
Hong Kong people. The grassroots leaders took advantage of UMELCO’s situation, thus 
pushing further for the development of a system of government which could claim to 
represent the interests of various groups of Hong Kong people effectively.
The UMELCO In itiative and the Crisis o f Leadership
Frictions between the British officials and their main Hong Kong supporters - the 
so-called UMELCO members - were manifest when the British negotiators started to 
change their stance in late 1983. While some UMELCO members were still pressing for a 
continued British presence in Hong Kong after 1997, the British ministers now asked 
them to ‘face reality’. So some UMELCO members began to feel that they were being 
sold out4Cl and complained tha t  the British officials did not listen to their views a t  all.4 '
Catching the Governor by surprise, a senior unofficial Legislative Councillor, Sir 
Roger Lobo, initiated a motion on 24 February to the effect that the Legislative Council 
“deemed it essential that any proposals for the future of Hong Kong should be debated 
in this Council before any agreement is reached /  Apparently, this move by the 
Legislative Council had the effect of embarrassing the British in their negotiations with 
Beijing at a time when the impasse had just been b ro k en /  The motion, however, 
marked the first a ttem pt bv the Legislative Council to break its silence and take up a 
leadership role among the Hong Kong people. After the April announcement by Howe, 
UMELCO decided to send a delegation to London to attend the parliamentary debates 
on Hong Kong in May, with a view to lobbying the British members of Parliament to 
speak up on behalf of the interests of the Hong Kong people. In contrast to the numerous
46. Hong Kong  Economic Journa l , no.51 (December 1983), p.16.
47. Selina Chow commented that Edward Heath did not listen to the views of UMELCO,  
Asiaweek  (30 September. 1983), p.43.
48. Leftist papers criticized that UMELCO attempted to interfere with the talks. Even Edward 
Heath, the former British Prime Minister, claimed that UMELCO did not represent the views of 
the Hong Kong people, but only represented the views of a minority. An article in the Asiaweek  
analyzed the whole situation as an ‘ideological inconvenience’ (9 March. 1984), p.30.
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delegations to Beijing between 1982-84, Hong Kong lobbying activities in London had 
been until this time almost entirely absent; in fact, up till 1983, the Hong Kong issue 
had not yet been raised in Parliament. In other words, it had never become an issue on 
which political lobbying might be appropriate in Great Britain. Paradoxically, however, 
the 1997 issue of Hong Kong ultimately had to be debated and approved by the British 
Parliament; so the unofficial members saw it as necessary to express their views to the 
members of Parliament.
By stressing the historical link between Britain and the territory, the UMELCO 
delegation basically expressed doubts about accepting the PR C ’s administrative control 
over Hong Kong. It argued in London in May that  the British should take on the 
responsibility for securing an agreement which would be acceptable to the people of 
Hong Kong, a condition which would only be met if
L i t  contained full details of the proposed administrative, legal, social and 
economic systems applicable after 1997;
2. it provided adequate and workable assurances that the terms of the 
Agreements would be honoured;
3. it stated tha t  the provisions of the Basic Law would incorporate the 
provisions of the Agreements;
4. it guaranteed tha t  the rights of the British nationals would be sa tisfied .^
However, the British members of Parliament thought tha t  the UMELCO 
delegation was trying to seek residual British administration in Hong Kong after 1997 
because the UMELCO position paper posed the question: “Should not Britain insist on 
retaining some residual status in Hong Kong beyond 1997 to provide re-assurance that 
the terms of the Agreement will be kept?” ^  An ex-Governor of Hong Kong, Lord 
Maclehose, attacked the delegation as ill-conceived and badly-timed. He told the 
UMELCO members tha t  they should be giving leadership at home rather than seeking it 
from the British g o v e r n m e n t . R o b e r t  Adley, a member of Parliament and chairman of 
the British-Chinese Parliamentary Group, even denounced the views of the UMELCO 
delegation in his speech to the House of Commons on 17 May. 1984, as reflecting “not so
r o
much the daily concerns of the Hong Kong public but the obsessions of the few” .
Another delegation organized by the grassroots leaders also went to London. 
Unlike the UMELCO delegation, its members did not emphasize the British residual role 
in Hong Kong, but on the contrary, criticized the unrepresentativeness of UMELCO,
49. The S ta tement  by the Unof f i c ia l  Members o f  the Hong Kong  Execut ive and Legislat ive  
Counci l  on the Future o f  Hong Kong  (9 May, 1984).
50. Ibid.
51. South China  Morning  Post  (12 May, 1984).
52. Par l iam enta ry  Debates (Hansard) .  60(157) (17 May, 1984).
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arguing that the British should accept a responsibility to develop a democratic system as 
a precondition for self-government. In fact, they were the first, and almost the only, 
group to petition London for the democratization of the administrative system in Hong 
Kong. At the House of Commons, the delegation was supported by members of 
Parliament, like Robert Parry, Humphrey Atkins, Paddy Ashdown, Ian Wrigglesworth, 
etc. Robert Adley even went so far as to speak of tha t  democracy as a means to prevent 
Chinese intervention, arguing in the parliamentary debate on 17 May that
democracy, or the democratization of Hong Kong, is surely the best guarantee 
for the people of Hong Kong against the imposition upon them of unwanted 
change in the future. Unless we take an active rather than a passive role, there 
is the danger ... of creating a serious vacuum. None of us know how far China is 
really prepared to go in seeing a democracy in Hong Kong. The answer,
r o
therefore, is surely to put their words to the test and try it.
This whole issue involved the basic question of whether or not the appointed 
Legislative Council members could claim to represent the interests of the Hong Kong 
people, since the existing political system in Hong Kong w’as not constituted by 
democratic elections. Apparently, the cool reception of the UMELCO delegation by the 
British members of Parliament showed that the latter were not prepared to consider 
UMELCO as representing the interests of the Hong Kong people. A crisis of leadership 
was thus precipitated in Hong Kong, which was further aggravated soon after by the 
very cool reception accorded three senior UMELCO members, Sir S.Y. Chung. Q.W. Lee 
and Lydia Dunn, by Deng Xiaoping on their visit to Beijing in June 1984. In Beijing, the 
UMELCO members reiterated the stand they had taken in London in May by stressing 
the crisis of business confidence that still persisted in Hong Kong. As Sir S.Y. Chung, a 
senior Legislative Council member, put it
As regards the period after 1997, people are worried tha t  the high degree of 
autonomy may not in fact mean Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong 
because the people administering the future Government of Hong Kong may be 
controlled by Beijing and that the Chinese officials responsible for 
implementing China’s policy for Hong Kong may interfere in the local 
administration. Furthermore, people are worried that the one-country 
two-systems concept may not last because future Chinese leaders may revert to 
‘extreme-left’ policies.54
Upon their return on 25 June, the UMELCO members reported tha t  they had 
failed to convince Deng Xiaoping about the crisis of confidence in Hong Kong because 
“Chairman Deng did not believe that the views and anxieties we described were really 
the current state of confidence in Hong Kong” .5,) Their s tatem ent was in line with
53. Ibid.
54. Sir S.Y. Chung, UMELCO Statement for Press Conference (25 June, 1984).
55. Ibid.
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UMELCO’s earlier argument tha t  the PRC authorities failed to understand the reality 
of the Hong Kong situation.50 Confusion arose, however, when Deng Xiaoping met 
members of Hong Kong’s three major commercial and industrial associations soon after, 
namely the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, the Hong Kong Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, to whom he said
r  7
tha t  he was aware of the problem of confidence that existed in Hong Kong.
These events indicated very clearly that the Chinese leaders were reluctant to 
recognize the official position of UMELCO. Thus, UMELCO members now found 
themselves facing a problem of non-recognition by both the PRC and the British 
authorities as the legitimate spokesmen for the people of Hong Kong. The situation of 
UMELCO in 1984 reflected with brutal directness the inferior position of the Hong Kong 
representatives in the eyes of the two sovereign powers. In case of any conflict of 
interests between the two powers and the Hong Kong people, the interests of the local 
people would be subordinated to those of Britain and /o r  the PRC. Immediately, 
therefore, a sense of urgency was aroused among the local people, with a general feeling 
tha t  a “vacuum in leadership could exist if the UMELCO could not move to assume the 
position of power and leadership” . The Far Eastern Economic Review  analyzed the 
situation as follows
rejection of UMELCO as a valid channel for voicing Hong Kong people’s views 
regarding the territory’s political future will have an inhibiting effect on people 
wanting to express their views and could further alienate UMELCO ... China’s 
efforts to demoralize the only localized political institution in Hong Kong may 
prove to be a destabilizing factor in Hong Kong’s search for political leadership. 
Whatever the failings ... the fact is that they are one of the pillars of the 
current political and economic set-up in Hong Kong ... Destroying their 
credibility or staging confrontation with them will likely make a smooth 
transition and maintenance of the vaunted prosperity and stability more 
difficult.58
Between May and July 1984, public anxieties were stirred up yet again when Deng 
Xiaoping reprimanded his subordinates, Huang Hua and Geng Biao, on 25 May, for 
saying tha t  the People’s Liberation Army would not have to be stationed in Hong
56. Selina Chow said that the crisis of confidence was due to the secrecy of the talks as well as 
China’s inability to face and consider the reality of the Hong Kong people’s worries. Speech to the 
Annual Debate of the Urban Council (12 January, 1984).
57. South C hina  M orn in g  Post (27 June, 1984). See also Wah K iu  Yat Pao for D en g’s speech 
to the three commercial groups. See also Cheng M in g , no.82 (August 1984), pp.80-82, which 
records the discussions betw'een Deng and the three commercial groups.
58. Far E as tern  Econom ic R eview  (5 July, 1984).
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Kong.59 Similarly, the P R C ’s proposal in July to set up a Sino-British Joint Liaison 
Group (JLG), with the aim of promoting better communication between the two 
governments for the implementation of any agreements being reached by them, were 
received with suspicion by the local political commentators as representing a move to 
create an alternative source of authority to oversee the internal affairs of Hong Kong in 
the transitional period.®9
Arising out of these two episodes came a new fear th a t  Beijing would seek to 
exercise control over the Hong Kong administration through the British government 
itself. Apprehension on this score was reinforced by the realization tha t  UMELCO, the 
only official representative of the people of Hong Kong, was no longer likely to be 
recognized by either the British or the PRC authorities. All these developments 
shattered the wishful thinking tha t  had earlier prevailed tha t  the people of Hong Kong 
would be able to exercise some degree of actual control over the local administration 
when Hong Kong came under China’s sovereignty in the run-up to 1997.
THE CONCLUSION OF THE TALKS: THE SINO -BRITISH  
JO IN T D ECLA R A TIO N  ON THE FU T U R E  OF H O N G  K O N G
The prevailing sense of uncertainty in mid-1984 was temporarily relieved when Sir 
Geoffrey Howe announced on 1 August ten detailed provisions concerning the 
preservation of the existing legal, economic and financial systems. He had previously 
announced on 18 July that a Public Assessment Office (PAO) would be set up to test 
the acceptability in Hong Kong of any agreement reached with the Chinese government 
on the future of Hong Kong. But he also clarified in the same announcement that any 
differences of opinions collected by the PAO would not be reconsidered by the two 
negotiating powers, simply because the talks would not be reopened in any way after any 
form of agreement had been reached by Britain and China. The draft, agreement between 
the two governments was finally announced on 26 September, 1984, in the form of a 
Joint Declaration.
The Joint Declaration stipulated that the government of the People’s Republic of 
China would resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July, 1997. The 
PRC would establish, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of its Constitution, 
a Hong Kong SAR upon resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong. The Joint
59. On 22 May, 1984, H uang Hua, the Deputy Secretary-general of the  N ationa l  P eo p le ’s C on­
gress said th a t  the P eop le’s Liberation  Army would not be s ta t ioned  in Hong Kong. Geng Biao 
also expressed a similar view. However, on 25 May, before the second p lenary  session of the 6th  
N ational  People’s Congress, Deng Xiaoping said tha t  Huang and Geng could not m ake the  public 
s ta te m en ts  about C h in a ’s policies in Hong Kong. He said th a t  the  P eo p le ’s L iberation  Army 
would be s ta tioned in Hong Kong.
60. Far Eastern Economic Review  (19 July, 1984), p.12.
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Declaration emphasized tha t  it was the objective of both powers to maintain the 
economic prosperity and social stability of Hong Kong. Accordingly, the PRC promised 
that the capitalist social and economic systems of Hong Kong would be preserved for 50 
years and the Hong Kong SAR would be allowed to enjoy a high degree of local 
autonomy. By local autonomy, it meant that
the socialist system and socialist policies shall not be practised in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region. ... Except for foreign and defence affairs 
which are the responsibilities of the Central People’s Government, the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with executive, legislative 
and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. 1
Indeed, the Joint Declaration specified that almost every aspect of life would 
remain basically unchanged. It guaranteed tha t  the people of Hong Kong would enjoy 
their existing rights and freedoms, including those of the person, speech, the press, 
assembly, associations, travel, movement, correspondence, strike, religious belief, as well 
as their own choice of occupation and of academic research. On the economic side, it was 
promised that the Hong Kong SAR would retain the status of a free port, a separate 
customs territory and an international financial centre; it would also have independent 
finances, and its own external economic and cultural relations.
The general response to the Joint Declaration as reported in the Hong Kong press 
was positive. In November, a survey published by a private company, the Survey 
Research Hong Kong Ltd, showed tha t  the Agreement was broadly accepted by the 
people of Hong Kong without p r o t e s t . I t  was also claimed that the majority of the 
views presented to the PAO supported the goals spelled out in the Agreement: 
maintenance of prosperity and stability of the territory. Yet the report of the PAO 
appended an additional remark to the effect tha t  since there were no other alternatives 
available for the local people to make a choice
all but a few have acknowledged the inevitability of the reversion of sovereignty 
over Hong Kong to China in 1997. The proposition that an agreement between 
Britain and China on the future of Hong Kong is preferable to there being no
61. A D ra ft  Agreement between the Government o f  the United K ingdom  and Northern  
Ireland and the Government o f  the People’s Republic o f  China on the Future o f  Hong Kong  
(September 1984), p.14.
62. See the  survey carried ou t by the Survey Research Hong Kong Ltd, “Researching the 1997 
Agreem ent” (November 1984). See also a survey conducted  by the South C hina  M orning Post in 
conjunction with U M E L C O  and three o ther  organizations, published in the  South China M orn­
ing Post “1997: T he  V erd ic t” (24 November, 1984).
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agreement, is generally understood and accepted. 63
THE GREEN PAPER AND A NEW POLITICAL ENVIRONM ENT
After the conclusion of the talks, the two powers played down considerably their 
reliance on public campaigns to mobilize public support. One reason for this superficial 
tranquility was tha t  the Joint Declaration provided at least a temporary basis for 
consensus on the need to maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong society 
until 1997. Yet the Hong Kong and the PRC authorities did not entirely cease their 
competitive efforts to exert a degree of control over political developments in the 
territory. In July 1984, the Hong Kong government had taken the initiative quite 
independently of the PRC in introducing a Green Paper on the “Further Development of 
Representative Government in Hong Kong” . Later, Hong Kong officials justified that 
measure by quoting from the Joint Declaration’s saying that “the Government of the 
United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong with the object 
of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and social stability” .^4 Hong 
Kong officials also claimed tha t  the Green Paper was fulfilling Clause 3.4 of the Joint 
Declaration, which stipulated that
the Government of the Hong Kong SAR will be composed of local inhabitants.
The chief executive will be appointed by the Central People’s Government on 
the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally. Principal 
officials will be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region for appointment by the Central People's Government.
... The legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be 
constituted by elections. The executive authorities shall abide by the law and 
shall be accountable to the legislature. °
In fact, this general stipulation only outlined a very broad framework for the 
future political system. The people of Hong Kong remained generally reserved, if not 
sceptical, of China’s promises for local autonomy because most of them understood 
clearly that what the Chinese communists considered as p e o p le ’s democratic 
dictatorship' differed very much practically from ‘bourgeois democracy’, as Miners 
writes
63. Report of the Independent Monitoring Team of the Assessment Office, Arrangements  for  
Test ing the Acceptabi l i ty in Hong Kong o f  the Dra f t  Agreement  on the Future o f  the Territory  
(29 November, 1984), p.15. See also the Draft  Agreement , pp.7-8, which writes that “there is no 
possibility of an amended agreement. The alternative acceptance of the present agreement is to 
have no agreement. ... The choice is therefore between reversion of Hong Kong to China under 
agreed, legally binding international arrangements or reversion to China without such 
arrangements.”
64. A D ra f t  Agreement , p.13.
65. Ibid.,  pp.14-15.
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elections in China serve a different function from that in Britain. In 
‘Western-style’ democracies an election is a procedure which allows voters to 
choose between two or more competing candidates who put forward alternative 
policies. But in communist states elections are not held to enable the voters to 
exercise a choice, but are a procedure whereby a single candidate who has been 
preselected by the party is endorsed by the unanimous or near-unanimous vote 
of the e lec tora te .^
People in Hong Kong understood tha t  it was unrealistic to think of a local 
government in which free elections would be allowed to be held. Still, there w'as a hope 
initially that the PRC officials would concede a substantial degree of local 
self-government. There was also a widespread belief tha t  any opportunities to influence 
the processes of constitutional development should be lost gradually in the run up to 
1997 while they were still quite open to the people of Hong Kong in 1984-85 under the 
umbrella of the British administration.
There is no doubt tha t  in the latter half of 1984, public enthusiasm for political 
reform was kindled considerably by the prospect of changes suggested by the Green 
Paper as well as the Sino-British Agreement. After the conclusion of the talks, political 
groups such as the Hong Kong People’s Association (November 1984) and the Hong 
Kong Forum (November 1984), were rapidly organized with a view to preparing for the 
elections to be held in 1985. Others, such as the Meeting Point (1983), the New- Hong 
Kong Society (1983), the Society for Social Resesarch (1982). the Hong Kong Affairs 
Society (February 1984) and other newly formed district-based community groups, were 
engaging more actively in pushing for more rapid constitutional changes.
Subsequently, differences in the interpretation of Clause 3.4 of the Joint 
Declaration came up, giving rise to controversies about the ways in which the executive 
should be made accountable to the legislature and the form in which elections were held. 
Supporters of the democratic movement interpreted the Agreement as offering a clear 
direction for political reforms before 1997, claiming that the legislature was to be wholly 
elected and should be made accountable by the executive by means of exercising 
independent legislative power in the political processes. The more conservative 
establishment elements emphasized continuity and stability, however, arguing that the 
executive could be made more accountable to the legislature within the existing 
framework of institutions. The Chinese officials even came to contend tha t  the executive 
authorities had already been made accountable to the legislature under the existing 
administration, and thus the executive-oriented system of government should be 
preserved by 1997. The colonial administration also favoured continuity and change, but 
refused to commit to any long-term goals for constitutional changes. As public debates
66. N.J. Miners, Government  and Poli t ics o f  Hong Kong  (4th edition, 1986), p.250.
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on the matter developed into an unprecedented degree, Hong Kong society was 
politicized to a modest degree in 1984-85. In the following chapter, I shall discuss public 
debates over the Green Paper and the pattern of political alignment th a t  was taking 
shape at the end of 1984 and early 1985.
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C H A PT E R  4
THE P A T T E R N  OF POLITICAL A L IG NM ENT  
RESULTING FROM  THE REFORMS OF 1984
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter analyzes how the democratic movement gradually took shape 
during the two years of Sino-British talks on the future of Hong Kong. This chapter will 
show that  a process of mild political polarization began to be seen in Hong Kong by the 
end of 1984. Demanding rapid constitutional changes were the socially-oriented members 
of pressure-group and grassroots organizations and the liberal middle-class professionals 
and businessmen. Defending the status quo were the more conservative business and 
professional sectors, whose spokesmen favoured the preservation of the existing system.
These processes were, however, influenced by the competitive initiative of the two 
sovereign powers who tried to gain control over whatever changes were developing in the 
territory. While the British a ttempted to take advantage of their control over the 
transitional administration by developing a system of representative government in 1984 
similar to those of the other decolonizing societies, their efforts were constrained by the 
will of the PRC to exert ultimate control over Hong Kong. In the course of its struggle 
to gain initiative, the P R C ’s position was to become increasingly dominant. 
Nevertheless, the representative government of 1984 became a model governing the 
public debates on the administrative system for the future of Hong Kong. The following 
will analyze the pattern of political alignments resulting from the introduction of the 
Green Paper in July 1984 on the “Further Development of Representative Government 
in Hong Kong’".
THE GREEN PAPER ON “THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN HONG KONG” JULY 1984
On 18 July, 1984, the Hong Kong government published a Green Paper entitled 
“The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong'’ (hereafter 
simply called the Green Paper), the purpose of which was to invite public comments on 
the government's suggestion for making the central consultative institutions of the Hong 
Kong administration “more representative in a way which will make the Government
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more directly accountable to the people of Hong Kong.” 1 23The Green Paper stated three 
main objectives for developing a new form of representative machinery:
1. to develop progressively a system of government the authority for which is 
firmly rooted in Hong Kong, which is able to represent authoritatively the 
views of the people of Hong Kong, and which is more directly accountable to 
the people of Hong Kong;
2. to build this system on our existing institutions, which have served Hong 
Kong well, and as far as possible, to preserve their best features, including 
the maintenance of the well established practice of government by consensus; 
and
3. to allow for further development if tha t  should be the wish of the
o
community.
S tra teg y  o f the P o licy  P roposa l
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Green Paper was published when the 
talks were not yet concluded and it was disclosed just before Sir Geoffrey Howe made an 
announcement in August 1984, introducing a broad outline of the arrangements 
proposed for the future of Hong Kong which was being negotiated with Beijing. Sir 
Geoffrey Howe ensured that almost all aspects of the Hong Kong's general life-style 
would remain unchanged, but he evaded any commitment on the future administration 
of Hong Kong. This indicated tha t  Britain and China were as yet unable to reach an 
understanding regarding the future political system for Hong Kong. Nevertheless, Howe 
clearly indicated that the British administration would remain in Hong Kong until 1997. 
Indeed, it was also stipulated in the subsequent Joint Declaration tha t  the British 
government would be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong in the 
transitional period. On this basis, the Hong Kong officials took the view that the 
colonial government should take up the responsibility of preparing for ’gangren
O
zhigang .
At this time, the people of Hong Kong were extremely sensitive towards any sign 
of the P R C ’s interference. The new political forces that were emerging were capable of 
highlighting the fear of Chinese intervention, thus emphatically pushing for the 
democratization of the transitional government. So the Hong Kong government sought 
to convince the public that the policy was drafted quite independently of the PR C ’s 
influence; Denis Bray, then Deputy Chief Secretary, stated on 19 July that the Hong
1. Green Paper on the uFurther Development  o f  Representat ive G ove rn m en t  in  Hong K o n g ” 
(July 1984), p.3.
2. Ibid ., p.4.
3. Based on the author’s interview with Mr C.M. Leung, then Principal Assistant Secretary of 
City and New Territories Administration (10 April. 1985).
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Kong government did not and would not consult Beijing over political reform in Hong 
Kong.4 5
The Hong Kong administration was also aw'are that the withdrawal of the British 
might foster some anti-colonial feelings on the part of the more progressive elements in 
Hong Kong society. This could easily be aroused because of the distrust of many people 
in Hong Kong towards both the British and the PRC authorities. The image of the Hong 
Kong administration had been badly discredited during the two years of talks for being 
unrepresentative of the interests of the Hong Kong people. So the Hong Kong 
government was concerned with upholding its authoritative image during the 
transitional period. By cultivating popular support, the government hoped to ensure 
tha t  its policies would be smoothly implemented in the run-up to 1997. In 1984 the 
major concern of the government was to cope with pressures from wdthout, for as Lau 
analyzes the situation
the transfer of a certain amount of power to Hong kong people in anticipation 
of the termination of colonial rule is a policy to be implemented w'ith a sense of 
urgency because there is a shortage of time left to the colonial government.0
Thus the Hong Kong government was facing an almost impossible task.6 On the one 
hand, it had to devise an institution firmly based on popular support so that the local 
people would be convinced th a t  they were in a position strong enough to resist Beijing's 
autocratic demands after 1997. On the other hand, it had to ensure that these same 
institutions would not be over-politicized to the point of endangering economic 
prosperity and social stability.
Yet political reform soon became a highly divisive issue, as was evident also in 
various other cases of decolonization. The demand for democracy came from the more 
liberal groups, while the resistance to change came from the more conservative 
businessmen and ruling elite. From the British and the PRC governments’ point of view, 
the participation of the established sectors was desirable for the maintenance of 
prosperity and stability. Any administrative changes had to take into account the 
participation of the major economic groups. At the same time, the government also
4. Wah K iu  Vat Pao  (20 July, 1984). See also Peter Tsao, then Director of Information, who  
said repeatedly that theoretically the source of authority over the Hong Kong administration  
came from Britain before 1997 and from China after 1997. In practice, the administration rested 
completely in the hands of the Hong Kong government. South China  M orn in g  Post  (30 October, 
1983) and (12 December, 1984).
5. S.K. Lau, “Political Reform and Political Development in Hong Kong: Dilemmas and 
Choices” , a paper presented to the conference, “Hong Kong and 1997: Strategies for the Future” , 
organized by the Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong (6-8 December, 1984), p.3.
6. N.J. Miners, “Alternative Governmental Structure for a Future Self-Governing Hong Kong” , 
a paper presented to the conference, “Hong Kong and 1997: Strategies for the Future” , organized 
by the Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong (6-8 December, 1984).
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wanted a more balanced representation of different political elements within the 
administration, such tha t  local people would be encouraged to participate more actively 
in the preparation for self-administration.' In fact, a process of rational debate on these 
issues was deliberately encouraged at all levels of the society with a view to letting 
political forces outside the government promote and develop a solid foundation for the 
profound changes towards ‘gangren zhigang'. The government also wished to 
accommodate some of the demands of the liberal members in order to enhance the degree 
of representativeness and responsiveness of the administration for the sake of 
strengthening its hand in the negotiations with Beijing. From the point of view of 
decolonization, the politics of transition in Hong Kong were bound to mean the 
accommodation of more political forces in the political processes, hopefully without 
threatening the existing system too radically. In this way, the government would 
manage to retain some control over the process of power transfer up to 1997.
There were two immediate tasks facing the government in 1984. The first was to 
absorb the demands for participation into the channels provided. The other was to 
encourage the participation of the professionals and the businessmen. The strategy 
behind these reforms in 1984-85 was to provide multiple channels of participation. The 
Green Paper proposed to introduce elected elements to the Legislative Council to be 
constituted indirectly by (1) functional groups (or constituencies), namely commercial, 
industrial, financial, medical, educational, legal and labour professionals; and (2) an 
electoral college, which would consist of representatives from the Urban Council, the 
Regional Council and the district boards. The number of appointed unofficial and official 
members would gradually be diminished as they were replaced by an increasing number 
of elected members. Accordingly, the Green Paper recommended th a t  about one-quarter 
of the members would be indirectly elected to the Legislative Council in 1985 (see Table 
!)•
The functional constituencies were designed in such a way so as to foster the 
interest of the economic and professional groups in more active political participation. 
By claiming to allow a continuing contribution by these sectors of society, the 
government was actually modifying the existing informal system of selection by 
appointment into a formal representative system for election. In this way, it would 
preserve the original political balance in the Legislative Council, and thus ensure 
continuity and stability.
The electoral college was to consist of representatives based on geographical 
constituencies. Yet its members would not be elected directly from the geographical 
areas. The government argued that direct elections had already been introduced to the
7. Based on the author’s interview with Mr C.M. Leung (10 April 1984).
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Table 1
Compositional Changes of Legislative Council, 1985-88 
as Proposed by The Green Paper in July 1984
Legislative Council Members 1984
Year
1985 1988
a. Elected by Electoral College 0 6 12
b. Elected by Functional Constituency 0 6 12
c . Appointed by Governor 29 23 16
d. Official Members 18 13 10
Total 47 48 50
Source: The Green Paper, “The Further Development of Representative Govern­
ment in Hong Kong” (July 1984) p.14.
Urban Council and the 18 district boards since 1982, while a Regional Council was to be 
set up in the New' Territories in 1985, its composition being similar to th a t  of the Urban 
Council, w'hich allowed half of its unofficial members to be elected on a district basis. 
Members of all these district-based councils would be allowed to elect representatives 
indirectly to the Legislative Council in 1985 through an electoral college.
Accordingly, the proportion of elected elements at the district level was to be 
substantially increased in 1985, such changes being made mainly through the district 
boards. The boundaries of some constituencies were redrawm so as to allow- the total 
number of elected members to be increased to 237. Between 1985 and 1988, elected 
members would constitute a two-thirds majority in each district board. Moreover, the 
chairman would be a non-official member and would be elected from amongst the 
appointed and elected members. Official members w'ould no longer have votes on any 
decisions made bv the boards.
Thus, district, elections were to be structured in such a way as to admit greater 
participation of the more progressive elements in the administration but contain their 
influence at the district level in order to prevent them from directly affecting the 
decision-making processes. Whether or not they would be able to join the Legislative 
Council w'ould depend entirely on their capacity to obtain the support of their colleagues 
w'ithin their own constituency. However, the government retained the power to appoint 
one-third of the unofficial members at the district level, w'hich meant that the 
progressive elements could still be outbalanced by the appointment of more moderate or 
conservative members. The consequence of this was to be that in 1985 only a very few-
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progressive elements were voted into the Legislative Council through the electoral 
college. The government almost ensured that conservative elements continued to 
dominate the policy-making processes between 1985 and 1988.
In the main, the Green Paper emphasized continuity and stability and it strongly 
defended the existing system of government by consultation. So the functions of the 
Legislative Council remained basically unchanged; it continued to be responsible for “the 
enactment of legislation and for controlling and monitoring the expenditure of public 
funds ... It should also retain its powers to question the Administration on m atters of
o
public interest and debate questions of policy.” 0 In other words, the role of the 
Legislative Council and other elected district bodies remained advisory. All changes 
merely referred to a modification in the proportion of elected to appointed members.
By emphasizing the distinctive feature of government by consultation, the Green 
Paper showed a strong disinclination towards direct elections which it conceived as 
resulting in the development of “parties, factions and adversarial politics” ; thus the 
Green Paper supported the view that
direct elections to the Legislative Council, on a universal franchise, ... have not 
been universally successful as a means of ensuring stable representative 
government ... Direct elections would run the risk of a swift introduction of 
adversarial politics, and would introduce an element of instability at a crucial 
time. ... Thus it is considered that the introduction of direct elections to the 
Legislative Council would not be appropriate at the present time, although in 
due course, as the political and constitutional circumstances of Hong Kong 
evolve, further thought will be given to this possibility, if popular support for 
the idea develops.
Even the introduction of a system under which a substantial number of 
unofficial members are elected indirectly by an electoral college and by 
functional constituencies will be a major change in the system of government, in 
Hong Kong. It will take time for people to become familiar with this new 
system and to develop experience in its operation.^
C o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e  T r a n s i t i o n a l  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
With regard to the special circumstances of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong 
government argued against direct elections for several reasons. By July 1984, the major 
consideration of the Hong Kong administration was to avoid jeopardizing the talks with 
Beijing and embarrassing the PRC government. Morever, it was worried tha t  the 
introduction of direct elections would entail some risk of inviting direct participation by 
pro-PRC elements in the working of the system of government simply because pro-PRC 
grassroots organizations and members of the Chinese Communist Party could take the
8. Green Paper, p.12.
9. Ibid., pp.9-10.
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opportunity to mobilize mass support during the election campaigns. Besides, any 
process of mass mobilization in the direct elections could conceivably result in a 
destabilization of the political situation, thereby inviting the P R C ’s military 
intervention. Warnings and hints had already come from PRC leaders who talked about 
the possibility of internal instability in Hong Kong which would induce the need for 
intervention from China in tha t  event.10 So in their speeches to the Legislative Council, 
both the Governor, Sir Edward Youde, and a leading unofficial member, Sir Roger 
Lobo,* 11 stressed tha t  political stability was a prerequisite for developing reform in Hong 
Kong.
This indicated tha t  the British authorities did not have an adequate capacity to 
respond unequivocably to pressures from the public, as in the normal process of power 
transfer in other decolonizing societies. The British authorities were constrained by the 
fact th a t  Hong Kong’s sovereignty would be ultimately returned to the PRC. Hence, the 
goal of decolonization without independence basically held back the British in their 
a tt i tude  to political reforms. With regard to the embarrassing demands coming forward
for democracy and autonomy, the British government simply did not have the power to
1 9accede to them.
Although the Hong Kong authorities did not consult the PRC government over 
the drafting of the Green Paper, they clearly understood tha t  any reform introduced 
without the acquiescence of Beijing would be impossible to sustain. As a m atter  of fact, 
the Green Paper and the subsequent White Paper (November 1984) contained no 
commitment to any long term objectives regarding the development of the political 
structure of Hong Kong prior to 1997 - they even refused to commit themselves to any 
plan a t  all beyond 1988. While the Hong Kong officials were determined to control the 
pace of the reform, they did not exclude the possibility of seeking co-operation with the 
PRC authorities in future on this m atter. The Hong Kong authorities used several 
opportunities to make very clear their intention that the future Hong Kong system 
ought to be “compatible with the overall structure and systems of the government of the
10. In his speech to the Lions Club of Tai Ping Shan on 9 August, 1984, Xu Jiatun talked about 
three sources of political instability in Hong Kong. He assured that intervention from the cadres 
would be forbidden, and international instability would very unlikely affect Hong Kong. So in­
stability would most likely come from Hong Kong internally - i.e. large scale unrest due to politi­
cal pursuit of self-interests. Deng Xiaoping also said on a number of occasions that in case there 
was internal instability in Hong Kong, it would be desirable for the PRC to have direct inter­
vention.
11. See the Governor’s speech to the Legislative Council on 19 July, 1984, and Sir Roger Lobo’s 
speech on 3 August, 1984.
12. S.K. Lau, “Political Reform and Political Development in Hong Kong: Dilemmas and 
Choices” , pp.3-4.
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People’s Republic” .*0
The urgency of their new-found zeal for reform was not shared, however, by the 
PRC officials. Soon after the Green Paper was published in July, it was reported that 
local leftists were showing increasing displeasure over the way in w'hich the Hong Kong 
government was handling the entire issue. Li Zhong, the chief editor of the NCNA in 
Hong Kong, stated that the Chinese government had no obligations in regard to the 
development of representative government in Hong Kong. Other NCNA officials in Hong 
Kong refused to give their view's on direct elections. Editorials in the leftist papers and 
pro-PRC magazines expressed suspicions about the Green Paper on three grounds:
1. they felt tha t  China should have been consulted before the plan to publish 
the Green Paper wras made know'n.
2. They suspected that the British w'ere moving to create a means of ensuring 
residual British influence in the post-1997 government and th a t  the Green 
paper wras only an a ttem pt to develop a de facto  independent entity in Hong 
Kong.
3. They considered that the structure of the future administration of Hong 
Kong should be left open until the drafting of the Basic Law, w'hich would be 
discussed between the Chinese authorities and the Hong Kong people 
themselves.
A CPPC C  member, Ho Sai-chu, who later became an elected Legislative Councillor in 
1985, openly called for the British administration to consult the Chinese authorities on 
the issue of political reform.14 The pro-PRC Federation of Hong Kong Trade Unions 
also expressed dissatisfaction about the British initiative, saying th a t  the future political 
system should ultimately be clarified by the Basic Law' instead of by public debates 
initiated by the Hong Kong administration.
P u b lic  D eb ates  on the G reen P aper
Immediately after the Green Paper w'as introduced, a major public debate was 
started on the issues involving in the relationship between future autonomy and the pace 
of political reform. Much attention w-as paid to the question of whether or not the 
government should commit itself to introduce direct elections in 1988. There w-as, in 
fact, a general consensus on the desirability of indirect elections to the Legislative 
Council during the period 1985-88, but criticisms of the Green Paper focussed mainly on 
the inability or unwillingness of the government to give a precise date for the 
introduction of direct elections. The political community wras immediately divided 
between those who preferred slow changes and those w'ho favoured rapid political reform.
13. Sir David Akers-Jones, Secretary for District Administration, uThe Political System of 
Hong Kong: Its Development and 1997” , a speech to a symposium organized by the Hong Kong 
Affairs Society (12 August, 1984).
14. Ta Kung Pao (19 July, 1984).
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ln general, those who called for direct elections argued in terms of the need to 
prepare for self-administration. As the chairman of the Civic Association and an elected 
member of the Urban Council, Hilton Cheong-leen put it in a speech to a symposium 
organized by the Hong Kong Affairs Society on 12 August which well represented this 
view
although the Green Paper does not make specific recommendations for the 
period from 1991 to 1997, I think tha t  the aim should be for self-administration 
or internal self-government to be arrived at sometime between 1991 to 1994, 
and not to wait until 1997.15
He argued th a t  logically the government “should review the possibility of having direct 
elections in 1988” . At the same conference, his opinion was echoed by a pressure-group 
leader, Szeto Wah, who was also the chairman of the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ 
Union, and who identified direct elections with the notion of democratization of the 
political system before 1997. Szeto suggested a count-down theory (Daoshao Lun), 
according to which a democratic self-government should be established well before 1997, 
and so direct elections should be introduced as soon as possible to enable the practice to 
be smoothly inherited by the post-1997 government. Szeto’s argument was strongly 
supported bv the grassroots and community organizations.
In a debate in the Legislative Council on the Green Paper on 3 August, a group of 
unofficial appointed members also criticized the government for not committing itself to 
a precise time-table for political reform. While Selina Chow called for a change in the 
advisory status of the Executive and Legislative Council, Lydia Dunn suggested a 
ministerial system which would allow elected representatives to have real power over the 
decision-making process. Both unofficial members, however, addressed the need to evolve 
a system which was responsible and accountable to the public. As Miss Dunn said, 
“people must be convinced their future elected representatives have real influence and 
this can be achieved through executive responsibility.” Another appointed unofficial 
member, Allen Lee, even pointed out tha t  a democratic political system was essential to 
secure public confidence in the Agreement. In the symposium organized by the Hong 
Kong Affairs Society on 12 August, he reiterated the position of the Young Professionals 
of May 1983 by putting forward the worries of Hong Kong people about a drastic 
political change after the British withdrew in 1997. He argued that as 1997 approached, 
the political system of Hong Kong should be democratized. Significantly, though as an 
industrialist, Allen Lee did not share the fears of the other businessmen that the existing
15. Hilton Cheong-leen, “Political Leadership, the Electorate and Development of the Political 
System” , a speech to the symposium, organized by the Hong Kong Affairs Society (12 August,  
1984). See also Wah K iu  Yat Pao  (19 July, 1984) which reported that 12 out of 15 elected mem­
bers in the Urban Council supported direct elections to the Legislative Council.
93
economic operation of Hong Kong would be jeopardized by direct elections and political 
reforms. He argued tha t  Hong Kong's international s tatus and free enterprises could only 
be guaranteed and sustained by a comparatively open political framework. (For a brief 
information about the members of the Executive and Legislative Council of 1984-85, see 
Appendix D.)
The liberal views of these unofficial Legislative Councillors gave an incentive to 
the democratic movement stirred up by the grassroots organizations. Immediately after 
the Green Paper was published, a public campaign was launched by the grassroots and 
pressure-group leaders to seek equal opportunities for participation in the political 
process. Those grassroots leaders who were elected to the district boards and Urban 
Council in 1982 and 1983 lobbied other colleagues and, on 20 July, thirteen of them, 
such as Fung Kin-kee, Lee Chik-yuet, Chui Kim-ling, Lam Chak-piu, etc. joined forces to 
call for direct elections, thus representing an echo to the public campaign from within 
the political system. Outside the official political mechanisms, pressure-group and 
grassroots leaders attempted to build up a united front to demand direct elections. A 
letter to the editor of the South China M orning Post in August typified the public 
response to such an effort
given that sovereignty will be surrendered to the mainland, the people of Hong 
Kong must now commence the difficult task of building a proper and 
recognizable social entity based on democratic principles. To atta in  this 
objective, all essentially democratic political forces must compromise and 
present to the outside world a united front.10
A Joint Conference, in which 90 community groups participated in September, marked 
the high tide of this effort at coalition, all of them urging direct elections to be 
implemented no later than 1988.
The conservative sector of the society was, however, sceptical about the argument 
for establishing a democratic government before 1997. In the Legislative Council, 
members like Roger Lobo, Henrietta Ip, Pauline Ng. Peter Wong and Ho Kam-fai, called 
for a ^cautious, moderate and gradual approach” towards political reform. They agreed 
with the government that it should not commit itself to introduce direct elections in 
1988; whether direct elections should be implemented in 1988, would entirely depend 
upon “the circumstance of Hong Kong” at that time. In a debate in the Legislative 
Council on the Green Paper (3 August, 1984). Bill Brown and Stephen Cheong expressed 
their concern about sustaining economic confidence. Others, such as Yeung Po-kwan, 
emphasized stability and continuity, while Hu Fa-kong defended the efficiency of the 
existing administrative system. Peter Poon even expressed his reservations about
16. South C hina  M orning Post  (3 August,  1984).
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democratization by arguing in the same debate tha t ,  “we want above everything a just 
and free society. Democracy by itself is no panacea and does not necessarily produce 
such a society.”
With the exception of a few, a majority of the appointed unofficial Legislative 
Council members preferred indirect to direct elections, and they came to agree with the 
principles underlying the Green Paper tha t  the existing system had been enabling Hong
. . 1 7Kong to “enjoy a sustained period of economic growth and internal stability” . Thus 
the major features of the existing system should remain largely intact. Stephen Cheong 
even disputed the argument of the grassroots members tha t  only directly elected 
members were accountable to the public. “W hat m atters most” , he said, “is whether 
their work is in the interest of the public” .10 Another unofficial member, Andrew So, 
echoed his view by contending tha t  “what is crucial is tha t  there should be more citizens 
to participate enthusiastically in the elections and that more dedicated and righteous 
men and women could come up as leaders” . ^
In addition, the conservative members were concerned about China’s attitudes. 
Indeed, the Chinese officials had not clearly expressed their a tt itude towards direct 
elections. In his answer to questions from reporters on 10 September, Xu Jiatun refused 
to give his view on direct elections, saying instead that
the kind of elections being practised in each place depended on the special 
circumstances of different societies; direct elections by means of one-inan-one- 
vote being one of them only.
While some people interpreted Xu’s words as a sign of Beijing’s displeasure towards 
direct elections, others countered that PRC officials had not yet come up with a 
blueprint about Hong Kong’s future administration and so local people ought to be able 
to exercise a certain influence over Beijing's ultimate decision.
Some unofficial Legislative Council members, like Charles Yeung, reminded those 
people pursuing political reforms tha t  they would be acting contrary to Beijing’s 
w ishes /1 Stephen Cheong even called for attaining a better understanding with China 
over the issue of political reform before more drastic changes were to be made. Bill 
Brown warned tha t  “if Hong Kong formed a government unacceptable to China it would 
certainly have trouble in 1997 because this just would not work.” ^1 However, the 
grassroots leaders contended tha t  in order to realize local autonomy, Hong Kong people
17. Green Paper, p.8.
18. South China Morning Post (1 August,  1984).
19. South China Morning Post (24 October, 1984)
20. South China Morning Post (1 August,  1984).
21. South China Morning Post (16 August,  1984).
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should be given complete freedom to develop their own system of government, as Lo 
Chi-kin of the Meeting Point proposed in an open forum on 31 July, a t  which he said, 
“Hong Kong will have its hands tied over political reforms if it has to consider that 
China likes or dislikes.
Speculations on China’s attitude towards political reforms in Hong Kong became 
another divisive issue in the public debates. Those who defended the sta tus quo believed 
tha t  consensus with China should be attained before any major move was made to 
reform the existing framework. By putting to the test China’s goodwill about allowing 
local autonomy, those who called for direct elections argued that the Hong Kong people 
should be given a free hand to evolve a democratic self-administration. In this grand 
debate, leaders of the newly emerging middle-class organizations, like the Hong Kong 
Affairs Society and the Hong Kong People’s Association, and individual professionals, 
such as Martin Lee, began to join forces with the grassroots members to demand greater 
public participation in the policy process in preparing for local autonomy in 1997. By the 
second half of 1984, the active political groups in Hong Kong society could be roughly 
divided between the “'democrats’ who urged democratic self-government, and the 
‘conservatives’ who favoured the status quo. Before discussing the participation of these 
two major groups in the 1985 elections, the following section will look a t  three major 
groupings - the pro-establishment, the middle-class professionals and the grassroots 
organizations - in order to throw light on the major patterns of political alignment in the 
immediate post-Agreement period. Although the socio-economic backgrouund of the 
members of various groups are briefly mentioned in each category, the classification is 
based mainly on the orientation of each group towards the future system of government, 
and in particular towards the on-going political reform.
POLITICAL G R O U P IN G S A ND  A LIG N M EN TS IN 1984-85 
The Pro-Establishment
Members of the establishment in Hong Kong referred to those people who shared a 
similar philosophy about the colonial administration, believing tha t  the existing political 
framework was most conducive to the maintenance of the free economic system. These 
people, who usually had prominent social status, included the senior civil servants and 
the conservative sector of businessmen and professionals. In view of the impending 
political changes, this elite group considered it necessary for the future government to be 
more representative and accountable but were reluctant to see the power structure 
changed too drastically. They were also suspicious of the emergence of the mass-oriented 
grassroots organizations because the latter adopted the strategies of mass protest and
22. South China Adorning Post (1 August,  1984).
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advocated some form of social redistribution, which the conservatives thought, would 
generate political conflict and social instability.
In 1984, members of the establishment were fairly uninterested in politics and were 
unwilling to involve in a mass-style electoral campaign. Thus they strongly supported 
the introduction of indirect elections to the Legislative Council by the Hong Kong 
government, which actually guaranteed the continued participation of the dominant elite 
in the policy-making processes without large-scale electoral mobilization.
The Hong Kong Belongers’ Association, which consisted mainly of senior Civil 
Servants and other professionals represented this kind of pro-government organization. 
This group had strong influence in the administrative sector because of its direct access 
to top officials. Yet its members always found it embarrassing to criticize the 
government because many of them were so close to the policy-making sectors. Basically, 
the Belongers took a more conservative attitude towards political reform and they did 
not intend to become a political group, for like the Hong Kong Observers, they aimed 
only at becoming a part of the respected segment of intellectual opinion. Since they 
usually enjoyed high social status, they were unwilling to seek public support openly in 
the election campaigns. They would participate if, and only if, they had a good chance of 
success in the elections. Still, a few members, such as Peggy Lam and Chung Pui-lam,
0  Astood for elections to the district boards and Legislative Council in 1985.
Whether or not they were impelled by the Hong Kong administration, two groups 
of unofficial Legislative Councillors became actively involved in 1984-85 in the 
organization of interested individuals into political groups. In February 1985, the 
Progressive Hong Kong Society (PHS) was set up under the leadership of a lawyer who 
was also a popular Executive and Legislative Councillor, Maria Tam. Being joined by 
several conservative businessmen, such as Philip Kwok. Kan Fook-yee and Cheung
o r
Yan-lung, this set-up represented the first effort of the ucore members of the political 
establishment to co-operate with the business groups controlled by the major families
23. In their meeting on 14 May, 1985. the members agreed that Hong Kong was not yet ready 
for party politics. uIf only all political groups in Hong Kong could join hands together to have a 
cohesive movement to push a joint action for the future of Hong Kong, the situation would look 
much better, but a cohesive political movement is slim” , The M inutes .  So the Association decided 
to remain as a neutral group in the meantime.
24. Mrs Peggy Lam was an elected chairman to the Wanchai District Board. Mr Chung Pui- 
lam was an elected member to the Sham Shui Po district. Both of them also campaigned for seats 
to the Legislative Council through the electoral college in their respective constituency. Mr Chung 
was elected in September 1985. They were said to be also members of the Progressive Hong Kong 
Society.
25. Philip Kwok (1938—) was Chairman of the Wing On Holding Ltd and Wing On Bank in 
Hong Kong. Kan Fook-yee (1936—) was a Chartered Surveyor and Partner of Frank Kan & Bail- 
lieu. Cheung Yan-lung (1921 — ) was a Sole Proprietor, having a diverse range of investment in 
stocks, theatres, construction, restaurants, and land developments.
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rooted in Hong Kong” .2  ^ Besides. Maria Tam called for the co-operation of various 
interests in all s tra ta  of society and the resolution of individual differences under a single 
leadership. Thus she actively supported a wide range of interested individuals in 
standing for the elections to the district boards and Legislative Council in 1985.
Under the leadership of another group of Legislative Councillors, such as Allen Lee 
and Selina Chow, members of the Young Professionals were also involved in drafting a 
constitution in 1984-85 with a view to setting up a formal political party to represent 
the interests of the professional elite. Unlike the PHS, which called for co-operation with 
China, members of the Young Professionals stood unambiguously for direct elections. 
One of its members, Martin Lee, a lawyer elected to the Legislative Council in 
September 1985, even argued openly tha t  direct elections were the only system which 
could convince the public tha t  the political system of Hong Kong could stand up to any 
attem pts by the PRC to intervene in the internal affairs of Hong Kong.
T he M id d le-c lass P rofession als: ‘L ib era l-D em ocrats’
While the PHS and the Young Professionals represented the active participation of 
some pro-government groups in political activities, other middle-class professionals were 
emerging outside the political system at this time. Leaders of the Hong Kong Affairs 
Society, Huang Chen-ya and Nelson Chow, for example, were academics. This Society 
also consisted of members of the legal profession, like Ho Chun-yan and Man Sai-cheong, 
who were later elected to the Urban Council in 1986. Other figures, such as Lo King-man 
and Michael Luk of the Hong Kong People’s Association (HKPA) were also academics, 
while the HKPA’s active member, Vincent Ko, was a lawyer elected as chairman to the 
Central and Western district board in 1985.
From the above examples, it is clear that there were several common background 
features observable among these middle-class groups. Most of them were professionals 
around the age of 35-40. Usually, they started out as small discussion groups during the 
talks, but when the Agreement was about to be concluded, they claimed th a t  they 
regarded Hong Kong as their permanent home and said that they were willing to 
contribute to the maintenance of prosperity and stability.27 Gradually they became 
active participants in the discussions of the major political issues because they thought 
tha t  there were more opportunities for their own participation in the administration in
26. Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “Hong Kong: The Pressure to Converge” , In terna t iona l  A f f a i r s , 63(2)  
(Spring 1987), p.273.
27. See the Hong Kong Affairs Society, A Posi t ion Paper Submi t ted to the Public As ses sm ent  
O ff ic e  (November. 1984). The Hong Kong People’s Association, The M an i f es to  (18 November,  
1984). Concerning the New Hong Kong Researchers Association, see South China M or n in g  Post  
(30 October, 1984) and the author’s interview with its chairman, Walter Yeung (October 1985).
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the transitional period, in which they hoped to provide ‘leadership’ in filling the political 
vacuum.
By 1984-85, these newly emerging groups were still very moderate in their political 
outlook and they generally expressed their support for the introduction of the Green 
Paper. With the exception of the Hong Kong Affairs Society, which advocated direct 
elections, the other middle-class groups just believed in an ‘elitist government’ (jingying 
zhengfu), and did not commit themselves to any particular political stance. But by 1985, 
these groups were making efforts to form a coalition of the middle-class members 
together with such opinion groups as the Hong Kong Observers to discuss issues relating 
to political reforms and the Basic Laws.28
The G rassroots O rgan izations: ‘S o c ia l-D em o cra ts’
Projecting a more progressive image were the grassroots organizations, which 
consisted mainly of young community workers, school teachers and religious leaders, 
calling for equal opportunity of public participation in the policy process and thus better 
representation of the interests of the lo\s-income people.
In 1984-85, the active grassroots leaders consisted of both veterans and new 
pressure-group members. Among these, the leading figures were Dr Ding Lik-kiu of the 
Christian Industrial Committee (CIC), Elsie Elliot of the Association for the Promotion 
of Public Justice (A PPJ). and Szeto Wah of the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ 
Union (HKPTU). Other active members included Fung Kin-kee and Lam Chak-piu of 
the People's Council, Lau Nai-keung, Yeung Sum and Lee Chik-yuet of the Meeting 
Point. Cheung Ka-man of the NHKS, Lee Wing-tat of the Society for Social Research, 
Lau Chin-sek of the CIC, Fung Ho-lap of the Society for Community Organization. 
Some were leaders of religious organizations, such as Lo Lung-kwong of the Methodist Ai 
Wa Community Service Centre, Mak Hoi-wah of the Neighborhood Action Advisory 
Council and Social Workers’ General Union. Besides, various concern groups and 
residents associations, such as those based in the Kwun Tong. Tuen Mun, Eastern and 
Sham Shui Po districts gradually developed out of these grassroots organizations.
These progressive grassroots organizations were commonly described as ‘pressure 
groups’. They often criticized the existing government as colonial, bureaucratic and 
elitist, with policies working primarily to the benefit of the capitalist investors. Thus 
these people regarded themselves as a form of political opposition from without, and 
they only aligned themselves on policy issues on a purely ad hoc basis in fighting against 
policy injustice for their own communities. Until 1985, many of them, such as the
28. Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ‘Hong Kong: The Pressure to Converge’, p.273.
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People’s Council, the Society for Community Organization, the C1C and other residents 
associations were still claiming to be concerned only with the promotion of community 
welfare. Individual leaders were, however, deeply involved in the elections and the 
formation of new political groups. Broadly speaking, they were able to agree upon one 
common goal: democratic self-government and direct elections to the Legislative 
Council. So they were still capable of promoting the democratic movement, thereby 
providing a starting point for grassroots organizations to plan for long-term political 
goals.
The Association for Democracy and Justice (ADJ) was the first grassroots 
organization to consist of members from various groups which claimed to have specific 
political purposes. It was registered in March-April 1985 after the district board election, 
with Dr Ding Lik-kiu, Reverend Lo Lung-kwong, Lau Chin-sek, and Ng Shui-lai being 
the founding members. Primarily, it represented those active pressure-group leaders who 
saw the prospect of obtaining political power within the political institutions. Thus 
they were calling upon other grassroots members to participate actively in political 
issues and “work within the system itself instead of outside as critics of government 
policies7*. u After a year’s development the ADJ was reorganized to become the 
Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood (ADPL). Being set up in April 1986, 
the ADPL was joined by some of those who were newly elected to the Urban Council 
and Regional Council in March, namely Fung Kin-kee, Chang Ka-rnan, and Lee 
Wing-tat, as well as members of the community groups from Sham Shui Po and Tsing 
Yi districts.
So by 1984-85, the term ‘pressure group* in Hong Kong bore different connotations 
from those in the pre-1982 period, which Lau and Kuan refer to as uthose groups which 
are more ‘radical’ in outlook, demand policies with redistributive effects and imply 
relatively unconventional tactics of political influence.” 01 Various terms, such as 
‘interest groups*, ‘quasi-political groups’, and ‘political-opinion groups’, had also been 
used to describe all the fast-emerging groupings, particularly the middle-class 
professional and grassroots organizations. Basically, members of these newly-emerged 
groups represented the rise of a new generation of political participants who had been 
excluded from direct participation in the Hong Kong government previously and had 
come forward to address a wide range of socio-political i s s u e s . W h i l e  the middle-class
29. S.K. Lau and H.C. Kuan, “The 1985 District Board Election in Hong Kong: The Limits of 
Political Mobilization in a Dependent Polity” , Occasional Paper, no.8 (Hong Kong: Centre for 
Hong Kong Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, July 1985), p.5.
30. South China Morning  Post  (6 April, 1985).
31. S.K. Lau and H.C. Kuan, “The 1985 District Board Election in Hong Kong, The Limits of 
Political Mobilization in a Dependent Territory” , p.4.
32. Asiaweek  (23 August, 1985), p.37.
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organizations were more liberal and moderate in a ttitude, the grassroots and 
pressure-group members were more social-oriented. If the middle-class professionals were 
regarded as ‘liberal-democrats’, the grassroots members could be categorized as 
‘social-democrats’.
CONCLUSION: THE BA LA N C E OF POLITICAL FORCES  
IN THE PO ST -A G R E E M E N T  PE R IO D
The above description is merely a brief survey of the most active political groups 
and individuals who emerged into prominence between 1982 and 1985. In fact, many of 
them were loosely organized opinion and discussion groups, being formed among a few 
close friends who shared common concerns about Hong Kong’s future. Others were 
affiliated with either community groups, social welfare agencies, religious organizations, 
professional bodies or commercial associations. By early 1985, most of the groups had 
just been set up for less than one year or even a few months. Almost none of them were 
engaged in any particular kind of political activity, although individual members began 
to become involved actively in the on-going debates on political reforms. While some 
groups were still discussing a political platform among their members, others simply put 
forward a common stance on particular issues, without consciously following any specific 
ideological or political line. In general, people of similar socio-economic or occupational 
background tended to associate with each other. It should be stressed, however, tha t  the 
political stance of an individual or a group was not always associated directly with 
membership of any particular income or professional class. Members of the social 
services profession, for example, generally supported direct elections to the Legislative 
Council, and yet there were a few exceptions.
In most cases, political groupings in Hong Kong could be roughly categorized into 
the conservative-oriented business and professional groups, the liberal-oriented 
middle-class business and professional groups and the social-oriented pressure groups and 
grassroots organizations. This pattern of political alignment broadly reflected the 
balance of political power that was developing in the Hong Kong society in the 
immediate post-Agreement period.
A major political controversy arose over the different interpretations of how to 
attain prosperity and stability in the course of constitutional changes. On the one hand, 
the demand for wider political participation was building up from outside the influential 
circles, calling for direct elections, greater public participation and minimum 
intervention from Beijing. On the other hand, members of the more conservative sectors 
were drawn by the Hong Kong as well as the PRC officials to constitute an important 
source of opinion, with a view to preserving the basic philosophy of the colonial 
government regarding an essentially liberal and non-interventionist economy.
101
All these groups saw that  the Sino-British Agreement provided new opportunities 
for political participation. They conceived the partial liberalization of the Legislative 
Council in 1985 as a  step towards opening up the central institutions of government to 
greater public participation as part of the process of preparing for ‘gangren zhigang’. 
The ‘liberal-democrats’ as well as the ‘social-democrats’ now began to emerge even more 
rapidly, both of them being interested in supervising and restraining the power of the 
future government by some form of public participation. At the beginning of 1985, there 
were also discussions among these groups of ‘democrats’ about the possibility of 
becoming political parties because they thought tha t  future political leadership was to be 
filled by those who were able to mobilize the mass electorate.
The grassroots organizations did try to reach out to the masses a t  this time in an 
a ttem pt to make the community feel th a t  the group leaders represented their interests. 
But these people were still unable to establish confidence among the ordinary citizens. In 
the debates on political reform, these groups even failed to mobilize their own 
communities to back up the demand for direct elections. It was virtually the lack of mass 
support tha t  reduced the effectiveness of any organized political efforts.
Paradoxically, the more the grassroots leaders looked to the masses, the more they 
became distrusted by the established elements who were afraid tha t  those who sought for 
more welfare for the poor people would upset the investors’ confidence. The 
conservatives were, however, driven to seek not merely the protection of the Hong Kong 
administration, but also the recognition of the PRC authorities, who thought that the 
extent of liberalization would depend not only on the willingness of the British and the 
Hong Kong officials, but also of the PRC, to accept a fundamental reform of the power 
structure behind the administrative machinery. The more active participation of the 
conservative economic sectors basically suited the interests of the PRC in its penetration 
of Hong Kong society.
While the PRC did not mobilize its 170,000-strong Hong Kong Federation of 
Trade Union at the grassroots as a political force at this time, it chose to encourage the 
professionals and businessmen to speak up against major political changes. Indeed, the 
PR C ’s economic interests in Hong Kong had been expanding rapidly since the early 
1980s. By 1984, China’s share of the territory's worldwide trade reached 21.4% and its 
investment in Hong Kong was calculated to be roughly around HKS 30 billion, which 
was vested largely in ventures like banking, insurance, shipping, retailing, property and
o  o
manufacturing .00 Commercial organizations such as The Bank of China Groups, the 
China Resources (Holdings) Company, Everbright Industrial Corporation, the Hong
33. Hong Kong Trade Development Council, “Hong Kong’s Growing Economic Relations with 
China” , 1985.
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Kong China Merchant Steam and Navigation Company and the China International 
Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) were major Chinese corporations investing 
in Hong Kong.
Naturally, those investors who had close contact with Chinese economic 
enterprises became political allies of the PRC. Several businessmen, namely Fei Yi-man, 
Ann Tse-kai, Ho Sai-chu, Wong Kwan-cheng, Li Lian-sheng, Tsui Sze-man, Fok 
Ying-tung, etc., were appointed to the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). After mid-1985, the ability to gain 
direct access to the PRC authorities became a new source of protection for these and 
some other conservative capitalists, namely Pao Yue-kong, Cha Chi-ming, Li Ka-shing 
and even some members of the dominant elite in the Hong Kong administration, such as 
Maria Tam, David Li, Lord Kadoorie, Stephen Cheong, etc., for many of them were now 
invited into the Basic Law Drafting (BLDC) and Basic Law Consultative Committees 
(BLCC). By recruiting these members of the conservative business and professional elite, 
the PRC was able to organize a powerful bloc to resist the democratic movement, as Lau 
and Kuan explain
To deal with a few die-hard democratic activists, the tactic will be to divide 
and isolate them, or frighten them into silence. Given the political apathy of 
the masses, the staunch support of the economic and social elites and the 
increasing self-censorship of the mass media, the present pressure for large-scale 
democratic reform can gradually be dissipated.
As a m atter of fact, the democrats found themselves ‘sandwiched' between the 
suspicion of the apolitical masses and the conservative elite, and thus they could only 
confine themselves to fairly moderate demands. In 1985-86, they were still unable to 
transform themselves into effective opposition parties. After investigating their position 
in 1985. Lau and Kuan consider that
it is highly unlikely that they would develop into full-scale political parties, 
with a strong mass base and the full array of affiliated functional organizations 
and act as bona fide  representatives of the Hong Kong people vis-a-vis  Britain 
and China. These leaders constituted but a small proportion of the Hong Kong 
leaders who are typically moderate, conservative, pliable, authoritarian, 
ineffective and amorphous.
But no m atter how weak they were, these newly emerging groups of democrats did 
try to get themselves entrenched in the political processes of Hong Kong. Indeed, the 
dominant elite of Hong Kong was never formally tied to the administration since there
34. S.K. Lau and H.C. Kuan, “Hong Kong After the Sino-British Agreement.: Limits to Institu­
tional Changes in a Dependent Polity75, Occasional Paper (Hong Kong: Centre For Hong Kong 
Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, August 1985), pp.21-22.
35. Ibid., p.23.
103
had been an absence of political parties and full-time politicians. The access of the 
conservative business and professional members to the colonial bureaucracy was made 
easy by an undemocratic administrative process within which the general public had 
minimal say. At the beginning of the political transition, the position of the dominant 
elite was increasingly challenged by the newly-emerged group of democrats who 
demanded, a more open, responsible and representative government. By 1984-85, there 
were two parallel forces observable in the politicization processes in Hong Kong, with the 
democrats growing in strength much more quickly than  the dominant elite. While the 
former still had to establish their own base among the public, the latter continued to 
exert effective influence over the entire political process under the informal umbrella of 
the two sovereign powers.
An issue which remains is: To what extent were the democratic elements capable 
of entering into the policy process by virtue of their popular support? With the 
introduction of elections to the Legislative Council, the political groups were given their 
first chance to exert influence effectively on the administration. It was during the district 
board elections tha t  the newly emerging groups demonstrated their mobilization 
capacities in launching public campaigns. The next chapter will investigate the election 
campaigns of March 1985, with a view to understanding how these groups made use of 
their limited opportunities to mobilize public support and thus enhance their influence 
vis-a-vis the dominant elements in Hong Kong society.
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Map 2a. Electoral Map by Districts (Hong Kong Island), 
District Board Elections, 1985.
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C H A P T E R  5
E L E C T O R A L  P O LITIC S: D I R E C T  E L E C T I O N S  
TO T H E  D I S T R I C T  B O A R D S ,  M A R C H  1985
IN T R O D U C T IO N : D IST R IC T  BO A R D  ELECTIONS IN THE  
C O N T E X T  OF THE C H A N G IN G  POLITICAL SYSTEM  IN H O N G  K O NG
The first elections to be held after the signing of the Agreement, the d is tr ic t  board 
elections in M arch 1985 (hereafter called the March elections) were carried out a t  a time 
of political uncerta in ty . C h in a ’s a t t i tu d e  tow ards political reform in Hong Kong in the 
transit ional period was not yet clearly spelt out, yet the Hong Kong government was 
try ing to  prom ote  public in terest in the elections with a view to convincing the local 
people th a t  they were already partic ipating  in the first step of the a t ta in m e n t  of local 
au tonom y. In this regard, Hong Kong officials tried to persuade the public abou t  the 
increasingly im p o rtan t  role to be played by the d istrict boards in the political system. In 
Septem ber 1985, 426 d is tric t board members would elect among themselves 10 
representa tives to  the Legislative Council. This m eant th a t  the d is tric t boards could be 
the stepping stone for the elected members to the central institutions.
P art ly  owing to the vigorous efforts of the government, about 45% of the potential 
voters were registered, the ac tua l numbers having increased substantially  from 900,000 
in 1982 to  1,270.000 in 1985, being an increase of 41.3%. Moreover 501 candida tes  were 
registered by the end of Jan u a ry  to stand for the elections. Members of the middle-class 
and grassroots  organizations, in particular, showed enthusiasm , while even m em bers of 
the p ro -PR C , pro-GM D and Tro tskyite  groups were reported to have been preparing 
quite vigorously for the campaign. Indeed, many candidates who showed in terest in the 
March elections were convinced that  such a move represented uthe first im p o rtan t  step 
tow ards democracy with the establishment of a highly au tonom ous adm in is tra tion  
accountab le  to the people as the u lt im ate  goal” .1 A survey carried ou t by the  Hong 
Kong F orum  found th a t  71 candidates (64%i of the respondents) ad m itted  th a t  their 
motives in running for the elections were related to “the future developm ent of Hong 
Kong” , while 49 candida tes  (44% of the respondents) expected henceforth to have
1. Joseph Y.S. Cheng, uThe 1985 District Board Elections in Hong Kong” , in Joseph Y.S. 
Cheng, (ed.) Hong Kong  in  Transi t ion  (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1986), p.71.
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9greater participation in the policy process.
By the end of 1984, the forthcoming March elections were a ttracting widespread 
reports in the mass media, which presumed public interest in the elections to be an 
indication of the level of growing political consciousness of the local people after they 
had experienced a period of inhibiting psychological uncertainties. Special attention was 
paid to the participation of the pro-PRC groups, whose activity was readily interpreted 
as a sign of the P R C ’s approval or disapproval of the principle of ‘representative 
government’ in Hong Kong.
The media were also interested to see if the March elections would become a 
battleground between the leftists and the rightists. But in fact, the district board 
elections did not become a battleground between members of the pro-GMD and 
pro-PRC groups primarily because their members were not systematically organized on a 
district basis. On the whole, members of these two groups could not be considered to 
have participated very actively in the March elections.
The 170,000-strong Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions0 (HKFTU), which 
was generally regarded as a ‘hard-core leftist’ grassroots organization, only supported 10 
members standing as independent candidates, of whom only 5 were elected. It was 
reported that 70% of the members of the HKFTU were not even registered as voters. 
This showed that even if the pro-PRC groups had a huge mass base, they could not have 
mobilized their potential supporters effectively as a voting force on this occasion.
In my interviews with various members of the HKFTU, I found tha t  these 
pro-PRC elements were forced into a passive position on the m atter of political reform. 
Since the PRC authorities in Hong Kong had never announced any official policy 
regarding the elections in Hong Kong, the pro-PRC members were not given any 
instructions on how far they could be involved in the colonial administration. Besides, 
these pro-PRC groups realized tha t  the local people were still sensitive about the PRC's 
involvement in the internal politics of Hong Kong, so they intentionally kept a low 
profile in the elections immediately after the signing of the bilateral Agreement. Some of 
them were also hesitant about too actively criticizing any aspects of maladministration, 
in case it might be interpreted as a micro-level of expression of Sino-British conflicts. 
Yet if they remained silent, they could be accused of being ‘yes-men’ who had joined 
sides with the British administration.'*
2. The Hong Kong Forum, “Bawunian quyihui xuanju houxuanren zhenggang ji zhengzhi xin- 
tai diaocha baogao” , ( “A Report on the Survey on the Platform and Political Orientations of the 
Candidates Standing for the 1985 District Board Elections” ) (1985), p.31.
3. By 1985-86, The Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions was composed of 72 trade unions in 
Hong Kong, accounting for a membership of 170,000.
4. The M ir ro r , no.93 (April 1985), p.39.
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Still there were more pro-PRC members standing for the elections of 1985 than 
there had been in 1982, when only about 10 candidates campaigned in the 1982 district 
board elections.^ In 1985, it was calculated that about 23 elected candidates were 
pro-PRC, accounting for 9% of the 237 elected members. Including others who were 
closely associated with the PRC, this group accounted for 18.1% (43) of the 237 elected 
membership.®
Members of the pro-GMD groups were said to have taken an even less active part 
in the 1985 elections than the pro-PRC groups. Even in comparison with the elections of 
1982, the proportion of pro-GMD candidates dropped dramatically, for in 1982 about 30 
candidates (more than 15%) in the urban areas and two candidates in the New 
Territories were claimed to be related to ‘freedom associations’ (zivou shetuan).^ But in 
1985, only about 12 candidates were strictly speaking ‘hard-core rightists’ and only
o
about 5 of them were elected.0 There were a few candidates who were deemed to have 
close connections with pro-GMD organizations such as the Kowloon General Chamber of 
Commerce and the Hong Kong and Kowloon Trade Union Council (HKTUC). Other 
so-called pro-GMD groups, like the Association for Democracy, the Alliance for 
Democracy and Freedom of Hong Kong, Society for Education, the Association for 
Democracy and Self-Government, the “I Love Free Hong Kongr campaign committee, 
and the Self-Salvation Action Movement, also separately promoted one or two members 
standing as candidates in the elections.
In any case, their participation did not make a significant change in the political 
equilibrium because only a small number of pro-PRC and pro-GMD candidates was 
elected. What most significantly characterized the district board elections in 1985 was 
the emergence of the non-partisan non-ideological middle-class and grassroots 
organizations, members of which were inclined towards a more open and liberal 
government. Before analyzing the emergence of these new groups, the following section 
will first discuss the mechanisms and composition of the district boards and then its 
implications for district-level politicking with a view to understanding better the 
conditions favouring the participation of such middle-class and grassroots organizations 
at the district elections.
5. The Severities,  n o .147 (April 1982), p.37.
6. S.K. Lau, and H.C. Kuan, “The 1985 District Board Election in Hong Kong, The Limits of  
Political Mobilization in a Dependent Polity” , p.10.
7. Wide Angle,  no .120 (16 September, 1982), pp.24-25.
8. S.K. Lau and H.C. Kuan “The 1985 District Board Election in Hong Kong, The Limits of 
Political Mobilization in a Dependent Polity” , p.9. See also an interview with Albert Lam, the 
Regional Secretary for City and New Territories Administration, by the Hong Kon g  Economic  
Journa l , no.97 (April 1985), pp.4-6.
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THE MAJOR FE A T U R E S OF D IST R IC T  POLITICS IN H O N G  KO NG  
M echanism of the D istrict Board System
The system of local administration went through several stages in its development 
prior to the introduction of the Green Paper on District Administration in 1980. As a 
result of this, 18 District Boards were set up in Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the 
New' Territories in 1981-82. In each district, there was a District Management 
Committee (DMC) of officials charged w'ith co-ordinating and monitoring the w'ork of 
government departments. The DMC was to ensure tha t  the departments should be as 
responsive as practicable to district needs and wishes.^ Representatives of each district 
were appointed to join the key members of the DMC to form a District Board to advise 
on the whole field of administration.1^
According to the White Paper on District Administration (1981), the role of the 
district boards was to give advice mainly on matters affecting the well-being of the 
people who lived and w orked in the d istrict.11 Betw'een 1982-85. the major scope of the 
district board’s activities could be assessed from the kinds of sub-committees set up in 
each boardJ which mainly dealt w'ith specific matters, such as environment, traffic and 
transport, community building and community welfare, recreation and sports, and 
finance. Gradually, the government took the initiative in letting the boards discuss 
various policy issues, such as the allocation of educational resources, social security
9. According to the te rm s of reference, the  D istrict M anagem en t C o m m ittee  was to  uadvise
Heads of D epartm en ts  th rough  the ir  representatives  on the C om m ittee  on measures required to 
advance the interests of residents and improve conditions in the d is tric t  and to in it ia te  direct
action within defined limits to achieve the same objectives” . For part icu lars ,  see White Paper,
District A dm nin is tra tion  in Hong Kong  (Janua ry  1981), p.31.
10. It is s ta ted in the W hite  P a p e r  th a t  uthe role of the  D istrict Boards will rem ain  mainly
advisory ... In under tak ing  activities with funds m ade available for the purpose, D istrict Boards 
will be expected to act within the overall framework of G overnm ent policy, and in the  urban area,
tak ing  account of the role of the  U rban  Council .” Ibid., p.10. The te rm s of reference for district
boards are as follows
a. to advise on m a tte rs  affecting the well-being of people living in the d is t ric t  and those 
working there;
b. to  advise on the provision and use of public facilities and services w ith in  the  district;
c. to advise on the  adequacy and priorities of G overnm en t  program m es for the  district;
d. to  advise on the use of public funds allocated to the d is tric t  for local public works and 
com m unity  activities;
e. to undertake, where funds are m ade available for the purpose, m inor environm enta l  
im provem ents  within the d is tric t ,  and
f. to  undertake, w’here funds are m ade available for the purpose, the p rom otion  of recrea­
tional and cultural activities with in  the d istric t.
11. T h e  W hite P aper  (1981), p.10.
12. T here  were abou t 81 subcom m ittees  in 18 boards for the period 1982-85. See Society for 
Social Research (ed.),  Weizhi zhi zhan - quyihui de guoqu yu weilai (Position  W ars  - the Pas t  
and F u tu re  of the District Boards),  (Hong Kong: W ide Angle Press L td . ,  1985), p p .41-42.
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schemes and even debates on the future of Hong Kong . 10 So all central policies and 
controversial public issues could be regarded as the concern of the district boards 
because they might affect the welfare of the local community as a whole.
C o m p o s i t io n s  o f  th e  D i s t r i c t  B o a r d s
It was proposed in the Green Paper on District Administration (1980) tha t  elected 
elements be added to the district boards to constitute half of the members of unofficial 
representatives. Accordingly, there were in total 132 elected and 135 appointed unofficial 
seats in the 18 district boards between 1982-85. In addition, each district board consisted 
of appointed officials from various departments who were also the key members of the 
DMCs; seats were also provided for the chairmen of the Rural Committees in the New 
Territories and for the members of the Urban Council in the urban areas elected for the 
districts1 constituencies.
In 1984, membership of the district boards was revised so that each board was to 
consist wholly of unofficial members between 1985-88. Moreover, the number of elected 
seats was doubled, increasing to 237, thus allowing elected members to form a two-thirds 
majority of the total membership. The chairmanship of each board was no longer to be 
held by official members but would be elected from among the unofficial members 
themselves. Officials were to attend the meetings only to provide administrative and 
secretarial assistance and answer questions being raised by the unofficials. All these 
changes meant that the district boards were to enjoy greater freedom and initiative to 
discuss district affairs. For the period 1985-88. the membership of each district board 
was to consist of both appointed and elected unofficials, together with ex-officio 
representatives of the Urban Council in the urban areas and Rural Committees in the 
New Territories as in Table 2.
T h e  V o t in g  S y s te m
The elections for the district boards were organized on a constituency basis. The 
number of constituencies and elected members was determined by the population size of 
each district, the majority of which returned one elected member between 1982-85. For 
the period 1985-88, the boundaries of some constituencies were redrawn on a population 
basis of roughly 50.000 so that the number of constituencies was increased from 122 to 
145 and the number of boards from 18 to 19 (see Table 3). On average, there were 
roughly 7-8 constituencies in each district, but some could have up to 12 constituencies 
as in the cases of Eastern, Kwun Tong and Wong Tai Sin Districts. In general, two seats
13. Among the central policies discussed by the district boards, 15 out of 18 items were moved 
by the District Officers, Ibid., p.49.
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Table 2
Memberships of the District Boards (March 1985)
No. of
Constituencies
Elected Appointed 
Seats Seats
Rural Urban Total
Committee Council
Central t Western 7 13 5 - 2 20
Eastern 12 18 9 - 4 31
Kowloon city 8 16 8 - 4 28
Kwun Tong 12 20 10 - 4 34
Mongkok 6 10 5 - 2 17
Sham Shui Po 10 18 9 - 4 31
Southern 6 11 6 - 2 19
Wan Chai 5 10 5 - 2 17
Wong Tai Sin 12 21 10 - 4 35
Yau Ma Tei 5 8 4 - 2 14
New Territories Islands 7 7 3 8 - 18
Kwai Chung/Tsing Yi 8 15 9 1 - 25
North 6 8 7 4 - 19
Sai Kung 5 5 5 2 - 12
Sha Tin 8 15 8 1 - 24
Tai Po 7 7 8 2 - 17
Tsuen Wan 8 9 6 2 - 17
Tuen Mun 8 16 8 1 - 25
Yuen Long 7 10 7 6 - 23
Total 145 237 132 27 30 426
Source: City and New Territories Administration.
were available in each constituency, thus m aking an increase in the num ber of elected 
members from 132 to 237. As a result of this, the num ber of elected seats  ranged from 
9-20 in each board. The m ethod of voting, which was based on the ‘first past  the post ' 
system in its most s traightforw ard form, i.e. a simple plurality , remained unchanged. 
Under this system, the candidate(s) with the  most votes would be elected in each 
constituency.
Im p lica tions  for P o lit ick ing
In theory, elected members could claim to have a popular m an d a te  representing 
the in terests of their own constituencies because their legitimacy derived from some form 
of popular elections a t the community level. B u t in actual practice they could not do so 
primarily because they were not given any real powers and their function was merely 
advisory. In order to implement policies smoothly a t  the local levels, official members 
would try to obtain the consent of unofficial members. Thus, unofficial m em bers might 
prove to be very influential if they united in a  common stance to resist or initia te  
particu lar  proposals. Nevertheless, unofficial members seldom united on a  common 
stance. While the elected members tended to  exhibit a more aggressive and critical 
approach tow ards government policies, appointed  unofficials generally came to approve
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Table 3
Comparing the District Boards Elections of 1982 and 1985
1982 1985
Number of District Boards 18 19
Number of Constituency 122 145
Number of Appointed seats 135 132
Number of Elected seats 132 237
Registered Candidates 401 501
Registered Voters 899,559 1,271,392
7, of Voters Turn-out 387, 37.57.
Number of Candidates per Seat 3.04 2.11
Source: The City and New Territories Administration.
and id e n tify  w ith  o ffic ia l lines, the  resu lt being th a t the appo in ted  u no ffic ia ls  and the 
o ffic ia ls  co ns titu te d  the  d o m in a n t p o lit ic a l influence in each board. I t  was p a r t ic u la r ly  
true  between 1982-85 when o ffic ia l members had v o tin g  r ig h ts  in the  decisions made by 
each board.
W ho were these appo in ted  u n o ffic ia l members? W hy d id  they p resum ab ly  id e n tify  
w ith  the o ffic ia l lines? A cco rd ing  to  the W h ite  Paper o f D is tr ic t A d m in is tra tio n  (1981), 
appo in ted  u n o ffic ia ls  were “ m em bers o f the p ub lic  selected and appo in ted  by the 
gove rnm ent7’ , w ho were usua lly  local businessmen, teachers and social w o rk e rs .*4 So 
these appo in ted  m em bers came m a in ly  from  the business and professional classes and 
were appo in ted  to  the  local adv iso ry  bodies, such as the R ura l C om m ittees  (R C s) in the 
New T e rr ito r ie s  and the Area C om m ittees  (AC s) in the urban areas. RCs consisted 
m a in ly  o f w ell-respected v illage  representa tives in the  New T e rr ito r ie s , the  cha irm en and 
vice-cha irm en o f each o f w h ich  sit ex-o ffic io  in the  Heung Yee K u k  (New T e rr ito r ie s  
A ssoc ia tion) (H Y K ) . The  H Y K  was made a s ta tu to ry  body in 1960. Its  fu n c tio n s  were to  
advise the gove rnm ent on m a tte rs  a ffec ting  the w e ll-be ing  o f the o rig in a l in h a b ita n ts  
l iv in g  in the New T e rr ito r ie s , w ith  a v iew  to  p ro m o tin g  co -opera tion  and u nde rs tand ing  
between the gove rnm ent and the ru ra l in h a b ita n ts  concern ing the la t te r ’s tra d it io n s  and 
custom s. A fte r  the in tro d u c tio n  o f the  D is tr ic t  A d m in is tra tio n , m any o f them  were also 
appo in ted  to  rep resen ta tion  on the  New T e rr ito r ie s  d is tr ic t boards. A C s were set up in 
the 1970s in  the  sub-d iv is ions  o f each o f the c ity  d is tr ic ts  to  fa c ilita te  the  o rg a n iza tio n  o f 
some gove rnm ent cam paigns, such as the F ig h t V io le n t C rim e  C am pa ign  and the 
C lean-up H ong Kong  C am pa ign . M em bers o f the  AC s were a ppo in ted  from  the
14. The White Paper (1981), p.8.
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organizations based on tenament and apartment buildings, such as Mutual Aid 
Committees (MACs) in the public housing estates and Owners Corporations (OCs) in 
the private buildings, the latter two being self-appointed organizations whose 
establishment was strongly encouraged by the government as part of the twro major 
campaigns to promote better building management and security. By 1981, there were 
some 3,000 MACs in existence.
The kaifong associations (hereafter called the kaifongs) were also community 
organizations in the urban areas which originated to provide services to the local areas 
concerned, the first one being set up as early as 1949 in Sham Shui Po. These kaifong 
leaders were generally known to be wealthy and of high social standing in their own local 
comm unity.15 It was no exaggeration to say that the kaifongs supplemented the 
inadequate services provided by the government, thus contributing to the prosperity and 
stability of each community. It seemed natural tha t  they should have closer connections 
with the local officials and have become ‘recognized' leaders in the eyes of the 
government. Many of them were represented in the ACs and OCs and other public 
advisory bodies. With the introduction of the District Administration in 1981, many of 
the kaifong leaders, together with other key figures of ACs, MACs and OCs in each 
district, were appointed to the urban district boards.
These local organizations were often regarded by the government as ‘grassroots 
organizations'. Yet these ‘grassroots organizations' were quite different from those 
self-initiated pressure groups and residents' associations that have been discussed in 
Chapter Three. In general, members of the former were on average over 40 years of age, 
while those of the latter were in their 20s and 30s. Among the ‘government-initiated' 
groups, there w'ere also increasing numbers of young professionals, such as 
schoolmasters, social workers, lawyers and administrative executives w'ho were co-opted 
by the local officials because of their similar outlook to the government.1^  The 
dominance of these people at the district boards was gradually resented by the 
self-initiated pressure-group leaders because the former had better access to the local 
officials and were usually identified by the pressure-group leaders as ‘pro-government’. In 
the following discussion, I will however refer to these ‘pro-government1 group leaders as 
‘trad itional’ or ‘sub-dominant1 elite because they seldom acted against official lines, thus 
being regarded by Lau and Kuan as ‘‘traditionalistic, authoritarian, conservative and
15. Aline K. Wong, The K a i f o n g  Associat ions  and the Society o f  Hong Kong  (Taipei: Asia 
Folklore and Social Life Monographs, 1972). See also “Chinese Community Leadership in a 
Colonial Setting: The Hong Kong Neighbourhood Associations” , Asian  Survey , 12(7) (July 
1972), pp.587-601.
16. Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “The 1985 District Board Elections in Hong Kong” , p.74.
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1 7deferential to political authorities.'”
In the first ever district board elections (1982), local officials also encouraged these
i o
‘local leaders’ with some standing in their communities to run for election. As a result, 
a considerable proportion of the elected members were sponsored by these community 
groups. However, many of these traditional members were not actively and substantially 
supported by their own community-based organization; many of these traditional 
candidates at most received nominal support from their respective MACs, OCs or 
kaifong associations, and they turned out to campaign mainly in their individual 
capacity. Among the 132 members elected during the period 1982-85, only 26 were 
members of the MACs, 11 were kaifong leaders, and 14 came from the RCs and HYK. 
From the small number of these traditional members being elected, we could probably 
conclude that the sub-dominant elites at the district level had weak grassroots networks 
and strictly speaking, they could not claim to represent local interests effectively. But 
together with the appointed unofficials, members of these MACs, OCs, KFs, RCs and 
HYK were able to constitute a dominant force in the district boards between 1982-85.
ELECTORAL POLITICS: NO N-PARTISAN  
NON-IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGNS
A change in the political balance could be foreseen for the period 1985-88 primarily 
because elected unofficial members would now outnumber appointed members for the 
first time, while official members could no longer hold the balance merely with informal 
representation. In other words, the political balance was now determined by the 
proportion between elected and appointed members and more importantly, by the kind 
of people who were elected into each district board. If all elected members came from the 
same party and formed into a united front, they could constitute the dominant political 
influence at the district level. Thus, changes in the composition of the district boards 
became an important incentive in encouraging more participants to stand for the March 
elections, which turned out to have a great impact on the nature of the electoral 
campaigns, for in some districts potential candidates joined in electoral alliances with a 
view to achieving better co-operation in the district boards after the election.
The March elections were held at a time when some newly emerging middle-class 
and grassroots leaders were urging the implementation of direct elections to the 
Legislative Council, and the district elections were, in fact, a kind of direct election 
which involved a modest degree of public campaigning and mass mobilization. Many of
17. S.K. Lau and H.C. Kuan, “The 1985 District Board Election in Hong Kong. The Limits of 
Political Mobilization in a Dependent Polity” ,p.4.
18. Ibid.
those who showed an interest in the March elections believed that direct elections would 
certainly be introduced to the Legislative Council in 1988. Hence, these people thought 
the district election a good opportunity for them to activate and mobilize the masses. 
Other individuals who planned to take part in the same constituency based Urban 
Council and Regional Council elections in 1986 also supported friendly candidates in 
order to establish a political base for themselves.1  ^ Thus, participation in the district 
boards provided an opportunity for those who had some political ambitions to develop a 
political foothold in the political system.
Many candidates stood for the elections for the first time. In order to obtain 
technical advice on political campaigning, many found it expedient to affiliate with 
political organizations. Many groups were also set up initially to aim at recruiting 
candidates for the March elections. But given such a short span of time, they were 
formed without any definite platforms and were not organized along ideological lines. 
Most of them were grouped in accordance with personal relationships, common 
professional and educational background or just common interest in the elections.
In my interviews, I found that many of those members associated with the new 
political groups did not expect to commit themselves to any particular organization on a 
long-term basis. The groups were merely regarded as providing the forums for interested 
individuals to aggregate and exchange opinions with one another during the campaign. 
The experienced candidates could contribute their political skills, and their knowledge 
did help to improve the campaigning strategies of the new members. In this regard, 
candidates of the same group were never committed to a common course of action 
because each of them had to apply his/her knowledge in accordance with the particular 
situation. Some individuals came to associate with more than one group. As a 
consequence, distinctively non-partisan and non-ideological' types of political groupings 
emerged during the elections.
The district elections of 1985 were thus characterized by two major phenomena: 
( l)  ad hoc electoral alliances with weak political commitments followed by rapid 
realignment among members of the board in the post-election period; (2) non-ideological 
district problems constituted the major issues of the campaign. Even some candidates 
who mentioned ‘national issues’ had to translate them into concrete terms relating to 
the daily problems of the communities concerned. The following observations will try to 
provide some explanations for these features.
19. Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “The 1985 District Board Elections in Hong Kong” , p .7 l.
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(1) Ad Hoc  E le c to ra l  A l l ia n c e
Ad hoc political alignments were contingent upon the actual situation within each 
constituency, but two general patterns could be observed.
In the first instance, two candidates formed an alliance when more than one seat 
was available in a constituency. These were actually electoral partnerships rather than 
coalitions, which arrived at a consensus on the distribution of constituencies in order to 
avoid risky contests. Where a candidate was strong enough to monopolize most of the 
votes, he would choose to enhance the position of an allied candidate whom he preferred 
to work with on the district board in future. During the campaign, candidates would 
supplement for each others’ shortcomings, thereby strengthening each other’s position. 
Some of them became quite solid partnerships, while others were only intended to serve 
for the election campaign.
In the second case, potential candidates of different constituencies in the same 
district formed alliances. This situation enabled different political groups to co-operate 
with each other, aiming to win all the available seats for their members, others merely 
wanting to avoid competing with each other in different constituencies. By doing so, 
these people hoped to project an image of a united front, thus weakening the position of 
the other lnon-aligned' candidates.
The Clique of Twelve in the Central and Western (C&W) district was an example 
of intergroup alignments within a district, where 12 out of 19 candidates, drawn from 7 
political groups, formed themselves into a clique, to compete for 13 seats in 7 different 
constituencies (for details, see also Chapter Six. Case Study A). Consequently, 10 of 
them were elected, accounting for a success rate of 83%. The Eastern Alliance which ran 
in the Eastern district was another example of .inter-group alignment. In this case, 11 
out of 42 candidates allied to contest for 18 seats in 12 different constituencies and 
finally, all of them were elected. Coincidentally, the Hong Kong Forum also found out 
that those who had some form of coalition or electoral alliances exhibited a higher 
success rate than independent candidates (see Table 4).
There were no obvious reasons to suggest that these allied candidates succeeded 
because of their affiliation to any forms of coalition or electoral partnership. In both the 
cases of the Eastern Alliance and the Clique of Twelve, for example, most of their 
members campaigned in their individual capacities. As they merely regarded the 
coalitions as a forum to share technical information, manpower and financial resources, 
individual members realigned themselves after the elections. Both these cases indicated 
that the electoral alignments and political affiliations were not solid. Basically, these 
electoral alliances were not party-like organizations which, in Lau and Kuan's words, 
“organize voters on a large scale, unite them behind a platform of aggregated interests,
118
Table 4
Relationship between Coalition and Rate of Success
Form of Coalition No. Elected/Nominated Success Rate
Electoral Partnership 14/26 53 .8 V,
Coalitions 14/19 73 .7 V,
None of the Above 32/71 45. I V
Source: Hong Kong Forum, “Bawunian quyihui xuanju hou xuanren
zhenggang ji zhengzhi xintai diaocha baogao" (“A Report on the 
Survey on the Platforms and Political Orientations of the 
Candidates Standing for the 1985 District Boards Elections") 
(1985), p .34.
com m and loyalty to the group, vote in accordance to group labels, and inspire 
confidence in group leadership,” but “very loose ad hoc groups, based mainly on 
expediency, convenience and m utual acquain tance’".
Nevertheless, it was these individuals w ithout any particular political principles 
who found themselves in the best position to campaign in the d is tric t elections. They 
found th a t  the  limited advisory functions and scope of activities handled by the district 
boards enabled them  to limit themselves to discussing district and com m unity  problems, 
thus  avoiding the need to address national issues along ideological lines.
(2) D is tr ic t-O rien ted  P la tform s
Alm ost all candidates claimed to be concerned with the specific problem s of their 
constituencies. A study by the Hong Kong Forum  showed that abou t  92% (461) of the
o  1
respondents  discussed district problems in their platforms. Generally speaking, 
cand ida tes  needed to be skilful in transla ting  central policies into specific local issues, 
such as environm ental improvem ent, public safety, t ranspor t  and traffic, schooling, 
problems of the aged and youth , recreational and sport facilities. These issues were 
ac tually  related to the scope of activities of the district boards themselves. In my 
interviews with various elected members after the elections, most of them  argued th a t  
the general electorate  was still too conservative to accept overt ‘politica l’ p latform s wdth 
any ideological implications because people did not like to discuss ‘politics ' openly. Since
20. S.K. Lau and H.C. Kuan, “The 1985 District Board Election in Hong Kong, The Limits of 
Political Mobilization in a Dependent Territory”, p.14.
21. The Hong Kong Forum, “Bawunian quyihui xuanju houxuanren zhenggang ji zhengzhi 
xintai diaocha baogao” ( “A Report on the Survey on the Platforms and Political Orientations of 
the Candidates for the 1985 District Board Elections” ), p.8.
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the residents were more concerned with their daily problems, candidates could only 
emphasize those policies tha t  affected the immediate welfare of the residents.
There were no debates among the candidates on ‘national issues’ regarding the 
distribution of socio-economic resources in society. In a survey carried out by the Hong 
Kong Forum, only about 2% of the candidates mentioned social welfare measures and 
income redistribution and 9% mentioned political reform. A few of the candidates 
vaguely mentioned broader issues such as ‘gangren zhigang*, the future of Hong Kong
n o
and maintaining the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. Yet none of them 
proposed how these goals could be attained through discussions at the district boards.
Even members of the pro-GMD, pro-PRC and Trotskyite groups chose not to sell 
their ideological wares in the campaign and avoided emphasizing their political 
backgrounds. Chan Cheong, for example, was the only candidate who claimed to be 
associated with the Trotskyites and was elected in the March elections. In his platform, 
Chan only vaguely called for the return of sovereignty to China, the establishment of a 
democratic people’s association, direct elections and the right to participate in the Basic 
Law committees. During the whole campaign he put more emphasis on analyzing district 
problems and matters affecting community welfare. Unless voters asked him to explain 
his political background, they could have hardly distinguished Chan from the rest of the 
grassroots leaders. As with candidates of other political backgrounds, it was very 
doubtful if many voters even came to be aware of Chan’s ideological stance.
There were also no debates among the candidates themselves about how they 
could improve district welfare. The incumbent members were in a more advantageous 
position by citing their experiences in dealing with government officials. However, they 
could not provide much information about how they had contributed towards improving 
the quality of life in their own community. In an on-the-street TV interview about 
public impressions of the district board candidates, many interviewees said that they did
no
not know wrhat their district board members had ach ie v e d /0 Others showed a sense of 
distrust about the ability of the elected members to tackle district problems simply 
because they realized tha t  the elected district boards were not given any executive power 
at all.
While people might have criticized the district board members for being able to do 
little to improve community problems, the latter could have easily unloaded their share 
of responsibility for this by putting the blame on the government officials, thus also 
justifying their inability to respond effectively to public demands. The fact tha t  most 
candidates concentrated their criticisms on the shortcomings of the bureaucracy w'as a 
reflection of the lack of real decision-making power of the district boards.
22. Hid.
23. X i n w e n  toushi  (News Magazine), a programme produced by the Hong Kong TVB.
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I m p l ic a t io n s  for th e  E m e r g e n c e  o f  G ra ssro o ts  and  M id d le -c la s s  G r o u p s
The discussion above has shown tha t  district elections were actually designed in a 
way tha t  favoured the participation of those groups which had no strong ideological and 
political commitments. Even though such a non-partisan and non-ideological campaign
# o i
was sometimes criticized as “immature, instrumental, individual and self-oriented“ , it 
was these very qualities tha t  characterized the emerging middle-class and grassroots 
members who came to the fore during the electoral campaigns. While the former could 
align flexibly with all sorts of other candidates according to the particular situation, the 
latter were more noteworthy for mastering the skills needed for public campaigning and 
voter mobilization. Broadly speaking, both groups generally wished to develop a more 
accountable and responsive government, their candidates being able, very often, to 
translate these ideas during the campaign into concrete slogans such as ‘reflecting public 
opinion’ and ‘fighting for people’s rights and welfare’. It was also these groups of people 
who were most capable of highlighting particular community problems, thus challenging 
the dominant position of the traditional groups at the community level. In order to 
illustrate how these new members emerged in the March elections, the following section 
will analyze the campaign strategies of one individual. Chang Ka-man, who obtained the 
highest number of votes among the 501 candidates during the March elections.
A C a se  S tu d y :  T h e  C a m p a ig n in g  S tr a te g ie s  o f  C h a n g  K a -m a n
The case of Chang Ka-man provides a typical example of grassroots participation 
in the election campaign. In comparison with other political groups, members of the 
grassroots organizations generally exhibited a stronger sense of organizational 
commitment and discipline, since many of them had developed their political support 
from previous participation in community actions and mass movements. Thus, they 
found themselves in a more advantageous position to conduct election campaigns in their 
own communities by applying their skills and experiences in popular mobilization. 
Several groups such as the People’s Council and the associated residents’ associations 
had long been working within the oldest public housing estates and were most influential 
in districts such as Sham Shui Po, Wong Tai Sin and Kwun Tong. The People's Council 
did not itself claim to be a political group, but it became a pioneer among the grassroots 
organizations in running an election campaign when it promoted a few candidates - Tsui 
Kim-ling, Wong Chee-kwan, Fung Kin-kee and Lam Chak-piu - in the district boards 
and Urban Council elections in 1982 and 1983 respectively. After they were elected,
24. S.K. Lau and H.C. Kuan, “The 1985 District Board Election in Hong Kong, The Limits of 
Political Mobilization in a Dependent Territory” , p.28.
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these candidates set up their own ‘councillors' office’. These offices became good training 
grounds for community leaders and subsequently also served to develop the skills and 
experiences of several candidates for the district board elections in 1985.
Chang, aged 25, was typical of these, since he developed his connections at the 
grassroots level by joining the councillor’s office of Lam Chak-piu in 1982. During the 
next three years, he became involved in a number of social movements in the public 
housing areas of Kwhn Tong. Chang suggested in an interview tha t  his work with Lam 
had helped him to develop a community base and, through tha t  connection, he had also 
joined the People’s Council and the Society for Community Organization. Moreover, 
Chang had been a student activist who had formed the New’ Hong Kong Society after he 
graduated from the University of Hong Kong, thus becoming one of the leading 
personalities associated with discussions about the 1997 issue. Chang had decided to 
stand for the March elections in about mid 1984. Following the Joint Conference for 
Direct Elections in September 1984 he participated in a training programme, w’hich was 
organized by the few elected grassroots members sitting on the Urban Council - Lam 
Chak-piu, Lee Chik-yuet and Fung Kin-kee. The programme mainly catered for 
developing the skills of the grassroots members in conducting district elections. In 
January 1985, together w’ith 1G other grassroots members, aged between 24-36, he stated 
his objective of standing for the elections, and called for the democratization of the 
political system and the participation of the young people.
Like other grassroots members running in the elections, Chang emphasized the 
formation of a cohesive campaigning team with a core group of individuals. Collective 
participation was a slogan which sustained the commitment of the group. The A nnual 
Report of the Urban Councillor’s Office. Lee Chik-yuet, defined collective participation 
simply as the opposite of individual participation,*^'1 i.e. he emphasized that the 
campaigning team was merely a group of individual members w'ho aimed at 
‘contributing to the community’. This group of individuals was to become the core group 
of the campaigning team. The election exercise itself was a ‘process of internalization’, 
during w'hich the campaigning team itself became a democratic organization whose 
members w'ere expected to share the values of democracy. Jobs w'ere distributed by the 
central committees, yet there were no hierarchical relations among the members, each 
job being considered as equally important as any other. The team helped the candidate 
to analyze the social problems of a particular constituency and designed the campaigning 
platform accordingly. This platform which was considered to be the effort of the 
collective wisdom of the group wras not merely a promise of the candidate, but also a 
goal of the campaigning team.
25. O ff ic e  o f  Mr.  Lee Chik-yuet ,  Urban Council lor,  Annual  Report ,  1983-84,  (April 1984),  
pp.2-3.
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The team  stressed collective responsibility, so th a t  the. candida te  was merely a 
representa tive  of the campaigning team , although they put heavy emphasis on the 
‘responsibility’ and ‘accoun tab il ity ’ of the candida te  th roughout the campaign. In order 
to m ake sure th a t  the candida te  would be responsive to com m unity  needs, the 
cam paigning team  would itself be transform ed into a formal organization. The 
ca n d id a te ’s performance would, by implication, be supervised by the team , members of 
which were usually recruited into his office after the elections.
Having established a cohesive campaigning team, Chang s ta r ted  to  prepare his 
cam paign. In the first place he chose to run in the Shun Lee and Shun On Constituency 
in the Kwun Tong district because it was a new constituency, containing few established 
influences. Nevertheless, the electoral campaign there involved a m odest degree of 
political mobilization because it was a  com paratively large constituency, consisting of 
10,722 registered voters.
R egistration  of candida tes for the election s tarted  in Janua ry .  In most cases, the 
official cam paigns were conducted during Jan u a ry  and February , bu t  Chang had started  
to p repare  for his campaign as early as August 1984, his main objective being to reach 
out and  establish initial con tac t  with the residents. In the course of carrying out a 
survey am ong the electorate, Chang discussed local problems with the ordinary people, 
thereby establishing an image of ‘qinmin* (being close to the people). He then published 
the results of his survey in the form of a ‘Minsheng yanjiu baogao shu ' (A Report on the 
Survey of People’s Livelihood), according to which it appeared th a t  potential voters in 
the constituency came mostly from young couples living in the public housing estates of 
the Shun Lee area, who were most concerned with the governm ent's  public housing 
policies in respect of eligibility criteria and rent increases. So Chang decided to 
concen tra te  his efforts on mobilizing public housing voters living in the Shun Lee area 
and he drafted  a p latform in accordance with his analysis of the problems there. After 
he finished the draft,  he reviewed the conclusions with the residents on several occasions 
when public discussions were organized, so that  he was able to claim th a t  the platform 
‘rep resen ted ’ the view of the ordinary people because it was drafted , com m ented upon 
and finalized on the basis of constructive public criticism.
T h e  exercise did serve to highlight district problems and proved to be an effective 
beginning of the campaigning process. O ther candidates might have assumed th a t  such 
problems were already quite obvious, thereby ignoring their wider significances in the 
election campaign. Such a process of problem identification also helped to dem arcate  
Chang as a candida te  who would be likely to become the spokesman for public 
grievances. While the o ther candida tes failed to  establish initial con tac t  with the people, 
Chang was able to cu lt ivate  an image of being responsive to the people well before the 
full cam paign s ta rted  in Jan u a ry .  C u ltiva tion  of a public image was to become an
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important part of his campaign because in many new constituencies, such as Shun Lee, 
voters were generally unfamiliar with all the candidates. Given tha t  there were only a 
few months left before the March elections, Chang had to build up a reputation for 
himself quickly if he was to prove acceptable to the general public; so this became the 
main task of his campaigning team in the following two months.
The second stage of the campaign started in November 1984, when Chang tried to 
impress the voters with his previous performance in the district in a more concrete form. 
Chang’s campaigning team organized an Elderly Health Programme and recorded it on 
video tape which became a part of the publicity in the later stage of his campaigns. In 
January, the official campaigns started in full when candidates began to register for the 
elections. Immediately after he had registered as a candidate, Chang started to appeal 
to the voters directly by paying door-to-door visits to individual families. Posters, 
banners and pamphlets were also displayed along the main streets.
Both of his opponents - Kwong Poi-pun and Poon Yu-kwong - were in their fifties 
and both of them had already retired from their jobs, Poon having been a former 
headmaster in a school in the district. In order to stamp himself as a unique candidate. 
Chang emphasized in his pamphlets and posters that he was a young educated social 
activist, who worked ‘wholeheartedly and enthusiastically’ for the welfare of the 
community and would ‘dare to speak up' for the interests of the residents living there. 
By emphasizing his youth and dynamism, he hoped to mobilize young couples to vote for 
him.
During the next month, he also managed to mobilize the participation of some 
young local residents as volunteers who assisted him in reaching out to these families to 
vote on election day. Moreover, he also mobilized students in the schools, who although 
too young to be eligible for voting, were asked to distribute pamphlets to their parents. 
Young students were usually very enthusiastic in persuading their parents to support 
their favoured candidate, thus enhancing the possibility tha t  young couples would vote 
for him.
Chang was, however, worried that Chinese tradition might consider a young 
candidate as inexperienced and untrustworthy, so projecting a youthful image might 
have proved a shortcoming for Chang. In order to compensate for such a contingency. 
Chang put dowm as his supporters, the names of a number of middle-aged socially 
respectable grassroots leaders, such as Elsie Elliot, Szeto Wah, Lam Chak-piu. During 
his home visits, his campaign team was able to highlight this point by saying, for 
example, “With the support of Urban Councillor, Elsie Elliot, we are the campaigning 
team of Chang Ka-man running for the Shun Lee constituency” (Women shi Ye Xien 
yiyuan zhichi de Shunli qu quyiyuan Zhang Jiamin de zhuxuan tuan).
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During the last stages of the campaign, C hang  also entered into an ad hoc alliance 
with Kwong. The coalition was not an identifiably consolidated one, bu t was decided on 
purely pragm atic  grounds. Since there were two seats in the constituency, Chang 
expected th a t  the  coalition would give him a friendly colleague in the future, so th a t  he 
gave thought in m aking his choice of par tn e r  to  the question of who would be his 
preferred ally for fu ture  co-operation. But he also gave consideration to the  likely 
d is tribution of votes am ong the three candida tes so as to choose an ally who could offset 
his weaknesses a n d /o r  split the votes of his two opponents. Basically, Chang hoped th a t  
K w ong’s age would help supplem ent his d isadvan tage  of being too young in the  eyes of 
some voters. Besides, he es tim ated  th a t  his base was concentrated mainly in the public 
housing areas in Shun Lee, whereas the o ther tw o candidates paid particu lar  a t ten t io n  to 
voters living in the p rivate  housing areas and home ownership sectors in Shun On. Thus, 
his opponents were spli tt ing  those votes am ong themselves. In allying himself w ith  one 
of them , Chang hoped to  split his two opponents  still further. As a result, C hang would 
benefit from the perceived s trengths  of his ally, w ithout the la tte r  receiving any benefit 
in re turn . It tu rned  out th a t  his ally, Kwong, was defeated by the third cand ida te ,  Poon, 
by 1,028 votes. Chang himself, however, won 6,708 votes, accounting for 59% of the 
votes cast in the constituency.
The tu rn -o u t  ra te  in th a t  constituency was 41%, which was well above the 
te r r i to ry ’s average of 37.5%. This showed th a t  Chang had quite effectively organized the 
vo ters’ support in a mobilization-style electoral campaign. In contrast with his efforts in 
the elections, his two opponents  were less able to  campaign vigorously, not being 
well-equipped with knowledge of the election game, so that they did little more than  put 
up a few banners and posters and pay a few home visits.
C hang 's  campaign indicated a p a t te rn  which turned out to be fairly common 
am ong the middle-class and grassroots candidates.  Basically, there was a  lack of any 
organizations w hich could effectively ac tiva te  a proportion of the voters to support  any 
particu lar  candidate.  V oters could not be reached through established networks of party 
or organizational re lationships and therefore m ost candidates needed to appeal to  the 
voters on a personal basis. However, most cand ida tes  were unfamiliar with the  voters 
because they all had had little experience of com m unity  services. They stood for election 
for the first time with a  view to obtaining a foothold for themselves and widening their 
com m unity connections. In order to impress the voters with their fitness to serve, most 
candidates were faced with an im mediate task of establishing a t ru s tw orthy  public image 
weithin a short span of time. Thus many of these people emphasized their  youth, 
enthusiasm , education and  professionalism. In addition , many of them  quickly affiliated 
themselves with some ‘political g roups’ or residents associations in the nam e of 
‘concerned groups’ ju s t  a few m onths before the elections in order to gain public
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‘exposure’. Tactics such as door-to-door visits, and identification of community problems 
were extensively applied in particular situations. These were the means by which 
candidates hoped to establish direct and personal contact with every voter, thus 
convincing them of their ability to fulfil his/her platform promises, such as ‘fighting for 
residents’ welfare’ and ‘speaking up for the public interest’. Since most of the voters did 
not have any strong preconceptions about who they were intending to vote for, 
candidates who paid household visits more extensively were usually more successful in 
pulling over these wavering voters to their side. Many candidates would have mobilized 
up to 100-200 volunteers, most of them residents living in the constituency, to go to 
every household on the polling day in order to make sure tha t  these ‘indecisive 
supporters’ did come down to the polling station to cast their ballots.
ELECTORAL RESULTS
Overall Political Balance in the Post-election Period
How far did the active participation of the middle-class and grassroots members in 
the elections exert an effect upon the political equilibrium at the district level? An 
analysis of the overall electoral result may throw some light on this question.
It has been contended that Hong Kong people were still politically apathetic 
because only 37.5% of the registered voters actually went out to vote, accounting for 
merely 17% (476,530) out of the 2.8 million potential voters. Thus, Lau and Kuan have 
argued that the newly emerged groups were still unable to mobilize the “relatively
O '*
unmobilized and unorganized mass” / '  Such a view has, however, been countered by- 
Cheng who argues that the turn-out rate “was satisfactory even by the standard of local 
elections in Western democracies” and that those who went out to vote had actually
o  Q
increased by 39.7% since 1982/° Above all, the turn-out rates in the public housing 
areas were generally higher than those in private housing. For example, the average 
turn-out rate in the public housing constituency of Tuen Mun (Tai Hing) w'as as high as 
64.5%, while the lowest turn-out rate was recorded in the Mongkok (25%) and Yau Ma 
Tei (26%) districts where private building blocks predominated. Such a situation could 
also be explained by the fact that pressure groups in the public housing areas were quite 
effective in mobilizing voters to vote in the electoral campaign.
Besides, we can actually see that there was a significant change in the
26. See G.L. Curtis, Election Campaigyi ing Japanese Style (Tokyo: Kodansha International 
Ltd, 1971), p.107. In his study of Japanese elections in the 1960s, those voters whose political 
consciousness was low would cast their votes indiscriminately and tended to vote for the can­
didates they had been asked to vote for.
27. S.K. Lau and H.C. Kuan, “The 1985 District Board Election in Hong Kong, The Limits of 
Political Mobilization in a Dependent Territory” , p.36.
28. Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “The 1985 District Board Elections in Hong Kong” , p p .75-78.
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charac te ris tics  o f the  elected d is t r ic t  board m em bers in 1985 from  those o f 1982. 
G enera lly speaking, m ore young cand idates w ith  h igher educationa l background were 
elected. Tables 5 and 6 ind ica te  th a t there  was a s ig n ifica n t increase in  the num ber o f 
elected m em bers w ho were between 20-30 years o ld in 1985, hence a corresponding  
increase in the  num ber o f young school teachers, social w orkers and o the r professionals. 
In a d d it io n , from  the resu lts o f the  vo te r tu rn -o u t, i t  seems there  was a g rea te r 
p ro p o rtio n  o f young executives and professionals w ho a c tu a lly  voted (see Tab les 7 and 
8 ) . ^  T h is  can be expla ined by the  fa c t th a t m em bers o f the newly em erg ing m iddle-class 
and grassroots o rgan iza tions  were genera lly  young professionals in th e ir  20s or early  30s, 
and they were fa ir ly  successful in m o b iliz in g  people o f s im ila r socio-econom ic 
backgrounds to  go to  the  polls.
Table 5
Comparison of the Age Distribution of Elected Members 
in the 1982 and 1985 District Board Elections
Age 1982
No. 7.
1985
No. 7
20-31 11 8.3 46 19.4
31-40 34 25.8 86 36.3
41-50 33 25.0 45 19.0
51-60 42 31.8 45 19.0
61-70 9 6.8 12 5.0
71-80 3 2.3 3 1.3
Total 132 100.0 237 100.0
Source: The City and New Territories Administration.
It m ay also be argued th a t the exten t o f p a r tic ip a tio n  o f these m iddle-class and 
grassroots o rgan iza tions  was exaggerated by the  mass m edia, since they actually- 
co ns titu te d  on ly  a m in o r ity  o f the 501 cand idates cam paign ing  fo r the  e lections. ^ et 
a lthough  m ost o f these people were s ta nd ing  fo r e lection fo r the f ir s t  tim e , they were 
able to  cam paign  more aggressively th an  the  tra d it io n a l groups and thus  the success ra te  
o f these groups was rem arkab le , as ind ica ted  in T ab le  9. M em bers o f the grassroots 
o rgan iza tions , in p a rtic u la r, dem onstra ted  th e ir  m o b iliz a tio n  capacities and thus  in 
m any instances e ffective ly  p rom oted  th e ir  cand idates. Lau has suggested th a t,  in c lu d in g
29. Law  C h i-k o n g , uT h e  E ffec ts  o f C a m p a ig n  S tra teg ics  and O th e r F ac to rs  on the  O u tco m e  o f 
the  D is tr ic t  B oa rd  E le c tio n s ” , Resource P aper Series, no. 11 (H ong  K on g : D e p a rtm e n t o f  Social 
W o rk , U n iv e rs ity  o f  H ong K on g , 1986), p p .20-23.
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Table 6
Occupational Distribution of the Elected Members 
in the 1982 and 1985 District Board Elections
Occupation 1982
No. 7,
1985
No. 7
Business 58 43.9 67 28.3
Industry 4 3.0 3 1.3
Education 22 16.7 42 17.7
Social Work 4 3.0 20 8.4
Professionals (Acct,
doctors, etc.) 5 3.8 30 12.6
Office Workers 15 11.4 35 14.8
Construction 7 5.3 5 2.1
Housewives ' 1 0.8 2 0.8
Factory Workers/Technician 6 4.5 8 3.4
Driver - 0 5 2.1
Retired 3 2.3 7 3.0
Journalism - 0 4 1.7
Others 7 5.3 9 3.8
Total 132 100.0 237 100.0
Source: The City and New Territories Administration.
Table 7
Age Distribution of Voters, 1985
Age Voters (%)
21-29 21.1
30-39 35.9
40-49 15.8
50-59 14.3
60 and Above 12.9
Average Age: 40.9.
Source: Law Chi-kong, “The Effects of Campaign Strategies and Other
Factors on the Outcome of the District Board Elections", 
Resource Paper Series, no.11 (Hong Kong: Department of Social 
Work, University of Hong Kong, 1986), pp.20-21.
those who were related to the self-initiated residents’ associations, 50 grassroots 
members were elected to the 19 district boards, accounting for 21.1% of the 237 elected
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Table 8
Occupational Distribution of Voters, 1985
Occupation Voters (/£)
Professionals k Administrative 36.5
Office Workers 12.6
Sales 5.7
Servicing 4.9
Construction/Factory Workers 36.3
Others 4.0
Source: Law Chi-kong, “The Effects of Campaign Strategies and Other
Factors on the Outcome of the District Board Elections”, 
Resource Paper Series, no.11 (Hong Kong: Department of Social 
Work, University of Hong Kong, 1986), pp.20-21.
O A
sea ts .oU As indicated in Table 10, the most remarkable achievement was seen in the 
Tuen Mun dis tr ic t  where all eight grassroots members were elected and occupied 50% of 
the elected seats. In this case, all the seats  in the new town constituencies were occupied 
by pressure-group candidates, while rural members could only get elected in the 
remaining constituencies where rural in h ab itan ts  still dom inated. In contrast  with their 
dom ination of the Tuen Mun district elections in 1982, HYK and RC members fell back 
remarkably in the March elections. In the case of Sham Shui Po, 11 out of 18 of the 
elected seats were won by members associated with the People’s Council and other 
residents’ associations, leaving only 7 elected seats to be occupied by m em bers related to 
the Sham Shui Po Kaifong Association. All this shows th a t  candidates of the kaifongs. 
MACs, RCs, and HYK failed to meet the challenge of the newly emerging grassroots 
members and self-initiated residents associations.
C on trary  to  the high success ra te  of the middle-class and grassroots  organizations, 
m embers of the tradit ional com m unity  groups did not perform very successfully a t  all in 
the March elections. The Civic Association, for example, which had strong connections 
with various kaifong associations had only 24 (44%) candidates got elected to the 
district boards in 1985. The study of Lau and Kuan shows that  202 candida tes  were said 
to be related to  the MACs and ACs, of whom 92 were elected, giving a success ra te  of 
merely 45.5%.'^ A survey by Law Chi-kong suggests th a t  out of 38 candida tes  said to be
30. S.K. Lau and H.C. Kuan, “The 1985 District Board Election in Hong Kong, The Limits of  
Political Mobilization in a Dependent Territory” , p.32.
31. Law Chi-kong, “The Effects of Campaign Strategies and Other Factors on the Outcome of 
the District Board Elections” , p.31.
129
Table 9
Success Rate of Members of the Political Groups
No. of 
Nominations
No.
Elected
Success 
Rate (2)
T h e  M id d le -C la s s  O rg a n iza t io n s
Hong Kong Affairs Society 3 3 (1002)
Hong Kong People’s Association 9 9 (100%)
Hong Kong Researchers’ Association 2 2 (1002)
T h e  G r a ssr o o t s  O rg a n iza t io n s
Meeting Point 4 4 (1 0 0 2)
New Hong Kong Society 
People’s Council on
1 1 (ioo2)
Public Housing Policy 11 9 (822)
Professional Teachers’ Union 30 24 (802)
Society for Social Research 2 2 (ioo2)
T h e  P r o - E s t a b l i s h m e n t
Civic Association 54 24 (442)
Reform club 35 17 (502)
Hong Kong Belongers’ Association 2 2 (1002)
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
related to the kaifongs, 14 were elected, having a success ra te  of only 36.8%, while out of 
52 candidates said to be related to the RCs, only 18 were elected, dem onstra ting  a 
success ra te of 34.6%.°^ But it was only in the public housing and new town 
constituencies th a t  the traditional com m unity leaders suffered a setback. In other 
districts  where privately owned buildings were predom inant,  the influence of these 
trad it ional com m unity  groups still prevailed, as in the cases of Mongkok and Yau Ma 
Tei. So in reviewing the overall figures, we find th a t  members of the trad itional 
com m unity  groups still constituted the backbone of the district boards for the period 
1985-88, accounting for 38% of the 237 elected seats.
T he decrease in the proportion of elected seats held by the trad it ional com m unity 
groups in some d istricts  indicated th a t  the political equilibrium a t  the d istrict level was 
changing because of the gradual increase in the proportion of grassroots m em bers elected 
to the d is tric t boards, a change made possible in part  by the increase in the proportion 
of elected seats permissible in each district. In the long run, the political balance there 
was bound to shift significantly further away from the dominance of the tradit ional 
pro-governm ent groups in favour of the newly emerging grassroots and middle-class 
organizations.
32. Ibid., p.34.
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Table 10
Elected Candidates Supported by the Grassroots Organizations 
(including the Self-initiated Residents Organizations)
Districts No. 7» of Elected 
Candidates
U r b a n  D is t r ic t s
Central & Western 4 30.8
Eastern 7 38.9
Kowloon City 3 18.8
Kwun Tong 3 15.0
Mongkok 3 30.0
Sham Shui Po 4 22.2
Southern 1 9.1
Wanchai 0 0
Wong Tai Sin 4 19.0
Yau Ma Tei 1 12.5
Subtotal 30 20.7
N e w  T err ito r ie s
Islands 0 0
Kwai Chung/Tsing Yi 6 40.0
North 0 0
Sai Kung 1 20.0
Shatin 4 26.7
Tai Po 0 0
Tsuen Wan 1 11.1
Tuen Mun 8 50.0
Yuen Long 0 0
Subtotal 20 21.7
Total 50 21.1
Source: S.K. Lau and H.C. Kuan, uThe 1985 District Board Election in 
Hong Kong: The Limits of Political Mobilization in a Dependent 
Polity", p .32.
In 1985, however, the government was still able to retain control over the political 
equilibrium because it preserved the power to appoint 132 unofficial seats, accounting for 
one-third of the total membership of the district boards, so that many people who were 
associated with the traditional groups were appointed by the various boards. These 
people were usually middle-aged professional and business people. Tables 11 and 12 
below indicate tha t  after taking into account the appointed members, the professions 
and age profile of the district board members appeared to be significantly different from 
that  of those elected before March 1985. This can be seen most notably in the increase in 
representation of the businessmen and industrialists and of those between 41-50 years of
age.
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Table 11
Occupational Distribution of the District Board Members, 1985-88
Occupation Elected
no. 7.
Appointed 
no. 7.
Overall 
no. 7
Business/Industrialists 70 29.5 69 71.2 139 38
Education 42 17.7 25 18.9 67 18
Social Work 20 8.4 8 6.1 28 8
Professionals 30 12.7 18 13.6 48 13
White Collar Employees 35 14.8 5 3.8 40 11
Construction Industries 18 7.6 2 1.5 20 5
Housewives 2 0.8 3 2.3 5 1
Factory Workers/Technicians 0 0 2 1.5 2 1
Retired 7 3.0 0 0 7 2
Journalists 4 1.7 0 0 4 1
Others 9 3.8 0 0 9 2
Total 237 100 132 100 369 100
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
Table 12
Age Distribution of the District Board Members, 1985-88
Age
Elected 
No. 7.
Appointed 
No. 7
Overall 
No. 7
21-30 46 19.4 6 4.5 52 14
31-40 86 36.3 46 34.8 132 36
41-50 45 19.0 38 28.8 83 23
51-60 45 19.0 22 16.7 67 18
61 and above 15 6.3 20 15.2 35 9
Total 237 100.0 132 100.0 369 100
Average age 4]L. 5 46.0 425.1
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
It was impossible to assess the exact number of those 132 appointed members who 
w'ere associated with the traditional community groups. Their continued dominance 
could be seen, however, in the election of the 19 chairmen in each board from among the 
elected and appointed unofficials themselves in April 1985. The result was that ,  in the 
New Territories, all 9 chairmen of the 9 district boards were associated with appointed 
members from the HYK or RCs, while in the urban areas, 5 out of 10 chairmen were
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appointed unofficials. This shows that by appointing such people to the district boards, 
the government was able to allow the conservative-cum-moderate sectors to retain their 
dominance, at least for the period 1985-88.
This situation gives rise to a further question. To what extent could the young and 
more aggressive members of the elected minorities expect to exercise influence on the 
operation of the district boards? A brief analysis of district politics in the post-election 
period throws some interesting light on the answer to this question.
Im p lications  for P ost-e lec t ion  D istr ic t  P o lit ic s
In my interviews with some of these ‘younger and more aggressive’ middle-class 
and grassroots members, it became clear that they realized well their limited influence 
on the district boards. Generally speaking, they looked upon electoral mobilization as 
much for its usefulness as a source of political influence and power in future political 
activities as for its present value. While they thought of making use of their elected 
positions to cultivate political bases, they also saw the elections as serving only as an 
experimental ground for them to test their mobilization capacities. The grassroots 
organizations exhibited a more consistent pattern of development during the 
post-election period in that most of their elected members set up their own councillors’ 
offices which then became training grounds for developing community activists. These 
offices also became the bases of mobilization when particular issues called for mass 
action.
Many elected members regarded the district board elections as a channel for 
getting access to the senior administrators. Although their influence within the boards 
was counterbalanced by the dominance of the traditional conservative groups, they.could 
make use of the district boards as a forum to lobby moderate individuals on an 
issue-by-issue basis. In any case, all elected and appointed unofficial members sat in the 
district boards on an individual basis, so in many districts individual positions shifted in 
response to different issues. Such individuals found themselves the subjects of attention 
from other members who were lobbying for support on various issues.
An example of how this kind of new political behaviour occurred can be seen in the 
response of various district board members to the government’s interim report on a
o o
reduction of subsidies to well-off public housing tenants. 0 Protests against the report
33. A R eview  o f  Public H ousing  Allocation Policies: A C on su lta tive  Document  (1984) sug­
gested that the government should encourage the well-off tenants to move out of public housing so 
that more vacant flats could be allocated to those on the waiting list. The policy was published as 
a Green Paper in August 1985 for consultation with the public and the 19 district boards. The 
major controversies were related to the definition of the term ‘well-off’ tenants. Protests mainly 
came from the public housing residents for many of them could potentially be classified as ‘well- 
off .
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became the first, occasion for community mobilization in the post-election period. 
Between July and November 1985. grassroots organizations mobilized various 
communities for concerted action on the issue. In the first place, core groups such as the 
People's Council and the Society for Community Organization took up the leadership of 
the movement. Then the councillors’ offices, the community groups and the residents’ 
associations began to mobilize their own bases. Generally speaking, they organized mass 
gatherings in their respective districts which in turn served to arouse the residents to 
criticize the policy. The climax came with mass meetings organized for all the 
communities at Morse Park on 22 September, at which more than 1,000 people attended.
The government also contributed to the mobilization of public activity on the issue 
by publishing the interim report for the purpose of evoking public discussion on the 
issues. Having explained the principles of the policy in great detail, its official members 
encouraged individuals to speak out in favour of the policy in order to counterbalance 
the media coverage of the community campaign. Moreover, the 19 district boards were 
asked to discuss the policy, so tha t  the government might be able to obtain the support 
of the sub-dominant conservatives. Since the grassroots members were in a minority, 
they were unable to gain the full support of all the 19 district boards, which indicated 
tha t  even though the new groups were emerging more rapidly than the sub-dominant 
elite, they were not yet able to exercise effective control over the district boards. But 
their mobilization activities did serve to arouse public attention to the loopholes in the 
policy.
In the meantime, the elections had stimulated the emergence of a more aggressive 
generation of politicians. Generally speaking, the elected members of the district boards 
tended to be more critical of official policies simply because they did not identify 
themselves as part of the administration. In most instances, elected members addressed 
the lack of accountability and responsiveness of the administration, thus demanding such 
things as the opening up of the administrative meetings and greater access to 
government information. In order to push through their demands, the minority groups in 
each board tried to bring every policy issue to the public’s attention, with the further 
result tha t  many administrative policies also became controversial topics of public 
debates.
A typical example of this phenomenon was public criticism of the Electronic Road 
Pricing (ERP) policy. The ERP system was originally proposed as one of the options for 
solving traffic congestion on certain busy urban roads. But it turned out tha t  many 
people expressed their fear about the potential intervention of the government in 
matters affecting the freedom of movement of individuals. During the debate on the 
issue, many district board members kept on asking for more detailed information, while 
the government tended to explain only the general principles without providing details
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of the technical aspects of the policy. As a result, the criticisms were not based on the 
merits or demerits of the policy, but emphasized the Government's failure to respect 
public opinion, thus discrediting it as being both bureaucratic and technocratic. As the 
first major policy issue to be put before the district boards for discussion immediately 
after the elections, it also became the first major policy which was unanimously 
disapproved by all 19 boards. Ultimately, the proposal was modified so as to apply only 
to the toll-paying tunnels. Public outcry persisted on the ground that the policy was 
being applied without sufficient respect for public opinion, so the policy was shelved 
indefinitely. This entire issue suggested that the district boards had not merely become 
forums for public debate, but could also apply powerful pressure upon the government if 
they acted in concert.
R ECA PITU LATIO N: D IST R IC T  POLITICS IN THE C O N TEX T  
OF C H A N G IN G  POLITICAL SYSTEM  IN HO NG  K O N G
The case of the ERP policy shows that although the elected members of district 
boards were not going to be able to exercise any significant decision-making power, they 
were able to exercise influence well beyond the scope of purely advisory functions simply 
by their ability to claim to represent a popular mandate. Such a phenomenon could also 
be observed as an important consequence of similar processes of enhancing community 
representation and participation in various other decolonizing societies, such as Malaysia 
and Singapore in the 1950s, where the elected legislature was not yet given formal 
powers to determine policies, but the representatives of the local community could 
legitimately claim to be speaking on their behalf. Since the elected members there 
expected eventually to a ttain  self-government, their opinions were influential enough to 
extend beyond the limits of their advisory functions, for the executive officials were 
reluctant to come into conflict with them, although they might try to manipulate the 
members into factions so as to avoid any unanimous opposition to the government.
In Hong Kong, the colonial authorities retained political control by reserving a 
proportion of the membership of the district boards for official appointment. Whether or 
not the Hong Kong officials intended to manipulate individuals into factions, the fact 
was that political alignments were not yet clearly delineated in many districts in 
1985-86, simply because many individuals were not yet ready to commit themselves to a 
particular group on a long-term basis. Still, a loose pattern of political alignments had 
gradually been developing during the electoral campaign, with the more liberal-oriented 
middle-class and grassroots members tending to cluster on one side, and the more 
conservative business and professional individuals on the other. While the liberals 
generally believed that a more balanced representation of different sectors of the various 
socio-occupational groups was the first, step leading towards a more representative and
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responsible government, the conservatives showed a disinclination towards politicization 
as such and tended to favour the preservation of the old political equilibrium in which 
they remained dominant. By looking to the protection of the officials, the conservatives 
were able to maintain control over district politics in the initial stage of the political 
changes introduced by the elections. But the success of the middle-class and grassroots 
members in the March campaign had already indicated their determination to control 
future electoral politics. Should the appointment system continue to contract, the 
conservatives could no longer look to those officials for support.
The sub-dominant elite continued to dominate most district boards, but they 
found themselves increasingly confronted by a more aggressive and critical generation of 
young members who foresaw the possibility of attaining gradual control over the 
administration in the run-up to 1997. This progressive group of people now assumed a 
leading role in the formulation of public opinion and their impact was immediately felt. 
The debates on the proposal for installing an ERP system, for example, were dominated 
by the progressive members, thus resulting in its unanimous defeat.
By mid-1985, Hong Kong society had been politicized to a modest degree in that 
there were now more vigorous debates than previously among the newly emerged elected 
members and political groups on the formation of political parties in Hong Kong. Yet, 
many of these new groups were not full-scale political organizations a t all. Some of them 
had started  as lobbying agencies for a particular cause. The People’s Council, for 
example, was concerned with matters affecting the interests of the public housing 
residents. In 1985 more and more of these kind of groups w'ere speaking out on a whole 
range of socio-political issues, and they entered into coalitions on an issue-bv-issue basis. 
Between April and September 1985, these groups became more assertive than before and 
made use of every suitable public issue that arose to attack the inadequacies of the old 
bureaucratic system of administration. Almost every such move, as in the controversies 
over the setting up of a Media Council, the Broadcasting Report, the sanction of 
pornographic magazines and the Legislative Council (Powers and Privileges) Bill, was 
made in an attem pt to reduce governmental power and to push for a more responsive 
government.
There was, however, one common concern among these newly emerging groups: 
they were now very alert to potential intervention by the Hong Kong government in the 
freedoms and liberties of the private citizen. Having entered the first year of political 
transition, they were very sensitive, too. about any policies initiated by the Hong Kong 
administration that might pave the way for Chinese intervention in the internal affairs 
of Hong Kong in the interim period before 1997. Up to mid-1985, Beijing’s interference 
in the affairs of Hong Kong was not yet very noticeable, although its political influence 
began to be felt with the setting up of the BLDC in June and BLCC in October. Thus
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Beijing’s role in the future political reform in Hong Kong also constituted an important 
part of the on-going public debate. The more progressive members now argued that in 
order to convince the local people tha t  China did not intend to intervene in the internal 
affairs of Hong Kong, direct elections to the Legislative Council should be implemented 
as soon as possible.
Also deeply engaged in the political debates were two groups of people under the 
leadership of two eminent Executive and Legislative Councillors, Allen Lee and Maria 
Tam, who exemplified the inclination of some members of the Hong Kong establishment 
in relation to participation in political activities. Allen Lee and his allies in the 
Legislative Council, such as Selina Chow, Stephen Cheong, Chan Ying-lun and Rita Fan, 
now openly admitted tha t  they intended to form a political party and tha t  they favoured 
the introduction of direct elections in 1988. They were different from the grassroots 
members in tha t  they preferred to maintain Hong Kong’s traditional economic and 
political systems, such as free trade, a low taxation system, and minimum government 
intervention in economic life. q Maria T am ’s group - the PHS - wrhich took shape in 
March just after the district board elections, spoke out in favour of reaching a consensus 
with the PRC. By recruiting conservative members from various economic and 
professional sectors later in 1985, the PHS also became engaged in a vigorous process of 
enlarging their community connections in various district boards.
Before we go on to examine these later developments, however, a closer 
examination of the politics behind the district board elections in three particular 
districts will help to give us a deeper understanding of how various political influences 
were developing at the district level in 1985. These districts are the Central & Western 
(C&W) district on Hong Kong Island, the Sham Shui Po (SSP) district in Kowloon and 
the Tuen Mun (TM) district in the New Territories.
34. Far Eastern Econom ic Reinew  (5 September, 1985), pp.36-37.
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C H APTER 6
CASE STUDIES OF DISTRICT  
ELECTORAL POLITICS, 1985
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter Five, I have discussed the emergence of the newly emerging 
middle-class and grassroots members who managed to get themselves involved in the 
political processes through the system of district election. In this chapter, I want to 
investigate in greater detail the activities of the new participants in three particular 
districts - Central & Western (C&W), Sham Shui Po (SSP) and Tuen Mun (TM) - 
during and after the March elections and analyze the resulting changes in the balance of 
political forces in each of these.
In these cases, I am trying to shed light on three questions. Firstly, what were the 
mobilization capacities of the newly emerging groups during the election campaign? 
Secondly, what pattern of political alignments was developed during and after the March 
elections? Thirdly, what was the impact of the election exercise on the balance of 
political power, and hence its implications for future political changes?
These questions will be answered mainly on the basis of the in-depth interviews I 
conducted with various elected members of these districts during the post-election period 
between April and September 1985.1 In these interviews, 1 tried to investigate their 
motives in competing in the elections and what they expected to achieve from their new 
status as elected representatives. 1 also discussed with them their campaigning and 
mobilization strategies, their degree of group affiliation and their political att itudes on 
particular contemporary issues. These discussions were matched against my own 
observations of other developments in 1985. and discussions with various Hong Kong 
government and NCNA officials.
1. Since many of the candidates were not available during the election campaign, interviews 
were mainly conducted in the post-election period.
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M ap 3. Electoral M ap by Constituencies, Central Western District Board Elections. 
1985.
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C A S E  S T U D Y  A :  E L E C T O R A L  P O L I T I C S  I N  T H E  
C E N T R A L  & W E S T E R N  D I S T R I C T  B O A R D  ( C & W  D B )
The District Boards are merely sounding boards for the government to 
manufacture public opinion; we should at least be given some executive powers 
in making decisions on matters affecting the well-being of the community - 
Vincent Ko.
Being the most outspoken member of the Clique of Twelve, Vincent Ko, who was 
also a member of the Hong Kong People’s Association, was elected to the Kennedy Town 
West and Mount Davis Constituency of the C&W district in which three candidates 
contested for two seats. By beating his opponents by a wide margin, he won 84% of the 
votes cast while his electoral partner obtained 49%, leaving their opponents to gain a 
mere 10% of the votes.^ Together with Ko, members of the Clique of Twelve won 10 out 
of the 13 seats in the C&AV district election campaign. Immediately after the March 
elections, Ko was elected by his colleagues as a chairman to the board.
The above description probably gives an impression tha t  Vincent Ko was one of 
the leaders of the Clique of Twelve, a coalition which was set up to gain control over the 
C&W DB. However, it was never the intention of the Clique to monopolize all the 
available seats, and strictly speaking, the Clique was not a consolidated group of people 
sharing the same goals in running the C&W DB election. Whether out of expediency or 
not, these 12 people, who had a common interest in standing for the elections, combined 
into an ad hoc coalition just a few months prior to the March elections (see Table 13), 
with a view to distributing their candidates evenly among 6 constituencies, so as to 
avoid contesting the same seats against each other. Where two seats were available, they 
formed partnerships in those constituencies.
The Clique was quite effective in creating an image, at least among the mass 
media, that it was a powerful group and in providing a formidable common front against 
other potential independents standing for the elections. This was made possible by the 
fact that the Clique was composed of young people from different professional 
backgrounds, thus appearing to be an aggregation of a group of members of the 
newly-emerging elite in Hong Kong who all had some ambitions towards greater 
participation in the territory’s politics. As shown in Table 13, 10 out of 12 members of 
the Clique were in their 20s and 30s and were working in different commercial, social, 
and professional occupations.
2. In all those constituencies where two seats were available, voters were given the choice of 
casting their votes for either one or two candidates. Because of this balloting system, the total 
number of votes gained by all candidates did not correspond to the total number of votes cast. In 
other words, the aggregate of votes gained by all candidates of the same constituency did not add 
up to 100%.
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Table 13
Age and occupation of Members 
Standing for the 1985
of the 
CfcW DB
Clique of Twelve 
Election
Name Occupation Age Constituency
Esther Chan Architect 33 Mid-level k Peak
Karl Tong Accountant 34 Mid-level k Peak
W.K. Chow** Social Worker 27 Chung Wan
Gerry Wai** Lawyer 33 Chung Wan
M.L. Tsui* Manager 46 Sheung Wan
Anthony Ng Medical Practitioner 37 Sheung Wan
W.T. Hung Engineer 29 Kennedy Town
S.W. Lee University Tutor 25 Kennedy Town
Y.K. Cheung* Retired Businessman 63 Sai Ying Pun East
K.H. Lai Social Worker 26 Sai Ying Pun East
Y .S . Chow Merchant 57 Kennedy Town West k
Vincent Ko Lawyer 38 Mount Davis
* defeated 
** uncontested
Note: There were 7 constituencies, the remaining one being elected 
uncontested by an incumbent member, Lee Tat-yu (55), a school­
master. The other two seats were occupied by two members of the 
legal profession, Paul Leung (31) and Chang Yau-hung (32) as 
shown in Table 6.4.
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
W ith  the election of these 10 young professionals, the C&W DB turned  out to be 
one of th e  youngest and most technocratic d istrict boards in Hong Kong as Tables 14 
and 15 show.
T he success of these people suggests th a t  young middle-class professionals were 
generally favoured and accepted by the voters, a t  least in th a t  electorate. W hether by 
coincidence or not, those candida tes  who were in their 60s and retired, namely Pang 
W ah-keung and Cheung Yiu-kai, were defeated. Nevertheless, this alone does not 
indicate th a t  these young professionals were particularly skilful a t  mobilizing electoral 
support ,  for the fact was th a t  many of them  were elected in the d istrict w ithou t  having 
to organize vigorous cam paigns a t  all; in fact, three of them  were elected without 
contest. Many of these young professionals who chose to run in the C& W  constituencies 
simply considered th a t  they would be elected relatively easily in th a t  d istrict,  without 
any need to  campaign very intensively for votes at all. The level of political mobilization 
in the C & W  district wras notoriously lowr because it consisted entirely of private  housing. 
Only 19% (53,778) of the qualified voters in the d istrict registered and only 16,267 
actually  voted, giving a tu rn -o u t  ra te  of 30.2%. In o ther w'ords, a mere 5.8% of the 
qualified voters actually voted. Moreover, the voters w'ere split into 7 electoral
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Table 14
Occupational Distribution of C&W DB Members, 1985-88
Occupation Candidates 
(Standing for 
the Election)
Elected Appointed UC* Total 
(for DB)
Architect 1 1 1
Accountant 1 1 1
Lawyer 4 4 1 1 5
Medical Doctor 1 1 1
Engineer 1 1 1
Business 5 1 3 1 5
Education 3 2 1 3
Social Work 3 2 2
Total 19 13 5 2 20
* Urban Council members automatically 
Source: Central and Western
Table 15
Age Distribution of C&W DB !
represented at the 
District Office.
Members, 1985-88
Boaxd.
Age Candidates Elected Appointed UC Total
20-31 6 4 0 0 4
31-40 8 7 1 1 9
41-50 1 0 2 0 2
51-60 - 2 2 1 0 3
60+ 2 0 1 1 2
Total 19 13 5 2 20
Source: Central and Western District Office.
constituencies so that some candidates could be elected with only a few hundred votes, 
as shown in Table 16. Vincent Ko, for example, chose to run in the Kennedy Town West 
and Mount Davis Constituency, where 15.145 people were registered as voters; but only 
32.9% (4,898) of them actually turned out. In other words, even though Ko gained 84% 
of the votes, he actually obtained only 4.194 votes and his partner, Chow Yin-sum, 
obtained only 2,433 votes. Yet by the standards of the C&W district campaign overall, 
the turn-out rate in his constituency was comparatively high.
The example provided by the C&W district elections reveals tha t  many young
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Table 16
Turn-out Rate by Constituency and Distribution of Votes By 
Candidate in the 1985 C&W DB Elections
Constituency/ 
(Number of Seats)
Registered
Voters
Turn-out
Rate
Vote Distribution 
Candidate 
(Number of Votes)
Mid Levels 
and Peak (2)
11,637 3,277 (28.22) Esther Chan (2,253) 
Karl Tong (2,073) 
B.K. Yuen (1,242)*
Chung Wan (2) 8,584 Uncontested Gerry Wai 
Chow Wai-keung
Sheung Wan (2) 8,584 2,328 (27.12) Anthony Ng (1,522) 
Y.H. Chang (1,187) 
M.L. Tsui (1,086)*
Sai Ying Pun West (1) 6,349 Uncontested Lee Tat-yuKennedy Town East (2) 8,136 2,745 (33.7%) W.T. Hung (1,977) 
S.W. Lee (1,334) 
Y.W. Shek (339)* 
W.K. Pang (817)*
Sai Ying Pun East (2) 10,276 2,928 (28.5%) K.H. Lai (1,953) 
Y.Y. Leung (1,636) 
Y.K. Cheung (878)*
Kennedy Town West 
Mount Davis (2)
Total
15,145
53,778
4,989 (32.9%) 
16,267 (30.2%)
Vincent Ko (4,194) 
Y.S. Chow (2,433) 
C.H. Ho (512)*
* Defeated candidates.
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
professionals were interested in participating in the electoral process and gaining access 
to their local administrative bodies but found themselves quite inexperienced in running 
an electoral campaign on the basis of universal suffrage. So they chose to stand for those 
constituencies where competiton was less intensive and the rate of mobilization was low. 
Since the C&W district is the fastest-growing financial and commercial centre of Hong 
Kong with its residents coming mainly from the upper-middle income groups, it was only 
to be expected tha t  young people from various professional backgrounds, standing for 
the election for the first time, preferred to campaign in this district. In addition, the 
C&W district has long been faced with vexing urban problems, such as the existence of a 
cattle depot and fish, poultry and vegetable wholesale markets in close proximity to the 
upper-middle income residential area, which makes it one of the most problem-ridden 
urban areas in Hong Kong. This means that candidates who ran for election found it 
quite easy to highlight those problems in terms of environmental pollution, hygiene, and 
traffic congestion.
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Since many of them did not have any prior experience of participation in 
community affairs, the candidates found it more convenient to affiliate themselves with 
groups and coalitions during the campaign. In order to share technical information and 
individual experiences, these candidates often arrived at a division of labour amongst 
themselves to make use of material resources more efficiently and economically.
What eventuated was that members of the Clique, and the 13 elected unofficials of 
the C&W DB, came from very diverse political backgrounds, as Table 17 reveals. While 
Vincent Ko and Chow Wai-keung were members of the Hong Kong People’s Association, 
Lee Shun-wai belonged to the Hong Kong Affairs Society; Anthony Ng was a member of 
the Hong Kong Observers: Esther Chan was affiliated to the Hong Kong Researchers 
Association; Karl Tong, having been appointed to the Legislative Council between 
1983-85, was a core member of Allen Lee’s group; and Hung Wing-tat was associated 
with the Meeting Point, and thus claimed to represent the views of the grassroots 
organization.
Table 17
Political Affiliation of the Clique of Twelve 
Standing for the 1985 C&W DB Elections
Groups Elected Defeated
Association for Democracy 0 1
Education Action Group 1 0
Hong Kong People’s Association 2 0
Meeting Point 1 0
New Hong Kong Researchers Association 1 0
Hong Kong Observers- 1 0
Hong Kong Affairs Society 2 0
Reform Club 1 1
Legislative councillor
(related to the Allen Lee’s Group)
1 0
Note: Except for the 2 defeated, the remainder elected all belonged
to the Clique of Twelve.
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
As was typical of the new groupings, most of the above groups did not come out 
with any explicit political platform and did not, in 1985, have any plans regarding their 
future operations. In fact, members of these various groups had no common views on 
major principles and they easily coalesced into ad hoc alliances with each other. During 
the campaign, most of them did not emphasize their membership of a particular group 
simply because the groups were too new to be known and identified by the public. And
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because these groups had not yet developed into any solid parties, individuals soon 
realigned after the March elections. Generally speaking, the Clique of Twelve was more 
successful than the others in forming one political line immediately after the elections 
and was thus successful in putting forward its own leader as the chairman of the board. 
But they quickly became split and there were still no clear-cut political divisions in the 
C&W DB in the post-election period.
Nevertheless, members of the C&W DB exhibited a similar political orientation 
among themselves. Being conscious of their future role in the post-1997 ‘gangren 
zhengfu' (government of the Hong Kong people), these people visualized an opportunity 
for their own continued participation in the administrative system. Since they believed 
that professionals would constitute the backbone of the future Hong Kong society, they 
regarded an elitist system as essential to the maintenance of a freely operating economic 
system. This explains why such a group of elite representatives believed in active 
participation in politics by young businessmen and professionals.
However, these people were not entirely confident about their future. Although 
about one-third of them said they were optimistic about the future of Hong Kong, most 
of them had reservations about the feasibility of local autonomy under the PRC's 
sovereignty. But they believed that a ‘one-country two-systems’ formula could be 
worked out if the Hong Kong people showed a determination to manage themselves well. 
Most of them also admitted that their participation in politics was closely related to the 
future of Hong Kong, for they thought tha t  the district board was a suitable channel for 
such participation. Although they realized well tha t  the district boards did not possess 
actual power, they thought they could make use of it to develop their community base. 
Thus it turned out to be this group of relatively ambitious people who were later most 
aggressive in pushing for the upgrading of the role of the district boards. In the 
meantime, they emphasized their function as one of effectively reflecting public opinion, 
thus emphasizing tha t  ‘public opinion was the most powerful source of influence’. This 
explains in part why members of the C&W DB later became very critical of the 
government.
What characterized the operation of the board was that its members tended to ask 
for technical and detailed information from the officials. Very often they even discussed 
more than what was advised and, in the words of the District Officer, “assigned to 
themselves a role to ‘supervise’ the policy-makers” . For example, a t  a district board 
meeting (6 March, 1985) which discussed the ERP system, Hung Wing-tat asked the 
officials to explain the government’s overall plan regarding a solution to the 
transportation problems of Hong Kong. Lee Shun-wai addressed the social and economic 
effects of the ERP system. Others such as Esther Chan, Karl Tong and Gerrv Wai cited 
the objections of their constituencies, thus demanding that the government should be
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more responsive to public opinion. All these examples show that  the elected members 
were prepared to confront the policy-makers by claiming to represent a popular 
mandate.
The aggressive approach of these elected members was resented by the local 
officials. Lam Kam-kwong, the C&W District Officer, noted this in an interview a few 
months after the elections
Sometimes, they just regard themselves as policy-makers, but in fact the 
government, after weighing up different sources of opinions, still holds the 
power to make all final decisions. We also want ‘democracy’ but are afraid that 
people ask for democracy just for the sake of power, and we begin to be 
convinced that power is corrupt because we conceive that some members 
merely regard the district boards as an opportunity for them to consolidate 
their community base for future ‘gangren zhigang’. Since they are prepared to 
criticize the government on every major and minor issue being consulted, we 
subsequently waste our time and resources in handling political relations within 
the board without solving the problems themselves.
This shows tha t  even with the limited degree of liberalization conceded by the 
British authorities, district administration became politicized to an unprecedented 
degree. In order to ensure re-election, elected members would now have to justify their 
quasi-representative status by claiming to be responsive to public opinion. They might 
not be able to obtain concessions from the officials all the time, but they could easily put 
the blame for achieving nothing on the government, thereby justifying their demand for 
further power to be given to them.
In many instances, these unofficial members actually exerted strong pressure on 
local officials. However, their influence was constrained by their inability to co-operate 
consistently on all major issues. Since all members were elected and appointed on an 
individual basis and most members had just joined the board for the first time, various 
factions were developing without any clear sense of direction. As a result, the district 
boards were becoming an arena for political manoeuvring as individual members lobbied 
for support on different issues. By the end of 1985, the C&W DB was typical of other 
boards in which political divisions were by no means static. But in other districts, unlike 
the C&W district, established influences were quite strong so tha t  political alignments 
were clearly marked between the newly emerging members and the traditional elite, as 
we will see in the following case studies of Sham Shui Po and Tuen Mun.
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Map 4. Electoral Map by Constituencies, Sham Shui Po District Board Elections, 1985.
CASE S T U D Y  B: POLITICS OF THE  
S H A M  SHUI PO D ISTR IC T B O A R D  (SSP DB)
Table 18
Candidates Standing for the 1985 SSP DB Elections
Constituency/ 
(Number of Seats)
Name
Elected Defeated
Age Occupation
Nam Shan k Yau Yat Chuen (2) K.L. Chui 58 Retired
K.W. Wong 43 Com Worker
W . W . Ngok 38 Engineer
T.K. Chow 57 Worker
Pak Tin (2) S.K. Ha 39 Technician
K.K. Tam 28 Soc Worker
K.S. Lee 61 Secretary
L.H. Lui 49 Technician
Nam Cheong West (2) F.L. Chan 72 Merchant
C.K. Hou 48 Merchant
K.T. Leung 28 Soc Worker
Nam Cheong East* (2) K.W. Cheng 38 School Exec
C.K. Liu 52 Merchant
Shek Kip Mei* (l) K.C. Chan 38 Merchant
Nam Cheong North (l) w.s. Choi 36 Manager
Chan Tung 50 Merchant
Laichikok k Un Chau (2) v.v. Ha 28 Com Worker
C.K. Wong 47 Dev Officer
T.S. Poon 57 Exec Sec
K.C. Hui 22 TJni Student
Lai Wan* (2) W.S.. Cheung 33 Solicitor
P.L . Chung 44 Solicitor
Li Cheng Uk k So Uk (2) C.S . Chan 54 Exec Sec
S.W . Tang 29 Teacher
K. Y. Hui 61 Retired
Cheung Sha Wan (2) P.H . Wong 65 Merchant
H.K. Yue 45 Merchant
L.N . Yau 24 Soc Worker
* Automatically elected without contest. 
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
Table 18 shows tha t  28 candidates contested 18 seats in the 10 constituencies in 
the SSP district election campaign. There were 8 grassroots members campaigning in G 
constituencies. Chui Kim-ling, Wong Kwai-wan and Wong Chee-kwan were candidates 
of the People’s Council on Public Housing Policy, closely related to which were two staff 
members of the office of an Urban Councillor, Fung Kin-kee - i.e. Leung Kam-tao and 
Tam  Kwok-kiu, who were also the founders of the Concerned Group for Sham Shui Po 
People’s Livelihood. Similarly, Ha Ving-vung came from the office of Urban Councillor 
Lee Chik-yuet; Yau Lai-ngo represented the Lai Kwok Estate Residents’ Association and 
Tang Sun-wah stood as an independent candidate, with the support of the People’s 
Council.
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What these candidates shared in common was a deep involvement in community 
services among the low-income groups and thus chose to stand for their candidacies in 
the public housing constituencies, claiming to represent the interests of the poor people. 
Common to them all was also a belief in democracy, which they regarded as a process by 
which the government was to be made more representative of and accountable to the 
interests of the grassroots. They also believed tha t  the election campaign was itself a 
democratic process in which the general public would be involved in the identification of 
community problems.
During the campaign, these grassroots candidates highlighted various community 
grievances and called for greater self-consciousness about their rights on the part of the 
low-income residents living in the public housing estates. By paying intensive 
door-to-door visits, they recruited more participants for their own group and developed 
active members for their future work. Thus they were able to mobilize popular 
participation within the electorate quite effectively, and with the exception of Wong 
Kwai-wan, who was defeated by a narrow margin in the Nam Shan and Yau Yat Chuen 
Constituency, all these grassroots candidates were elected. Moreover, most of them were 
able to obtain a majority of the votes cast, as shown in Table 19 below.
Table 19 also shows that it was in such constituencies as Pak Tin, Nam Shan and 
Yau Yat Chuen, and Lai Chi Kok and Un Chau, where the densely populated public 
housing estates prevailed, that voter turn-out was well above average. Indeed, by taking 
advantage of the lower level of mobilization in the private blocs, the grassroots members 
easily defeated their opponents who relied for their political bases on the private housing 
areas. Leung Kam-tao, for example, wras elected together with a kaifong candidate, Chan 
Foo-leung, in the Nam Cheong West Constituency where two seats were available. By 
splitting the votes of his two opponents, Leung obtained 2,063 votes, accounting for 
81.6% of the votes cast, thus leaving Chan to gain 643 votes and beat his electoral 
partner, Hou Chun-kau, by 2 votes.
All these results indicated that the grassroots members were much better 
organized in the electoral campaign than the rest of the candidates, most of whom were 
related to the Sham Shui Po Kaifong Association or MACs. Having dominated the SSP 
DB of 1982-85, these traditional groups suddenly found their sphere of influence being 
threatened by the active participation of the grassroots members. But contrary to the 
mobilization capacities of grassroots members, the kaifong candidates were less energetic 
in large scale mobilization. Although a few of them were elected without contest, namely 
Liu Chi-keung and Cheng Kam-wah. in those constituencies where private housing 
prevailed, many of them, such as Hui Gut-yin and Yue Hung-kong, lost by a wide 
margin to the grassroots candidates. Subsequently, there were only about 6 kaifong and 
associated candidates elected in the March elections.
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Table 19
Voter Turn-out* in the 1985 SSP DB Elections
A. Voter Turn-out in Those 
Candidates were Distributed
SSP Constituency Where Grassroots
Constituency Registered
Voter
Number of 
Votes Cast
Candidate Number of
Votes Gained
Nam Shan & 10,689 4,105 (38.4%) K.L. Chui 2,168 (52.8%)
Yau Yat Chuen 
Pale Tin 13,966 5,494 (39.3%) K.K. Tam 4,296 (78.2%)
Nam Cheong W 7,994 2,528 (32.2%) K.T. Leung 2,063 (81.6%)
Lai Chi Kok 12,603 5,608 (44.5%) C.K. Wong 3,123 (55.6%)
& Yuen Chau V.V. Ha 3,264 (58.2%)
Lei Cheng Uk 13,525 5,005 (37.0%) c.s. Chan 2,207 (44.1%)
t So Uk s .w. Tang 3,214 (64.2%)
Cheung Sha Wan 13,844 4,711 (34.0%) L.N. Yau 3,084 (65.5%)
B. Voter Turn-out 
Campaigned
in Other Constituencies W'here Noi Grassroots Members
Nam Cheong E 10,083 K.W. Cheng Uncontested
C.K. Liu Uncontested
Shek Kip Mei 8,780 - K.C. Chan Uncontested
Nam Cheong N 5,730 1,473 (25.7%) W.S. Choy 847 (57.5%)
Lai Wan 15,351 - w.s. Cheung Uncontested
P.L. Chung Uncontested
C. Percentage of Votes Obtained by Other Elected Candidates in Their
Respective Constituencies where Grassroots Candidates were Distributed
Nam Shan & Yau Yat Cheun W.W. Ngok 2,097 (51.1%)
Pale Tin S.K. Ha 2,266 (41.2%)
Nam Cheong W F.L. Chan 643 (25.4%)
Cheung Sha Wan P.H. Wong 2,507 (53.2%)
* The average turn-out rate of the SSP DB elections was 37.0%. 
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
Tilting  the political balance between the kaifong and the grassroots m em bers were 
the independent candidates from various political backgrounds, most of whom had some 
experience in com m unity  work and  were appointed to those bodies as ACs and MACs 
within the d istrict.  People, such as Chan Chee-sing and Chow Tin-kee, were believed to 
be p ro-PR C . C hung Pui-lam  (also a m em ber of the Hong Kong Belongers Association), 
Choi Wai-shek and Cheung Wing-sum were middle-class professionals. Besides, many 
kaifong leaders were associated with the Civic Association. As a result, cand ida tes  of the 
SSP d istrict came from varied political backgrounds, as shown in Table 20.
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Table 20
Political Affiliation of the Candidates Standing for 
the 1985 SSP DB Elections
Political Background Elected Defeated
Community Groups
Area Committees 13 9
Kaifong 6 4
MAC 5 2
Residents’ Associations/Presssure Groups 8 1
Political Groups
Association for Democracy 1 0
Civic Association 4 2
Hong Kong Belongers Association 1 0
Reform Club 0 1
Pro-PRC 1 1
Notes: 1. In 1985, there were 11 ACs and 211 MACs in the SSP district.
2. This table does not indicate the political balance between 
the kaifong and grassroots members because in some cases their 
memberships overlapped.
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
Immediately after the SSP district elections, those elected as ‘independents ' 
became the targe t of lobbying by both the kaifong and grassroots m em bers, the result 
being th a t  a fairly clear political alignment developed between the two m ajor factions. 
About three or four independent candidates tended to support the grassroots  members 
on m ost issues; hence they accounted for a majority of the elected seats. This showed 
th a t  the  kaifongs failed to dom inate local politics as they had done before 1985, due to a 
d ram a tic  decrease in the  proportion of seats they occupied.
Changes in the political equilibrium of the SSP DB in 1985 can be seen in the 
significant change th a t  occurred in the socio-economic background of the elected 
members. Generally speaking, most grassroots members were social workers, teachers or 
blue collar workers in their 20s and 30s, while the kaifong m em bers were merchants 
above the age of 40. From  the result of the SSP district elections, there  was a  substantial 
increase in the num ber of young social workers and lower-income white  collar workers 
elected and a corresponding decrease in the proportion of business representa tives as 
shown in Tables 21 and 22.
B ut although the kaifongs suffered a great setback during the elections, their 
dom inant position in the  SSP DB remained unaffected between 1985-88. This  was made 
possible by the fact th a t  the government appointed 9 o ther members, the  socio-economic
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Table 21
Occupational Distribution of the Elected Members 
in the SSP DB, 1982 and 1985
Occupation 1982 1985
Retired/Student 1 1
Social Worker 0 3
Worker/White Collar Worker 3 4
Engineer 0 1
Lawyer 0 2
Business 3 5
Education 2 2
Total 9 18
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
Age Distribution of
Table 22
the Elected Members in SSP DB, 1982 and 1985
Age 1982 1985
20-31 2 5
31-40 1 6
41-50 1 2
51-60 2 3
60+ 3 2
Total 9 18
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
background of many of whom were similar to those of the kaifong members. Hence, the 
kaifong and appointed members usually took one line on the board. Tables 23 and 24 
below showed that 6 of the appointed members were businessmen or industrialists in 
their 30s or 40s, which significantly tilted the overall balance of the socio-economic 
background of the SSP DB members as a whole. The new political equilibrium was 
ultimately revealed by the election of the chairman by all the SSP DB members in April, 
w'hen the grassroots candidate, Lee Chik-yuet, was beaten by the pro-kaifong candidate, 
Cheng Po-hong, by two votes.
The grassroots members now found tha t  even though they had achieved direct 
participation in local administration, they could do little to improve community welfare, 
since they were constrained by the dominance of the conservative kaifong members
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Table 23
Occupational Distribution of the SSP DB Members, 1985-88
Occupation Elected Appointed UC Total
Retired/Students 1 0 0 1
Social Worker 3 0 2 5
Blue/White Collar Workers 4 1 1 5
Engineer 1 0 0 1
Lawyer 2 0 0 2
Businessmen/Industrialists 5 6 0 13
Education 2 1 0 3
Housewife 0 1 0 1
Total 18 9 3 30
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
Table 24
Age Distribution of the SSP DB Members, 1985 -88
Age Elected Appointed UC Total
21-30 5 0 1 6
31-40 6 3 2 io
41-50 2 3 0 5
51-60 3 1 0 4
61 + 2 2 0 4
Total 18 9 3 31
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
represented on the board. Accordingly, they also blamed the local officials for protecting 
the interests of the kaifong members and of the businessmen in general. After the March 
elections, the grassroots leaders found that the kaifong leaders actually had very weak 
links with the people at the grassroots level, because their influence depended largely on 
recognition by the local officials. So they came to the Elected Members in SSP DB 1982 
and 1985 (by age)] conclusion that they could only counterbalance the dominance of the 
kaifongs by occupying more elected seats in the district boards in future. For this reason, 
they also called for the introduction of direct elections to the Legislative Council in 1988. 
In order to prepare for such a future development, the grassroots members also made use 
of the district boards as a means through which to enlarge their community networks. In 
the first, place, they lobbied some of the younger members of the district boards on an 
issue-by-issue basis. They also tried to gain direct access to the local officials in order to
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enable people who were exerting pressure on the administration from without to do so 
more effectively. Thus, contrary to some officials’ belief, the pressure of these grassroots 
organizations was not fully contained by the mere process of participation in local 
administration, but was actually legitimized by their involvement in a variety of social 
movements, thus politicizing community issues further.
In addition, the grassroots members tended to be very critical of most government 
policies and they very often related the issues to the broader question of the 
re-distribution of socio-economic resources within the society as a whole. The kaifong 
members argued, however, tha t  the district boards should not interfere with central 
policies. By emphasizing their role in community services and charities, they implied 
that the district boards should not be so political as to become an official pressure group. 
They were also unhappy about the confrontational approach of the grassroots members, 
arguing that they thereby obstructed the efficiency of the administration.
Mutual suspicion and distrust between the two factions remained in the 
post-election period. Feeling tha t  the grassroots members intruded into their sphere of 
influence, the. kaifongs resented the rapid emergence of the grassroots members. These 
members of the business sub-elite were unable as well as unwilling to engage in large 
scale mobilization of political support and so they favoured maintaining a proportion of 
the members who would be officially appointed. Accordingly, they also objected to direct 
elections to the Legislative Council; some even expressed their fear tha t  the Tree 
lunchers’ might become over-represented in the administration in the future.
In view of the emergence of the grassroots interests, some kaifong members called 
for the more active participation of their own type of people in politics. A considerable
o
number of them joined Maria Tam 's PHS. Although this kind of political affiliation did 
not necessarily point towards the* development of a solid party, it indicated tha t  at least 
some members of the established economic and professional elite were starting to change 
their non-political a tt itude  and were getting involved in political activities.
Individual grassroots members were also actively engaged in developing their own 
political bases. After the March elections, there was a consistent pattern of development: 
(1) the consolidation of grassroots networks; (2) the development of intermediate 
connections by lobbying the more neutral members of the district board; (3) the 
enlargement of district support bv co-operating with the grassroots organizations of 
other districts. Such cross-district alignments gradually took shape when Fung Kin-kee, 
Urban Council repesentative in the SSP DB. organized the so-called Association for
3. In mid-1985, the Civic Association joined the PHS as a sister organization. It followed that 
many individual members of the Civic Association also joined the PHS. Both groups expanded in 
the Sham Shui Po district, mainly among the kaifong association members.
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Democracy and People’s Livelihood in April 1986, together with Lee Wing-tat of the 
Tsing Yi district, and pressure group member, L.K. Ding of the CIC.
By 1985-86, the two major factions in the SSP district were trying to enlarge their 
own intermediate connections outside their own particular constituencies. But their 
participation in different political groups was based in each case on individual decisions. 
Members of each faction were still unable to come up with a solid alliance in terms of 
long-term political developments. Although political alignments between the two 
factions were now clearly delineated, there were still many uncertainties facing them in 
view of the rapid political changes occurring in Hong Kong at th a t  time.
1 Rn
Map 6. Electoral Map by Constituencies, Tuen Mun District Board Elections, 1985.
CASE S T U D Y  C: POLITICS OF THE  
TUEN M U N  D ISTR IC T B O A R D  (TM DB)
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The incorporation of villages into the national political system inevitably would 
mean the importation of outside resources into the political arena, and thus 
would have the effect of restructuring political alignments in the villages so 
affected.4 5
Chau and Lau’s statement basically explains the redistribution of political power 
in the New Territories brought about by urbanization and economic development. As 
the Tuen Mun district was one of the most rapidly developing areas in the New 
Territories, its politics can be analyzed in terms of conflicts between traditional rural 
leaders and new town migrants. Defending the interests of the rural inhabitants were 
leaders of the HYK, who had been dominant within the Rural Committees (RCs) and all 
9 New Territories district boards between 1982-85. Emerging from the new town public 
housing estates were members of the new pressure groups, who were now capable of 
challenging the dominant position of the rural candidates in the March elections, thus 
altering the original political balance on the TM DB between 1985-88.
Background to Politics of the N ew  Territories
Unlike the Hong Kong Islands and the Kowloon Peninsula, the New Territories 
region was regarded as the rural hinterland of Hong Kong and as the home of the 
‘original inhabitants’.^ Under the colonial administration, the original inhabitants were 
well represented in the New Territories Administration by the HYK through the system 
of district offices and RCs. In fact, the HYK has become the largest single interest group 
in the New Territories capable of defending and advancing the interests of the 
indigenous rural members. It was mainly on issues of land resettlement and other 
matters affecting the well-being of the original inhabitants that the HYK played the 
roles of both an arbitrator and a bridge between the government and the rural public. In 
comparison with the traditional kaifong associations in the urban areas, the organization
4. L.Y. Chau and S.K. Lau, “Development, Colonial Rule, and Intergroup Politics in a Chinese 
Village in Hong Kong” , Occasional Paper, no.90 (Hong Kong: Social Research Centre, Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, May 1980), p .l .
5. The original inhabitants are those inhabitants and their descendants in the villages recog­
nized by the government in 1898 when the New Territories were leased to Britain by the Qing 
Dynasty. As the New Territories were acquired as a buffer zone in the military sense, the policy of 
the government at that time was to leave the s ta tus  quo undisturbed. Out of the desire to 
preserve the exotic customs and institutions of the natives, the government granted them a num­
ber of privileges. Lau’s study shows that the self-consciousness of this group as a special interest 
group with a defensive posture was strong among the inhabitants and is becoming stronger. For a 
further account of their privileges, see S.K. Lau and H.C. Kuan, “The District Board Elections in 
Hong Kong” , pp.7-8.
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of the HYK was much better structured,® hence it was quite effective in articulating the 
demands of the rural population. Indeed, the government also found it necessary to rely 
on the support of these traditional leaders to legitimize their development policies in the 
New Territories.”
With the development of new towns and the outward migration of the ‘original 
inhabitants’, the rural nature of the New Territories had been transformed. Since the 
1970s, the proportion of the original inhabitants living in the New Territories has been
o
dramatically reduced and they are thus becoming a minority.0 One of the towms, Tuen 
Mun, had only a population of 20,977 in 1970. with two-thirds living in the villages; but 
according to the 1981 census, this figure had risen sixfold in 10 years, the rate of 
population increase being determined by the rate of completion of public housing estates. 
By the early 1980s, 70% of the population of the region lived in public housing estates in 
the new towns, such as Tai Hing. Yau Oi and Butterfly Areas.® Yet during the 1970s 
and early 1980s, new town migrants were not represented in any of those district offices 
or the RCs. The HYK, which continued to dominate these New Territories advisory 
committees, was unwilling as well as unable to represent the interests of the new 
migrants.
The inauguration of the district board system in the New Territories has 
sometimes been regarded as an a ttem pt by the government to redistribute political 
power in the area at the expense of the rural interests, and that of the HYK in 
particular.*® Basically, the power base of the HYK was split up into districts and, as a 
result, the government no longer recognized the power of the HYK as a whole but 
consulted their views individually in each of its constituent boards. In order to reduce 
the dissatisfaction of the HY’K leaders, the chairman of each RC was allowed to sit 
ex-officio on the district boards. In response to this, the rural leaders showed a very 
strong inclination to mobilize support in their own constituencies in the district board 
elections in March 1982, with a view to maintaining their political influence. By
6. For a detailed description of the structure of the Heung ’tee  Kuk, see N.J. Miners, The 
Government  and Poli t ics o f  Hong K o n g , 4th edition (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 
1986), p p .187-188.
7. L.Y. Chau and S.K. Lau, “Development, Colonial Rule, and Intergroup Politics in a Chinese 
Village in Hong Kong” .
8. N.J. Miners. The Government  and Poli t ics o f  Hong Kong,  4th edition, p.189. For the 
development of the New Territories, see also L.Y. Chau and S.K. Lau, “Development, Colonial 
Rule, and Intergroup Politics in a Chinese V illage in Hong Kong” ; H.C. Kuan and S.K. Lau, 
“Planned Development and Political Adaptability in Rural Areas” in Ambrose Y.C. King and 
Ranee P.L. Lee, (eds.), Social  L i fe  and Development in Hong Kong  (Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 1981), p p .169-194.
9. Dis t r i c t  Prof i le o f  Tuen Mun  (Hong Kong: Tuen Mun District Office. 1984), p .l .
10. S.K. Lau and H.C. Kuan (1983), “The District Board Election in Hong Kong” , p.8. See also 
N.J. Miners, The Government  and Poli t ics o f  Hong Kong,  4th edition, p.189.
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dem onstra ting  their experience at organizing rural support ,  they achieved tu rn -ou t ra tes  
in the New Territories which were much higher than  in the urban areas .*1
When we examine the composition of the New Territories district boards for the
period 1982-85, we see th a t  the dominance of the rural members had no t been threa tened
a t  all by the governm ent’s a t te m p t  to redistribute political power. O u t of 56 elected
m em bers in the New Territories, 32 (57%) of them were indigenous in hab itan ts ,  while 14
m em bers were related to such rural organizations as HYK, RCs and village
representatives. Most of these rural representatives were, however, businessmen (22%),
res tau ran teu rs  (6%), industrialists and construction agents  (11%). This m ean t  th a t  the
low-income public housing members living in the new towns were heavily
under-represented. Only in Shatin and Tsuen Wan districts  were there 5 and 3 M AC
1 0
m em bers respectively representing the public housing residents of the new towns.
Up to 1984-85, the New Territories district boards had not yet become an arena of 
political conflict between the new town m igrants  and the rural leaders, ln Tuen M un, for 
example, none of the new town members were represented on the TM DB, but 
asp ira tions  for political partic ipa tion  were developing am ong the new town residents 
within the district,  partly as a consequence of the governm ent’s inadequate  planning. In 
fact, TM  became one of the New Territories districts  where grassroots  influence 
expanded very rapidly in the 1980s.
P o l i t i c s  in T u en  M u n  D is tr ic ts :  U r b a n iz a t io n  and  D e v e lo p m e n t
Economic, social and cultural in frastructures are usually planned according to the 
development of the new towns. In order to provide adequate  employment opportunit ies ,  
two m ajor industrial centres were also designed for the TM district.  However, by the 
time the  new towns were constructed there, the general economy of Hong Kong was 
depressed and so the government failed to a t t r a c t  industrialis ts  to  invest in the district.  
Since there were inadequate em ploym ent opportunities ,  a large proportion  of the 
residents had to work outside the district.  This immediately posed great  pressures upon 
the underdeveloped transpor ta t ion  network between the district and the urban  areas.
Moreover, the government had underestim ated the need for schooling in the 
housing estates. The demographic picture of the population living in the d is tric t reveals 
th a t  over 50% of them  were within the below-34 age groups, with a large proportion  of 
white-collar and blue-collar couples, the result being that the birth  ra te  within the 
d istr ic t ,  and thus population growth, was much faster than  w hat the governm ent had 
expected. This quickly posed great pressures on the limited num ber of school places 
available within the d istrict.
11. The turn-out rate was 38% in the New Territories and 35% in the urban area respectively.
12. S.K. Lau and Kuan, uThe District Board Election in Hong Kongr , pp.3-4.
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Such problems as these, em ploym ent opportunities, transpor ta t ion  and schooling, 
were impossible to  solve within a short t ime because they were related more 
fundam entally  to the redistribution of socio-economic resources in the society as a whole. 
B ut all these issues aroused many grievances among those families who particularly  felt 
a sense of isolation from their com m unity  in such a ‘rem ote’ area. Some M ACs were 
in itia ted  by the local officials to serve as a bridge between the government and the 
public housing inhab itan ts ,  bu t some residents still found th a t  the MACs were unwilling 
to speak up abou t their d iscontents , so they organized the residents’ associations am ong 
themselves, hoping that, these self-initiated organizations could be able to advance their 
in terests  more effectively.
Having developed out of their conflicts with local officials over the issues of 
education and t ran sp o r ta t io n ,  the first self-initiated residents’ association was 
established in 1979 in Tai Hing, la ter to become the Coalition of Concerned G roups for 
Tuen M un People’s Livelihood in 1984, whose objective was to negotiate with the 
governm ent on m a t te rs  affecting the welfare of the residents. Similarly, the Tuen Mun 
Forthviewers, the Tuen Mun P lan te rs  Society and the Butterfly Beach Area Livelihood 
A dvancem ent Association were established on their respective public housing estates. 
Generally speaking, these groups chose to express their grievances by conducting surveys 
and organizing signature campaigns, press conferences and mass gatherings. By doing so, 
they hoped to a t t r a c t  public a t ten t ion  to the issues, thus pu tt ing  pressure on the 
governm ent to improve their  conditions. Since these groups adopted pressure-group 
tactics  of open confrontation , they failed to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the local 
officials, so in order to gain direct access to the officials, the newly emerged pressure 
groups decided to run their own members in the March elections of 1985.
P ar t ic ipa tion  of the new town residents in the local adm inis tra tion  was m ade more 
feasible when various changes were introduced to the electoral a r rangem ents  for the 
d is tric t boards in 1985. By redrawing the boundaries of the constituencies on a 
population  basis of 50.000, two of them  now consisted wholly of public housing 
in hab itan ts ,  thus guaran teeing  some representation of new town members. The 
redrawing of the constituencies had im portan t political implications: w hether
intentionally  or not. the government had inevitably bifurcated the main sources of 
political influence between rural members and the new m igrants , thus  making them  a 
counterbalance to each o thers ' s treng th .
Such changes were welcomed by the local pressure groups, who regarded the  
d istrict boards as a channel for grassroots participation. Like o ther grassroots  
organizations, they pushed fur ther for direct elections to the Legislative Council, bu t  
were resisted by the rural businessmen who favoured the m ain tenance of the existing 
economic and political framework.
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In defending the interests of the conservative businessmen of the New Territories, 
the HYK participated very actively in the political debates of 1984-85. In their response 
to the government’s proposal to introduce elections to the Legislative Council, the HYK 
pushed for a formal seat in the functional constituency. In this they were unsuccessful, 
for the government argued that the HYK could be represented through the newly 
established Regional Council which would be given a seat in the Legislative Council. In 
fact, one of its leaders, Cheung Yan-lung, had already been appointed as a member of 
the Legislative Council which meant that the HYK members would have at least two 
seats during the period 1985-88. The failure of the HYK in its fight for a formal elective 
seat in the legislature made it even more determined to monopolize the positions in the 
district boards and the Regional Council. Since Tuen Mun Town Centre is the 
headquarters of the HYK, it is the most important sphere of influence upon the rural 
representatives. Inevitably, they also sought to monopolize all the elected seats in the 
TM DB. All these changes paved the way, therefore, for intensive competition between 
the rural leaders and pressure-group members in the March elections.
T M  D B E lections
There were a total of 35 candidates contesting 16 seats in the 8 constituencies of 
the TM DB. The contest was highly competitive, since none of the candidates were 
returned unopposed. As shown in Table 25, there were some situations in which as many 
as five or six candidates contested the two available seats within one constituency.
Table 25
Number of Candidates by Constituency, 1985 TM DB Elections
Constituency/(Number of Seats) Number of Candidates/Constituency
Tuen Mun Northeast (2) 5
Tai Hing (2) 5
Tuen Mun Southeast (2) 4
Yau Oi (2) 5
Tuen Mun Northwest (2) 3
Tuen Mun Southwest (2) 6
Tuen Mun Town Centre (2) 3
Castle Pealc (2) 4
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
Among these 8 constituencies, Tai Hing, Yau Oi and Tuen Mun Southwest were 
mainly inhabited by public housing residents, while Castle Peak and Tuen Mun 
Southeast consisted of a mixture of new town and rural residents and was still under the
16]
strong influence of the rural leaders. It was in these five constituencies th a t  various 
pressure groups d istributed  eight candidates, leaving Tuen Mun Town Centre, Tuen 
Mun Northwest and Tuen Mun N ortheast to be contested among the rural candidates 
themselves. Accordingly, there were abou t 20 rural candidates running in all 8 
constituencies. O ther  candidates were mainly related to the MACs in the public housing 
estates. There were also two candidates believed to  be associated with several local 
p ro -PR C  groups,10 but these proved to be unable to affect the outcome of the intensive 
competition between the rural and grassroots members.
Having been dom inant in the elections of 1982, the rural leaders were Elected 
Members in SSP DB 1982 and 1985 (by age)] expected to have be t te r  political 
experience than  their rivals; b u t  in the 1985 campaign, not many of them  carried out 
effective mobilization because their votes depended largely on their localistic s ta tus ,  
kinship, and personal connections in their own villages. So although the tu rn -ou t ra te  in 
a rural constituency such as Tuen Mun Northeast could be as high as 49.7%, the ra te  in 
the o ther two rural constituencies, Tuen Mun Northw est and Town Centre, was 
com paratively low.
The most vigorous campaigns were carried out in the public housing constituencies 
where the grassroots members were campaigning against the rural candidates*4 as well 
as the MAC members. In the Tai Hing constituency, for instance, two candidates were 
related to the Concerned G roup of Tuen Mun People’s Livelihood. They were also 
supported  strongly by the Meeting Point and o ther grassroots members. Cam paigning 
against them were 4 o ther M AC and rural leaders. The result was th a t  the turn-out rate 
of the voters there was as high as 64.5%, of which abou t 67% voted for the grassroots 
members. In fact, it was mainly in those constituencies where grassroots candidates ran 
in the campaign th a t  the voter tu rn-out was highest. It was also in those public housing 
constituencies t h a t  all 8 grassroots candidates were elected, as Table 26 indicates.
The success of all the grassroots candidates in launching their election campaigns 
which achieved a high voter tu rn-out clearly dem onstra ted  th a t  they w'ere more capable 
of conducting mass-style mobilization of the public. Since most of them  were young 
workers, as can be seen in Table 27, they were able to  make use of this as an advantage 
to cult ivate  a young and enthusiastic  image. During the campaigns, these candidates 
particularly  stressed their “wholehearted objectives to  fight for the rights and interests 
of the new town m ig ran ts” . Since most of them  had been involved in community 
m ovem ents in the district,  they were able to address the specific grievances of the
13. Both pro-PRC candidates stood as candidates in the public housing area of Butterfly Beach 
in the TM Southwest constituency.
14. Some original inhabitants had also moved into the public housing estates. In other words, 
rural leaders were also able to gain some support from among the public housing residents.
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T a b l e  26
V o t e r  T u r n - o u t  By C o n s t i t u e n c y ,  1985 TM DB E l e c t i o n s
C o n s t i t u e n c y /  
(Num ber  o f  S e a t s )
Number o f  
V o t e r s
T u r n - o u t
R a t e
T y p e  o f  
V o t e r s
Number o f  PG 
C a n d i d a t e s
T a i  H i n g  (2 ) 1 0 , 6 9 2 9 9 7 (64 .5 7 . ) New Town 2
T u e n  Mun S o u t h w e s t ( 2 ) 9 , 9 4 3 5 , 8 6 7 ( 59 .0 7 . ) New Town 2
C a s t l e  PeaJk ( 6 ) 6 , 5 9 8 3 , 4 0 0 ( 5 1 . 5 7 ) M ix e d 1
T u e n  Mun N o r t h e a s t (2 ) 7 , 3 2 0 3 , 6 3 9 ( 4 9 - 7 / 0 R u r a l 0
Yau Oi (2) 1 1 , 9 1 5 5 , 8 5 4 ( 49 .1 7 . ) New Town 2
T u e n  Mun S o u t h e a s t (2 ) 1 2 , 2 3 8 5 , 0 6 7 ( 48 .8 7 . ) M ix e d 1
T u e n  Mun N o r t h w e s t (2 ) 6 , 2 4 3 2 , 9 2 3 ( 4 6 . 8 7 ) R u r a l 0
Town C e n t r e  ( 2 ) 7 , 2 4 7 2 , 3 0 3 ( 3 1 . 8 7 ) R u r a l 0
S o u r c e : M i s c e l l a n e o u s  f i e l d  w o r k  d a t a .  
T a b l e  27
Age a n d O c c u p a t i o n  o f  
1985  TM
t h e  8 G r a s s r o o t s  C a n d i d a t e s ,  
DB E l e c t i o n s
C o n s t i t u e n c y Name O c c u p a t i o n Age G ro u p  A f f i l i a t i o n
T a i  H i n g M.Y. Ng T e a c h e r 28 C o n c e r n e d  G r o u p
W.B. Chu T r a n s p o r t
D i r e c t o r
32 C o n c e r n e d  G r o u p
T u e n  Mun SE M.P. Chan L a b .  T e c h . 28 TM F o r t h v i e w e r s
Yau Oi Y .L . C h e u n g H o u s e w i f e 27 C o n c e r n e d  G r o u p
S . C . Yeung T e c h n i c i a n 32 TM F o r t h v i e w e r s
T u e n  Mun SW T . S . Yim E x e c u t i v e  i n  
Com. S e r v i c e
32 P l a n t e r s  S o c i e t y
W.C. Ng T e a c h e r 34 B u t t e r f l y  A r e a  
L i v e l i h o o d
Ad v a n e  eminent  
A s s o c i a t i o n
C a s t l e  P e a k M.K. Yeung E x e c u t i v e 28 C o n c e r n e d  G r o u p
S o u r c e :  M i s c e l l a n e o u s  f i e l d  w o rk  d a t a .
electorate in their own constituencies. At the climax of Elected Members in SSP DB 
1982 and 1985 (by age)] the campaign, they successfully mobilized volunteers living 
within the various constituencies to support them in the election campaign, thus 
involving a substantial group of residents in political activity.
From the results of the March elections, it can be seen tha t  the dominance of the 
rural members of the TM DB was challenged by the emergence of the grassroots 
members, for the latter succeeded in winning half the elected seats. The board was no 
longer dominated by businessmen and restauranteurs, but was now counterbalanced by a
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group of representatives who were young white collar and blue collar workers living in 
the public housing areas. This means th a t  if there had been no appo in ted  seats, the 
grassroots members would have been able to match the political s treng th  of the rural 
leaders on an equal basis. U nderstandably , the governm ent did not w an t  the rural 
representa tives to be pushed into the background too rapidly, so the dom inance of the 
rural leaders was re instated by the government's  appoin tm ents .  Out of the  8 appointed 
members, 6 were incumbents, the m ajority  of them  either HYK leaders or pro-HYK 
professionals, businessmen or industrialists. Together with an ex-officio representa tive of 
the TM  RC C harim an - Lau Wong-fat - the dominance of the rural elements was thus 
m ain ta ined  in the TM DB between 1985-88.
Although the rural leaders were unexpectedly challenged by the  grassroots 
m em bers in the March elections, they were able to develop a new policy aimed at 
recruiting m em bers from the urban m igrants  and co-opting all the newly elected 
m em bers into their  organizational s tructure . Individual HYK members also partic ipated 
in o ther  political organizations. Lau Wong-fat. for example, who was the  Chairm an of 
the TM  DB as well as the HYK, joined the PHS.
W'hile rural organizations were well-developed and had ad eq u a te  financial 
resources to sustain their political developments in TM , the newly emerging grassroots 
organizations, by contrast,  lacked well-developed organizational capacities and financial 
support .  This helps explain why they could not put forward more candidates to 
monopolize all the elected seats. Before they could become a dominant group, they had 
to come to te rm s with the dom inant group. Nevertheless, the new groups consisted 
mainly of young and energetic members, who also enjoyed the advan tage  of familiarity 
with mass mobilization techniques. Like other grassroots organizations, those in the 
Tuen Mun district m aintained close connections with grassroots m em bers in other 
d istricts. Their m ajor task was to consolidate their mass base, but they also co-operated 
with the o ther groups in the formation of cross-district coalition on an issue-bv-issue 
basis.
CONCLUSION
T he three main cases discussed above a ltogether dem onstra te  th a t  district 
adm in is tra tion  had been modestly politicized by the rapid emergence of the  middle-class 
and grassroots  members who managed to get themselves established within the political 
processes th rough the new system of elections. Participation  of the new groups in district 
politics had the effect of upsetting the original political equilibrium, for in all three 
s i tua tions  the middle-class and grassroots leaders proved to be much more capable than 
the trad it ional com m unity leaders of mobilizing voter support in their electoral 
cam paigns, and so dom inated the m ajority  of the elected seats eventually.
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While the C&W DB was dom inated  by a new generation of young and educated  
candida tes  associated with various grassroots and middle-class groups, the s i tuation  in 
two other districts , namely SSP and T M , was different, being characterized by 
confrontation between members of the trad it ional and pressure-group organizations in 
an urban and a rural context respectively. The case of TM typified the consequences of 
the rapid urbanization  of the New Territories  during the previous decade, which had led 
to an increasing proportion of the urban population moving into the new towns. One 
result was the expansion of pressure-group influence in these public housing estates. In 
both Sham Shui Po and Tuen Mun, the  grassroots members dem onstra ted  their 
mobilization capacities in the election campaign and thus won a significant num ber of 
elected seats. The C&W dis tric t contrasted  with SSP and TM , however, in the fact th a t  
the m ajority  of its residents lived in middle-upper income private  housing areas. It was 
characterized by a  lower level of electoral mobilization. Its members, however, came 
from various professional backgrounds and tended to be most critical of the government 
policies, and thus it became the most aggressive and technocratic of the 19 d is tric t 
boards in the post-election period.
The remarkable mobilization capacity  of the grassroots members in the d istrict 
electoral campaigns had great  impact on the balance of power a t  the district level, and 
hence wider implications for future political reforms. It implied th a t  those people who 
were more effective in mobilizing the voters would be able to dom inate electoral politics 
if direct elections were introduced to the Legislative Council. Hence, the government 
would no longer be able to guaran tee  the representation of the conservative m em bers as 
in the past when the proportion of appointed members was reduced. Partly  for this 
reason, the conservative businessmen and professionals continued to object to  the 
im plem entation  of direct elections for the Legislative Council in the future, which would 
mean the further politicization of a mass electorate. They also became most unwilling to 
allow the fur ther reduction in the num ber of appointed seats a t  the district level in order 
to  prevent the fur ther expansion of the influence of the progressive elememts.
In any case, the m ost im m ediate  concern for the d istrict board members in the 
post-election period was how to extend the  influence of their own group so th a t  they 
could successfully nom inate their own candida tes  for the Legislative Council elections in 
September. It can be seen from the above three case studies th a t  both  the 
conservative-oriented trad it ional forces and the more liberal-oriented newly emerging 
groups were try ing to consolidate their com m unity  base and develop political allies in 
the post-election period. But between 1985-88, the government was still able to  ensure 
the continued dominance of the trad it ional forces on most of the d istrict boards, which 
almost guaran teed  the re turn  of the conservative businessmen and professionals to the 
elections for the Legislative Council. Under their dominance, those who favoured the
165
s ta tu s  quo continued to constitu te  the dom inant non-official influence upon the 
adm in is tra t ive  process, thus leaving most of the liberal members to ag ita te  from outside 
the s tru c tu re  of governm ent altogether.
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C H A PT E R  7
ELECTORAL POLITICS: INDIR EC T ELECTIONS  
TO THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,  
SEPTEM BER 1985
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN THE CHANGING  
CONTEXT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN HONG KONG
In the previous chapters, we have seen the advantages enjoyed by the young and 
energetic political activists who utilized the district board elections to mobilize public 
support in the electoral campaign. Although the progressive elements could only 
constitute the minority on each board, they still tried to widen their influence in society 
by continuing to rally support through public campaigns on particular issues. This began 
during the months leading up to the indirect elections to the Legislative Council of 26 
September, 1985, which will be our focus of this chapter.
Up to September 1985, the Legislative Council consisted of 30 appointed unofficial 
and 16 nominated official members. The White Paper (November 1984) stipulated that 
elected members would be introduced to the Legislative Council, starting in the period 
1985-88. The Legislative Council would be enlarged to 56, of which 24 would be filled by 
elections, leaving only 22 seats to be filled by appointed unofficial elements and 10 seats 
by official members.
The Legislative Council elections did not generate the same kind of popular 
campaign as the district board elections, but gave rise to a very different kind of 
political manoeuvring among a small number of elite politicians. Consequently, the 
public were largely excluded from the electoral procedure, simply because the franchise 
to the Legislative Council was strictly limited.
Moreover, the reforms proposed for the period 1985-88 did not change the 
fundamental structure of the political system. Just as in the case of the district boards, 
the partially elected Legislative Council of September 1985 was not given any 
independent legislative powers. But at this time, a new element had been injected into 
the political scene of Hong Kong by the increasingly overt involvement of the PRC in 
the internal affairs of Hong Kong through the appointment of members to the BLDC in 
June. This raised many of the same issues about how far Hong Kong’s political system 
would be allowed to develop along the path towards full representative and autonomous
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governm ent.  Considerable concern was developing about the independence of the Hong 
Kong official and unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative Councils, 
par ticularly  on the question of whether they would be influenced by any inclination to 
modify their views so as to please Beijing.
In this regard, the  progressive activists continued to pu t  pressure on the Hong 
Kong governm ent for fu r ther reform, contending th a t  economic and political confidence 
could only be sustained by fulfilling the promises of the Jo in t  Declaration which 
st ipu la ted  th a t  “the executive authorities  shall abide by the law and shall be accountable 
to the legislature^. Yet these aspirations for a more liberal and accountable government 
did not find realization either in the electoral campaign or in the newly elected 
Legislative Council, since a majority  of those candidates who were s tanding for the 
election and those m em bers who were finally elected m aintained a very cautious a t t i tu d e  
tow ards political reform.
W h a t above all characterized the Legislative Council election in September 1985 
was the partic ipa tion  of the few progressive members. Like the minority progressives at 
the d is tr ic t  level, the few progressives at the Legislative Council later made use of every 
occasion to push for responsible government. By making the criticism th a t  an indirectly 
elected legislature was not able to express and speak up for the wishes of the people of 
Hong Kong at all effectively, they continued to put pressure on the colonial 
adm in is tra t ion  for the in troduction  of direct elections in 1988. So. the Legislative 
Council elections dem onstra ted  once again, as did the d istrict board elections, th a t  even 
a limited degree of ‘dem ocra tiza tion ' had begun to affect the operation of political 
processes in Hong Kong in various ways which were making it much harder for the 
colonial au thorit ies  to re tain tight control over political developments. Before analyzing 
the im pact of indirect elections on the operation of the  Legislative Council after 
Septem ber, the following section will discuss the electoral system in order to reveal the 
chief characteris tics  of the campaign.
THE LEGISLATIVE CO U NC IL ELECTION SYSTEM
In C hap te r  Four, we have mentioned that  the s trategy of the Hong Kong officials 
tow ards  political reform was to provide multiple channels of political partic ipa tion  with 
a view to  accom m odating  the various political forces into the political system w ithout 
losing control of the political processes. While the Green Paper spoke strongly against 
direct elections, the W hite  P aper  regarded the system of indirect elections as a more
realistic and practical framework for the development of representa tive 
governm ent a t  the central level during the next few years w ithout pu tt ing  at. 
risk the prosperity and stability  of Hong Kong.1
1. The White  Paper on the Further Development o f  Representat ive Government  in Hong 
Kong  (November 1984), p.3.
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Accordingly, the proposal of the Green Paper was accepted and members were to 
be elected indirectly by two categories:
a. an electoral college of Urban Council, new Regional Council and District
Board members; and
0b. functional groups, or ‘constituencies’/
In the first category, all the elected and appointed  members of the Urban Council, 
Regional Council and the 19 district boards were eligible to  vote for the geographical 
constituencies and would elect from among themselves 12 representatives to the 
Legislative Council through an electoral college. M em bers of the Urban Council and 
newly-established Regional Council would each elect am ong themselves one repre­
sentative to the Legislative Council. Constituencies of the 19 district boards were 
reorganized into 10 geographical areas, each representing a population of roughly 
500.000 and electing 1 representa tive to the Legislative Council. There were altogether 
abou t  434 people eligible to vote for the geographical constituencies, as Table 28 shows.
In the second category, a system of functional constituencies was introduced, its 
main principle, according to  the W hite  Paper,  being based on developing the
present informal system of selecting unofficial m em bers of the Legislative 
Council from functional constituencies into a formal representa tive system for 
the election of one or more representatives from each functional constituency to
*y
serve on the Legislative C o u n c i l /
In 1985. a to ta l  of 12 seats  were allocated to  m embers of 9 functional constituencies as 
shown in Table 29.
There were two different criteria which determ ined the eligibility to vote for the 
functional constituencies. In the professional constituencies, the franchise was based on 
membership of those professions which had well-established and recognized qualifica­
tions. Hence the electoral rolls for these constituencies were “based either on the 
membership lists of the various m ajor professional bodies and institu tions  or on the 
s ta tu to ry  registers of members of those p rofessions/^  This qualification was applied to 
the educational, medical, legal, and engineering and associated professions. Since 
membership was registered on an individual basis, those people who were thus 
enfranchised also voted on a one-man-one-vote basis.
In case of the  economic and social constituencies, however, such as commercial, 
industrial,  financial, labour and social services, mem bership  was registered on an 
organizational basis. In o ther words, those enfranchised voted here on a one- 
organization-one-vote basis. As the W hite  Paper spells out
2. The Green Paper on the Further Development of Representative Government in Hong 
Kong (July 1984), p.12.
3. The White Paper, p.7.
4. Ibid., p.6.
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Table 28
Eligibility for Electoral College
A . B y  the 19 D istr ic t B oard s, Inclu d in g R ep resen ta tives o f the U rban  
C ou ncil and R ural C om m ittee  M em bers S ittin g  in E ach B oard
Constituencies No. of Eligible Voters No. of Seats
Island (East) 48 1
(incl. Eastern k Wanchai)
Island (West) 39 1
(incl. C&W k Southtern)
Kwun Tong 34 1
Wong Tai Sin 35 1
Kowloon City 28 1
Sham Shui Po 31 1
South Kowloon 31 1
(incl. Yaumatei k Mongkok)
N.T. (East) 60 1
(incl. Taipo, Northern k Shatin)
N.T. (West) 48 1
(incl. Yuen Long k Tuen Mun)
N.T. (South) 72 1
(incl. Tsuen Wan, Tsing Yi, 
Islands, A: Sai Kung)
Sub-total 426 10
B . B y  M em b ers o f the U rban  C ouncil and R egional C ouncil
Urban Council 30 1
Regional Council 24 1
Subtotal 54 2
Total 434* 12
* The figure takes into account the overlapping memberships
between the Urban council, Regional Council and the 19 Dis­
trict Boards.
Source: City and New Territories Administration.
these (voters) are based on well-recognized major organizations, associations 
and institu tions  with a terr ito ry  wide coverage. The lists of the voting members 
of these organizations will be adopted as the electoral rolls for these 
constituencies. C orpora te  members will nom inate representa tives to  vote on 
their behalf.1^
W h a t  can be deduced from these two different election systems to  the Legislative 
Council? F irs tly ,  it suggests th a t  the government put heavy emphasis on the
5. Ibid.
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Table 29
Eligibility for Functional Constituency
Constituency Eligible voters Number 
of Seats
Total
Seats
E con om ic C o n stitu en cies:
1. Commercial Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce 1
Chinese General Chamber of Commerce 1 2
2. Industrial Federation of Hong Kong Industries 1
Chinese Manufacturers Associations 1 2
3. Financial Hong Kong Association of Banks 1 1
S ocia l C on stitu en cies:
4. Labour All Registered Employee Trade Unions 2 2
5. Social Services Hong Kong Council of Social Services 1 1
P ro fessio n a l C o n stitu en cies:
6. Medical Hong Kong Medical Association 1 1
7. Education Electoral rolls compiled 1 1
8. Legal from statutory lists as well as 1 1
9. Engineers membership/staff lists of 1 1
Associated
Professions
Total
institutional and relevant 
professional bodies
12
Source: White Paper, uThe Further Development of Representative Government in
Kong Kong" (November 1986), p.17.
representation of the professional and economic sectors, since the W hite Paper argues 
th a t  Ufull weight should be given to representa tion  of the economic and professional 
sectors of Hong Kong society which are essential to future confidence and prosperity*
The government also tried to encourage the partic ipa tion  of the businessmen and 
professionals in the elections. However, those commercial and professional sectors turned 
out to be most apa the tic  tow ards the Legislative Council elections. Prior to the 
campaign, members of the legal profession claimed th a t  many of their members had not 
registered for the d is tr ic t  boards and the Urban Council elections because they did not 
realize that  such registration would also be applied to  the Legislative Council elections. 
Yet even when the government reopened the opportun ity  for them  to register, their 
response was still not enthusiastic. T he legal constituency recorded one of the lowest 
registration rates (31.3%), and similarly the two commercial constituencies also had 
poor response rates (24.6% and 32% respectively). Actually, only about 43.5% of the 
qualified voters had registered by May 1985. so the government had to reopen the 
registration twice until finally abou t 67.9% were registered by A ugust (see Table 30). In
6. Ibid., p.12.
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other words, only about 47,000 of those enfranchised had actually registered, which 
accounted for less than 1% of the population. Emily Lau explains that
Some businessmen have adamantly refused to take part in what they perceive 
as a charade, since they are convinced tha t  Peking will take over the 
administration after 1997.
This perhaps explains partly why the Legislative Council elections did not generate the 
same level of public interest as the district board elections.
Table 30
Eligibility and Registration of Voters 
to the Legislative Council Elections, September 1985
Constituencies** First Time Second Time
Estimated Registered Estimated Registered
Voters Voters Voters* Voters
Commercial (I) 2,610 641
Commercial (II) 5,380 1,724
Industrial (I) 830 366
Industrial (II) 2,540 866
Financial 141 107
Labour 390 286
Social Services 156 117
Medical 4,540 1,925
Legal 2,140 670
Educational 53,270 24,249
Engineers and 
Associated 
Professions
3,160 1,624
Total 75,594 33,003
(24.6%) 2,253 1,244 (55.2%)
(32.0%) 5,188 2,655 (51.2%)
(44.1%) 657 484 (73.7%)
(34.1%) 2,156 1,284 (59.6%)
(75.9%) 141 132 (93.6%)
(73.3%) 386 301 (78.0%)
(75.0%) 156 145 (93.0%)
(42.4%) 4,548 2,934 (64.5%)
(31.3%) 1,511 978 (64.7%)
(45.5%) 49,047 34,182 (69.7%)
(51.4%) 2,890 2,314 (80.0%)
(43.7%) 69,367 47,086 (67.9%)
Sources: Financial  D a i ly (5 July 1985).
Ming Pao D a i ly (2 August 1985) .
* The government re-estimated the number of voters in the 
second registration exercise and, accordingly, there were some 
differences in the number of eligible voters on the second 
time.
** Voters of the Commercial, Industrial, Financial, Labour and 
Social Services Constituencies were registered on an organiza­
tional basis, while voters of the Legal, Medical, Educational 
and Engineers and Associated Professions Constituencies were 
registered on an individual basis.
7. Far E as tern  Econom ic R eview (5 September, 1985), p.36.
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T he V o tin g  System
The electoral procedures were not introduced by the government until July 1985. 
According to the explanation of Peter Tsao, the Secretary for Administrative Services 
and Information, the rules for polling were governed by the key principle of ensuring the 
return of ua consensus candidate” , i.e. a candidate who commanded the greatest support
o
of his electorates” . In other words, each successful candidate had to be elected with an 
absolute majority (more than 50% of the votes). Nevertheless, the government had 
devised two different, but complicated and confusing, electoral procedures for the 
electoral college and the functional constituencies. In the second reading of the 
Legislative Council (Electoral Procedures) Bill, 1985, the then Chief Secretary, Sir Philip 
Haddon-Cave, explained that
In the case of the electoral college constituencies, where the number of voters 
will be relatively small, it is proposed to adopt a system of repeated ballots 
whereby voting is continued through a series of ballots on the same day until 
one candidate secures an absolute majority of the votes cast. In the case of the 
functional constituencies, where there will be greater numbers of voters, it is 
proposed to adopt a preferential voting system under which electors record 
their votes for the candidates in order of preference. This system calls for 
repeated counts of the votes, with lowest preference votes being added at each 
count to the first preference votes. The candidate securing the lowest number of 
votes on each count is eliminated, until a single candidate emerges with the 
support of more than 50% of the voters.^
Im p lica tio n s for E lectora l C am paigns
W hat were the implications of these different polling rules for the election 
campaign? In the following discussion, we can see that the electoral contests were 
determined largely by the number of the voters and the rules of polling.
In general, the electoral base of each of these constituencies was very limited. In 
the case of the geographical constituencies, the number of voters could be as small as 24, 
with the largest being New Territories (South) Constituency, which consisted of 72 
voters. In the case of the functional constituencies, only 156 registered organizations 
were qualified to vote for the Social Services Constituency; 141 for the Financial 
Constituency, 386 for the Labour Constituency, and 657 for the Industrial Constituency 
(11). Because of the small size of the electorate, there was no need to conduct large-scale 
popular campaigns, although some mild a ttem pts at public mobilization were made in 
those professional constituencies where balloting was based on a one-man-one-vote basis. 
Contests to the electoral college and those functional constituencies based on a
8. South China M orning Post (18 July, 1985).
9. South China M orning Post (14 March, 1985).
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one-organization-one-vote principle were largely carried out w ithout any public appeals, 
with the  result th a t  the campaigns were conducted in most cases as a  kind of process of 
negotiation and political bargaining behind closed doors.
T he rules of polling also determined the na tu re  of the electoral gam e and it was 
particularly  true in the contests th rough the electoral college where a successful 
cand ida te  had to lobby the majority support  of his colleagues in each constituency. Such 
rules of polling a lm ost guaranteed the re turn  of the conservative-cum-moderate 
candida tes ,  thereby discouraging mass campaigns and thus the partic ipa tion  of the 
progressive members. T he following section will first analyze the na tu re  of the electoral 
cam paign in general and  then discuss the particu lar  aspects of the elections for the 
electoral college and  the  functional constituencies.
ELECTORAL C A M P A IG N : GEN ER AL C H A RACTERISTICS
There were a ltogether 64 candidates campaigning for the 24 elected seats to the 
Legislative Council. In general, the campaigning process could not be considered as very 
com petitive, for 5 ou t of the 12 seats available for the functional constituencies were 
filled w ithou t contest. They were filled by David Li, representing the Financial 
C onstituency, Stephen Cheong, s tanding  for the Industrial (I) Constituency, Ho Sai-chu, 
for the Commercial (II) Constituency, and T am  Yiu-chung and Pang Chun-hoi filling 
the two seats of the Labour Constituency. Lau Wong-fat. who stood for the Regional 
Council Constituency in the electoral college, was also unopposed.
The candida tes  came overwhelmingly from the middle-class professional or 
business sectors, as shown in Table 31: 21 of them  were related to commercial, industrial 
and banking businesses, while the rest - 8 lawyers, 11 teachers and college
adm in is tra to rs ,  5 doctors  and 7 social workers and social services ad m in is tra to rs  - also 
came from middle to  upper-middle class background. A part from the two trade  union 
m embers of the Labour Constituency which could claim to represent the working class, 
there were no other candida tes  coming from blue collar background.
Generally speaking, the political outlook of the other candidates can be considered 
as fairly conservative, as can be seen in the kinds of issues which they discussed during 
the campaign. Most members for the economic sectors - i.e. candidates s tanding  for the 
Commercial, Industrial and Financial Constituencies - favoured minimal government 
in tervention in the economic development of Hong Kong, and believed th a t  on the 
m a t te r  of political changes, any reforms should be considered in the light of maintaining 
the confidence of the economic investors in the terr itory . By speaking out in defence of 
the economic interests, Stephen Cheong called for the protection of the position of the 
businessmen in the Legislative Council, while David Li considered th a t  par ty  politics
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Table 31
Occupational Distribution of Candidates Standing for the 
Legislative Council Elections, September 1985
Occupation Electoral Functional Total
College Constituency
Commercial/Industrial
Financial
Administrative
Educational
Accounting
Legal
Medical
Engineering, Surveying,
Architecture, Town Planning 
Biologist 
Social Services 
Labour
Total
14 5 19
1 1 2
3 0 3
6 5 11
0 1 1
5 3 8
3 2 5
2 3 5
1 0 1
4 3 7
0 2 2
39 25 64
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
was not su itable for Hong K ong.1^
Unlike the representatives of the economic sectors, members of the social services 
sector, and the front-line social workers in particu lar,  were generally regarded as taking 
a more progressive a t t i tu d e  tow ards political reform. Some social w'orkers were closely 
associated with the grassroots organizations. Thus it was in the Social Services 
C onstituency th a t  all three candidates claimed to support the in troduction of direct 
elections to the Legislative Council, plus a greater share of the financial resources for 
social welfare. However, th a t  constituency voted for its member on a one-organization- 
one-vote basis, so th a t  the votes of the adm in is tra to rs  in each social services 
organization became more im portan t.  Since the adm in is tra to rs  were generally considered 
to be less sym pathetic  to the working class than  the front line social workers, candidates 
s tanding  for this constituency tried to do away with the so-called Tree-lunch* image. As 
a result, all three candidates came to argue th a t  a comprehensive social welfare policy 
should be achieved w ithout d isturbing confidence among investors, so th a t  they 
contended th a t  more social welfare would not damage, but ra ther  con tr ibu te  to, the 
prosperity and stability  of Hong Kong.
W hether intentional or not, the most controversial topics of the day - the further 
developm ent of representative government, direct elections, Basic Laws and the
10. Mi n g Pao Dai l y  (14 September, 1985).
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potential intervention of Beijing in the internal affairs of Hong Kong - were rarely 
mentioned by candidates standing for most of the professional and geographical 
constituencies, even though the candidates were aware th a t  the future legislature would 
be faced with such critical issues. Actually most candidates were not at all clear about 
the views or expectations of the voters and in order to obtain all-round support, they 
merely expressed rather general principles in their platforms, such as the maintenance of 
existing socio-economic practices, or strong support for the notion of ‘prosperity and 
s tability1 as stipulated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration.
The de-emphasizing of the major political issues of the day can actually be 
regarded as symptomatic of the overall depoliticization of the Council election campaign. 
This was partly an outcome of the structure of the electoral system itself, which 
encouraged individuals to organize along geographical, economic and professional lines, 
thus discouraging those who organized along ideological lines. As a result, candidates for 
the electoral college generally stressed district interests, while candidates for the 
professional constituencies emphasized their experience and past contributions to that 
particular profession. All of them, however, concentrated on the question of how they 
were going to advance the interests of their own district or profession in the 
policy-making processes.
There were also some-candidates who were generally known to be associated with 
political groups. Generally speaking, five candidates were believed to be members of the 
Civic Association; one was a member of the Reform Club; one was a member of the 
Hong Kong Observers and two were associated with the Hong Kong Belongers 
Association. Nevertheless, none of the individuals who were known to have such political 
affiliations openly announced a platform regarding the policies of their own group. As in 
the March elections, there was also no open support by any political group for their 
members running in the campaign. In other words, none of these groups had any plans 
a t  all to sponsor their own members to the Legislative Council elections, and so their 
members only stood as independent candidates in the elections, campaigning in their 
own individual capacities.
Indeed, public attention was paid mainly to the activities of two appointed 
Legislative Councillors, Allen Lee and Maria Tam, who were reported to have supported 
a considerable number of candidates during the campaign. Yet they could not be 
regarded as leaders of any political parties. Allen Lee, for example, was believed to be 
supporting a t  least seven candidates, but some of them hardly even knew him. The Far 
Eastern Economic Review  reports an interview with him, in which he explains that 
“There are no strings attached to my support for them. If half of them win, I will be 
very pleased.’1** Similarly, a handful of candidates, who were known to have joined the
11. Far Eastern  Economic Review  (5 September. 1985), p.37.
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PHS, were supported by Maria Tam, but they also lacked the kind of party discipline 
and political commitment tha t  a political organization required. Some of these 
candidates even ran against each other in the Eastern Island Constituency. Tam, 
however, explained tha t  since the PHS was not a political party, it could not assign 
candidates to a particular constituency as an official policy of the group. Still her 
support was believed to have considerable influence, particularly after she was appointed 
to the BLDC in June 1985.
There were also a few candidates believed to be pro-PRC, three of whom were 
elected unopposed. They were: Ho Sai-chu, an appointed member of the CPPC C  
representing the pro-PRC Chinese General Chamber of Commerce at Commercial 
Constituency (II); Tam Yiu-chung, appointed to the BLDC in June, representing the 
170,000 strong pro-PRC Federation of Trade Unions (FTU), and David Li, Director and 
Chief Manager of the Bank of East Asia, standing for the Financial Constituency, with 
the support of the Bank of China Group in Hong Kong. Two others reported to be 
supported by the pro-PRC members were lp Kwok-ching, running in the South Kowloon 
Constituency, and Peter Chan, running in the Kowloon City Constituency. Other 
candidates, such as Martin Lee, running in the Legal Constituency and Szeto Wah of the 
Educational Constituency w'ere also appointed to the BLDC before they w'ere elected to 
the Legislative Council. In other words, those w'ho had had close connections with the 
PRC officials or pro-PRC organizations were participating quite actively in the 
Legislative Council elections.
Unlike the pro-PRC members, most pro-GMD candidates w'ere not openly 
identified at all with the election campaign. Apart from Pang Chun-hoi, who was 
nominated by the pro-GMD Hong Kong Trade Unions Council (TUC) to represent the 
Labour Constituency, no other candidates were known to be supported by the pro-GMD 
groups. But according to pro-GMD sources, they had supported about 10 to 20 
candidates in the Legislative Council elections on a personal basis. This is an indication 
tha t  the pro-GMD elements w'ere increasingly intimidated by the evolving situation in 
Hong Kong at a time w'hen Beijing's influence w^ as growing visibly.
T he E lectora l C am paign  for the E lectoral C ollege
The rules of polling largely determined the nature of the electoral game in the 
electoral college. In many instances, repeated ballotings wrere necessary when no 
candidate w'as able to obtain an absolute majority in the first round. In each round of 
balloting, candidates w'ith the least number of votes would be eliminated, forcing those 
voters who had supported the candidate to reconsider their choice. So in the course of 
repeated balloting, votes were redistributed in a way that allowed potential candidates 
to get their campaign underway. The result, w’as that various ad hoc alignments 
developed rapidly during the intervals betw'een each ballot on the same polling day.
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Table 32 shows th a t  except in the cases of the Urban Council, Island W est, Wong 
Tai Sin and Sham  Shui Po constituencies, members of the  o ther seven geographical 
constituencies had to cast their votes a t  least twice. In the cases of Island East, New 
Territories (East) and New Territories (W est), ballotings were even repeated four or five 
times. There was, how'ever, one common characteristic am ong these three constituencies 
in th a t  each of them  consisted of tw'o or more district boards and there were more than 
two candidates contesting the same seat. In these s ituations, across-the-board lobbying 
was necessary, and as a result, members of the same district board did not necessarily 
support candida tes  nom inated  by their own board members. In the case of New 
Territories (W est), for example, two district boards, Tuen Mun and Yuen Long, were 
combined to form one constituency, having a to tal of 48 eligible voters. While Tuen Mun 
district board consisted of 25 members, Yuen Long district board had only 23 electors. 
This m ean t  th a t  if m em bers of the Tuen Mun district board were able to  reach a 
consensus on the  choice of their own candidate,  they could easily ou tnum ber the  votes of 
the Yuen Long d is tric t board. However, there were a ltogether five candidates 
campaigning for this constituency, two of them  from Tuen Mun d istrict board, and three 
from Yuen Long d is tric t board. The elimination of the Tuen Mun candida te ,  Tso 
Siu-wai, in the first round and the small num ber of votes cast for the o ther one, Sit 
Ho-yin, indicated th a t  some members of the Tuen Mun district board had actually  voted 
for candidates coming from the Yuen Long district board. This also m eant th a t  members 
of both d istrict boards were deeply divided about the elections to the Legislative 
Council, with the result th a t  the successful candidate might not be considered as the 
most capable person for the job , but had an all-round personality th a t  was generally 
accepted by his colleagues.
•It was ironical th a t  tw'o-thirds of the district board members had been chosen 
through direct elections, yet they were now engaged in a different process of indirect 
politicking in the elections to  the Legislative Council. In fact, there w-as no way in 
w’hich the general public could control or even understand  how their ‘elected’ 
representatives voted in the Legislative Council elections. A jo in t s ta tem en t  was made 
bv some progressive d istrict board members urging the candida tes to announce their 
platforms publicly in order to make knowm their objectives in partic ipa ting  in the
i  o
Legislative Council elections. Representatives of fourteen social and com m unity  groups 
in Wanchai and Eastern  d istr ic ts  also called the a tten tion  of their members to  the need
12. In August, 7 groups, namely the Meeting Point, the Christian Industrial Committee, Hong 
Kong Affairs Society, Society for Social Research, the New Hong Kong Society, Concerned Croup 
on People’s Livelihood in Sham Shui Po, and Concerned Group on District Administration 
Scheme in Kwun Tong, urged the candidates to make known their platforms to the public. They 
were worried that indirect elections would introduce such activities as backdoor bargaining and 
favouritism. South China  M orn ing  Post (13 August, 1985).
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Table 32
Elections to the Legislative Council: 
Balloting for the Electoral College
Constituency No. of Candidate
Turn-out
Votes
1st
Gained In 
2nd 3rd
Each Ballot 
4th 5th
Regional Council 24 W.F. Lau* Uncontested
Urban Council 30 E. Elliot 13
H. Cheong-leen* 16
Island East 42 K .L . Lam 6 7 3 - -
P . Lam 10 10 8 11 -
L .H . Kwan 9 11 14 17 16
T .P . Chum 3 - - - -
A. Cheung 3 3 - - -
Y.T. Lee* 10 10 15 12 24
Island West 35 L.F. Liu* 18
A. Ng 9
H . K . Lam 8
Kwun Tong 29 K.S. Cheng 8 11
C.F. Poon* 14 18
M.W. Li 7 -
Wong Tai Sin 31 C . Lam* 16
K.S. Liu 15
Kowloon City 24 P . Chan 7 -
P.W. Pao 9 11
D. Tse* 8 13
Sham Shui Po 27 W.S. Cheung 8
P.L. Chung* 19
South Kowloon 27 K.C. Ip 4 -
Y.Y.H. Chan 5 7
L .S. Chan 5 6
J. Chan* 13 14
N.T. (East) 54 A. Wong* 16 23 24 29
H.L. Wai 5 - - -
H.Y. Pang 19 16 24 25
C.L. Liu 6 7 6 -
S. Wong 6 7 - -
N.T. (West) 44 S.T. Tang 8 6 - -
S.W. Tso 4 - - -
F .T . Man 13 13 18 18
C.W. Tai* 12 14 16 22
H.Y. Sit 7 10 9 -
N.T. (South) 66 R. Lai* 22 34
T.C. Ho 19 -
W.K. Lam 22 28
* elected candidates.
Source: Hong Kong Economic Journal (27 September, 1985).
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■t o
to consult the public on this issue before casting their vote. 0 They also dem anded th a t  
the elected Legislative Council members should m aintain  close ties with the grassroots, 
consult residents on m ajor issues and accept m onitoring by the residents .14 Various open 
forums were arranged for the candidates s tanding  for the electoral college, bu t  these 
were merely cosmetic in effect, for such a move could only symbolically hold the 
candida tes  accountable to voters a t the grassroots level. It could not provide any 
guaran tee  against such activities as backdoor bargaining and political manoeuvring. 
Thus the  mechanics of such a voting system were generally condemned as an 
encouragement to horse-trading, as Emily Lau commented a t  the time;
m any of the draw backs of indirect elections were highlighted in the electoral 
colleges. The smallness of the electorate resulted in intensive under-the-table 
wheeling and dealing, with the promise of political spoils (such as help in next 
M arch 's  Urban Council elections, subcom m ittee chairmanships and so o n ) .1"*
The E lectora l C am paign  for the F u n ction a l C on stitu en cies
Closed door lobbying was also carried out in some of the functional constituencies 
which cast their votes on an organizational basis. In principle, the board of directors of 
each organization was empowered to act on behalf of its members, but in practice the 
highest au thority  of an organization could often ‘dictate* the vote cast. As a result, there 
was alm ost no open campaigning amongst organizations, politicking being limited to the 
top  levels of each organization through internal and private  contacts  between the heads 
of each organization within their own professions. Usually, the most experienced and 
well-respected individuals, who had been partic ipa ting  actively in the activities of the 
economic and professional sectors, obtained the nominations of their respective 
organizations. In many situations, the directors of the organizations were able to  obtain 
consensus on the choice of candidacy, thus enabling some candidates to  be elected 
without contest, as in the cases of Commercial (II), Industrial (1), Financial and Labour 
Constituencies.
Some kinds of lobbying among organizations could also be seen in the case of the 
Social Services C onstituency, yet the campaigns to reach organizational voters were 
tactically different from those at the mass elections, since this system of elections 
basically discouraged the partic ipa tion  of organized political in terests - the progressive 
grassroots and middle-class organizations in particu lar.  In the case of the Social Services 
C onstituency, a front-line social worker, Mak Hoi-wah, generally identified as a radical
13. Wanchai and Eastern district boards were combined to become one constituency, the Hong 
Kong Island (East).
14. South China M orn in g  Post (13 September. 1985).
15. Far E as tern  Econom ic Review  (10 October, 1985), p.42.
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grassroots  leader, campaigned against Hui Yin-fat and Joyce Chan, the la t te r  two being 
well-respected and experienced adm in is tra to rs  in the social services sector, who projected 
a more conservative and m oderate  image respectively. In order to obtain votes from the 
generally conservative and m oderate  organizations he was seeking to represent, Mak 
tried not to emphasize his mass mobilization experiences during the cam paign. In the 
course of the voting, some organizations made their choice by holding a referendum 
am ong their members; others  handed over the decision to their boards of d irectors or to 
an authorized representa tive of the organization. Finally, Mak lost to Hui by 35 votes 
and it was generally believed th a t  his defeat was due to the system of 
one-organization-one-vote, which ensured the return of m oderate  elements such as Hui. 
A survey showed th a t  the  result of the election would have been more favourable to Mak 
and Chan if this election had been held on the basis of one-man-one-vote.16
Mak was not the only grassroots candidate who lost to the conservative members 
in the  Legislative Council elections. O ther grassroots members, such as Elsie Elliot of the 
Association for the Prom otion  of Public Justice, who stood for the Urban Council 
C onstituency, lost to a centrist ,  Hilton Cheong-leen, ex-chairman of the Urban Council 
and head of the Civic Association. Similarly, Li Ming-wah, of the Meeting Poin t,  was 
defeated in his contest for the Kwun Tong District Board Constituency. Indeed, those 
grassroots  members who had been most skilful in public campaigning during the district 
elections were largely passive in these Legislative Council elections because they found 
themselves in a minority position in the Urban Council as well as in most of the district 
boards. Although they strongly criticized the system of indirect elections, they had to 
par tic ipa te  as voters, if not candidates, in the election procedures, if they were to 
exercise any influence at all on the outcome of the voting. In the Sham  Shui Po 
C onstituency, for example, grassroots candidates chose to vote for a m o d era te-cum- 
liberal candida te  instead of prom oting members of their own group. In the Tuen Mun 
Constituency , grassroots m embers chose to vote across-the-board for a cand ida te  from 
the  Yuen Long Constituency , hoping that the choice would enable a better 
representa tion  of their in terests  in the Legislative Council.
Yet the partic ipa tion  of the progressives was not completely blocked by the
16. Among the 139 organizations which cast their vote. 126 participated in the survey. About 
60% of the organizations claimed to have held an internal referendum before deciding to vote for 
which candidate. In other words, the remaining 40% decided through an internal meeting of the 
Board of Directors. Comparing the results of the individual referenda and the outcome, we see 
some differences in the distribution of votes in the two situations. See C om m on  Sense,  T V B (29 
September, 1985)
Votes casted on
Individual Referendum 
One-Organization-One-Vote
Hui Mak Chan
337. 277. 407.
557. 297. 157.
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operation of this system of indirect elections. It was in those professional constituencies 
which voted on the basis of one-man-one-vote tha t  some kind of mild political 
campaigning could be seen. And it was in these constituencies that two identifiably 
progressive candidates - Szeto Wah and Martin Lee - were elected in the Educational 
and Legal Constituencies respectively.
In the case of the Educational Constituency, Szeto Wah faced an intense contest 
with four opponents: an experienced school administrator, a young teacher and two 
others related loosely to pro-GMD teaching associations. Since there were 34,182 
registered voters for the Educational Constituency, the campaign did involve a modest 
degree of mobilization of electoral support in each educational institution. Having shown 
himself earlier to be a promoter of the interests of the teaching profession and a critic of 
the government on various policy issues, Szeto was generally identified as a veteran 
grassroots politician. By gaining 68.7% (12.706) of the votes cast, Szeto's success could 
largely be attributed to his experience in campaigning and mass mobilization.
In the case of the Legal Constituency, there were three candidates contesting one 
seat - namely two barristers, Martin Lee (47) and Henry Litton (51), and one solicitor, 
Edmond Chow (60). Unlike the other professional constituencies which spoke up mainly 
on behalf of their professional interests, one particular feature of this constituency was 
that only Edmond Chow emphasized solicitors' interests and he was actually considered 
a ‘dark horse’ in the campaign. Vigorous campaigns were launched between Martin Lee 
and Henry Litton, both of whom were engaged in a hot debate about political reform 
and the future of Hong Kong. While Martin Lee was known to be supported strongly by 
Allen Lee, Henry Litton was supported by Maria Tam of the PUS. Thus, each very 
clearly represented different attitudes towards political reforms and political relations 
with the PRC. Henry Litton had more advantages in the sense that he was an 
experienced member of the legal profession, having been Oxford-educated and elected 
chairman of the Bar Association seven times. By presenting a well-argued and 
thoughtful case, he appealed to the older generation with his cautious approach towards 
political changes.
Martin Lee, QC, had come into prominence only recently over the 1997 issue, after 
joining the Young Professionals trip to Beijing in May 1983 and expressing their worries 
about the feasibility of ‘gangren zhigang’. Yet in June 1985 he accepted appointment to 
the BLDC, causing some people to express worries that ‘he would have to make sideway 
glances’ to the wishes of Beijing officials and would also be influenced by Beijing’s 
‘democratic’ approaches. In fact, his appointment to the BLDC brought into question 
among his legal colleagues the independence of the Legislative Councillors in general. 
People were afraid tha t  if he was elected to the Legislative Council, Martin Lee would be
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re luc tan t  to  say anyth ing  th a t  might upset Beijing. By highlighting such criticism of 
M artin  Lee, Henry Litton  put great stress upon the need for independence am ong the 
elected members. In an open forum, he expressed his worries th a t  the failure of the ‘one 
country  tw o system s’ slogan might be the result of a lack of confidence am ong the Hong 
Kong people because they would learn to restrain their utterances or take account of 
w h a t  Beijing might think of them . In an open letter, he says th a t
to establish an au tonom ous government in Hong Kong, plugged into the West 
as it is a t  present, and one responsive to  bu t  N O T subservient to Beijing will 
be a  m am m oth  task ... ‘Hong Kong for Hong Kong people’ - means ju s t  th a t :  
an au tonom ous region with its unique m ixture of E ast  and West. This is w hat 
we should preserve and build upon. ®
M artin  Lee tried to overcome these criticisms by pointing out the im portance of 
ensuring th a t  Hong Kong would have the strength  to exercise the high degree of 
au tonom y being promised in the Jo in t  Declaration. He also stressed th a t  he would fight 
for the in terests  of Hong Kong a t  the BLDC and the Legislative Council consistently. In 
his p latform , he said
1 em phatically  m ain ta in  th a t  ... Hong Kong m ust be able to resist any a t te m p t  
to intervene. This necessitates the development of a sound system  of 
governm ent with proper checks and balances and which ensures th a t  those in 
power are accountable to  the people of Hong K o n g .^
By requiring the chief executive to be accountable to the legislature, both 
candida tes  called for the  development of responsible government as a means of fulfilling 
the Jo in t  Declaration. Yet they adopted different strategies to the realization of the goal 
of responsible government. M artin  Lee explicitly com m itted himself to supporting  direct 
elections, saying in an open forum, that “if we don’t have direct elections by 1988, when 
are we going to have them  jsicj?” 20 Henry Litton, however, did not express clearly his 
a t t i tu d e s  tow ards political reform and refused to commit himself to any specific reform 
program . While some reports  thought tha t  he appeared to have reservations ab o u t  direct 
elections, par ty  politics and ministerial system , others said th a t  he favoured a mixed
O  1
system of direct and indirect e l e c t io n s /1 for he criticized the existing political reform 
program m e by saying th a t
17. See also Far Eastern  Econom ic Review  (5 September, 1985), pp.38-40.
18. Letter  f ro m  H enry L it ton , Legislative Council Election, Legal Functional C on s t i tu en cy  
(30 July, 1985).
19. Martin Lee, Letter to his Colleagues (23 August, 1985).
20. Martin Lee’s speech to an open forum for the candidates of the Legal Constituency (12 
September, 1985).
21. Far Eastern  Econom ic Review  (5 September, 1985), p.37. See also Financia l D aily  (3 
August, 1985), South China  M orn ing  Post (20-21 September, 1985), the Hong Kong Observers’ 
Survey, published in the South C h in a  M orning Post (20 September, 1985).
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if further steps towards the development of representa tive governm ent here 
follow the present course of indirect elections. Hong Kong may not end up with 
a W estm inster-style government. Instead, the executive branch will be 
controlled by civil servants and there will be no ministerial system, and no need 
for political p a r t i e s .^
M artin  Lee’s a rgum ent turned out to be accepted by his voters, the result being th a t  he 
gained 488 votes, acquiring 58% of the votes cast, while Henry Litton could only obta in  
312 votes.
ELECTION RESULTS
The fact th a t  the only two progressive candidates partic ipa ting  in the Legislative 
Council elections, M artin  Lee and Szeto Wah, were successful in the one-man-one-vote 
professional constituencies suggests th a t  the kinds of candida te  elected through direct 
elections could be very much different from those elected through indirect elections. 
Since the Legislative Council elections of September 1985 were largely held through a 
system  of indirect elections, the elected members were generally regarded as upholding a 
conservative and m oderate  political position. When one takes into account the 22 
appoin ted  members and the 10 officials who also sit in the  council, it is clear th a t  
conservative opinions were likely to retain a dom inant voice in the partially  elected 
legislature.
It can be seen from the d a ta  on their socio-economic background th a t  75% of the 
unofficials had some form of tert iary  education, three holding Masters degrees and two 
PhD  degrees. Most of them  also had high-level jobs in educational, business, banking 
and other professional sectors. As shown in Table 33, occupational d is tribution of the 
original Legislative Council did not undergo any significant change after the 
in troduction of elected members in September 1985 (see also Appendices D and E).
The political outlook of the Legislative Council members soon became ap p a ren t  in 
the  post-election period, particularly  when some of them  s tarted  to express their 
a t t i tu d e s  towards political reform in the first few sessions of the Legislative Council.
IM P A C T  OF THE ELECTIONS ON THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
The debate between M artin  Lee and Henry Litton was a significant reflection of 
the political a tm osphere  of the day. For alongside the Legislative Council election 
cam paign, ano ther process of election was set in train  in A ugust in connection with the 
se tt ing  up of the BLCC. Its members were chosen through the  m ethod of ‘dem ocratic  
consu lta t ion ’, ra ther than  of elections. Such a system of appo in tm en t to the BLCC was 
seen as pointing in a direction quite the opposite to the debates  on direct elections and
22. Far E astern  Economic Review, (5 September, 1985), p.37.
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Table 33
Occupational Distribution of Legislative Council Members 
Before and After the 1985 Elections
Occupation Before September 1985
(All Appointed)
September 1985 and 
Elected Appointed
After
Total
Company Directors and 14 8 11 19
Business Executives
Banking/Finance 1 2 0 2
Legal 5 3 3 6
Medical 2 2 1 3
Accounting 1 0 1 1
Engineering and 0 2 0 2
Associated Professions
Educational 4 4 5 9
Social Services 1 1 1 2
Labour 0 2 0 2
Clergyman 1 0 0 0
Total 29 24 22 46
Source: Miscellaneous field work data.
liberalization of the colonial adm in is tra tion .  Many people s ta r ted  to become convinced 
th a t  Beijing was beginning to impose its own control over Hong Kong and the BLCC 
was widely believed to be merely an organ for Beijing to m onitor public opinion in Hong 
Kong from the top.
Yet except in the case of the Legal Constituency, growing concern about the 
P R C 's  increasing influence in Hong Kong did not find expression in the  campaign for the 
Legislative Council elections. W hether or not they were ju s t  being cautious not to offend 
Beijing, most candidates were unwilling to  commit themselves to any particu lar course 
of political reform. But in the face of the widespread public criticism of the method of 
indirect elections, they were also re luc tan t  to speak out against direct elections, either. 
A t least some of them began to feel t h a t  indirect elections were inadequate  to produce 
bona fide  representatives capable of s tanding  up to Beijing’s pressures, and th a t  only 
direct elections to the Legislative Council could ever fulfil the words of the Green Paper 
on representa tive government - “to develop progressively a  system of government the 
au tho ri ty  for which is firmly rooted in Hong Kong'1. This concept, however, was not yet 
openly binding on Beijing as a goal for the fu ture SAR.
The a t t i tu d es  of the 64 candida tes  tow ards political reform could partly  be seen in 
a survey m ade by the Hong Kong Observers in September, ju s t  before the elections. 
W hether they were unwilling to  give opinions on this sensitive issue of political reform or 
not, only 25 candidates responded to it. Most of those who responded did, however.
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speak in favour of some form of direct elections, including several conservative-cum- 
m odera te  members, namely Thom as Clysdale (Commercial 1), Stephen Cheong 
(Industr ia l  1 Constituency) and Chiu Hin-kwong (Medical Constituency)."^ Several
O  A
post-election surveys also arrived a t  similar co n c lu s io n s /4 The Hong K ong Financial  
D a i ly , for example, published the result of a survey on the political o rien ta tion  of the 46 
elected and appointed  members, in which 34 (74%) responded - including 16 appointed
or
and 18 elected m e m b e r s / 0 With the exception of one appointed member, all respondents 
agreed to the in troduction of direct elections to the Legislative Council in future, 
a l though  they disagreed over the percentage to be so elected and the da te  on which the 
reform should be introduced.
In the two m onths  prior to the inauguration  of the new Legislative Council (27 
November, 1985), there appeared to be developing an a tm osphere in which even a 
partia lly  liberalized legislat ure could have had a great im pact on the overall direction of 
political change and development. The people of Hong Kong also seemed to be 
progressing tow ards self-government when some Hong Kong officials were quoted as 
saying th a t  the adm in is tra tion  was not currently  consulting Beijing on the question of 
political reform in Hong Kong.“^
However, this phase of wishful thinking gradually faded out as a series of events 
occurred ju s t  before the opening session of the Legislative Council from which Beijing's 
pressures on the Hong Kong government became increasingly obvious. Chinese officials 
s ta r ted  to talk abou t political reforms in Hong Kong, saying th a t  they should be 
in troduced only in a way th a t  was com patible with the Basic Law. Their remarks were 
su b s tan t ia ted  by Ji Pengfei, Director of the S ta te  Council’s Hong Kong and Macau and 
Affairs Office, when he reiterated the point to a senior Hong Kong official, Donald Liao, 
in O c to b e r /  Ji also said th a t  in order to avoid unnecessary chaos, the P R C  expected to 
see no drastic  changes in Hong Kong before 1997. This s ta tem ent was generally 
in terpre ted  by the Hong Kong press as a sign of the P R C 's  displeasure over the on-going 
process of political reform and the public debates on direct elections in the terr ito ry . Xu 
J i a tu n ’s remark abou t  ‘some signs of deviation from the spirit of the Jo in t  Declaration ' 
on 21 November fur ther aroused concern over the P R C 's  direct in tervention in Hong 
K ong’s internal affairs before 1 9 9 7 /°  It was in this first session of the Legislative 
Council deba te  on the G overnor's  Speech th a t  the issues of direct election and political 
reform became the most striking topics of public a ttention.
23. South China  M orn ing  Post (20 September. 1985).
24. Hong Kong Econom ic Journal (29 October, 1985); South China M orning Post (6 March, 
1986).
25. Hong K on g  F inancia l D a ily  (30 October, 1985).
26. South China  M orn ing  Post (8 October, 1985).
27. South C h in a  M orn in g  Post (21 October, 1985).
28. Xu Jiatun, a Press Conference, South China  Morning Post (22 November. 1985).
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In his debate. Martin Lee was able to capitalize on public sentiments about the 
issue by arguing that there was a direct relationship between highly autonomous 
government, direct elections, a fully elected legislature and an effective government 
answerable to the people of Hong Kong. In his speech to the new session of the 
Legislative Council, he pointed out that the people of Hong Kong w'ere still very 
sensitive on the m atter of whether or not the PRC would intervene in their internal 
affairs. He said that
it is not surprising, therefore, tha t  the the people of Hong Kong began to look 
very hard for some safeguards, realizing always that these safeguards must be 
compatible with the Joint Declaration. Many believe tha t  the only possible 
safeguard is to evolve a system w'hich will produce a really effective and highly 
autonomous government in the future S.A.R. so that it can withstand such 
a ttem pts  to interfere. ... That is why it is thought necessary to provide in the 
Jo in t Declaration that the executive shall be accountable to the legislature 
which shall be constituted by elections. But these provisions will be 
meaningless unless a substantial number of members of this Council are elected 
directly by the people of Hong Kong. And that  it is the whole rationale behind 
direct elections; and that is why so many people have been, and are, 
clamouring for ‘one country two systems’. Sir, this has now become the spirit of 
the times and no one can resist it. Take that away, and the beautiful and 
courageous dream of a grand old man will turn into a nightmare; and our 
freedoms can no longer be safeguarded.
But Lee’s stance in this first debating session was only supported by a few' other 
elected unofficials, among them Lee Yu-tai, w'ho favoured a fully elected legislature, and 
Hilton Cheong-leen. who called for a mixture of direct and indirect elections. The 
situation w'as completely different from the results of the abovementioned surveys 
conducted earlier in September and October wdien more elected members had spoken in 
favour of direct elections.
Many of the appointed members, especially those like Allen Lee, who had 
supported Martin Lee in the election campaign, had obviously changed their minds 
about direct elections. Allen Lee avoided talking about the issue of political reform in 
the Legislative Council debate of November 1985, but. remarked instead tha t  “none of 
these issues (constitutional reform, implementation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, 
etc.) are more important than our economy.'’0^ In December, he openly shelved his 
earlier political plans, for he felt that “China tended to see the presence of political 
parties as a threat to their future control of powerr and so it was unw'ise to go against 
what Beijing disliked.01
29. Hong Kong Legislative Council. Official Report of Proceedings (ORP) (27 November, 
1985), p.219.
30. Ibid., p.236.
31. South China Morning Post (30 December, 1985).
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Allen Lee's other allies, such as Selina Chow, who had spoken in favour of direct 
elections in previous debates on the Green Paper on Representative Government, also 
adopted a more cautious attitude now. Chow warned that
Most important of all, it {political reform] must be in no way put a t  risk the 
stability Hong Kong has and needs. ... Now that we have had the benefit of 
experience gained in the district board elections in March and the first round of 
Legislative Council elections in September, we must not lose the sense of 
urgency in our deliberations for the future.0^
In echoing Chow’s opinion, Stephen Cheong also expressed the view th a t  certain 
groups of people in Hong Kong were too impatient to carry out their wish for direct 
elections. By stressing the importance of maintaining economic prosperity, Cheong 
showed deep reservations about ‘breeding controversies’ over what he considered ‘drastic 
changes’. In the Legislative Council debate, he stated his position as follow's
We survived and thrived economically without having to undertake political 
experimentation. Let us not now prematurely introduce drastic changes to our 
formula for success. Like it or not, we owe our existence now and in future to 
our continued economic success. We do not have the luxury or err. {sicj If ever 
our prosperity is threatened through our impatience we would not be able to 
achieve the twin objective of developing for the future S.A.R. government a 
political structure that would be respected by both the people of Hong Kong 
and bv the central Government of China, and one tha t  would be manifestly 
capable of fostering Hong Kong's sta tus as a stable and prosperous 
international business and financial centre.00
In addition. Cheong commented on the need to reconcile the wishes of the people of 
Hong Kong with that of the PRC over the issues of political reform. He reminded the 
Council that
a high degree of autonomy for the S.A.R. government is not synonymous with 
independence, nor with the freedom of action one normally associates with 
democratic government based on universal suffrage. The future S.A.R. 
government will always walk a tight rope, and it will constantly have to 
reconcile the interests of the people of Hong Kong with the interests of the 
central Government of China. Not to accept this reality 1 submit is plain
o  i
stupidity. 4
The first debate of the newly elected Legislative Council brought out an obvious 
division of opinions among two groups of members. While the moderate and 
conservative elements were calling for the development of a mutual understanding with 
Beijing over the future political system, the progressives were expressing their worries 
about the possibility of a conflict of interests arising between Beijing and the Hong Kong
32. ORP , p.209.
33. Ibid., p.204.
34. Ibid., p.203.
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people. Martin Lee’s demand for responsible government reflected this worry. But by 
the end of 1985, the support for direct elections was coming only from a minority group 
of middle-class professionals. People like Martin Lee were fighting hard to convince the 
majority in the Legislative Council, who agreed with the conservatives, about the 
contribution tha t  direct elections could make to the maintenance of prosperity and 
stability. In the Legislative Council debate of November 1985, he expounded his views 
on this m atter as follows
Sir, the strength of our economy can only be maintained if, and only if, the 
people of Hong Kong believe that this principle of ‘one country two systems’ 
can work; tha t  is, they can reasonably expect tha t  the much mightier system 
across the border will not interfere in the administration of our much smaller 
system; or tha t  if there be such attem pts to interfere, there is sufficiently 
strong and effective government in Hong Kong to withstand them. It is not 
realistic to hope tha t  China will not interefere or at least a ttem pt to interfere; 
and we must be prepared for it. Indeed, it must be clear by now to everyone, 
including those who are afraid of direct elections, tha t  unless we have direct 
election, we will never have an effective and autonomous government to keep 
our system separate from the rest of China. In such a situation, the outflow of 
capital and talent will continue as before; and although the boat will not be 
rocked, our economy will languish and die. 0
In fact, an internal realignment of forces within the Legislative Council had begun 
to occur soon after the elections, and divisions between the progressives and 
conservatives became particularly obvious during the debate over direct elections and 
Beijing’s role in the process of political reform in Hong Kong. In 1986, Martin Lee 
started to gain some support from members such as Szeto Wah, Desmond Lee, Conrad 
Lam, Tai Chin-wah, Richard Lai, Hui Yin-fat and sometimes Hilton Cheong-leen. Allen 
Lee’s allies, however, started to re-emphasize economic priorities, thus coming into line 
with the view of other big businessmen such as Thomas Clysdale of the Hong Kong 
General Chamber of Commerce. Helmut Sohmen of the World International (Holdings) 
Ltd., and S.L. Chen of the Hong Kong China Light and Power Ltd. These people began 
to assert the view that the existing system was most conducive to the maintenance of 
economic prosperity. These people also came to be supported by the pro-PRC members. 
Cheong's argument was echoed by Ho Sai-chu a t the first Legislative Council session, 
when he said that Hong Kong's political reform should be in tandem with the Basic Law 
which was to be drafted and passed by the National People’s Congress.3^
R E C A P IT U L A T IO N
To recapitulate, the system of indirect elections to the Legislative Council 
guaranteed the return of the conservative-cum-moderate and upper-middle income
35. Ibid., p.220.
36. Ibid., p.217.
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candida tes ,  thereby discouraging the partic ipation  of those progressive members who 
were capable of mobilizing popular campaigns a t  the d istrict level. Yet the participation 
of the progressive dem ocrats  was not completely blocked by the operation of this system 
of indirect elections. It was those professional constituencies, such as the Legal and 
Educational Constituencies, voting on a one-man-one-vote basis th a t  two identifiably 
liberal candidates,  namely M artin  Lee and Szeto W ah, were elected.
Like the progressives in the district boards, the liberal members in the legislature 
could only consti tu te  a  minority group. In order to  speak up for the interests of their 
constituencies and the public as a  whole, the progressive members criticized every 
governm ent policy more aggressively than before. Since they had no real possibility of 
changing government policies, they were compelled to make use of their position to 
a t t r a c t  public a t ten t ion ,  one fur ther result being th a t  they also put to a tes t the 
a d m in is tra t io n ’s responsiveness tow ards public opinion. All legislation which could have 
implications for enlarging the powers of the future government and infringing the 
freedoms of a private  citizen now became the ta rge t  for a ttack  by the progressives in the 
Legislative Council.
However, the conservative businessmen and professionals did not share the view of 
the progressives th a t  there was an urgency for political reform before the PR C  takeover 
in 1997. R ather,  they conceived with suspicion the dem ands for more welfare made by 
the grassroots  and pressure-group leaders, who were able to get elected to the d istrict 
councils by a system of direct elections. In view of the emergence of the progressive 
dem ocrats ,  the conservative members were propelled to defend their interests more 
explicitly than  they had ever done before. They began to expound the view tha t 
economic prosperity and social stability  could only be maintained by preserving the 
basic features of the existing bureaucratic  system. So the Legislative Council elections 
dem onstra ted  once again, as did the district board elections, th a t  even a limited degree 
of liberalization had begun to politicize the operation of the political processes in Hong 
Kong. Indeed, both the newly elected district boards and Legislative Council of 1985 had 
proved to  be strikingly different from those of the old days when they were composed 
mainly of appointed  members.
By late 1985, the progressives seemed to be facing a difficult task. The 
fundam enta l  problem was th a t  they could not display their responsiveness to their 
electors because the legislature did not have any real power within the political system. 
But even if the Legislative Council had been more responsive to the public, it was also 
constra ined  by the fact th a t  it was no longer working within a fully independent political 
a rena because of the increasingly obvious role of Beijing in the political processes. Since 
X u ’s w arn ing  on 21 November ab o u t  the deviation from the Jo in t  Declaration, some 
people, like Allen Lee, were reported to have been discouraged from their previous
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enthusiasm for political participation, realizing that the Hong Kong people could not 
hope to manage their own affairs without external interference. Besides, the PRC was 
already developing an alternative system for political participation in Hong Kong. In the 
setting up of the BLCC, the conservatives were once again emerging as the dominant 
influence. Under their control, resistance to direct elections became increasingly strong 
in both the Legislature Council and the Basic Law committees.
The following chapter will discuss the setting up of the BLDC and BLCC, and how 
the PRC authorities started to exert their system of control in Hong Kong. It will also 
demonstrate how they mobilized their Hong Kong supporters as an alternative political 
force to counteract the influence of the progressives. In this situation, the progressives 
would have to fight even harder if they were to enter the PR C ’s political game at all.
37. Allen Lee was reported as saying that “China has misled Hong Kong people over the con­
cept of ‘gangren zhigang’ ... ‘one-man-one-vote’ does not necessarily guarantee the production of 
a representative government because the source of power remains in China’s hands. ... Since final 
powers will continue to rest in China’s hands, it will be a mirage to think Hong Kong people can 
effectively maintain Hong Kong. ... it is unwise to go opposite to China’s displeasure. ...” Ta 
K u n g  Pao  (16 June, 1986).
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C H A PT E R  8
THE P R C ’S INCREASING  D O M IN A N C E  OVER THE  
POLITICS OF HONG KONG A N D  THE FORM ATION  
OF THE BASIC LAW BODIES IN THE TERRITORY  
JU N E-D EC EM BER, 1985
INTRODUCTION: THE FORM ATION OF THE 
BACIC LAW BODIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
CHANGING POLITICAL SYSTEM IN HONG KONG
In accordance with the concept of ‘one country, two system s’, we will adop t a 
series of special policies to ensure the prosperity of Hong Kong after resuming 
sovereignty over the region. Because our basic policies for Hong Kong are to 
remain unchanged for 50 years following the establishm ent of the special 
adm in is tra tive  region, they should be codified in the form of law to guarantee 
their im plementation. It is therefore proposed by the S tanding C om m ittee  to 
establish a Basic Law D rafting C om m ittee  so th a t  the drafting process can be 
commenced as early as possible. The Basic Law will be the constitution which 
governs the Hong Kong Special A dm inistrative Region beginning 1997. The 
drafting  com m ittee  will include specialists and representatives from all walks of 
life, including Chinese com patr io ts  in Hong K ong.1
The above s ta tem en t was part, of a speech made by Peng Chong, the 
Vice-chairman of the S tanding C om m ittee  of the National People’s Congress (N PC ). on 
5 April, 1985, to the Third Session of the Sixth N PC regarding Beijing’s basic policies on 
Hong Kong and the proposal to  set up a BLDC responsible for the drafting of the 
consti tu tion  for the Hong Kong S.A.R. The decision to set up a BLDC was also passed 
a t  the  close of the meeting. T he legal position of the com m ittee was confirmed on 10 
April, s tipu la ting  th a t  “the BLDC shall be responsible to the N PC  and when the NPC is 
not in session, the BLDC shall be responsible to the S tanding C om m ittee  of the NPC."
The objective of drafting  a Basic Law was to fulfil the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration which promised th a t  the people of Hong Kong would exercise a high degree 
of local autonom y over their internal affairs. This chapter will not deal with t he drafting 
of the Basic Law, bu t ra ther analyze the issues arising from the process of setting  up the 
Basic Law bodies in the second half of 1985.
1. Peng Chong, a speech to the Third Session of the 6th National People’s Congress, 5 April, 
1985.
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In early 1985, discussions had already been held in Beijing about setting up the 
BLDC and BLCC. Members of the BLDC would be appointed directly by Beijing and 
were to be involved in the actual work of drafting the constitution. In order to 
comprehend the wishes of the Hong Kong people towards the Basic Law, a BLCC was to 
be set up responsible for soliciting and reflecting local views to the BLDC and the NPC.
However, the formation of the Basic Law drafting and consultative bodies started 
in about mid-1985 at a time when a limited degree of liberalization and political 
participation were being experienced for the first time ever in the Hong Kong legislature. 
While political activists were calling for further political reform, they wished to attain a 
more responsible government w'hich would be capable of commanding the confidence of 
the local people. After all, there was a certain degree of distrust among the local people 
towards the Sino-British Joint Declaration, and thus the democrats raised almost every 
major policy confronting the transitional British administration to public attention and 
addressed the lack of an effective representative system in Hong Kong which could claim 
to represent local interests. This also raised many of the same issues: how to develop a 
system of local government for the future S.A.R. which could effectively stand up for 
local interests and be capable of resisting whatever pressures Beijing would exert on it.
The fundamental problem of ‘representation’ came up again during the process of 
establishing the Basic Law' bodies, in the course of which the democrats raised several 
key questions: W ho would be responsible for the w'hole process of consultation? W7hose 
opinion would be solicited? And how w'ould they be collected? The replies given by 
Beijing officials and their roles in the drafting process remained a very sensitive issue, 
because the extent of their participation in the process was readily interpreted as an 
indication of the extent to w'hich Beijing would attempt to exert its influence in Hong 
Kong before the 1997 transfer of power, as w'ell as after it.
Through the setting up of the Basic Law bodies, the pattern of the PR C 's political 
involvement and initiative in Hong Kong's affairs became increasingly obvious, thus 
making more people believe that Beijing was imposing its familiar techniques of 
co-opting various groups of local people into its institutions, but without genuine respect 
for their wishes. The following pages w'ill attempt to analyze the pattern of the PR C ’s 
activities in Hong Kong in 1985 and their immediate impact on the pace of the on-going 
politicization process in Hong Kong society set in motion by the political reforms 
initiated by the British.
THE SETTING UP OF THE BLDC, JUNE 1985
At the 11th session of the 6th NPC on 18 June, 1985, the PRC officially 
announced the appointment of 59 members to the BLDC, 23 (39%) of whom were to be 
Hong Kong representatives. Ji Pengfei, Director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and
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Macau Affairs Office, was made Chairman of the BLDC, Li Hou, Deputy-Director of the 
Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, was to be the Secretary-general, and Lu Ping, 
Secretary-general of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and Mao Junian, Deputy 
Secretary-general of the Hong Kong NCNA, were made deputy secretaries-general of the 
BLDC (see Appendix F).
The BLDC was to have 8 Vice-chairmen, four of whom were Hong Kong members, 
namely Ann Tse-kai, an industrialist appointed to the CPPCC; Sir Pao Yue-kong, a 
well-known shipper and property magnate; David Li, a banker, and Fei Yeimin, a 
pro-PRC publisher appointed to the NPC. Xu Jiatun was also one of the Vice-chairmen. 
Other Hong Kong members included prominent businessmen, such as Li Ka-shing and 
Cha Chi-ming, and professionals like Liu Yiu-chu, a lawyer, and Rayson Huang and Ma 
Lin, Vice-chancellors of the two universities in Hong Kong. In addition, two of the 
members, namely Henry Fok, also Chairman of the Hong Kong Chinese General 
Chamber of Commerce, and Rong Yongdao, an accountant, were also appointed to the 
CPPC C . Those who were closely related to the Hong Kong administration were Justice 
Simon Li and the two appointed members of the Executive Council and Legislative 
Council, Maria Tam and Wong Po-yan. Several others, namely David Li, Martin Lee, 
Szeto Wall, Tam Yiu-chung and Lau Wong-fat, were later to be elected to the 
Legislative Council in September. All of these, however, participated in the BLDC in 
their personal capacities, not as members of the Hong Kong administration or of the 
CPPCC . But with the exception of Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, most of the Hong Kong 
BLDC members were regarded either as ultra-conservatives or as pro-PRC individuals 
who had a close similarity of views with those of the PRC officials about political 
changes in Hong Kong.
The conservative outlook of some of these people could be seen in the views they 
expressed about the kind of people who should be allowed to participate in the making of 
the Basic Law and in the future political system. Ann Tse-kai, for example, had 
suggested in July that the BLCC should consist of people who agreed with his conviction 
tha t  the “lifeline of Hong Kong's economic structure is based on manufacturing, exports 
and tourism” . S i n c e  Ann's name was placed at the top of the 8 Vice-chairmen of the 
BLDC, many people in Hong Kong immediately expressed concern about his sentiments, 
wondering whether he was really expressing his own opinion or merely reflecting the 
views of Chinese officials. The South China M orning Post concluded tha t
given his s tatus in the drafting committee, it was widely believed that he spoke 
with authority. ... His remarks are in line with the Chinese thinking on 
maintaining Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability. Chinese officials are
2. South China M orning Post (4 July, 1985).
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understood to be concerned that some pressure groups may pursue radical 
welfare policies, which they feel are not conducive to the territory’s 
development.0
A nn’s statement was one of the earliest indications of PRC thinking on these 
m atters. Not long afterwards, another statement was made by Cha Chi-ming, the first 
drafting committee member to propose a political model for the future SAR, who 
suggested in August the establishment of an advisory council which would be responsible 
for advising the administration on a wide range of activities, including the amendment of 
the Basic Law and the nomination of candidates to the Legislative Council.'* Such a 
proposal was considered by his critics as nothing more than a modified form of the 
Central Advisory Commission of the PRC;3 45 6thus, even though he made the proposal in 
his personal capacity, it was widely believed to be a trial balloon on the part of the PRC 
to test the Hong Kong people’s willingness to accept a political model more similar to 
the PR C than the Westminster one. It was also interpreted as a sign that these Hong 
Kong representatives were prepared to make the system of Hong Kong conform with 
th a t  of the mainland in order to counterbalance the prevailing demand for democratic 
self-government, thereby providing a check on ‘drastic changes’ which they did not want 
to see. More critically, his proposal even turned out to have the support of some other 
Hong Kong drafting committee members, such as the Legislative Councillor Maria 
Tam.® More important still, it was these conservative Hong Kong members who were 
assigned the task of establishing the BLCC between July and December 1985 under the 
leadership of the two Hong Kong NCNA staff, Xu Jiatun and Mao Junian, who had been 
appointed to the BLDC.
THE FORM ATION OF THE BLCC, JULY-DECEMBER 1985
At the first BLDC meeting held in June 1985 in Beijing, the PRC authorities 
entrusted the job of organizing the BLCC to the Hong Kong drafting committee 
members. After they returned from Beijing, a meeting was organized on 16 July by the 
23 Hong Kong BLDC members themselves during which six of them, namely Justice 
Simon Li, Martin Lee. Liu Yiu-chu, Szeto Wah, Ann Tse-kai and Mao Junian, were 
authorized to form a preparatory committee for the organization of the BLCC. The 
initial task of this six-member preparatory committee was to draft a constitution of the
3. Ibid.
4. C h a’s model pertains to an advisory council which would be composed of prominent people, 
retired Executive and Legislative Council members, appointed for life and responsible for advising 
the administration over a wide range of activities, including the amendment of the Basic Law'. 
M in g  Pao  (7-11 August, 1985).
5. The Central Advisory Commission was set up in 1982 by the 12th Party Congress, consisting 
of senior party officials who gave advice on the making and the implementation of party policy.
6. Far E as tern  Econom ic R eview  (5 September. 1985).
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BLCC setting out the method and procedure for selecting the consultative committee 
members.
The idea that a BLCC should be established which would include a wide range of 
representatives from the different sectors of the Hong Kong community had only been 
roughly outlined by the Chinese authorities a t  the first BLDC meeting. They did not 
specify, however, how the consultative committee should be formulated, how local 
opinion would be solicited, or how they intended to ensure that the kind of local opinion 
th a t  was to be consulted would be respected by the Chinese government. A good deal of 
concern soon developed about both the role of the drafting committee members and the 
part to be played by the NCNA officials in preparing the constitution of the BLCC.
Immediately after the formation of the preparatory committee in July, the newly 
emerging grassroots and middle-class organizations began to demand strongly tha t  the 
consultative committee should be ‘a spontaneous process organized openly from below’ 
and should be representative of a wide range of people from different sectors of society. 
On 16 July, the same day on which the six-member preparatory committee was 
established, 11 political groups, including the Association for Democracy and Justice, the 
Hong Kong Affairs Society and the Hong Kong People’s Association, presented an open 
letter to Xu Jiatun, suggesting that
a. the BLCC representatives should be nominated by groups from the various 
sectors of the Hong Kong society;
b. BLDC members should not control and determine the membership and 
structure of the BLCC;
c. the preparatory works of the BLCC should only be finalized after a period of 
consultation and discussions;
d. the BLCC should be given a legal position by the NPC.
Yet the unannounced presence of an NCNA chief-editor, Yang Sheng, as an 
observer at the first meeting of the six-member preparatory committee on 23 July 
aroused further suspicion about the leadership role to be played by NCNA officials in 
assisting the setting up of the BLCC. Thus the whole process of formulating the BLCC 
became an extremely sensitive political topic which put to the test the issue of whether 
or not the PRC authorities would be imposing their leadership style on Hong Kong.
It was decided at the first BLDC meeting of June, and subsequently embodied in 
the constitution of the BLCC, that the consultative committee would be an unofficial 
body which should serve to “liaise and work as a bridge between various sectors of the 
community and the drafting committees, as well as to serve as an important channel to 
reflect views and suggestions on the Basic Law.” ' What all these words meant was that.
7. South China Morning Post (11 October, 1985).
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the BLCC was not to enjoy the same legal status as the BLDC. Even though it was 
stipulated in the BLCC constitution that the BLDC and BLCC would have parallel 
sta tus with each other, i.e. they'were “independent of and not subordinate to each other 
nor will either play a leading role to the other“ , that provision could not alleviate the 
suspicion among people in Hong Kong that the BLDC was playing the leading role over 
the BLCC. The BLCC would actually be in the same position in relation to the Beijing 
authorities as the Hong Kong Legislative Council and district boards were to the colonial 
government, in th a t  they were merely consultative organs responsible for soliciting and 
reflecting the views of the Hong Kong public, but without having any formal power. The 
whole drafting process lay entirely in the hands of the BLDC members who were obliged 
only to listen to the opinion of the BLCC, and had no legal commitment to follow the 
la t te r ’s suggestions. Local people saw this as the imposition upon Hong Kong of the kind 
of procedure being used in the PRC to make the government appear more ‘democratic’ 
and reponsive to public opinion. The Hong Kong Observers, for example, expressed the 
view that
It is up to everyone to show tha t  it (the concept of one country, two systems) 
can work. Much of the burden falls on China’s representatives in Hong Kong, 
who have to demonstrate tha t  though accustomed to socialist ways, they will 
not impose them on Hong Kong ... There is a danger that, in spite of the joint 
declaration's assurance tha t  ‘the socialist system and socialist policies shall not 
be practised in the Hong Kong SAR’, the socialist workstyle and socialist 
concepts will creep into Hong Kong. ... There is the even greater danger of 
socialist concepts being infiltrated into Hong Kong by members of the drafting 
committee. The draft constitution, for instance, says that the consultative 
committee will be an unofficial body. In Chinese the term is ‘minjian zuzhi’, or 
literally, an organ of the people. This term, while common in China, is not very 
common in Hong Kong. While on the surface it appears to mean tha t  the 
group is not organized and run by the government, in China its meaning is 
quite different. Very often, people in China apply the term to organizations set 
up by the Communist Party or by the Government and run by them. Being 
officially designated as unofficial doesn’t make them unofficial. Even the Youth 
League is sometimes called an unofficial body in China. When Ji Pengfei said 
th a t  the consultative committee will be an unofficial body, we wonder in what 
sense he was using the term. ... Though ostensibly an unofficial body, the very 
official drafting committee intends to retain full control over it, including not 
only the drafting of its constitution but how its members are to be selected, 
who may or may not serve, how it is to work, who its leaders will be and how 
its funds are to be raised. ... This may be the way things are done in socialist 
China. This is certainly not the way they are ordinarily done in Hong Kong. If 
the members of the drafting committee intend to change Hong Kong to make it 
conform more closely with Chinese practices, then they are in clear violation of 
the Sino-British Joint Declaration and of China’s declared policies towards 
Hong Kong. Either the consultative committee is truly unofficial or else its
Q
official character should be acknowledged.0
8. South China Morning Post (6 September. 1985) .
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Beijing’s modus operandi became more obvious, however, when the draft 
constitution of the BLCC was published in August.9 The major criticisms centred on the 
adoption of the concept of ua spirit of democratic consultation and co-operation” , which 
was meant to imply the toleration of public criticism and the incorporation of dissenting 
views. In calling for a general consensus, it stated that “issues related to the content of 
the Basic Law should be decided by mutual consultation rather than voting.” The reply 
of the Hong Kong Observers was that,
Democratic consultation, ... too, is a term alien to Hong Kong. It is used only 
in mainland China and can be found in dictionaries there. But it does not exist 
in Hong Kong. ... The term ‘democratic’ clearly means different things to 
different people. In China, it is almost always qualified. The Chinese 
Communists differentiate between ‘socialist democracy’, which they extol, and 
‘bourgeois democracy’, which they despise. What kind of democracy is going to 
be used during ‘democratic consultation’. ... we suggested it be clearly 
stipulated that democracy - not ‘socialist democracy’ but ‘bourgeois democracy 
isicl’.10
The leader of the preparatory committee, Justice Simon Li of Hong Kong, countered 
with the argument tha t  the term was not alien to the Hong Kong people because it had 
already been practised in the Hong Kong administrative process over the past decades. 
Maria Tam agreed with Li, explaining tha t  “democratic consultation was based on the 
spirit of free exchange of different opinions” so that compromise and common consensus 
could be a tta ined .15 Whether or not it had been practised in this way in Hong Kong, it 
could hardly be doubted that the application of such a term at a time of political 
transition strongly implied the adoption of the Chinese communist way of approaching 
the thorny question of a democratic or participatory government in the territory. Liu 
Yiu-chu pointed out that the term had special historical, ideological and political 
implications in Communist Party discourse, implying the existence of a powerful 
Communist Party which would ‘consult’ small groups, but would always have the final
t o
say. After intensive criticism, the w'ord ‘democratic’ w'as subsequently deleted from 
many parts in the final version of the BLCC constitution, but the original intention 
remained intact
The consultative committee shall in the spirit of democracy and co-operation 
maintain liaison with various consultative groups concerned with the drafting 
of the Basic Law, social organizations and different sectors of the community 
and shall study in depth the view's and suggestions on the contents of the Basic 
Law, hold democratic consultation, incorporate dissenting views, put aside 
minor differences to seek common ground, but shall not insist on unanimity,
9. South China  M orning Post (21 August, 1985).
10. South China M orn ing  Post (6 September, 1985).
11. Discussions at the C i ty  Forum  (1 September, 1985).
12. Financial D a ily  (17 August, 1985). See also Far E astern  Econom ic Review  (29 August, 
1985), p.12.
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nor decide by voting. The consultative committee shall reflect accurately and in
detail all different views, arranging them according to the order of priority and
1 ^submitting them to the drafting committee.
This left no doubt that the consultative committee would make the final decisions about 
who would be ‘consulted’ and how the views expressed to it would be conveyed to the 
drafting committee.
Considerable controversy also developed over the method of selecting the BLCC 
members. The BLCC constitution spelt out the stipulation tha t
Some members will be recommended by different sectors of the community and 
then invited by the promoters to sit for the consultative committee. Some other 
members of the consultative committee will be invited to join after the 
promoters have decided through consultation at their meeting. The promoters 
can also become members of the consultative committee through the procedure 
set above, but they will be sitting in their personal capacity.1"*
Accordingly, two-thirds of the members were to be nominated by various professional 
sectors of the community, including those recommended by the designated and 
non-designated organizations. One-third of the members were to be invited by the 
convenors after some kind of ‘consultation’, as indicated in Table 34.
According to the BLCC Constitution, the ‘designated organizations’ were defined 
as those organizations w'hich could represent a particular sector. The list was primarily 
based on those laid dowm for the functional constituencies in the Legislative Council 
election, as wrell as other representing opinions from various sectors in the community. 
Thus the designated organizations included, in addition to those specified in the 
Legislative Council elections, the Hong Kong Society of Accountants, the Association for 
the Advancement of Science and Technology, the Hong Kong Shipowners Association, 
the Hong Kong Tourist Association, Television and Radio Stations, the Hong Kong 
Federation of Students, Joint Conference of Leaders from Six Religious Groups and 
various Joint Conferences of organizations of concern regarding the Basic Law.1  ^
Regarding the principles for ‘recommendation’, it was also stipulated tha t
the nominees should be in agreement with the constitution of the consultative 
committee, should meet the requirements for membership, and should have 
sectoral or intersectoral representativeness. Nominees from the designated 
organizations, as long as they do not exceed their quota, will generally be 
accepted. If the total number of nominees from the nondesignated registered 
organizations exceeds the quota, recommendation will be made according to the
13. South Ch in a  Morning  Post (11 October, 1985).
14. Ibid.
15. Joint Conferences were defined in the BLCC constitution as “those federations of registered 
organizations within a sector which, in addition to its corresponding functions, can provide cer­
tain representativeness” . Ibid.
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Table 34
Criterion for the BLCC Membership 
as Proposed in the BLCC Constitution
*»Recommendation »Invitation Total 
Community Designated Non-
Groups Designated
Groups
% (No.)
Industry k Commerce 8 14 10 21.3% (32)
Finance k Property 9 4 5 12.0% (18)
Legal 6 0 4 6.7% (10)
Mass Media 4 2 5 7.3% (11)Labour k Grassroots 16 11 10 24.7% (37)
Religious 0 6 0 4.0% (6)
Foreigners’ Organization 0 0 5 3.3% (5)
Total 60 41 49 100.0% (150)
** Individuals to be recommended by designated and non- 
designated groups and then invited by the Drafting Committee 
to join.
* Individuals to be hand-picked by the Drafting Committee from 
the various sectors listed and invited to join.
Source: South Chino Morning Post (11 October, 1985).
qu o ta  by m utual consultation among these organizations.1^
Local critics immediately challenged both the definition of and the procedures for 
‘recom m endation ' and ‘invitation*, pointing out th a t  the BLCC consti tu tion  rejected any 
right for groups to nom inate their own representa tives as well as implicitly preserving 
the power of the convenors to ignore the nominations. Besides, it perm itted  great 
discretion for the convenors to ‘invite’, not appoin t,  o ther individuals not classified 
under any of these categories, causing the whole issue to become w ha t  M artin  Lee called 
an “indirect m ethod of selection and ap p o in tm en t” .1'
Moreover, the BLCC constitution did not specify clearly how the organizations 
were to  recommend their nominees. The process by which the candidates were 
‘recom m ended’ was finally left to the decisions of the various “designated ' as well as 
‘non-designated ' groups. While some groups, such as the post-secondary s tuden ts  unions, 
went th rough an open process of nomination, public debate and election of candidates, 
the m ajority  of the o thers, such as the industrial and commercial organizations, simply
16. Ibid.
17. Hong Kong Econom ic Journal  (6 September, 1985).
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nominated their own candidates after informal and internal discussions among the 
executive committees or the directors’ meetings. It turned out that the pattern of 
nomination was very similar to the pre-election campaign to the Legislative Council: 
candidates were not nominated by an open process of political campaigning, but by 
internal discussions and backdoor bargaining among a limited group of top-level 
decision-makers.
All these arrangements seemed to fall far short of the demands of the 
liberal-oriented middle-class and grassroots members, who were now beginning to realize 
that all these manoeuvres conformed very closely with the existing model of political 
manipulation by the Hong Kong colonial administration. Minimal participation was 
allowed, but without any surrender of commensurate powers by the authorities. 
Nevertheless, the progressive groups still thought that they might be able to play an 
im portant ‘political’ role in the BLCC, believing that their participation would lead 
towards a more liberalized process of discussion. Thus they too organized themselves to 
nominate candidates to the BLCC preparatory committees with a view to (1) gaining 
recognition from the PRC officials and the public: (2) widening their scope of 
participation; (3) lobbying the moderates in the BLCC to provide alternative views tha t
i o
could counteract the dominance of the conservatives.1 Whether or not their 
nominations would be successful they would prove to be a test of the willingness of the 
PRC officials to observe the principle of selecting people who were genuinely 
representative of various sectors of Hong Kong society.
Between June and November 1985, various political groups and individuals came 
into coalition and formed ‘concerned groups' or ‘joint conferences’ on the Basic Law. 
Even some district board members claimed to have solicited the opinions of their 
constituencies, and organized concerned groups on a district or cross-district basis. 
Finally, the Joint Conference of Political Commentary Groups on the Basic Law, which 
included 21 middle-class and grassroots organizations, was recognized by the six-member 
preparatory committee as one of the designated organizations, and was given four seats 
in the BLCC. In addition, there were two more seats to be filled by ‘invitation’ under 
the same category of ‘political commentators', for which several candidates were also 
nominated to the BLCC preparatory committee in the name of the Joint Conference of 
Community Groups on Basic Laws (see Appendix G). Other non-specified community 
organizations, such as the ‘kaifong' associations and Heung Yee Kuk, also put forward 
their own candidates within the same category. Subsequently the number of nominees 
recommended on behalf of the nonspecified organizations greatly exceeded the number of 
seats available. So the BLCC preparatory committees agreed to increase the number of 
seats from 150 to 180, as shown in Table 35.
18. Financia l D a ily  (20-21, August,  1985).
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Table 35
Number of Candidates Nominated to the BLCC (as at 20 November, 1985)
Method of Nomination No. of Nominees No. of Seats
By Recommendation
Specified organizations 60 60
Nonspecified organizations 122 41
By Invitation
Invited by promoters 95
Group/Individual Recommendation 50 49
Number Increased (not specified) 30
Total 3 2 7 * 180
* This total included those candidates who were nominated 
under different categories at the same time.
Source: Ming Pao Daily (20 November, 1985).
Thus the formation of the BLCC had triggered off another type of political process 
alongside that which had been initiated by the British, during which members of the 
newly emerging groups came to realign and organize among themselves. As part of their 
united front strategy, the PRC authorities were willing to tolerate such a limited process 
of political alignment and lobbying among these groups. By means of ‘consultation* and 
‘invitation’, the PRC authorities were able to co-opt a wide range of different groups of 
people into the bodies they were establishing, thus making the BLCC a channel of 
political accommodation. Almost every political and pressure group, as well as 
professional and commercial body, had members selected to take part in the BLCC 
deliberations. Various progressive and moderate members sitting in the district boards, 
Urban Council, and Legislative Council, as well as some pro-GMD individuals, were also 
‘invited’ to participate. Yet it turned out that the participation of the democrats could 
not possibly have altered the overall political balance in the consultative body 
significantly, for they were to constitute only a small minority within the BLCC, and, 
more significantly, Beijing’s leadership role in the drafting process remained too strong 
for them to be able to exert any real influence.
Beijing could not stop people in Hong Kong from suspecting tha t  the BLCC was 
simply a body through which the PRC authorities intended to impose their control 
system upon Hong Kong. Its m odus operandi was again revealed in the selection of 
members to the Standing Committee and Executive Committees of the BLCC in 
December. According to the BLCC Constitution, there was to be a Standing Committee 
of the BLCC
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which shall be responsible to the general meeting of the consultative committee 
and shall have full authority to carry out the affairs of the consultative 
committee when it is not in session. There shall be at least 15 but no more than 
19 members on the standing committee and they shall be selected from 
members of the consultative committee through consultation and election. The 
consultative committee shall have one chairman, five vice-chairmen and one 
secretary-general and they shall all be elected among members of the standing
1 Qcommittee.
On 6 December, thirty-two names were nominated among the 180 members 
themselves for the election of 19 members to the Standing Committee; but immediately 
after the election, Sir Pao Yue-kong and three other BLDC Vice-chairmen, proposed 
seven names from among the new list of the Standing Committee to form the Executive 
Committee, with Ann Tse-kai serving as the chairman, and the proposal was passed 
w ithout any' objections. There was a public outcry over the legality of this method of 
selecting the executive committee, with the critics pointing to the independence of the 
BLCC in the context of the PR C ’s promise to respect the rule of law in Hong Kong. Xu 
Jia tun  replied th a t  the selection process was ‘totally constitutional’ because there were 
‘many alternative forms of election’. ^  Martin Lee and other progressives were 
dissatisfied with this explanation, pointing out tha t  the case was
an obvious example of Hong Kong adopting a different system from across the 
border, ... and the case had ‘far-reaching’ implications for what is the right 
road of election for Hong Kong’s legislature in future ... it is bound to damage 
the credibility of the consultative committee.
In response to the huge public outcry, a re-election was held on 11 December with the 
same 7 people being nominated and elected. But the re-election of the same 7 members 
to the executive committee revealed tha t  nobody in the BLCC. including the democrats, 
was really prepared to confront the PRC openly, for as the Far Eastern Economic 
Review  commented “the fresh elections with the same results showed how ready the
O A
BLCC members were to bend to Peking’s will” .
From this series of events which occurred during the formation of the BLCC, the 
dom inant role of the Beijing officials became so obvious that many people, like Joseph 
Cheng, regarded it as a sign of the Chinese authorities’ determination to exercise tight
n o
control over this ‘supposedly unofficial, voluntary organization'. Many progressive 
elements remained deeply suspicious of the intentions of Beijing in the formulation of the 
Basic Law bodies because a political pattern was becoming apparent in which the
19. South  C h in a  M orn ing  Post (11 October, 1985).
20. South  C hina  M orn in g  Post (8 December, 1985).
21. Ibid.
22. Far E as tern  Econom ic Rexnew (19 December. 1985), p.12.
23. Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “Hong Kong: The Pressure to Converge”, In terna tiona l A f fa ir s  
(London), 63(2) (Spring 1987), p.276.
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dominance of the conservatives in alliance with the Beijing authorities wras increasingly 
clear. It was not simply a matter of Beijing imposing its will on Hong Kong unilaterally, 
but of the willing collaboration of various elements of Hong Kong society in th a t  process. 
And while some Basic Law committee members were beginning to make alternative 
proposals about the future political system in order to counterbalance those put forward 
by the groups demanding democracy and direct elections, Beijing officials started to 
exert pressure on the British administration with a view to ensuring th a t  its programme 
of on-going political reforms would conform with what was discussed in the Basic Law 
committees. The result was that the PRC officials were able to assume a leadership or 
veto role in the concurr%nt lebates about political reform. This also gave rise to the 
further questions whether these representatives of the people of Hong Kong, including 
the. progressives, would any longer be able to reflect their interests effectively. Would 
they prove to be more compromising and moderate when they had to deal with Beijing’s 
officials in order to accommodate themselves to the P R C ’s politicabOgame? It was 
befjnning to seem increasingly likely tha t  they w'ould have no choice but to do so.
THE IN C R E A SIN G  D O M IN A N C E  OF THE C O N SE R V A T IV E S  
IN HONG K O N G  POLITICS, 1985-86
The P R C ’s Initiatives
Beijing’s pressure on the British administration not to undertake further political 
reform became more visible towards the end of 1985. In October, Ji Pengfei told a senior 
Hong Kong official. Donald Liao, that political reforms in Hong Kong in the coming 
years should be introduced in such a way that they would be compatible with the Basic 
Law, adding tha t  in order to avoid unnecessary chaos, the PRC did not want to see any 
drastic changes during the next 12 years. On 21 November. Xu Jiatun openly warned in 
a press conference about ‘some signs of deviation from the Joint Declaration’. His words 
were immediately taken as a sign of Beijing’s pressure on the British administration not 
to go too far with its political reforms, although others interpreted his statement as 
indicative of the P R C ’s displeasure over the progressives' demand for direct elections. 
On 1 December, X u’s warning was echoed by Ji Pengfei in an interview in a PRC 
magazine, Outlook Weekly, in which Ji was reported to have expressed his view on 
political reform in Hong Kong, as follows:
we hope Hong Kong will not see drastic changes during the transition period ...
Hong Kong had already undergone some reforms and the effects of the
transformation needed consideration. ... We must, comply with the Joint
o i
Declaration. In short it is best to change as little as possible/'1 
All these public statements were followed by Ji's  visit to Hong Kong in the second half
24. Outlook Weekly  (Overseas edition), no.4 (2 December 1985), p.6.
204
of December when he officially opened the first meeting of the BLCC. On 21 December, 
he stated at a press conference that all major changes proposed in the political system 
should be discussed by Britain and the PRC in advance, because the territory’s future 
political system involved China and its relations with Britain, not just Hong Kong. 
While he was saying this, it was also reported that the Joint Liaison Group had 
discussed the topic of political reform in Hong Kong at its second meeting held in late 
November. All these statements indicated that the BLDC had become a de facto  power 
centre and tha t  the British were being asked through the JLG to conform with the 
position of the PRC.
B r i t i s h  R e s p o n s e
Some time after the JLG meeting, Timothy Renton, the British Minister of State 
with Special Responsibility for Hong Kong, said, during his visit to Hong Kong in 
January 1986, tha t  there was a ‘convergence’ of views between the two governments on
o j -
the issue of political reform in Hong Kong. 0 Local critics seized upon this remark, and 
called attention to the legal and moral responsibilities of the British to the people of 
Hong Kong. They argued tha t  the British were now beginning to back down, in the face 
of the P R C ’s pressure, from pursuing further steps towards the liberalization of the 
Hong Kong political system. Because of the perceived British failure to stand up to 
Beijing over political reform, people now began to regard the Hong Kong administration 
as being reduced to a lame-duck government.
There were obvious signs that the Hong Kong and British officials had started to 
change their tone about further political reform in Hong Kong bv the second half of 
1985. The Chief Secretary, Sir David Akers-Jones. for example, was still insisting in 
early October tha t  the Hong Kong government was not, and would not, be consulting 
the PRC authorities on the question of political reform because the Joint Declaration 
had authorized the British to run local administration in the transitional period. This 
bold front was soon abandoned. Timothy Renton seemed to be adopting a much more 
detached and non-committal role when he stated on 31 October that
Britain does not wish to impose anything on Hong Kong, and it does not want 
to be criticized for having preconceptions. ... It is a m atter  of you all, the 
people of Hong Kong, tha t  have got to think about through the many channels 
that are open to you, make vour views known.
He also argued that
25. Renton was reported as saying that uwe agree above all on the need for convergence be­
tween the system that is evolving in Hong Kong and the system to be laid down in the Basic 
Law” , South China  M orn ing  Post (21 January, 1986).
26. Far E as tern  Econom ic R eview  (6 February, 1986), p.18.
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Britain wants to set up a system of government in Hong Kong which the
Chinese will not pull down after 1997. In order to do this, we must know what 
9 7the Chinese w a n t /
After J i ’s visit to Hong Kong in December, Akers-Jones also changed his tone, saying 
tha t  there was to be a ‘constructive exchange of views’ between the two major powers, 
and that “the Basic Law and the development of Hong Kong’s own internal political
o  o
structure should converge” / 0 These remarks were immediately taken to be a clear sign 
tha t  the Hong Kong authorities no longer had a ‘completely free hand’ in developing the 
political system and tha t  the British might be prepared to “tolerate some sort of Chinese 
intervention in the internal administration of Hong Kong in the transitional period” . ^
T h e  Local R e sp o n se
By early 1986 it was becoming clear tha t  the on-going politicization process of 
1984-85 was halted. The pattern of Hong Kong politics was becoming increasingly 
dominated by the actions and statements of the PRC authorities, their position of 
leadership being now meekly accepted by the British through their silent acquiescence to 
Beijing's demands. This change in the British stance could also be seen in the shift in the 
position of several of the more liberal appointed members of the Legislative Council, like 
Allen Lee and some of his allies, who had backed down by the end of 1985 from their 
previous support for direct elections. Under the umbrella of British and PRC support, 
the more conservative elements in Hong Kong society who favoured the continuation of 
the existing system now spoke out more actively against democracy and direct, elections 
than they had ever done in 1984-85. Lord Lawrence Kadoorie, for example, Director of 
the Hong Kong China Light and Power Company, and the only Hong Kong 
representative in the British Parliament as a member of the House of Lords, made his 
famous statement in January 1986 in favour of a political structure which preserved ‘the 
rights of the few’. He was reported as saying that, “the people who govern Hong Kong 
should be chosen from those members of the community who created the prosperity. 
Hong Kong could only survive under a ‘benevolent oligarchy’. u Whereas the Hong 
Kong colonial legislature had appeared in 1985 to be becoming more liberalized and 
responsive to public opinion. Lord Kadoorie seemed to be now pointing in quite the 
opposite direction in his call for the preservation of a bureaucratic and undemocratic 
form of government. This conservative view also conformed with PRC pressures to exert 
greater leverage on the process of political changes now occurring in Hong Kong.
27. Press conference in Hong Kong by Timothy Renton on 31 October, 1985. See also Far 
Eastern Economic R eview  (14 November. 1985), p.25.
28. Report of the press conference in December 1985 of Sir David Akers-Jones, South China  
M orning Post (6 January, 1986).
29. South C hina  M orn ing  Post  (31 December, 1985).
30. South China  M orn ing  Post  (6 January, 1986).
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When Lu Ping visited Hong Kong in January 1986 with the responsibility for 
collecting the views of the Hong Kong people about the drafting of the Basic Law, he 
expressed his personal view on political reform by saying that under the existing system 
the executive of Hong Kong had already been made accountable to the legislature, hence 
any further changes to the existing system would result in a deviation from the Joint
o - i
Declaration. 1 Whether by coincidence or not, Lu Ping's personal views were similar to 
those of the Hong Kong conservatives who were also in favour of preserving the existing 
relationship between the executive and the legislature, i.e the domination of the former 
over the latter. The December 1985 issue of the pro-PRC M irror magazine in Hong 
Kong suggested a political system similar to Cha Chi-ming’s model of an advisory 
council, an idea which now started to take root among some members of the BLCC and 
subsequently became a proposal from 71 BLCC members in August 1986, in a suggestion 
to the BLDC for the preservation of the existing functions of the Legislative Council. 
This meant tha t  the legislature was to be limited merely to “making laws, controlling 
government spending, monitoring policy-making by the executive branch and holding
O O
ex-officio in the statutory committees*. It should not have the power to dismiss the 
Chief Executive or ,the principal executives. The proposal also suggested that such a 
system was “mostly likely to preserve the separation of powers of the executive from the 
powers of the legislature* because the legislature could act as a check on the executive's 
policies by means of delaying the passage of the bills and criticizing the
09
maladministration of the chief executives.00
The democrats were not at all satisfied with this political model, arguing that such 
a system could not claim to attain checks and balances between the executive and 
legislature and such a system was in no way capable of fulfilling the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration insofar as it stipulated that “the executive shall abide by the Jaw and shall 
be accountable to the legislature*. In order to counteract the growing dominance of 
these conservative views, the progressives continued to argue that only by introducing a 
‘democratic' system would it be possible to fulfil the stipulation of the Joint Declaration, 
and hence to convince the Hong Kong people that the ‘one country, two systems' 
concept was being implemented. The democrats contended that accountability of the 
executive to the legislature could only be brought about by the introduction of direct 
elections and by giving the power to the legislature to dismiss the executive. This 
argument became the major contention in a proposal submitted by 190 progressive 
members in November 1986. But the progressives were now facing a much more difficult
31. Hong K on g  Econom ic Journal  (10 January, 1986).
32. South C hina  M orn ing  Post (22 August, 1986).
33. “A Preliminary Proposal for the Future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Govern­
ment Structure” , South China M orn ing  Post (22 August, 1986 and 5 November, 1986).
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task than previously. Not only did they have to put pressure on the Hong Kong 
administration, but they also had to persuade both the PRC officials and the 
conservative Hong Kong representatives in the Basic Law bodies to believe tha t  further 
political reform would upset neither the territory’s existing prosperity and stability nor 
the P R C ’s sovereignty in Hong Kong.
C ONCLUSION
By way of conclusion, we might ask what were the consequences of these changes 
and realignments in 1986 for the political development of Hong Kong? To what extent 
were the progressives capable of pushing for a more liberal political process?
We cannot assume that  Beijing has determined to halt the on-going liberalization 
process in Hong Kong, although politics and government in Communist China differ in 
many ways from what have been practised in the Colony of Hong Kong and other liberal 
societies in the West. But through various channels of public discussions, PRC officials 
expounded their opinions regarding the future political system of Hong Kong. In doing 
so, they were able to establish a dialogue with the people of Hong Kong, with a view to 
testing public reactions as well as persuading these people to come to accept its way of 
thinking and leadership style.
We can see from the above analysis tha t  in 1985-86 the overall situation was now 
favourable to the P R C ’s position and there was little the progressives could do to shift 
the PRC policy in the direction tha t  they wanted. Yet the politicization processes were 
still going on in Hong Kong society, as evident in the growth of the opposing forces 
which managed to check each other’s influence. On the one hand, the conservatives were 
now speaking out more actively in defence of the existing system than they had done in 
1984-85. On the other hand, the democrats were pushing for further changes towards a 
more open and accountable system of government. Hence, both groups were suggesting 
alternative proposals for the future political system, each trying to lobby their 
supporters in order to demonstrate tha t  they represented an influential segment of 
public opinion.
In this campaigning for public support in 1986, a certain amount of disagreement 
between the two camps was evident, resulting in a process of mild political polarization 
which had never before been so visible. Such differences came to the surface over various 
issues, such as the controversy in mid-1986 over the the P R C ’s decision to construct a 
nuclear plant in Daya Bay near Hong Kong. The reluctance of the Hong Kong 
Legislative Council to protest against the P R C ’s decision on this issue convinced many 
local people that with the exception of a few council members, such as Martin Lee, Lee 
Yu-tai, Conrad Lam and Szeto Wah, most of those Legislative Council members who 
had been put there by indirect elections and government appointment, had failed to
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speak up for the interests of the Hong Kong people out of fear that they might have to 
confront the opposition of Beijing on the matter. Other issues, such as the Legislative 
Council debates on the Public Order (Amendment) Bill and the Film Censorship Bill in 
early 1987, further suggested tha t  the interests of the Hong Kong people were not being 
effectively represented under the existing system of administration. Although the 
progressives could only constitute a minority in both the Legislative Council and the 
Basic Law bodies, their protests in these isolated incidents did have the effect of igniting 
a series of ‘crises of confidence’ which became apparent several times two years after the 
Sino-British talks, thus heightening public awareness of the importance of direct 
elections. But the more actively the democrats attempted to mobilize public support for 
direct elections, the more defensive was the reaction of the conservative members in 
resisting any further reform of the Hong Kong political .system. In the end, the 
democrats were still unable to persuade the Hong Kong conservative sectors and the 
PRC officials that direct elections and democratic self-government would contribute to 
the successful implementation of the Joint Declaration.
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C H A P T E R  9 
C O N C L U S I O N
When China resumes the exercise of sovereignty in Hong Kong on 1 July 1997,
Hong Kong shall, according to the Sino-British Jo in t  Declaration and the 
principle of ‘one-country, two-system s’, become a  highly autonom ous Special 
A dm inistrative Region. We believe th a t  in order to achieve these principles, a 
system of government w ith  checks and balances should be established through 
the participation of the various sectors of people in society, with a  view to 
developing a democratic, legal, stable and efficient government, representing 
the various groups of in terests  in society and m aintain ing prosperity and 
stability .
Our story of Hong K ong’s politicization started  with the Kao Shan meeting of 
Septem ber 1984: the s ta tem en t  cited above was also part  of a manifesto presented to 
ano ther  political rally at the Kao Shan T heatre  arranged on 3 November, 1986. by the 
so-called Joint C om m ittee  on the Promotion of Democratic Governm ent. It was held to 
dem and democracy for the post-1997 Hong Kong government, and it a t t ra c ted  1,300 
people, with 91 com m unity  organizations represented. The dem ands it expressed were 
regarded by some com m ittee  m em bers themselves as ‘compromising’ and ‘conservative’, 
because they represented a re trea t  from their previous call for a wholly elected 
legislature and were now only a call for a limited number of members to be directly 
elected to the Legislative Council.
This meeting can be regarded as the climax to a year of public debate between two 
groups expressing divergent opinions on the development of Hong K ong’s political 
system. The progressives called for a more open and liberal system of government, 
capable of representing au tho ri ta t ive ly  and effectively the in terests of the people of Hong 
Kong. The conservatives, however, favoured the preservation of the prevailing 
bureaucratic  and essentially non-partic ipatory  polity, sufficient to sustain a reasonable 
ra te  of economic growth. While the  former tended to employ tactics  directed towards 
consciously rallying public cam paigns and mobilizing broader mass partic ipa tion  in the 
m aking of public policy, the la t te r  perceived the politicization of Hong Kong society with 
suspicion and d is trust.  In August 1986, the conservatives had launched an offensive 
when they presented a proposal from 71 BLCC members which suggested, in principle, 
the m aintenance of the best features of the existing system. The progressives responded 
by pu tt ing  forward an a l te rna t ive  proposal, urging democratic self-government from 191
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BLCC and com m unity members which became the one u ltim ately presented a t  the Kao 
Shan rally, urging democratic self-government. The purpose of th a t  rally was to  draw 
a t ten t io n  to public support for the idea of democratic government with a view to 
highlighting the forthcoming annual debate  in the Legislative Council on the  G overnor’s 
Speech, scheduled for 5-6 November, as well as the discussions about to take  place a t  the 
political sub-group meeting of the BLDC on 6-8 November.
The headline in the South China M orning Post on 6 November, 1986, reported 
th a t  “emotions ran high in the Legislative Council yesterday as the debate  on the 
G overnor’s Speech on the ‘S ta te  of the T err i to ry ’ widened the rift between those 
dem anding  direct elections and those warning that, radical reforms would undermine 
Hong K ong’s economic success” . The senior member, Lydia Dunn, opened the  debate  by 
calling for ‘consensus’ and ‘reasoned compromise’ as the only way in which “stability 
and prosperity could be preserved in the Hong Kong society” . M artin  Lee, as expected, 
led the  opposition bv warning th a t  ‘a tide of em igra tion’ was still continuing “when 
alm ost two years have lapsed since the signing of the Sino-British Jo in t  D eclara tion” . In 
his speech, he said
Sir, this unhappy s ta te  of affairs will continue so long as people here do not see 
any possibility of the future SAR G overnm ent being able to preserve our 
freedoms. Yet, I a t tach  more im portance to the preservation of our freedoms 
than  the preservation of our prosperity because not everyone in Hong Kong has 
a share or the same share of our prosperity - but we all cherish our freedoms, 
w hether rich or poor.
Can any th ing  be done about th a t?  The answer is yes, though not easy [sic .
We m ust convince the people of Hong Kong, by action and not by words, that  
there is a future for them here in Hong Kong, and th a t  their freedoms can and 
will be preserved. In practical terms, it means th a t  we must ensure th a t  what 
has been promised to us in the Jo in t  Declaration will not be taken back from us 
in the Basic Law; we must ensure th a t  all the im p o rtan t  ou ts tand ing  issues 
which have not been agreed upon in the Joint Declaration will be resolved in 
such a way th a t  the final version of the Basic Law will not fall below w hat 
most people consider to be already the bottom  line as contained in the Joint 
Declaration and will be acceptable to the people of Hong Kong. B ut most 
im portan t  of all, the people of Hong Kong must see that  this G overnm ent has 
the will and the ability to govern w ithout intervention from Beijing.*
He continued to elaborate on the them e tha t  the existing system was unable to  provide 
the kind of leadership th a t  could make people feel confident about the future 
preservation of their freedoms. There were some people, he said, who were ‘selfish’, and 
hoped to preserve their own vested interests and thus deprive “their fellow citizens of 
Hong Kong of their undoubted rights to partic ipa te  in the ad m in is tra t io n ” /  He also
1. Hong Kong Legislative Council, O ff ic ia l  Report o f  ISoceedings  (5 November, 1986),
pp.261-262.
2. Ibid.,  p.263.
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criticized these people for advocating the ‘oligarchy of the rich', which, he considered, 
was bound to corrupt,  for such a system, he argued
does not enable those in power to defend the interests of the people of Hong 
Kong vis-a-vis  the Central G overnm ent because they do not enjoy the m andate  
from and support  of all the people of Hong Kong. It will make it impossible for 
the G overnm ent to exercise a high degree of au tonom y for a government th a t  
has the support  of such a small m inority  of the people it governs is bound to 
seek support  from the C entral G overnm ent,  and will thus become a mere 
puppet government.
This com m ent was directed very obviously at Lord Kadoorie, who had advocated in 
early 1986, a ‘provident and benevolent’ oligarchical system for the fu ture  of Hong 
Kong. By criticizing the ‘oligarchy of the r ich’, M artin  Lee tried to justify his repeated 
dem ands for direct elections and democracy, which, he contended, were essential 
elements in m aintain ing the prosperity and the stability  of Hong Kong and in 
com m anding the allegiance of the local people.
In the same debate , the conservatives were quite prepared to counter-attack 
M artin  Lee’s criticisms. Helmut Sohmen, an appointed  member, who claimed to 
represent the interests of the business com m unity , said th a t  he was totally  unconvinced 
by the a rgum en ts  concerning direct elections, because he thought tha t
direct elections will mean party  politics, with the a t ten d an t  panoply of 
platforms, campaigns, finance schemes, m em bership drives and patronage. It, is 
in the  very nature  of political parties  th a t  they try to produce separate 
identities and a trend toward polarization. Such a development could well lead 
us away from the goal of a socially cohesive and economically stronger Hong 
Kong. ... It should not be necessary to remind everyone th a t  people’s livelihood 
is not fostered by ideology, debating  societies, or organizing committees, but by 
the productive harnessing of available resources to create job  opportunities  and 
greater w ealth  for the whole com m unity . ... All reforms should however avoid 
change th a t  is unpredictable in its consequences, patently  not adding to our 
resources, or can dam age our proven s treng th  which lies first and foremost in 
our position as a commercial centre of global im portance .3 4 5
The counter-offensive launched by the conservatives came to a climax in the 
debate on the  following day w-hen ano ther appointed  member, Selina Chow, attacked 
M artin  Lee's com m ents abou t the ‘selfish rich m a n ’ as ‘irresponsible, unfair, illogical and 
divisive’ and running the risk of ‘inciting a class w a r’. She also argued th a t  the 
prevailing doub ts  and suspicions being aroused about the Hong Kong and Chinese 
governments “consumes much of the energy and positive thinking which had previously 
been channelled into enterprise and produc tiv ity” .^ This was perhaps the first time in
3. Ibid., p.265.
4. Ibid., p p .313-314.
5. Ibid., p.338.
212
the history of Legislative Council debates in Hong Kong tha t  the members were clearly 
divided into two opposing camps.
A similar division was also seen in the discussions at the political sub-group of the 
BLDC held in the same week in which the two proposals presented by the 71 BLCC 
members and the 191 BLCC and community members were the dominant issues on the 
agenda. The method of selecting the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council 
members became a bone of contention. The proposal of the 71 suggested the
establishment of an ‘Electoral College’, which would consult with the Chinese 
authorities to nominate people to run in the elections to the Chief Executive and the 
legislature. The proposal of the 191 argued that the Chief Executive should be elected 
either from among the Legislative Council members themselves or from direct elections 
through universal suffrage and that the legislature should be constituted by a 
considerable number of directly elected members. Hence, with the emergence of these 
two opposing proposals on the future political system, there were very obvious signs of 
increasing political division in Hong Kong by the end of 1986.
The debate about the direction the post-colonial government should take became a 
fundamental issue that split up Hong Kong society, although the scale of the political 
polarization mentioned above was not comparable to the scale of the mass mobilization 
processes common in many of the other decolonizing societies. The continued rallies for 
and against direct elections in 1986 did indicate that a significant, although still very 
moderate, degree of politicization had occurred during the early stages of the transfer of 
power from the colonial authorities to local representatives, a process which had some 
resemblance to some of the important features observable elsewhere in South and 
Southeast Asia, such as those in Malaya and Singapore in the 1950s.
'J(. 5$: ^ 5$. sf- ^  ^  i f  ^  if:
To summarize the major argument of the thesis, 1 want to emphasize that all 
decolonizing processes mentioned in Chapter One have occurred in distinctly different 
socio-political environments; yet many of them experienced similar but varying degrees 
of politicization, and sometime even large-scale popular mobilization. Hong Kong has 
also been experiencing the first steps in a decolonization process which has had some 
similarities with those other cases, but also some quite unique features which make it 
fundamentally different. In the course of this, it too has experienced a moderate degree 
of politicization, as we have seen in the account given of the events of 1985-86.
As in the case of other ex-British colonies, a limited form of representative 
government was being introduced to the territory’s essentially advisory legislative and 
district-based councils in 1984-85. Although the elected members were not given any 
administrative powers at all, they were able to exercise influence well beyond the limited
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scope of the functions allotted to them. Hong K ong’s situation once again showed th a t  
even a limited degree of political liberalization could s ta r t  to raise public expectations of 
more partic ipation , thus  generating strong pressures on the colonial au thorit ies  to open 
up the  political system further. By the end of 1984, an embryonic process of political 
polarization could also be discernible within Hong Kong society. At one extreme, urging 
democratic  self-government were the socially-oriented grassroots and pressure-group 
m embers as well as the liberal middle-class professionals. At the o ther, defending the 
s ta tu s  quo were the more conservative businessmen and professionals w'ho resented the 
rapid rise to prominence of the new' groups with their demands for greater participation 
in the political processes.
Yet Hong Kong's political t ransit ion  is to be understood in term s not only of the 
in teraction between the British colonial authorit ies  and the local people, bu t also of the 
P R C ’s increasing involvement in the te r r i to ry ’s political processes in the run-up to 1997. 
Hong Kong has entered a distinctive process of political transition , wdth the communist 
officials now- undertak ing  a leadership role within a capitalist political system. In the 
light of the P R C 's  increasing intervention in the political life of the Colony, a significant 
segment of the population became increasingly aware of the potential loss of their 
economic and social freedoms likely as a result of a communist takeover. Thus, the 
politicization process in Hong Kong society was not caused just by the change in British 
policy tow ards the Colony, but was fuelled also by a sudden growth in awareness among 
the local people of C h in a ’s increasing involvement in the internal affairs of Hong Kong. 
While the social-democrats hoped to see the end of social injustice a t the term ination of 
colonial rule, the liberal-democrats hoped to  develop before 1997 a system of government 
which could guaran tee  the m aintenance of the existing freedoms and liberties that  they 
were, enjoying. Both the social-democrats and the liberal-democrats, however, 
considered th a t  the existing system was unable to represent the in terests of the local 
people effectively and this existing system could not fulfil th a t  p a r t  of the Joint 
Declaration which said th a t  ‘the Executive shall be accountable to the Legislature’. The 
unprecedented alliance of the social- and liberal-democrats developed into a democratic 
movement calling for ‘gangren minzu zhigang' (democratic self-government), even 
though there were differences in their individual perceptions of China and her intentions. 
T he campaign failed to transform  into a mass political movement. Nevertheless, it 
gained m om entum  in 1985-86, the first two years of the political transit ion , when 
various public debates brought up the same issue of the sincerity of both the British and 
the Chinese officials in fulfilling their earlier promises of local autonom y.
The agita tional style of the dem ocrats  w'as resented, however, by the conservative 
elite wdio argued th a t  it w'ould be unrealistic to think of resisting Chinese interference in 
local affairs. By 1985-86, the conservatives began to form a new' a lte rna tive  political
214
force, speaking out more explicitly in favour of maintaining the status quo than they had 
ever done before. The conservatives not only supported the basic principles of the 
colonial politico-economic system, but also came to agree with the Chinese government 
in favouring the preservation of the existing framework of authority in Hong Kong. This 
group wdthin the conservative elite came to constitute a dominant element of vocal 
public opinion as it found itself gradually co-opted to the cause of Beijing through 
appointments to the BLDC and BLCC and other Chinese political bodies, namely the 
NPC and CPPCC.
With the increasing dominance of the conservatives, the democrats were driven to 
demonstrate in an increasingly desperate way tha t  they constituted the only political 
movement capable of representing the interests of the majority of the people in Hong 
Kong. All tha t  they could do, however, was to put more pressure on Hong Kong officials 
to implement direct elections in 1988. But, the British retreated to a much more passive 
position on the m atter of further developing institutions of representative government. 
In the Green Paper on “The 1987 Review of Developments in Representative 
Governmentr (May 1987), the Hong Kong government avoided making any further 
commitments about the fundamental principles of government in the run-up to 1997; 
instead it simply listed a number of options which were to be debated by the people of 
Hong Kong regarding the methods to be adopted for elections to the Legislative Council. 
The most basic issues relating to the functions and powers of the Governor, the 
Executive Council and the Legislative Council during the transitional period were totally 
ignored in the Review. By February 1988. it was even stated clearly in a White Paper on 
“The Development of Representative Government: The Way Forward" that direct 
elections would not be implemented until 1991, when the Basic Law would be 
promulgated. Now it was rather through the BLDC that the various models for the 
future political system were discussed. Beijing was able to take on an increasingly 
important leadership role in shaping the future political system for the people of Hong 
Kong. Since 1985-86, the public interest aroused earlier in greater participation in Hong 
Kong’s political processes began to subside because of frustration, and the earlier hopes 
for attaining a high degree of local autonomy and political freedoms came to be seen as 
just wishful thinking.
This story of Hong Kong's political development in 1985-86 raises a number of 
further questions which I can only touch on briefly here. How much local autonomy are 
the people of Hong Kong likely to enjoy in the post-1997 era? What are the implications 
of the degree of post-1997 autonomy likely to be for the politicization process during 
Hong Kong’s political transition? And what is the significance of Hong Kong’s recent 
experiences within the broader story of twentieth century decolonization worldwide? In 
view of the limitations and constraints on the course of political transition in Hong
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Kong, it is very unlikely that the people of Hong Kong will ever enjoy a substantial 
degree of local autonomy as in the case of Singapore before 1963. It may also be 
over-optimistic to expect large-scale political mobilization tha t  we have observed in the 
other decolonizing societies mentioned in Chapter One likely to occur in Hong Kong. 
One major reason is the China factor, which I will return below. Another is tha t  Hong 
Kong in the 1980s was simply not faced wdth the kind of fluid and turbulent 
international and domestic environment that other newly emerging nations had to cope 
with in the postwar decades.
In the 1980s, the international environment, and the Far East in particular, has 
been generally stable and prosperous as far as Hong Kong is concerned. Indeed, 
throughout 1985-86, the economy of Hong Kong remained basically sound. In 1985, there 
w'äs a revival in investors’ confidence, marked bv a sharp rise in activity and some 
significant increase in property values, along with some signs of a recovery in 
private-sector construction. The Hang Seng index went to an all-time high of 1,776 and 
until late October 1986 maintained a level which wfas 60% above tha t  of the previous 
year. In 1985, there had been hardly any industrial or social disputes, apart from some 
minor protests against the increase in bus fares, w'hich hardly aroused public attention. 
The most controversial debates which arose over such issues as the Electronic Road 
Pricing System and the Legislative Council (Powers Privileges Bill), w'ere, however, 
totally unrelated to the social and economic frustrations of lower-income groups. These 
controversies could not be regarded as a major source of social instability. In other 
words, the kinds of extreme social and economic dislocations experienced by most 
decolonizing societies in the postwar decades were not suffered by Hong Kong society in 
the 1980s. In such circumstances, the absence of mass mobilization is not at all 
surprising.
It is significant tha t  other Asian societies, like South Korea and Taiwan, which 
had also enjoyed economic prosperity throughout the 1960s and 1970s, have experienced 
a relatively high degree of popular activism and protest since the early 1980s. Yet the 
demands for democratic reforms elsew'here in Asia do not seem to have had any 
significant influence on the movement for democracy and self-government in Hong Kong. 
One reason is that there has been no international pressure, from either the United 
States or the communist bloc or the Third World, on the British and the Chinese 
governments to liberalize the colonial system in Hong Kong before 1997. Another reason 
has been that the demand for democracy in Hong Kong is closely bound up with the 
question of China’s unification which is a much more complicated political issue, 
involving the relationship not only between mainland China and Hong Kong, but also 
between China and Taiwan and Macau. Thus, Chinese officials have been particularly 
suspicious of the kind of political activities in Hong Kong w'hich are related to any sort
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of independent-cum -democratic movement in either Taiwan or mainland China, readily 
perceiving them  as a th rea t  to the goals of terr itoria l integrity and national unification. 
Besides, C h in a ’s political history has dem onstrated  th a t  its leaders have been in to lerant 
of any dem ocratic (1978-79) or autonomous (Tibet of 1987) movement being organized 
spontaneously from below, although the same leaders have been quite experienced in 
organizing mass partic ipation  in their own kinds of political campaigns. It is increasingly 
ap p a ren t  th a t  Chinese authorities  would be very re luc tan t to allow the  further 
advancem ent of the m ovem ent for democracy and self-government in Hong Kong likely 
to develop as a result of the British initiative to introduce limited representa tive 
governm ent in 1984-85. It has also become obvious th a t  Chinese leaders have been 
determ ined to  exericse u lt im ate  control over w hatever changes may evolve in Hong 
K ong’s political system. In this light, the movement for democracy and self-government 
was not supported  by either the British or Chinese authorities ,  a lthough th e  la t te r  have 
exhibited a  certain degree of tolerance and patience tow ards it. Hence the level of 
politicization in Hong Kong society has been sharply qualified, and indeed constrained, 
bv the lack of domestic and international support  for the cause of democratic 
self-government.
The im pact of ‘the China factor’ on Hong Kong's on-going politicization process is 
an even more complex and controversial issue. By 1985-86, many people in Hong Kong 
were becoming much more sceptical of the possibility of influencing the P R C ’s 
decision-making processes, hence dubious about the la t te r 's  promises to allow the Hong 
Kong SAR to enjoy a high degree of local autonom y. O thers who showed strong  interest 
in political par tic ipation  in 1983-84 began to w ithdraw  in 1985-86 from their earlier 
en thusiasm  to  become involved in the political system. Paradoxically, th is  a t t i tu d e  of 
.scepticism and cynicism continued to serve as the driving force for the broader 
politicization process occurring, particularly the movement for dem ocratic self- 
government. In the initial stages of the political transition , some dem ocrats  kept on 
reminding Britain  and C hina th a t  what was promised in the Joint Declaration of 1984 
should not be taken away in the transitional period. They were even prepared to 
challenge any deviations in the interpretation  of the Jo in t  Declaration regarding the 
m ethods by which the executive could be made accountable to the legislature or the 
ways by which the elections were held at various levels of the political processes as part 
of a ‘Sino-British conspiracy’. By rallying public support through cam paigns on an 
issue-by-issue basis, the activ ists  did succeed in setting  off a series of ‘crises of 
confidence’ several times after the signing of the 1984 Sino-British agreem ent on the 
fu ture  of Hong Kong, most notably over the Daya Bay issue in 1986. T hus  the 
politicization process, which a t  times moved toward a limited degree of polarization and 
conflict, also created new kinds of tension and uncertain ty  about the course of political 
change.
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A t the time when the idea of local au tonom y was on the ascendancy in Hong Kong 
in 1985-86, it was difficult for either the British or the Chinese officials to  suppress it. 
They had to tolerate criticism and m aintain a dialogue with the progressives in the  early 
stages. B ut by encouraging the conservatives to speak up for the s ta tus  quo, they  have 
developed an alternative  political force which has counteracted the influence of the 
progressives quite effectively. As open debates on political reform continued am ongst  the 
conservatives, the Chinese officials, the Hong Kong authorities  and the dem ocrats ,  Hong 
Kong society became politicized to a m odest degree in the first two years of the 
transit ional period, even though Beijing's ability to control the pace of consti tu tiona l 
changes soon became increasingly prominent. Yet although there was no sign in 1986-87 
of significant depoliticization or demobilization, the scope for effective action by the 
democratic  m ovement has been limited to the small group of political activists w ho have 
persisted in trying to  mobilize various sources of support for the cause of dem ocratic  
self-government. In my opinion, Hong Kong society is likely to remain politicized to  th a t  
modest degree throughout most of the transit ional period leading up to 1997, bu t  it will 
be very surprising if it becomes significantly more politicized, for neither the 
in terna tional nor the domestic dynamics of the situation  are likely to create any s trong 
pressures in that, direction. The lid of the P a n d o ra ’s box of ‘democratization* was opened 
only slightly and briefly in 1984-85, but it seems to have been slammed shut hastily by 
the British and Chinese officials before too much damage was done, as the au tho ri t ies  on 
both sides see it. But if the degree of political mobilization advances much further than  
the P R C  officials will to lera te , the officials are likely to crack down on criticism or 
political dissent when they take over formal control in Hong Kong after 1997.
218
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Studies  on D eco lon iza t ion , Polit ic ization  and  
P o lit ic a l  M ob iliza t ion , etc.
Allen, J., The Malayan Union. Monograph Series no.10 (New Haven: Yale University 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1967).
Alderman, G., Pressure Groups and Government in Great Brita in  (New York: 
Longman, 1984).
Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S., The Politics o f  Developing Areas (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1960).
------------------ and Verba, S., The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in
Five Nations  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
Anderson, B.R.O’G., Java in a Time o f  Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
1972).
Apter, D.A., Ghana in Transition  (New York: Atheneum, 1963).
------------------ , The Politics o f  Modernization  (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1965).
Bastin, J. and Benda, H.J., A History o f  Modern Southeast Asia - Colonialism. 
N ationa lism , and Decolonization (Sydney: Prentice-Hall, 1977).
Beer, L.W., (ed.)„ C onstitu tionalism  in Asia - Asian Views o f  the American Influence  
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
Bellow, T.J.. The P A P  o f  Singapore: Emergence o f  a Dominant Party System  (New 
Haven: Yale University Press. Southeast Asian Monograph Series no. 14, 1970).
Blondei, J., (ed.), Comparative Government (U.S.A.: MacMillan, 1969).
Bretton, H.L., Power and Stability m  Nigeria: The Politics o f  Decolonization (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1962).
Brissenden, R. and Griffin J., (eds.). Modern Asia: Problems and Politics (Milton: The 
Jacaranda Press, 1974).
Chan, H.C., Politics in an Adm inistrative State: Where Has the Politics Gone?. 
Occasional Paper, no .11 (Singapore: University of Singapore, 1975).
------------------ , The Dynam ics o f  One-Party Dominance: The P AP at the Grassroots
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1978).
------------------ , A Sensation o f  Independence, Singapore's David Marshall (Singapore:
Oxford University Press, 1984).
219
Clutterbuck, R., C onflict and Violence in  Singapore and M alaysia 1945-1983 
(Singapore: Graham Brash (Pty.) Ltd., 1985).
Conn, P.H., C onflict and Decision Making: An Introduction to Political Science (New 
York: Harper Row, Publishers, 1971).
Converse, P.E. and Dupeux, G., “Politicization of Electorate in France and the United 
States” , in L. Bowman and G.R. Boynton, (eds.), Political Behavior and Public 
O pinion , Comparative A nalysis  (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974).
Dahl, R.A., Modern Political Analysis  (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963).
------------------ , Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition  (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1978).
Dennis, J. and Jennings, M.K. “Special Issue on Political Socialization” , Comparative 
Political S tud ies , 3(2) (July 1970), pp .135-139.
Deutsch, K.W., “Social Mobilization and Political Development” , Am erican Political 
Science Review , 55 (September 1961), pp.493-514.
Drysdale, J., Singapore’s Struggle for Success (Singapore: Times International, 1984).
Easton, D., “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems” , World Politics (April 
1957), pp .383-400.
Edmunds, M., Patronage and Politicization  (Canberra: M.A. thesis, Australian National 
University, 1979).
Etzioni, A., “Mobilization as a Macrosociological Conception“ , B ritish  Journal o f  
Sociology, 19 (September 1968), pp.243-253.
Feith, H., The Decline o f  C onstitutional Democracy in Indonesia  (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1962).
Field, J.O., Consolidating Democracy - Politicization and P artisanship  in India  (New' 
Delhi: Manohar, 1980).
Gann, L.H. and Duignan P., (eds.), C olonialism  in A frica . 1870-1960 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982).
Gifford, P. and Louis, W.M.R., (eds.). The Transfer o f  Power in A frica , 
D ecolonization 1940-1960 (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1982).
Goldman, B. and Wilson, A.J., (eds.). Prom Independence to Statehood (London: 
Frances Printer, 1984).
Goldrich, D., “Toward the Comparative Study of Politicization in Latin America” , in 
D.B. Heath and R.N. Adams, (eds.), Contemporary Culture and Societies o f  Latin  
Am erica  (New' York: Random House. Inc.. 1965).
------------------ , “Political Organization and the Politicization of the Poblador” ,
Com parative Political Studies. 3(2) (July 1970), pp .176-202.
Graham, K., The Battle o f  Democracy, C o n flic t , C onsensus , and the Individual 
(Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 1986).
220
Graves, D.R., “Elections and National Mobilization in India", Comparative Political 
Stud ies , 11(2), (July 1978), pp.255-277.
Grimal, H., Decolonization: the British, French, Dutch, and Belgian Empires, 
1919-1963 (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1978).
Guerrero, A., Philippine Society and Revolution (and the Specific Characteristic o f  
Our People’s War), 3rd edition (Oakland: International Association of Filipino, 
1979).
Halper, T. and Hartwig, R., “Politics and Politicization : An Exercise in Definitional 
Bridge-Building” , Political Studies, 23 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp.71-79.
Holland, R.F. and Rizvi, G., (eds.), Perspectives on Imperialism and Decolonization 
(London: Frank Cass, 1984).
-------------------, European Decolonization 1918-1981, An Introductory Survey  (London:
MacMillan, 1985).
Huntington, S., Political Order in Changing Society (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1968).
-------------------and Nelson, J.M., No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing
Countries  (Harvard: Harvard University Press. 1977).
Jeffrey, R., (ed.), Asia: The Winning o f  Independence (London: MacMillan, 1981).
Jeffries, C., Transfer o f  Power, Problems o f  the Passage to Seif-Government  (London: 
Pall Mall Press, 1960).
Jennings, 1., “Nationalism and Political Development in Ceylon - the Background of 
Self-government” , a paper presented at the IPR Conference in Lucknow (New York: 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950).
Johnson, C.A., Peasant Nationalism and C om m unist Power, The Emergence o f  
Revolutionary China, 1931-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).
Kahin, G.M.. (ed.), Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1952).
------------------ . Governments and Politics o f  Southeast Asia  (New York: Cornell
University Press, 1964).
Kahler, M., Decolonization in Britain and France: The Domestic Consequences o f  
International Relations  (New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1984).
Kearney, R.N., (ed.), Politics and Modernization in South and Southeast Asia  (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975).
Kerkvliet, B.J., The Huk Rebellion: A Study o f  Peasant Revolt in Philippines 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
Khoong, K.H., Merdeka! British Rule and the Struggle for Independence in Malaya, 
1945-1957 (Kuala Lumpur: lnsan k  Author. 1984).
Lande, C.IL, Leaders, Factions and Parties (New Haven: Yale University Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1965).
221
LaPalombara, J. and Weiner, M., Political Parties and Political Development 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
Lasswell, H.D. and Kaplan, A., Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1950).
Leys, C., (ed.), Politics and Change in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969).
Liang, D., The Development o f  Philippine Political Parties (Hong Kong: South China 
Morning Post, 1939).
Liddle, R.W., (ed.), Political Participation in  Modern Indonesia  (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1973).
------------------ , Power, Participation and the Political Parties in  Indonesia  (Mass:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1974).
Mackie, J.A.C., K on fron ta si, The Indonesia-M alaysia D ispute 1963-J965 (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974).
Milbrath. L.W., Political Participation  (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965).
McVev, R.. Southeast Asian Transitions  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).
Nettl, J.P.. Political M obilization: A Sociological A nalysis o f  M ethods and Concepts 
(London: Faber & Fabler Ltd, 1967).
Perlmutter, A., Modern A uthoritarian ism , A Comparative A nalysis  (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1981).
Pluvier, J.. Southeast Asia from  Colonialism  to Independence (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1974).
Pye, L., Politics, Personality, and National Building: B urm a's Search for Identity  
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
------------------ , Southeast A s ia ’s Political System s  (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974).
• Pym, F.. The Politics o f  Consent (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1984).
Ratnam. K.J., C om m unalism  and the Political throcess in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: 
University of Malaya Press, 1965).
Reid. A.. The Indonesian National Revolution 1945-1950 (Longman, 1974).
Remmer. K.L.. “Political Demobilization in Chile 1973-78” , Comparative Politics 12(3) 
(April 1980), pp.275-301.
Roff, W.R.. The O rigins o f  M alay N ationalism  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1967).
Rogers, M.L., “The Politicization of Malay Villagers, National Integration or 
Disintegration?” , Comparative Politics 7(2) (January 1975), pp.205-225.
Rosenthal, D.B., “Deurbanization, Elite Displacement, and Political Change in India” , 
Comparative Politics, 2(2) (January 1970). pp. 169-202.
222
Saunder, P., Urban Politics, A Sociological Interpretation (London: Hutchinson, 1983).
Sturtevant, D.R., Popular Uprisings in the Philippines, 1840-1940 (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1976).
Templeton, K.S., (ed.), The Politicization o f  Society (Indianapolis: Liberty Press,
1979) .
Tinker, H., Ballot Box and Bayonet, People and Government in Emergent Asian  
Countries  (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).
Townsend, J.R., Political Participation in C om m unist  China  (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1967).
-------------------, Politics in China , second edition (Boston: Little, Brown Company,
1980) .
Turnbull, M., A History o f  Singapore (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1977).
Verba S. and Nie, N., Participation in America, Political Democracy and Social 
Equality  (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972).
------------------ , B. Ahmed and Bhatt, A.. Caste, Race and Politics (Beverley Hills: Sage
Publications, 1971).
Weiner, M., “Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process” , in L. Binder, J.S. 
Coleman, J. LaPalombara, L.W. Pye, S. Verba, M. Weiner, (eds.) Crises and 
Sequences in Political Development (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1971), pp. 159-204.
Yeo, K.W., Political Development in Singapore, 1945-55 (Singapore: Singapore
University Press, 1973).
H on g  K ong Studies
Adley, R., All Change Hong Kong (Poole: Blandford, 1984).
Ai Fan, Gangren Zhigang, Xing  (Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong is Feasible) 
(Hong Kong: Wide Angle Publishers, 1984).
Atwood. L.E., “Public Opinion and Media Use in Hong Kong” , Occasional Papers No.15 
(Hong Kong: Centre for Hong Kong Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
August 1986).
Benton, G.. The Hong Kong Crisis  (London: Pluto Press, 1983).
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Newman, D. and Rabushka, A., Forecasting Political Events, 
The Future o f  Hong Kong  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
Bonavia, D., Hong Kong 1997, The Final Settlement (Hong Kong: South China Morning 
Post, 1985).
Cha. L., On Hong Kong's Future - A Collection o f  Ming Pao Daily News Editorials  
(Hong Kong: Ming Pao Daily News Ltd., 1984).
Chan, Albert, Xianggang fazh i yu jibenfa  (Hong Kong’s Legal System and the Basic 
Laws) (Hong Kong: Wide Angle Publishers. 1986).
223
Chan, R., Is Hong Kong District Board a Channel for Popular Citizen Participation? 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong Research Resource Press, 1982).
Chau, L.Y. and Lau, S.K. “Development, Colonial Rule, and Intergroup Politics in a 
Chinese Village in Hong Kong” , Occasional Paper, no.90, (Hong Kong: Social 
Research Centre, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, May 1980).
Cheng, C.Y., Shouhui zhuquan yu Xianggang qiantu (The Recovery of Sovereignty and 
Hong Kong’s Future) (Hong Kong: Wide Angle Publishers, 1982).
------------------ , “Feizhimindihua yu zhengdang zhi xingqi” ( “Decolonization and the
Emergence of Political Parties” ), Hong Kong Economic Journal , no.78 (September 
1983), pp.37-40.
------------------ . “Pouxi XingMaYinTai siguo caituan jinjun Xianggang di zhengjing
yinsu” ( “An Analysis of the Political Reasons for Financial Investment in Hong 
Kong by Singapore, Malaysian, Indonesian and Thai Corporations” ), Hong Kong 
Economic Journal , no.100 (June 1985), pp.7-10.
------------------ , “Cong liangju yiyuan weiren mingdan kan guoduqi zhengfu de chulu”
( “What are the Prospects of the Government in Transition? A View Based on an 
Analysis of the Appointed Executive and Legislative Members” ). Hong Kong 
Economic Journal , no.100 (July 1985), pp.18-22.
------------------ , “Xianggang Yingguoji min de zhengzhi nanti” ( “Political Dilemmas
Confronting the Hong Kong British Nationals” ), Hong Kong Economic Journal. 
no .104 (November 1985), pp.31-56.
Cheng, J.Y.S., “The Future of Hong Kong: A Hong Konger’s View” , International  
Af f a i r s , 58(3) (Summer 1982), pp.476-488.
------------------ , “Hong Kong Citizens Push for Power” , Asia Week, 8 (31 December
1982), pp.49-50.
------------------ . (ed.), Hong Kong in the 1980s (Hong Kong: Summerson Eastern
Publishers Ltd., 1982).
------------------ , “Jijue Xianggang qiantu wenti de yige chubu fangan” ( “A Preliminary
Suggestion to Solve the Problem of the Future of Hong Kong” ), Pai Shing  
Semi-m onthly,  no.54 (16 August, 1983), pp.26-29 and no.55 (1 September 1983), 
pp.44-47.
------------------ . “The Future of Hong Kong: Surveys of the Hong Kong People’s
Attitudes” , The Australian Journal o f  Chinese Af f ai r s ,  no.12 (July 1984), pp. 
113-142.
------------------ , Hong Kong: In Search o f  A Future (Hong Kong: Oxford University
Press, 1984).
------------------ , Xianggang weilai de fazhan  (Hong Kong's Future Development) (Hong
Kong: Tiandi Tushu Youhen Gongsi, 1984).
------------------ , Xianggang jingji zhengzhi shehui luncong (Collection of Essays on Hong
Kong Economy, Politics and Society) (Hong Kong: Going Fine Ltd. 1984).
224
-------------------, “Representative Government and the Future of Hong Kong” ,
Convocation Newsletters, no.4 (December 1984).
-------------------, “Reform of the Economic Structure and ‘One Country, Two Systems’” ,
The Australian Journal o f  Chinese Af fa i r s ,  no .13 (January 1985), pp .109-120.
-------------------, Hong Kong in the Mid-Eighties  (Hong Kong: University Publishers &
Printers, October 1985).
-------------------, Hong Kong In Transition  (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1986).
-------------------, “Hong Kong: The Challenge of the Future” Asia Pacific C o m m u n ity ,
no.31 (Winter 1986), p p .19-44.
-------------------, “Hong Kong: The Pressure to Converge” , International A f f a i r s
(London), 63(2) (Spring 1987), pp.271-283.
Cheung, S.N.S., M aijuzhe yan: Xinbao Zheng Wuchang lunheng ji  (Sayings from a 
Common Man: Collections of Critical Commentaries by Stephen N.S. Cheung in the 
Hong Kong Economic Journal) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Economic Journal Ltd., 
1984).
Ching, F.. Hong Kong and China, For Better or For Worse (New York: The China 
Council of the Asia Society and the Foreign Policy Association, 1985).
Conference on Trade Unions and Labour Organizations in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: 
Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 4-6 September, 1985).
Davies, S.N.G., “One Brand of Politics Rekindled” . Hong Kong Law Journal, 7 (1977), 
pp.44-95.
Easey, W., Ducking Responsibility, Britain and Hong Kong in the 1980s (London: 
Hong Kong Research Project, 1980).
Endacott, G.B., The Government and People o f  Hong Kong, 1841-1962 (Hong Kong: 
University of Hong Kong Press, 1964).
-------------------, A History o f  Hong Kong  (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1973).
England, J. and Rear, J., Industrial Relations and Law in Hong Kong (An Extensive 
Rewritten Version of Chinese Labour under British Rule) (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1981).
Fang. Kamui, Fendiao (Ironies) (Hong Kong: Wide Angle Publishers. 1984).
Fung, ILL., Two Models o f  Public Participation with Implication to the Hong Kong 
Context (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University M.S.W. masters thesis. 1978).
Geiger, T. and Geiger, F.M., Tales o f  Two City-States, The Development and Progress 
o f  Hong Kong and Singapore (Washington: National Planning Association, 1973).
Gillespie, J.Y. and Nesvold, B.A. (eds), Macro-Quantitative Analysis: Conflicts,
Developments and Democratization  (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971).
G rantham , A., Via Port - From Hong Kong to Hong Kong (Hong Kong: University of 
Hong Kong Press, 1965).
225
Han Yuan, Xianggang de zuihov yicheng (Hong Kong's Last Journey) (Taipei: Shibao 
Shushi, 1984).
Harris, P.B., “The Internationa] Future of Hong Kong” , International A f f a i r s  (January 
1972), pp.60-71.
-------------------, “The Frozen Politics of Hong Kong” , The World Today (May 1974),
pp.259-267.
------------------ , “Sources of Stability and Instability in Hong Kong” , Southeast Asian
Spectrum , 3(1) (October 1974), pp.42-50.
-------------------, “Representative Politics in a British Dependency: Some Reflections on
Problems of Representation in Hong Kong” , Parliamentary A f f a i r s , 28 (1975), 
pp.180-198.
------------------ , Hong Kong: A Study o f  Bureaucratic Politics (Hong Kong: Heinemann,
1978).
-------------------, “Policy Process and Policy Formulation in Hong Kong” , in C.H. Leung.
J.W . Cushman and G.W. Wang, (eds.), Hong Kong: D ilem m as o f  Growth
(Canberra: Australian National University, 1980).
------------------ , Reflections on Hong Kong, Li fe,  Work and Politics (Hong Kong:
Heinemann Asia, 1981).
------------------ , Public Administration and Public A f f a i r s  in Hong Kong (Hong Kong:
Heinemann Asia, 1983).
------------------ , “Hong Kong Confronts 1997: An Assessment of the Sino-British
Agreement” , Pacific Af fai rs ,  59(1) (Spring 1986), pp.45-68.
Hicks, G., “Hong Kong on the Eve of Communist Rule", a paper prepared for the panel 
discussion on “The Future of Hong Kong as a Market Economy” , in the Annual 
Meeting of W. Social Science Association (24-27, April 1985). Fort Worth, Texas.
Ho, Suk-ching, ‘Entering the China Market - Via Hong Kong?” , Asia Pacific  
C om m unity ,  no.31 (Winter 1986), pp.45-54.
Hoadley, J.S., “Hong Kong is the Life Boat, Note on Political Culture and 
Socialization” , Journal o f  Oriental S tud ies , 8 (1970), pp.206-218.
------------------ , “Political Participation of Hong Kong Chinese: Patterns and Trends".
Asian  Survey, 13 (1973), pp.604-616.
Hong Kong Affairs Society, A Symposium on “The Political system of Hong Kong: Its 
Development and 1997” (Hong Kong: June 1984).
Hong Kong Daily Express, Women dui Xianggang qiantu de yijian - Xianggang  
Kuaibao duzhe toushu zhuanji  (Our Views on the Future of Hong Kong - 
Collection of Readers’ Letters from Hong Kong Daily Express) (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong Daily Express Ltd., 1982).
Hong Kong Federation of Students, Xianggang Xuesheng yundong huigu (Reflections 
on Students’ Movements in Hong Kong) (Hong Kong: Wide Angle Publishers, 
1983).
226
------------------ , Xianggangzhou zhanlan  - ‘Xianggang zhengzhi yantaohui’ lunwenji
(Hong Kong Week Exhibition - A Collection of Papers from the Seminars on “Hong 
Kong's Political System” ) (Hong Kong: The Federation, 1983).
The Hong Kong Observers, Pressure Points (Hong Kong: Summerson Educational 
Research Centre, 1983).
Hong Kong Research Project, Hong Kong: A Case to Answer  (London: Spokesman
Books, 1974).
Hong Kong University Social Science Students Association, Zhengzhi canyu zai 
Xianggang  (Political Participation in Hong Kong) (Hong Kong: The Association,
1983) .
Hong Kong University and Chinese University of Hong Kong Students Unions, (eds.), 
Xianggang qiantu fengyun  - Baokan zazhi j ia n j i  ziliao (The 1997 Debate: 
Compendium of Newspaper and Magazine Sources) (Hong Kong: The Students
Unions, 1984).
Hook, B., “The Government of Hong Kong: Change within Tradition” , The China 
Quarterly, no.95 (September 1983), pp.491-511.
Hopkins, K., Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 
1971).
Howe, C.. “Growth, Public Policy and Hong Kong’s Economic Relationship with 
China” , The China Quarterly , no.95 (September 1983), pp.512-533.
Hu, Husheng. Wu Chum ai Xianggang ziyou (Do Not Betray Hong Kong’s Freedom) 
(Hong Kong: Xinsi Chubanshe, 1984).
Hu, Juren, 1997: Xianggang , Xianggang diwei wenti ziliao huibian (1997 Collected 
Sources on the Position of Hong Kong) (Hong Kong: Pai Shing Semi-Monthly, 
1982).
Hughes, R., Borrowed Place, Borrowed T im e , Hong Kong and its M any Faces (London: 
Andre Deutsch, 1976).
Huidian wenjianji (Collected Documents of the Meeting Points), M inzhu  gaige yu 
gangren zhigang (Democratic Reforms and Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong) 
(Hong Kong: Shuguang Tushu Gorigsi, 1984).
Jao. Y.C., Leung. C.K., Wesley-Smith. P. and Wong. S.L., (eds)., Hong Kong and 1997: 
Strategies for the Future (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies. University of Hong 
Kong, 1985).
Jarvie, I.C.. Hong Kong Society in Transition  (London: Routledge <U Kegan Paul. 
1969).
Jiang. Weiwen, Xianggang zhengzhi yu gangren zhigang (Hong Kong's Political System 
and Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong) (Hong Kong: Wide Angle Publishers.
1984) .
Johnson, C.A., “The Mouse-Trapping of Hong Kong: A Game in Which Nobody Wins” , 
Asian  Survey , X X IV (9) (September 1984), pp.887-969.
227
Jones, J.F. et al ., “Neighbourhood Association in a New Town: The Mutual Aid 
Committees in Shatin” , Occasional Paper, no.76 (Hong Kong: Social Research
Centre, Chinese University of Hong Kong, August 1978).
King, A.Y.C., “The Political Culture of Kwun Tong: A Chinese Community in Hong 
Kong” , Occasional Paper (Hong Kong: Social Research Centre, Chinese University 
of Hong Kong, 1972).
-------------------, “Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the
Grassroots Level” , in A.Y.C. King and R.P.L. Lee, (eds.), Social L i fe  and 
Development in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1981).
-------------------and Lee, R.P.L., (eds.), Social L ife  and Development in Hong Kong
(Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1981).
-------------------, “The Hong Kong Talks and Hong Kong Politics” Issues and Studies ,
22(6) (June 1986), pp.52-74.
Kwan, H.C., “Political Stability and Change in Hong Kong” , in T.B. Lin, R.P.L. Lee 
and U.E. Simons, (eds.), Hong Kong: Economic , Social and Political Studies in 
Development (Hamburg: The Institute of Asian Affairs, 1979), pp .145-166.
Kwan, Alex Y.H. and Chan, David K.K., (eds.). Hong Kong Society, A Reader (Hong 
Kong: Writers’ Publishers’ Cooperative, 1986).
Kung, J., The Struggle for a Hospital: A Contextual Analysis o f  an Urban Social 
Movement in Hong Kong (Brisbane: unpublished Masters Thesis, Queensland 
University, 1984).
Lamb, H.K., Hong Kong 1997: A Date With Fate (Hong Kong: Lincoln Green 
Publishing. 1984).
Lau, S.K., “From Traditional Familialism to Utilitarianistic Familialism: The
Metamorphosis of Familial Ethos among the Hong Kong Chinese'", Occasional 
Paper, no.78 (Hong Kong: Social Research Centre, Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, October 1978).
-------------------and Ho, K.F., “Social Accommodation of Politics: The Case of the Young
Hong Kong Workers” , Occasional Paper Hong Kong: Social Research Centre. 
Chinese University of Hong Kong. 1980).
-------------------, “The Government, Intermediate Organizations and Grassroots Politics in
Hong Kong” , Asian Survey. X X I(8)  (August 1981), pp.865-884.
-------------------, Society and Politics in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Chinese University
Press, 1982).
-------------------, “Local Administrative Reform in Hong Kong: Promises and
Limitations” , Asian Survey. 22(9) (September 1982), pp.858-873.
-------------------, “The District Board Elections in Hong Kong” . Occasional Paper (Hong
Kong: Centre for Hong Kong Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1983).
-------------------, “Organizing Participatory Urban Services: The Mutual Aid Committees
in Hong Kong” , Occasional Papers, no.2 (Hong Kong: Centre for Hong Kong
Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong. November 1983).
228
------------------ , “Social Change, Bureaucratic Rule, and Emergent Political Issues in Hong
Kong” , World Politics , X X X V (4)  (July 1984), pp.544-562.
------------------ , and Kuan, H.C., “The 1985 District Board Election in Hong Kong: The
Limits of Political Mobilization in a Dependent Polity” , Occasional Paper, no.8 
(Hong Kong: Centre for Hong Kong Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, July
1985) .
------------------ , “Hong Kong After the Sino-British Agreement: Limits to Institutional
Changes in a Dependent Polity” (Hong Kong: Centre for Hong Kong Studies, 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, August 1985).
------------------ , “The Changing Political Culture of the Hong Kong Chinese” , in J.Y.S.
Cheng, (ed.), Hong Kong in Transition  (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
1986) , pp.26-51.
--------------:— , “Chinese Bureaucrats in a Modern Colony: The Case of Hong Kong” ,
Occasional Paper, no.16 (Hong Kong: Centre for Hong Kong Studies, Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, September 1986).
------------------ , “Decolonization Without Independence: The Unfinished Political Reforms
of The Hong Kong Government” , Occasional Paper, no.19 (Hong Kong: Centre for 
Hong Kong Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong. May 1987).
Law. Chi-kong. “The Effects of Campaign Strategies and Other Factors on the Outcome 
of the District Board Election” , Resource Paper Series, no .11 (Hong Kong: 
Department of Social Work, University of Hong Kong, 1986).
Lee, N., “Nur noch 13 fette jahre?” ( “1997: The Case of Hong Kong’s Reunification with 
China” ) GEO. no.5 (October 15, 1984), pp.58-59.
Lei, Jian. Zhaoxun yige xin difang - j ianshe yige xin Xianggang  (A New Hong Kong: 
Our Strategy) (Hong Kong: The Author, 1984).
Lethbridge. H.J., Hong Kong: Stability and Change (Hong Kong: Oxford University 
Press, 1978).
------------------ , Hard Cra ft  in Hong Kong - Scandal , Corruption , The 1C AC  (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1985).
Leung, C.H., Cushman. J.W. and Wang G.W., (eds)., Hong Kong: D ilem m as o f  
Growth  (Canberra: Australian National University, 1980).
Leung, Sai-wing. “Perception of Political Authority by the Hong Kong Chinese” , 
Occasional Papers, No. 17 (Hong Kong: Center for Hong Kong Studies, Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, November 1986).
Lewis, D.K., “The Prospect of Hong Kong” (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 
no.142, 1982).
Lin, T.B., Lee, R.P.L and Simons, U.E., (eds.), Hong Kong: Econom ics , Social, and 
Political Studies in Development (Hamburg: Institute of Asian Affairs, 1979).
Lin, X ingzh i (Lin Chan-muk). Xianggang qiantu wenti de shexiang yu sh ish i  - Xinbao  
zhengjing duanping xuan ji , 1975-1984 (The Problems of Hong Kong's Future:
229
Hypothesis and Facts - Collection of his Commentaries on Politics and Economy 
from the Hong Kong Economic Journal. 1975-1984) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
Economic Journal Publishers, Sept 1984).
Long, Xin, Xianggang de ling yige zhengfu  (A Shadow Government of Hong Kong) 
(Hong Kong: Haishan Tushu Gongsi, 1986)
Luo, Zhongxie, et al., Q uyihui - zai m inzhu  canzheng di jiaose  (The District Board’s 
Role in Democratic Participation) (Hong Kong: 1982).
Luo, Xianhao, “Public Administration and Public Opinion in the New Territories’1 
(Hong Kong: unpublished M.Phil. Thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1975).
Lu, Fanzhi, Xianggang - cong zhimindi dao tebie xingzhengqu (Hong Kong - From 
Colony to Special Administrative Region) (Hong Kong: Wide Angle Publishers, 
1982).
------------------ , Zou xiang m inzhu  zizhi di ‘gangren zhigang’ (Towards Democratic
Self-Government and Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong) (Hong Kong: Beichen 
Xueshe and Jixian She, 1985).
-------------------, Ping Zhongying shuangfang yu jibenfa xventi (On China, Britain and the
Basic Laws) (Hong Kong: Beichen Xueshe and Jixian She, 1985).
Lu, Zijian, et al., M inzhu  Xianggang tansuo  (A Survey on Democracy for Hong Kong) 
(Hong Kong: Shuguang Chuban She, 1984).
------------------ and Zhang Hande, Zhengzhi gaige hequ hecong (What is the Direction for
Political Reforms) (Hong Kong: Genius Publishing Company, 1984).
------------------ , P n g  daiyi zhengzhi baipishu (A Critique of the White Paper on the
Further Development of Representative in Hong Kong) (Hong Kong: Genius 
Publishing Company. 1985).
Lui, T.L., Urban P o te s ts  in Hong Kong: Sociological Study o f  Housing Conflicts  
(Hong Kong: unpublished M.Phil. Thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1984).
Lui, T.L. and Kung, J., Chengshi zongheng - Jurnin yundong ji chengshi zhengzhi 
yanjiu  (Urban Perspectives - A Study of Residents Movements and Urban Politics) 
(Hong Kong: Wide Angle Publishers, 1985).
Lui, J .W .C., Pressure Groups and the Decision-making P ocess  - A Study o f  the 
P cc io u s  Blood A f f a i r  (Hong Kong: M.Soc.Sc. Dissertation, 1984).
McMillen. D.H., “Hong Kong. China and the Australian Connection: Some Preliminary 
Thoughts” , a paper presented at Australian-Sino Relations Conference, 10-12 July, 
1985, Griffith University.
------------------  and Ivory, P., “Hong Kong. China - Transformation in Transition?:
Implications for Australia'*, a paper prepared for the Asian Studies Association of 
Australia, 6th biennial conference, University of Sydney (11 th -16th, May 1986).
Minchin. J., No M an is an Island , A Study o f  Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew (Sydney: 
Allen &: Unwin, 1986).
Miners, N.J., “Hong Kong: A Case Study in Political Stability” , Journal o f  
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics , X III (1975), pp.26-39.
230
-------------------, “Can the Colony of Hong Kong Survive 1997?r , Asian Pacific
C o m m u n ity , no.6 (1979), pp .100-114.
------------------ , “China and Hong Kong’s Future” , in C.H. Leung, J.W. Cushman and
G.W. Wang, (eds.), Hong Kong: D ilem m as o f  Growth (Canberra: Australian 
National University, 1980).
------------------ , The Government and Politics o f  Hong K ong , 4th edition (Hong Kong:
Oxford University Press, 1986).
-----------7------, “Plans for Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, 1946-52” , The China
Quarterly. 107 (September 1986), pp.463-482.
Ng, S.H. and Levin, D.A., Contemporary Issues in Hong Kong Labour Relations  (Hong 
Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1983).
------------------ , Laogong wenti m ianmianguan  (Diverse Aspects of Labour Problems)
(Hong Kong: Wide Angle Publishers, 1984).
Overholt, W.H., “Hong Kong and the Crisis of Society” Asian Survey. X X X IV (4 )  
(April 1984), pp.471-484.
Peggs, I.P., The Adm inistrative  Consequences o f  Public Participation: An Evaluation  
o f  District Adm inistration in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: M.Soc.Sc. Dissertation, 
University of Hong Kong, 1983).
Prospect and Desire - Hong Kong, From the S tatesmen's Eyes (Hong Kong: Genius
Publishing Co., 1985).
Pye, L., “The International Position of Hong Kong” , The China Quarterly, no.95 
(September 1983), pp.456-469.
Rabushka, A., The Changing Face o f  Hong Kong  (Washington. D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973).
------------------ , Value for Money: The Hong Kong Budgetary Process (California: Hoover
Institution Press, 1976).
------------------ . Hong Kong, A Study in Economic Freedom (Chicago: The University of
Chicago, 1979).
Rear, J., “One Brand of Politics” , in K. Hopkins, (ed.), Hong Kong: The Industrial
Colony (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp.55-140.
------------------ and England, J., Chinese Labour under British  Rule (Hong Kong: Oxford
University Press, 1975).
Robinson, K.E., “Hong Kong: the 1997 Issue” , The Commonwealth Journal o f  
International A f f a i r s , no.287 (July 1983), pp.263-273.
Scott, L, “Sino-British Agreement and Political Power in Hong Kong” , Asia Pacific  
C o m m u n ity , no.31 (W'inter 1986), pp.1-18.
------------------ , “Policymaking in a Turbulent Environment: The Case of Hong Kong",
International Review o f  Adm inistrative  Sciences, 52 (December 1986),
pp.447-469.
231
Scott, J.L., “Local-Level Election Behavior in an Urban Area” , Occasional Paper, no.6 
(Hong Kong: Centre for Hong Kong Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
January 1985).
Shi, Dalang, Xianggang shehui qiantu lun heng (Discussions on the Future of Hong 
Kong Society) (Hong Kong: University Publications, 1982).
Shi, Junan, et al., Jibenfa m ianm ian  guan (Perspectives on Basic Laws of Hong Kong) 
(Hong Kong: Genius Publishing Co., 1984).
Sima, Yi, Rongyao quangui Deng Xiaoping de Xianggang qiantu tanpan  (The Talks on 
the Future of Hong Kong Which Give All Glory to Deng Xiaoping) (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong Economic Journal Publishers, 1984).
Situ Huifen, Liang De et al.. Xianggang Pinglun  (Hong Kong Commentaries) (Hong 
Kong: Wide Angle Publishers, 1987).
Shively, S., “Political Orientations in Hong Kong - a Socio-psychological Approach” , 
Occasional Paper, no. 12 (Hong Kong: Social Research Centre, Chinese University of 
Hong Kong, 1972).
Survey Research Hong Kong Ltd., Researching the 1997 Agreement (Hong Kong: 
Survery Research Hong Kong Ltd., 1984).
Tongxiang 1997: Xianggang qiantu wenti zhuanji  (Towards 1997: Special Issue on the 
Future of Hong Kong) (Hong Kong: The Mirror Post Cultural Enterprises Co. Ltd., 
1983).
Turner, H.A., The Last Colony: But Whose? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1980).
Walden, J., Excellency , Your Gap is Showing! Six Critiques on British Colonial 
Government in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Corporate Communications Ltd., 1983).
------------------ , “Hong Kong’s Two Futures” , speech to the Lions Club International
Zone, South China Morning Post (2 December, 1983).
------------------ , “The Plight of Hong Kong’s Silent Majority” . Asian Wall Street Journal
(13 November, 1984).
------------------ , “Hong Kong Chases a Democratic Mirage". Asian Wall Street Journal (7
March, 1985).
------------------ , “White Paper Spelt the End of Democracy", speech to a seminar
organized by the Hong Kong Management Association. South China Morning Post 
(12 September, 1985).
------------------ , “U.K.’s Moral Responsibility” , letter to the Editor, South China Morning
Post (19 December, 1985).
W aterson , ' N., Hong Kong' Future: Countdown to C o m m u n is m ? (London: Bow
Publishers, July 1984).
Whiting, A., Donnithorne A. and Lee, N., “Panel on Hong Kong” , (Canberra: 
Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies. 
Australian National University, 1 August, 1985).
232
Wilson, D., “The Future of Hong Kong“ , World Today , 20(9) (September 1964), 
pp .395-402.
------------------ , “New Thoughts on the Future of Hong Kong” , Pacific C o m m u n i ty , 8
(1977), pp.588-599.
Wong, A.L.C., “Chinese Community Leadership in a Colonial Setting: The Hong Kong 
Neighbourhood Association” , Asian Survey , 12(7) (July 1972), pp.587-601.
-------------------, The Kai fong  Associations and the Society o f  Hong Kong (Taipei: Asia
Folklore and Social Life Monographs, 1972).
Wong, A.W.F., “Non-Purposive Adaptation and Administrative Change in Hong Kong” , 
in C.H. Leung, J.W . Cushman and G.W. Wang, (eds.), Hong Kong: Di lemmas  o f  
Growth (Canberra: Australian National University, 1980).
Wong, H., Xianggang qiantu yu Jihenfa Tebie Xingzhenggu di zhengzhi lantu (The 
Hong Kong Future and Basic Law) (Hong Kong: International Affairs College, 
1985).
Wu, Yuanli, “The Future of Hong Kong Before and After 1997” , The American Asian  
Review (Winter 1984), pp. 13-23.
Xianggang dangan  (Hong Kong File) (Hong Kong: Pai Shing Semi-Monthly, 1984).
Xianggang de Mingri  zhi xing (Hong Kong’s Rising Stars), Vols. 1 2 (Hong Kong:
Wide Angle Publishers, 1985).
Xianggang Ivxiang  (Wither Hong Kong) (Hong Kong: Pai Shing Semi-Monthly, 1983).
Xianggang miny i  yu Xianggang qiantu (Hong Kong's Public Opinion and Hong Kong’s 
Future) (Hong Kong Xinwenhua Shiye Gongying Gongsi, 1983).
Xianggangren lun Xianggang qiantu (Hong Kong People on Hong Kong's Future) 
(1983).
Xianggang shetuan z izhi . cujin hui  (The Association for the Promotion of Community 
Self-Government) Jiuqi tekan - gangren zhigang moni  - Jianli  Shetuan zizhi 
zhengfu  (1997 Special - Simulating Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong - To 
Promote Communuity Self-government) (Hong Kong: The Association, 1984).
Xianggang weilai yu fanrong wenti  (Hong Kong’s Future and the Problem of 
Prosperity) (Hong Kong: Wide Angle Publishers, 1983).
Xianggang Wenti Wenjian Xuan j i  (A Selection of Documents on the Problems of Hong 
Kong) (Beijing: Renrnin Chuben She, 1985)
Xinshizhen Baoye Youxian Gongsi, Difang xingzheng dashi huigu (Review of Key 
Issues in District Administration) (Hong Kong: Xinshizhen Baoye Youhen Gongsi, 
1984).
Xu Dongbin, Xiaotan Keyin Xianggang Xue  (Callously Imbibe Hong Kong’s Blood) 
(Hong Kong: Pai Shing Semi-Monthly, 1983).
Xue Fengxuan (Victor Sit), Xianggang Dalu Zongheng Tan (A Cross Section of Hong 
Kong and the Mainland) (Hong Kong: Dadao Wenhua Youxian Gonsi, 1986).
233
Yeung, S., Shehui zhengce yu shehui yundong (Social Policy and Social Action) (Hong 
Kong: Wide Angle Publishers, 1983).
------------------ , Xianggang shehui gaige (Hong Kong’s Social Reforms) (Hong Kong:
Wide Angle Publishers, 1985).
------------------ , Xianggang zhengzhi gaige (Hong Kong’s Political Reforms) (Hong Kong:
Wide Angle Publishers, 1986).
Zeng Shuji, ei al ., Wuxingqi xia de Xianggang - Xianggang qiantu wenti tantao  (Hong 
Kong under Five Star Rule - An Analysis of Hong Kong’s Future) (Hong Kong: 
Shuguang Tushu Gongsi, 1982).
------------------ , Xianggang yu Zhongguo zhi jian  (Between Hong Kong and China) (Hong
Kong: Wide Angle Publishers, 1984).
------------------ , Julong Kouli de m ingzhu  (The Pearl in the Dragon’s Mouth) (Hong
Kong: Wide Angle Publishers, 1984).
Xianggang zhengzhi j ingjixue  (The Political and Economic Studies of Hong Kong) 
(Hong Kong: Wide Angle Publishers, 1985).
H o n g  K o n g  G o v e r n m e n t  P u b l i c a t i o n s
A Draft Agreement Between the Government o f  the United Kingdom o f  Great Britain  
and Northern 1 reland and the Government o f  the People's Republic o f  China  
(Hong Kong: The Government Printer, 26 September 1984).
Green Paper, District Adm inistration in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Government 
Printer, June 1980).
------------------ . The Further Development o f  Representative Government in Hong Kong
(Hong Kong: The Government Printer, July 1984).
------------------ , The 1987 Review o f  Developments in Representative Government (Hong
Kong: The Government Printer, May 1987).
Report of the Assessment Office. Report o f  the Independent Monitoring Team , 
Arrangements for Testing the Acceptability in Hong Kong o f  the Draft  Agreement 
on the Future o f  the Territory (Hong Kong: The Office. 29 November, 1984).
------------------ , Arrangements for Testing the Acceptability in Hong Kong o f  the Draft
Agreement on the Future o f  the Territory - Submissions Made by Organizations to 
the Assessm ent Of f i c e , vols. 1 & 2 (Hong Kong: The Office, 29 November. 1984).
White Paper, District Adm inistra tion  in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Government 
Printer, January 1981).
------------------ , The Further Development o f  Representative Government in Hong Kong
(Hong Kong: The Government Printer, November 1984).
M a g a z i n e s / P e r i o d i c a l s /N e w s p a p e r s  
A sian  Wall Street Journal 
Asiaweek  (English)
Beijing Review  (English)
Cheng M ing M onthly  (Chinese)
Chung Pao M onthly  (Chinese)
Far Eastern Economic Review  (English) 
Hong Kong Economic Journal (Chinese) 
The M irror M onthly  (Chinese)
The N ineties M onthly  (Chinese)
October Review  (Chinese)
M ing Pao D aily
Pai Sing Sem i-m onthly  (Chinese)
South China M orning Post 
Ta R ung Pao 
W ah K iu  Yat Pao 
Wen Wei Bao 
The Wide Angle
235
Appendix A
THE CO NSULTATIVE SYSTEM IN HONG K ONG  
BEFORE SEPTEM BER 1985
THE CONSULTATIVE SYSTEM
Advice & 
Consent
GOVERNOR
Y. ' '
r.^T: » iy
Appowtsd by ths British sover­
eign. ns a  in practice selected 
&V Britain's pnme ministsr snd 
tris government of ths day. His 
authority a  derived from tris 
le tten  Patent and Royal ln- 
stnjctions, first enacted in 1843 
as a Roys) Charter and since 
rewritten and amended numer­
ous times. His wide powers 
include the final say on iegsla- 
txxi. disposal of land, appoint­
ment of lodges & puPlic 
officers, and pardons. Though 
he ■ required to consult with 
the Executive Council, he •  not 
legally bound to ecceot its 
advice.
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (Exco) 17 Members
FUNCTION: To edvae the 
governor. Likened to a cabinet, 
it meets in private session with 
the governor once a week. 
MEMBERSHIP: Presided over 
try the governor, Exco includes 
four tx-otficto government 
members (the Chief Secretary, 
the Commander British Forces.
the Finanaal Secretary and the 
Attorney Generali and thirteen 
nominated members appointed 
by the British monarch (in 
practice the govemorl. Of 
these, two are chosen from 
government ranks end the 
rsmeeimg eleven are privets 
dozens or Unofficieis. Only
Exco m briefed by the governor 
on the content of the Sino- 
Bnosh talks. Historically, the 
Unofficial represented Brash 
trading interests. Today mem­
bership has been expanded 
to include locals and profess­
ionals. though Exco Unofficial 
remaei notably pro- business.
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (Legco) 47
FUNCTION: Enactment of
legislation (bills must have the 
governor's assent before they 
become lawl and the control 
of public funds. Legco meets 
once every two weeks, except 
for a receee of about two 
months in August & Septem­
ber. Its debates are broadcast 
live m Cantonese and English. 
MEMBERSHIP: Presided over
by the governor, Legco deludes 
three ex-o/Wob government 
members and 44 nominated 
members  appomtad by the Bri- 
ush monarch (in practice the 
govemorl. Of these, fifteen 
ere chosen from government 
ranka and the remaining 29 ere 
private citizens or Unoffideie. 
As ■ the case in Exco. the 
Unofficial!' views are widefy
noted smee Unofficial« sre the 
primary meant through which 
the government ascertain« 
public opinion. A united 
Unoffioei vote against the 
government would ceirv corv 
saderepie poetical weight, 
though *ege*Y it could be over­
turned by me governor. At 
present five Exco Unofficisls 
also ait on Legco.
f PROPOSED "REGIONAL COUNCIL"FUNCTION: Roughly modeSed 
after Urbco. the stik-uonemed 
council would taka over the 
direction of the New Temtonea 
Senncaa Department currently 
handled directly by the central 
government. Alternatively, two 
new government departments, 
one for recreeoon & culture and 
another for health & hygiene, 
may be created to service both 
Urbco end the regional council. 
MEMBERSHIP: Identical to 
Urbco in composition, with the 
addition that the Heutig Yea
Kuk would have several ex- 
otfkto seats on the new council. 
A pibnsionel. entxely eopomted 
council is proooeed for (966. 
with elections of half the mem­
bers to taka piece si 1986. 
Exact boundaries between the 
two councils have yet to be 
determined. Areas trist might 
go art her way mckide the 
outlying elands and parts of 
Kowloon that are currsotfy 
classed as pen of the New 
T emtonea.
URBAN COUNCIL (Urbco) 30
FUNCTION: The direction of 
tfw Urban Senncaa Department 
in the provwpn of such emem- 
bes as sanitation, racraaoon 
and cultural services m trsdi- 
tionaAy urban Hongkong 
Wand. Kowloon and New 
Kowloon Use map). Its primary 
revenue is ■ share of ratss 
(a species of prooeny taxi. In 
addition it coAects fees for soma 
services, though it may not 
legaiats taxes and it thus
financially rskant on the cen­
tral government. 
MEMBERSHIP; The only 
government-related sdnsrsatre- 
ttve body in Hongkong conv 
pneed solely of members of 
ths puokc. Urbco includes X  
members, fifteen appointed by 
the governor end fifteen elected 
by district. The ehe »men of 
Urbco •  erected by the counck 
and may be either an apoomted 
or elected member.
DISTRICT BOARDS (DBs). 500
HEUNGYEEKUK 
(RURAL CONSULTATIVE 
COUNCIL) 117
FUNCTION: The eighteen OBs 
are the primary mesne of public 
coreuitaoon and participation 
at tha district level, the bottom
FUNCTION: To advise the 
government on poüciea effect- 
the indigenous residents 
the New Territories. 
MEMBERSHIP: Rural leaders, 
frequently village headmen, 
elected to one of 27 "rural
mg 
of 
committees. Ths Kuk retains 
considerable clout in New 
Territories politics, though rapid 
urbanisation means its consti­
tuents form a shnnkjng mmortty 
of New Term ones residents. J
of Hongkong's governmental 
pyramid. Though their role i* 
meevy to edvee the govern­
ment rather then make or imple­
ment pokey, they are allocated 
public funds tor local recrea­
tional and cultural activities. 
MEMBERSHIP: At present
elected members make up half 
of each board. The govem- 
hee recently proooeed 
mcreeemg the number of 
sleeted members to twice that
of non elected. District boards 
m the traditionally urban areas 
have links with the Urban 
Council in the form of Urbco 
members (elected and ap­
pointed I who sit on the OBs. 
white those m the New Terri­
tories provide seats lor mem­
bers of the Kuk. The govern­
ment has said that tha proposed 
regional council would also 
mdude members of the Oistnct 
Boards.
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Appendix B
THE PROGRESS OF THE SINO-BRITISH TALKS  
ON THE FU T U R E  OF HONG KONG,  
September 1982 - September 1984
D a t e Rounds Joint D e c l a r a t i o n s
Sept 22-26, 1982 1st pha s e  
( T h a t c h e r ’s 
visit to 
Beijing)
The two p o w e r s  agree to e n t e r  into 
talks t h r o u g h  d i p l o m a t i c  c h a n n e l s  
f o l l o w i n g  the visit, w i t h  the common 
a i m  for m a i n t a i n i n g  the s t a b i l i t y  
and p r o s p e r i t y  of H o n g  Kong.
July 12-13, 1983 2nd pha s e  
1st r o u n d
c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l
July 25-26, 1983 2nd r o u n d b e n e f i c i a l
Aug 2-3, 1983 3rd r o u n d d i s c u s s i n g
Sept 22-23, 1983 4th r o u n d d i s c u s s i n g
Oct 19-20, 1983 5th rou n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l
N o v  14-15, 1983 6th rou n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l
Dec 7-8, 1983 7th r o u n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l ,  the 
p r o g r e s s  of the talks w a s  r e v i e w e d
Jan 25-26, 1984 8th rou n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l
F e b  22-23, 1984 9th rou n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l
M a r  26-27, 1984 10th r o u n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  a n d  b e n e f i c i a l
M a r  26-27, 1984 11th r o u n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l
A p r i l  11-12, 1984 12th r o u n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l
A p r i l  15-18, 1984 H o w e ’s v i sit p r o g r e s s i v e  d e v e l o p m e n t
A p r i l  21, 1984 Howe in HK Howe o f f i c i a l l y  a n n o u n c e d  that B r itain  
w o u l d  r e t u r n  Hon g  K o n g  to the PRC in 
1997.
A p r i l  27-28, 1984 13th r o u n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l
M a y  9-10, 1984 14th r o u n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l
M a y  30-31, 1984 15th r o u n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l
June 12-13, 1984 16th r o u n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l ;  a w o r k i n g  
g r o u p  to be set up
June 27-28, 1984, 17th r o u n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l
July 11-12, 1984 18th r o u n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l
July 24-25, 1984 19th r o u n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l
July 27-31, 1984 H o w e ’s v i s i t p r o g r e s s i v e  d e v e l o p m e n t
July 3 1 - Aug 1, 1984 Howe in HK i n t r o d u c e d  10 p o i n t s  that w o u l d  be 
i n c l u d e d  in the draft agreem e n t ;  the 
se t t i n g  up of the J L G .
Aug 8-9, 1984 20th r o u n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  a n d  b e n e f i c i a l
Aug 22-23, 1984 21st r o u n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  a n d  b e n e f i c i a l
Sept 6-7, 1984 22nd r o u n d c o n s t r u c t i v e  and b e n e f i c i a l
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Appendix C
THE P R C ’S POLICIES IN HONG KONG A N D  THE  
DELEGATIONS TO BEIJING BETW EEN 1982-1984
15 June, 1982: Deng Xiaoping met 12 representatives from Hong Kong and Macau. 
According to the Pai Shing  Magazine, Deng told the visitors that as a principle the 
PRC would reassert its sovereignty over Hong Kong ‘sometime about 1997’, but 
this would be accomplished in a way which would preserve Hong Kong's stability 
and prosperity.
31 October, 1982: Denny Huang, an Urban Councillor of Hong Kong, returned from 
Beijing saying that sovereignty was not negotiable. Hong Kong would be given a 
high level of local autonomy.
1 November, 1982: Xi Zhongxun met the delegates of the Hong Kong Trade 
Development Council, telling them that a plan for the future of Hong Kong should 
be worked out in one to two years1 time. The system of Hong Kong would remain 
unchanged after returned to the PRC.
20 November, 1982: Liao Chengzhi met a Hong Kong factory owner, Wang Jian, telling 
him that Beijing would recover sovereignty over Hong Kong not later than 1997. 
Hong Kong would become a special administrative region and would be allowed to 
have ‘gangren zhigang1.
1 December, 1982: Liao Chengzhi told a visiting group of industrialists that the PRC 
had long considered ‘gangren zhigang’ as a solution for the future of Hong Kong.
1 December, 1982: Liao Chengzhi told the New Territories Delegation that “the ball was
now in Britain’s court11. Beijing intended to recover the sovereignty over Hong Kong 
no later than 1997. After regaining sovereignty, Hong Kong would practise ‘gangren 
zhigang1. Capitalism would continue in the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region.
9 December, 1982: Liao Chengzhi met the Hong Kong delegates of the NCP and
CPPC C .
10 December, 1982: Zhao Ziyang and Gu Mu discussed economic co-operation with Hong
Kong leading property developers, Gordon Wu and Cheng Yu-tung. Upon their 
return on 16 December, they said that Zhao was aware of the Hong Kong peopled 
worries.
Spring 1983: The New Hong Kong Society visited Beijing. The Beijing officials stated 
tha t  the PRC must recover the sovereignty of Hong Kong on 30 June, 1997. Any 
a ttem p t to extend the British administration was unacceptable. Hong Kong would 
continue to enjoy the freedom of organizing social activities.
2 March, 1983: Liao Chengzhi met the delegates of the post-secondary staff members. He
proposed 9 points for ‘gangren zhigang1. It could be summarized as four principles: 
“recovery of sovereignty, maintaining prosperity, ‘gangren zhigang1, maintaining 
existing system11.
11 April, 1983: John Young, a staff member of the Hong Kong University Extra-mural
238
Department, came back from his Beijing trip saying tha t  Hong Kong would have a 
‘mini-constitution’ after 1997.
16 May, 1983: The Young Professionals visited Beijing. Xi Zhongxun told them that the 
PRC w'ould handle the Hong Kong issue with care.
28 May, 1983: The PRC authorities told the Hong Kong journalists that Hong Kong 
would become a special administrative region ‘for a long tim e’ after the PRC 
regained sovereignty.
28 July, 1983: The Hong Kong Federation of Students returned with a draft of the terms 
for the special administrative region. The terms included ( l)  sovereignty and 
administration were inseparable; trusteeships and joint-administration were not 
acceptable to the PRC; (2) Hong Kong would enjoy a high level of local autonomy; 
(3) the governor would be appointed by the PRC central authorities; he was not 
necessarily a party member but should ‘love the country’. (4) independent judiciary; 
(5) the existing socio-economic system would remain unchanged; (6) own currency; 
(7) The rightists, Trotskyites and religious activities were allowed to continue in 
Hong Kong so long as they were not insurgents.
14 October, 1983: Denny Huang returned from Beijing and revealed similar details for
the special administrative region.
October 1983: K.L.C. Legg. the Director of the Hong Kong Polytechnic returned from 
Beijing and asked people to put their heart at ease. The two governments would 
reach a satisfactory agreement for the future of Hong Kong.
21 November, 1983: Ji Pengfei met 81 Hong Kong and Macau commercial and industrial 
members. He emphasized that sovereignty and administration were inseparable. 
Hong Kong would be allowed a high level of local autonomy. Its prosperity and 
stability would be maintained.
15 November, 1983: Ji Pengfei met the New Territories Delegates, proposing 50 years’
transition after 1997. The Hong Kong people would continue to enjoy the freedoms 
of movement, press, speech, and associations. All these would be written in the 
mini-constitution.
1 December. 1983: Ji Pengfei met the Chinese Reform Association of Hong Kong, saying 
that the draft of the. Basic Law would be discussed by the people of Hong Kong 
before it would be passed in the NPC.
9-10 December, 1983: Ji Pengfei met the delegates of the Hong Kong Observers, agreeing 
that the Hong Kong government would be elected. Hong Kong people would be 
allowed to participate in the drafting process of the Basic Law. They also met Li 
Juseng and Lu Ping.
8 January. 1984: Mun Kin-chok (Min Jianshu), the Dean of Business Administration, 
the Chinese University of Hong Kong returned from Beijng. Ji Pengfei said to him 
that the people of Hong Kong could be classified into three types: (1) pro-Beijing: 
(2) pro-British; (3) neutral.
24 April, 1984: A group of fourteen urban councillors and district board members
returned from Beijing (generally known as the ‘social activists’ group). They said 
that the Chinese officials had promised to give local residents two chances to 
comment on the mini-constitution for Hong Kong before it was finalized. They 
called this as ‘two ups and two downs’ principle. The Chinese officials also 
summarized their position on the 1997 issue in five short phases, “return of 
sovereignty, setting up of special administrative zone, Hong Kong people ruling 
Hong Kong, local system unchanged, continuation of prosperity” .
25 April, 1984: A group of academics visited Beijing. The PRC authorities said to t hem
that Hong Kong would enjoy autonomy except in four areas, namely national
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security, foreign relations, constitution, and the National People’s Congress would 
have final say on the appointment of the key local officials. These key officials 
might be nominated either by consultation or by elections. The drafting of the Basic 
Law would be completed in 3-5 years’ time after the Sino-British talks.
28-30 April, 1984: Ji Pengfei met representatives of the Hong Kong and Kowloon 
Kaifong Association. He called upon the Hong Kong people to work for the 
prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. The rights of both the local and foreign 
immigrants would be protected equally.
2 May, 1984: Ji Pengfei met the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk delegates and discussed 
land problems. Ji said that the British should be responsible for the prosperity and 
stability of Hong Kong in the transitional period. He also warned the delegates to 
be cautious with internal disturbances in Hong Kong.
21 June, 1984: A nine-member delegation of the Hong Kong Chinese Clerks Association 
returned from Beijing. The senior Chinese officials promised not to send cadres to 
Hong Kong after the recovery of the territory’s sovereignty in 1997, and it would be 
written in Basic Law. They were also told that civil servants would be allowed to 
continue in their jobs in order to keep continuity in the administration.
23 June, 1984: After a UMELCO delegation returned from London in May, 3 of them, 
namely Sir S.Y. Chung, Lydia Dunn and Q.W. Lee, were invited to Beijing. The 
three members hoped to make use of this opportunity to convey their view to the 
Chinese leaders about the crisis of business confidence in Hong Kong. Upon their 
return they said tha t  they failed to convince Deng Xiaoping of a crisis of confidence 
in Hong Kong. But on the same day, another delegation led by the leading figures 
of Hong Kong’s largest trade and industrial associations returned from Beijing, 
bringing with them an entirely different version of Deng’s opinion. Deng was 
reported to have told the latter that he was aware of a confidence problem in Hong 
Kong and repeated the P R C ’s determination to maintain Hong Kong’s status quo 
for 50 years. The businessmen were also told that the Hong Kong people should 
have aspirations and confidence in administering Hong Kong. The delegation was 
led by the three chairmen of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, the 
Chinese Manufacturers Association, and the Federation of Hong Kong Industries.
13 July, 1984: The Hong Kong, Kowloon and New Territories Hawkers Delegation
returned from Beijing. They were told to have confidence in administering the 
internal affairs of Hong Kong and should have confidence in the proposed 
‘one-country, two-systems" principles. They were also told to work for the common 
goal: the maintenance of prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.
4-17 July, 1984: The Hong Kong Federation of Students Unions visited Beijing. They 
were told that the first post-1997 government would be constituted either by 
consultation or by elections. Direct elections could be a good idea but it should 
depend on the the level of political knowledge of the Hong Kong people. Moreover, 
the Hong Kong people would be able to enjoy the freedoms of speech, publication, 
associations, organizations, movements and the choice of jobs.
14 July, 1984: Li Xiannian met the Hong Kong garment manufacturers and exporters
delegation, agreeing that Hong Kong would retain the autonomy to negotiate 
trading details with importing countries.
18 July, 1984: Ji Pengfei met the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce delegation. He 
restated tha t  the British administration would be responsible for maintaining the 
prosperity and stability of Hong Kong in the 13 years’ transition. After 1997, Hong 
Kong would enjoy a high level of local autonomy within a special administrative 
region. The central government would not interfere in the internal affairs of Hong 
Kong.
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2 August, 1984: A delegation of the Chinese Civil Servants Association returned from 
Beijing saying tha t  they were assured of their pay and conditions of service. 
Moreover, the ‘three-three system’ proposed a t one time was now considered by the 
PRC officials as outdated. Rather, it would be the individual talents of those who 
participated on administering Hong Kong to prevail. Talents, not political beliefs 
would be taken into account for the appointment of the future administrators.
30 August, 1984: The delegates of the Hong Kong Civil Servants General Union returned 
from Beijing. They were told by Ji Pengfei tha t  the civil service system would 
remain unchanged; their rights would be protected.
18 September, 1984: The Tung Wah Groups of Hospitals returned from Beijing and were 
assured of their continued operation in Hong Kong after 1997. Ji Pengfei also said 
th a t  the central government would not send cadres to interfere in the internal 
administration of the territory.
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Appendix D
M EM BERS OF THE HONG KONG EXECUTIVE  
A N D  LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS  
as at January 1985
Type of 
Appointment
Name Age Position/Profession
Executive Council (All appointed) 
Chairman Sir Edward Youde 61 Hong Kong Governor
Ex-officio Sir Philip Haddon-Cave 60 Chief Secretary
Ex-officio Major Derek Boorman 55 Commander British Forces
Ex-officio Sir John Bremridge 60 Financial Secretary
Ex-officio Michael David Thomas 52 Attorney General
Official David Akers-Jones 58 Secretary for District
Official Eric Peter Ho 58
Administration
Secretary for Trade and Industry
Unofficial Sir Sze-yuen Chung 68 Engineer, Chairman of Sonca
Unofficial Oswald Victor Cheung 63
Industries Ltd. 
Lawyer
Unofficial Sir Roger Lobo 62 Company Director of Lobo t Co
Unofficial Li Fook-wo 69 Director of Bank of East Asia
Unofficial Michael G.R. Sandberg 58 Chairman of Hong Kong fc Shanghai
Unofficial Lo Tak-sing 50
Bank
Lawyer
Unofficial Lydia Dunn 45 Executive Director of John Swire
Unofficial Lee Quo-wei 67
t Sons Ltd
Chairman of Hang Seng Bank
Unofficial Chen Shou-lum 60 Engineer, Director of China Light
Unofficial Maria fai-chu Tam 39
t Power Ltd 
Lawyer
Legislative Council (All appointed) 
Chairman Sir Edward Youde 61 Hong Kong Governor
Ex-officio Sir Philip Haddon-Cave 60 Chief Secretary
Ex-officio Sir John Bremridge 60 Financial Secretary
Ex-officio Michael David Thomas 52 Attorney General
Official David Akers-Jones 58 Secretary for District
Official Allan James Scott 51
Administration 
Secretary for Transport
Official Thong Kah-leong 57 Director of Medical and Health
Official Eric Peter Ho 58
Services
Secretary for Trade and Industry
Official Donald Poon-huai Liao 56 Secretary' for Housing
Official Piers Jacob 52 Secretary for Economic Services
Official David Gregory Jeaffreson 54 Secretary for Security
Official Chan Nai-keong 54 Secretary for Lands and forks
Official Ronald G.B. Bridge 53 Commissioner for Labour
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Type of 
Appointment
Name Age Position/Profession
Official James Neil Henderson - Secretary for Education and 
Manpower
Official John Walter Chambers 54 Secretary for Health and Welfare
Official Michael Man-kin Leung 47 Director of Education
Official Peter Kwang-yung Tsao 52 Secretary for Homes Affairs
Unofficial Sir Roger Lobo 61 Director of Lobo k Co
Unofficial Harry Sin-yang Fang 62 Orthopaedic Surgeon
Unofficial Lo Tak-sing 49 Lawyer
Unofficial Francis Yuan-hao Tien 70 Director of Manhattan Garments Ltd
Unofficial Alex Shu-chih Wu 65 Chairman of Fidelity Management 
Ltd
Unofficial Chen Shou-lam 60 Engineer, Director of China Light 
& Power
Unofficial Lydia Dunn 45 Executive Director of John Swire k  
Sons Ltd
Unofficial Peter Chak-cheong Wong 63 Lawyer
Unofficial Wong Lam 66 Public Relations Manager, Kowloon 
Motor Bus Ltd
Unofficial Ho Kam-fai 52 Director of Extra-mural
Department, Chinese University 
of Hong Kong
Unofficial Allen Peng-fei Lee 45 Managing Director of Ampex Far 
East Operation
Unofficial Andrew Kwok-wing So 46 Vice-president of CUNA Mutual 
Insurance Group
Unofficial Hu Fa-kuang 61 Engineer, Director of Ryoden 
Electric Engineering Co
Unofficial Wong Po-yan 62 Director of United Overseas 
Enterprises Ltd
Unofficial William C.L. Brown 54 Manager of the Chartered Bank
Unofficial Chan Kam-chuen 60 Adviser to Director, Far East 
Cable k Wireless, HK
Unofficial John Joseph Swaine 53 Lawyer
Unofficial Stephen Kam-chuen Cheong 44 Managing Director of Lee Wah 
Weaving Factory Ltd
Unofficial Cheung Yan-lung 63 Sole Proprietor, Lica fc Co
Unofficial Selina Shuk-yee Chow 40 Impressario, Director of 
Brainchild Ltd
Unofficial Maria Wai-chu Tam 39 Lawyer
Unofficial Henrietta Man-hing Ip - Medical Practitioner
Unofficial Chan Ying-lun 35 Public Relations Manager, San 
Miguel Brewery Ltd
Unofficial Rita Lai-tai Fan 40 Educational Psychologist, Head of 
Student Affairs, Hong Kong 
Polytechnique
Unofficial Pauline May-lin Ng 38 Middle School Teacher
Unofficial Peter Wing-cheung Poon 52 Accountant
Unofficial Yeung Po-kwan 46 School Principal, Ming Yin College
Unofficial Cham Yau-sum 39 Accountant, Director of Kwong Fat 
Hong (Holding)
Unofficial Keith Hon-keung Lam 45 Partner of Siu Wing Stocks and 
Shares
Unofficial Carl Ka-wing Tong 35 Accountant
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Appendix E
M E M B E R S OF THE HONG KONG EXECUTIVE  
A N D  LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS  
as at August 1986
Type of 
A p p o i n t m e n t
Name Age P o s i t i o n / P r o f e s s i o n
E x e c u t i v e  C o u n c i l  (All appointed)  
C h a i r m a n  S i r  E d w a r d  Y o u d e 62 H o n g  K o n g  Gov e r n o r
E x - o f f i c i o Sir D a v i d  A k e r s - J o n e s 59 Chief Secr e t a r y
E x - o f f i c i o M a j o r  T.A. B o a m - C o m m a n d e r  B r i t i s h  F o r c e s
E x - o f f i c i o Sir John B r e m r i d g e 61 F i n a n c i a l  Secre t a r y
E x - o f f i c i o M i c h a e l  D a v i d  Thomas 53 A t t o r n e y  General
O f ficial Eric P e t e r  Ho 59 S e c r e t a r y  for Trade a n d  Industry
O f ficial D o n a l d  P o o n - h u a i  Liao 57 S e c r e t a r y  for D i s t r i c t
U n o f f i c i a l Sir S z e - y u e n  C h u n g 69
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
E n gineer, C h a i r m a n  of Sonca
U n o f f i c i a l Lyd i a  D u n n 46
Indust r i e s  Ltd
E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r  of John Swire
U n o f f i c i a l W i l l i a m  P u r v e s 55
and Sons Ltd
C h a i r m a n  of H o n g  K o n g  t Shanghai
U n o f f i c i a l L e e  Quo-wei 68
Bank
C h a i r m a n  of H a n g  Se n g  Bank
U n o f f i c i a l Che n  S h o u - l u m 61 Engi n e e r ,  D i r e c t o r  of China Light
U n o f f i c i a l M a r i a  W a i - c h u  T a m 40
fe P o w e r  Ltd 
L a w y e r
U n o f f i c i a l D a n i e l  C h i - w a i  Tse 51 P r e s i d e n t  of H o n g  K o n g  Baptist
U n o f f i c i a l C h i u  H i n - k w o n g 58
Co l l e g e
M e d i c a l  P r a c t i t i o n e r
U n o f f i c i a l P e t e r  C h a k - c h e o n g  Wong 64 L a w y e r
Legislative C o u n c i l
C h a i r m a n  Sir E d w a r d  Y o u d e 62 H o n g  K o n g  Gove r n o r
E x - o f f i c i o S i r  D a v i d  A k e r s - J o n e s 59 Chief Secre t a r y
E x - o f f i c i o S i r  John B r e m r i d g e 61 F i n a n c i a l  Secr e t a r y
E x - o f f i c i o M i c h a e l  D a v i d  Thomas 53 A t t o r n e y  General
Official D o n a l d  P o o n - h u a i  Liao 57 S e c r e t a r y  for D i s t r i c t
O f ficial I.F.C. M a c P h e r s o n 57
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
S e c r e t a r y  for Trans p o r t
O f ficial Eric P e t e r  Ho 59 S e c r e t a r y  for Trade a n d  Industry
Official C h a n  N a i - k e o n g 55 S e c r e t a r y  for Lands a n d  Works
Official James Neil H e n d e r s o n - S e c r e t a r y  for E d u c a t i o n  and
Official Joh n  W a l t e r  C h a m b e r s 55
M a n p o w e r
S e c r e t a r y  for H e a l t h  and Welfare
O f ficial P a n g  Y u k - l i n g 56 S e c r e t a r y  for H o u s i n g
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Type of 
Appointment
Name Age Position/Profession
A Unofficial Lydia Dunn 
A Unofficial Chen Shou-lam
A Unofficial Peter Chak-cheong Wong 
A Unofficial Ho Kam-fai
A Unofficial
A Unofficial
A Unofficial
A Unofficial
A Unofficial 
E Unofficial
Allen Peng-fei Lee
Hu Fa-kuang
Wong Po-yan
Chan Kam-chuen
John Joseph Swaine 
Stephen Kam-chuen Cheong
A Unofficial Cheung Yan-lung 
A Unofficial Selina Shuk-yee Chow
A Unofficial Maria Wai-chu Tam 
A Unofficial Henrietta Man-hing Ip 
A Unofficial Chan Ying-lun
A Unofficial Rita Lai-tai Fan
A Unofficial 
A Unofficial 
A Unofficial 
A Unofficial
Pauline May-lin Ng 
Peter Wing-cheung Poon 
Yeung Po-kwan 
Cham Yau-sum
A Unofficial Poon Chung-kwong
A Unofficial Helmut Sohmen 
A Unofficial Rosanna Yick-ming Wong
E Unofficial Jackie Chai-keung Chan 
E Unofficial Cheng Hon-kwan 
E Unofficial Hilton Cheong-leen
E Unofficial Chiu Hin-kwong
E Unofficial Chung Pui-lam 
E Unofficial Thomas Clysdale
E Unofficial Ho Sai-chu
E Unofficial Hui Yin-fat
E Unofficial Richard Sing-lung Lai 
E Unofficial Conrad Kui-sing Lam
46 Executive Director of John Swire t 
Sons Ltd
61 Engineer, Director of China Light
fe Power Ltd 
64 Lawyer
53 Director of Extra-mural
Department, Chinese University 
of Hong Kong
46 Managing Director of Ampex Far
East Operation
62 Engineer, Director of Ryoden
Electric Engineering Co
63 Director of United Overseas
Enterprises Ltd
61 Adviser to Director, Far East 
Cable t Wireless, HK
54 Lawyer
45 Managing Director of Lee Wah
Weaving Factory Ltd (Industrial 
I Constituency)
64 Sole Proprietor, Lica fe Co 
41 Impressario, Director of
Brainchild Ltd
40 Lawyer
Medical Practitioner 
36 Public Relations Manager, San 
Miguel Brewery Ltd
41 Educational Psychologist, Head of
Student Affairs of Hong Kong 
Polytechnique
39 Middle School Teacher 
52 Accountant
47 School Principal, Ming Yin College
40 Accountant, Director of Kwong Fat
Hong (Holding)
46 Professor of Chemistry, Dean of
Science Faculty, University of 
Hong Kong
46 Vice-chairman of World
International (Holding) Co 
34 Director, Hong Kong Youth 
Association
47 Engineer (Electoral College)
59 Engineer (Electoral College)
64 Director of H. Cheong-leen Council 
(Electoral College)
58 Medical Practitioner (Medical 
Constituency)
45 Lawyer (Electoral College)
52 Accountant (Commercial I 
Constituency)
49 Director of Fook Lee Construction
Co Ltd (Commercial II 
Constituency)
50 Director of Hong Kong Council of
Social Services (Social Services 
Constituency)
40 Businessmen (Electoral College)
51 Medical Practitioner (Electoral
College)
Type of 
Appointment
Name Age Position/Profession
E Unofficial
E Unofficial 
E Unofficial
E Unofficial
E Unofficial 
E Unofficial
E Unofficial 
E Unofficial
E Unofficial 
E Unofficial
E Unofficial 
E Unofficial
E Unofficial
Lau Wong-fat 49
Martin Chu-ming Lee 48
Lee Yu-tai 41
David Kwok-po Li 47
Liu Lit-for 55
Ngai Shiu-kit 61
Pang Chun-hoi 65
Tam Yiu-chung 35
Poon Chi-fai 34
Szeto Wah 55
Tai Chin-wah 33
Daniel Chi-wai Tse 51
Andrew Wang-fat Wong 42
Businessman, Chairman of
Provisional Regional Co, Heung 
Yee Kuk and Tuen Mun Rural 
Committee (Electoral College) 
Lawyer
Administrator, Hong Kong 
Polytechnique (Electoral 
College)
Accountant, Chief Manager of Bank 
of East Asia (Financial 
Constituency)
Banker, Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd 
(Electoral College)
President of Eurasia Engineering 
Corp Ltd (Industrial II 
Constituency)
Member of Hong Kong Trade Union 
Council (Labour Constituency) 
Member of Hong Kong Federation of 
Trade Unions (Labour 
Constituency)
Administrator (Electoral College) 
School Principal, Head of Hong 
Kong Professional Teachers Union 
(Educational Constituency)
Lawyer (Electoral College) 
President of Hong Kong Baptist 
College (Electoral College) 
Lecturer at Chinese University of 
Hong Kong (Electoral College)
A = Appointed E = Elected
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A pp en d ix  F
M E M B E R S  OF T H E  B A S I C  L A W  
D R A F T I N G  C O M M I T T E E  
(B ackgrounds  and Profess ions as at 18 June 1985)
N a t u r e  of 
A p p o i n t m e n t
Na m e Age P o s i t i o n / P r o f e s s i o n
C h a i r m a n Ji Pen g f e i 75 D i r e c t o r  of H o n g  K o n g  and M a c a u  Affairs 
Office of the State C o uncil
V i c e - C h a i r m a n W a n g  H a n b i n 59 S e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l  of NPC S t a n d i n g
Committee; C h a i r m a n  of N P C  L e g i s l a t i v e  
A f fairs C o m m i s s i o n
X u  J i atun 69 D i r e c t o r  of N e w  China Ne w s  A g e n c y  (Hong 
Kong Branch)
H u  Sheng 67 D i r e c t o r  of Central Party H i s t o r y
R e s e a r c h  Centre; P r e s i d e n t  of Academy 
of Social S c ience of China
Fei X i a o t o n g 75 V i c e - c h a i r m a n  of CPPCC N a t i o n a l
Committee; V i c e - c h a i r m a n  of China 
Democ r a t i c  L e a g u e  Central C o m m i t t e e
A n n  T s e-kai 75 C h airman of W i n s o r  Indust r i a l  Co r p  Ltd in 
Hon g  Kong, a p p o i n t e d  m e m b e r  of CPPCC
Pao Y u e - k o n g 66 Chairman, W o r l d  Wide S h i p p i n g
D a v i d  K.P. Li 46 Accountant, Chief M a n a g e r  of Bank of East 
Asia, m e m b e r  of H o n g  K o n g  L e g i s l a t i v e  
Council
Fei Y i m i n g 77 D i r e c t o r  of Ta Ku n g  Pao in H o n g  Kong, 
Sta n d i n g  Comm i t t e e  m e m b e r  of NPC
S e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l  
D e p u t y  Secret a r y -
Li H o u 62 V i c e - d i r e c t o r  of the State C o u n c i l ’s Hon g  
Ko n g  and M a c a u  Af f a i r s  O f f i c e
Ge n e r a l Lu P i n g 58 Secr e t a r y  G e neral of the Sta t e  C o u n c i l ’s 
Ho n g  Kong and M a c a u  A f f a i r s  Office
Mao J u n i a n 48 D e p u t y  S e c r e t a r y  General of N e w  China 
News A g ency (Hong K o n g  Branch)
3 6  P R C  M e m b e r s (by a l p h a b e t i c a l order)
C h e n  Chu 67 S e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l  of Cen t r a l  P a rty 
F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  Comm i t t e e
C h e n  X i n 55 S e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l  of Cen t r a l  P a r t y  Unit e d  
Front Work D e p a r t m e n t
D u a n  M u z h e n g  
Fei X i a o t o n g
65 De p a r t m e n t  h e a d  and P r o f e s s o r  of Law at 
Z h o n g s h a n  U n i v e r s i t y
Guo D i h u o 81 CPPCC N a tional C o m m i t t e e  m e m ber;
V i c e - c h a i r m a n  of G u a n g d o n g  p r o v i n c e  
NPC; V i c e - c h a i r m a n  of Cen t r a l  S t anding 
C o mmittee of China D e m o c r a t i c  N a tional 
C o n s t r u c t i o n  A s s o c i a t i o n
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Nature of 
Appointment
Name Age Position/Profession
Hu Sheng 
Ji Pengfei
Jia Shi 66 Vice-minister of the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade
Ke Zaishuo 61 Director of foreign Affairs Ministry at 
Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office; 
Senior Representative of China at 
Sino-British Joint Liaison Group
Lei Jieqiong 79 Vice-chairman of China Association for 
Promoting Democracy; NPC Standing 
Committee member; Vice- chairman of NPC 
Law Committee; Vice-president of All 
China Women’s Federation
Li Hou
Li Yumin 55 Vice-president of Bank of China
Liao Hui 43 Director of State Council’s Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Office
Lin Hengyuan 76 Deputy head of CPPCC National Committee 
Work Group for Law; Executive bureau 
member of China Democratic League
Lu Ping 
Mao Junian
Mo Yinggui 84 Vice-president of Guangzhou City CPPCC
Qian Changzhao 86 Vice-chairman of CPPCC National 
Committee; Vice-chairman of 
Revolutionary Committee of Chinese 
Kuomintang
Qian Weichang 73 CPPCC National Committee member;
President of Shanghai Polytechnical 
University
Qiu Shaoheng 72 Vice-chairman of NPC Standing Committee 
Legislative Affairs Commission
Ron Yiren 69 Vice-chairman of NPC Standing Conmittee; 
Chairman of Board of Directors of China 
International Trust and Investment 
Corporation; Vice-chairman of All-China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce
Rui Mu 77 Professor of Law Department in Beijing 
University
Shao Tianren 71 Adviser to NPC Foreign Affairs Committee
Wang Hanbin
Wang Shuwen 58 Director of Law Institute in Academy of 
Social Science of China
Wang Tieya 72 Professor of Law Department and Director 
of Institute of International Law in 
Beijing University
Wu Dakun 69 CPPCC National Committee Member; 
Professor of Economics in China 
People’s University
Wu Jianfan 59 Vice-director of Law Institute in Academy 
of Social Science of China
Xiang Chunyi 58 Vice-chairman of NPC Standing Committee 
Legislative Affairs Commission
Xiao Weiyun 61 Assistant Professor and Deputy department 
head of Law in Beijing University
Xu Chongde 56 Assistant Professor of Law Department in
China People’s University; 
Vice-president of Society of Political 
Science in Academy of Social Science of 
China
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Nature of 
Appointment
Name Age Position/Profession
Xu Jiatun
Yong Longgui 68 Adviser to NPC Financial t Economic 
Conmittee
Zhang Youyu 86 NPC National Committee member; Vice- 
chairman of NPC Law Committee
Zhao Nan 58 Vice-minister of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs
Zheng Weirong
23 H ong K o n g  M em b ers
Ann Tse-kai
52 Director of First Department at Hong Kong 
and Macau Affairs Office
Cha Chi-ming 66 Manufacturers
Louis Cha 
Fei yiming
61 Director of Ming Pao Daily
Henry Y.T. Fok 62 Member of CPPCC, Chairman of Chinese 
General Chamber of Commerce in Hong 
Kong
Eayson Huang 65 Vice-chancellor of University of Hong 
Kong
Kwong Kong-kit 49 Bishop of Hong Kong Anglican Church
Lau Wong-fat 48 Businessman, Chairman of Heung Yee Kuk 
and Tuen Mun Rural Committee
Martin Lee 
David K.P. Li
47 Lawyer (Elected to Hong Kong Legislative 
Council in September 1985)
Li Ka-shing 56 Managing Director of Cheung Kong Ltd
Simon F.S. Li 63 High Court Judge
Ma Lin 60 Vice-chancellor of Chinese University of 
Hong Kong
Liu Yiu-chu 
Pao Yue-kong
50 Lawyer
Eon yongdao 58 Accountant
Shi Jueguang 66 Buddhist
Szeto Wah 54 School Principal, Head of Hong Kong
Professional Teachers Union (Elected to 
Hong Kong Legislative Council in Sept 
1985)
Maria W.C. Tam 49 Lawyer, Appointed member of the Hong Kong 
Executive and Legislative Councils
Tam Yiu-chung 35 Executive of Hong Kong Federation of 
Trade Unions (Elected to Hong Kong 
Legislative Council in Sept 1985)
W'ong Po-yan 62 Director of United Overseas Enterprises, 
appointed member Hong Kong Legislative 
Council
Raymond Wu 47 Chairman of Hong Kong Medical Association
Zheng Zhengxun 49 Vice-chairman of Chinese General Chamber 
of Commerce in Hong Kong, Vice-chairman 
of Hong Kong Productivity Council
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Appendix G
LOBBYING ACTIVITIES BY THE  
PROGRESSIVE G R O U PS TO THE  
P R E P A R A T O R Y  COMMITTEE OF THE BLCC, 1985
30 June: Concerned Group for Basic Law  was formed by the Association for Democracy 
and Justice, Hong Kong Policy Viewers, Septentrio Academy, and Concerned Group 
in Sham Shui Po. They suggested that the formation of the BLCC should be a 
spontaneous process organized from below and it should not be organized by the 
Chinese authorities.
12 July: Kowloon City District Basic Law Consultative Of f i ce , a preparatory group 
organized by Kowloon City District Board members.
15 July: Open Forum jointly attended by 12 groups, namely Social Workers General
Unions. Hong Kong Professional Teachers Union. Association for Democracy and 
Justice. New Hong Kong Society, Hong Kong Affairs Society, Society for Social 
Research. Hong Kong Policy Viewers, Hong Kong People's Association and People's 
Council on Public Housing Policy. Most of them commented that the BLDC 
members should not undertake a leadership role to control the selection process of 
the BLCC representatives.
16 July: An open letter to Xu Jiatun, presented by 11 political groups. They suggested
that  (1) the BLCC representatives should be nominated by groups from the various 
sectors of the Hong Kong society. (2) The BLDC members should not control and 
determine the membership and structure of the BLCC. (3) The preparatory works 
of the BLCC should only be finalized after a period of public consultation and 
discussions. (4) BLCC should be given a legal position by the NPC.
22 July: Joint Conference o f  Concerned Groups on Basic Law in S h a t in , formed by 19
Shatin District Board members, which aimed at soliciting the opinions of the 
community on Basic Law issues.
23 July: Concerned Group on Basic Law, formed by members from 19 district boards.
24 July: Concerned Group on Basic Law , organized by members of the Southern
District Board.
28 July: An open forum on the BLCC, participated by 40 district board members who 
came from 12 district boards.
5 August: Joint Conference o f  Political C om m entary  Croups on the Basic Law , 
participated by 21 political groups, which aimed at nominating candidates to the 
BLCC. The 21 groups included, Civic Association, Reform Club, Hong Kong 
Belongers Association. New Hong Kong Researchers Association, Hong Kong Policy 
Viewers, Christian Sentinels, Septentrio Academy, Christian Industrial Committee, 
Hong Kong Affairs Society, Hong Kong People’s Association, Meeting Point, 
Progressive Hong Kong Society, Hong Kong Professional Teachers Unions, 
Association for Democracy and Justice, New Hong Kong Society, Society for 
Community Organization, Hong Kong Social W’orkers General Union, Trade Union 
Council, Hong Kong Forum.
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18 August: Joint Conference o f  Labour Unions on Basic Law , participated by 138
independent and leftist trade unions. 70 of them were members of the pro-PRC 
Federation of Trade Unions.
19 August: Joint Declaration by 13 political groups calling for a period of consultation
before the BLCC Constitution was to be finalized. They commented on the 
importance for a lack of a consultation period by saying that Hong Kong people 
would fear that this would become the normal practice and that their opinions were 
neglected.
7 September: Joint Conference o f  Education Groups on the Concern o f  Basic Law , 
participated by 5 major education groups.
5 October: Joint Conference o f  Politically Concerned Group on Basic Law  nominated 5 
members to the BLCC Preparatory Committee.
21 October: Joint Conference o f  C om m unity  Groups on Basic Law. which comprised of 
9 grassroots organizations, namely People’s Council on Public Housing Policy, 
Sham Shui Po Concern Group, Society for Community Organizations, and 
residents’ groups in Tuen Mun, Tai Hang Tung and Chaiwan, nominated 2 
candidates to the BLCC preparatory committee.
251
Appendix H
M EM BERSHIP LIST OF THE BASIC LAW  
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE (as at November 1985)
M e m b e r s  o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  C o m m i t t e e  
Chairman: Ann Tse-kai
Vice-chairmen: T.L. Yang, Rayson Huang, Wong Kwan-cheng, Li Kai-ming,
Philip Kwok (Electoral College)
Secretary General: Mao Junian
M e m b e r s  o f  S t a n d i n g  C o m m i t t e e
Lo Tak-shing, Lawrence Kadoorie, Peter Kwong, Ko Siu-wah. Louis Cha, Wong Po-yan, 
Leung Chun-ying, Danis Chang, Kwok Yuen-hon, Ng Hong-mun, Philip Yuen, Kong 
T ak-yan
N a m e s  of  all t h e  180 B L C C  M e m b e r s  (by alphabetical order)
Ann Tse-kai. Au Sing-wai, Louis Cha, Veronica Cha, Chan Cheng-chun, Peter Chan, 
Chan Hip-ping, Chan Pun, Chan Siu-kam, Chan Wing-kee, Chan Ying-lun, Danis 
Chang, Chang Ka-man. Chang Wan-fung, Char  Nee-quin, Edward Chen, Thomas Chen, 
Cheng Chung-wai, Cheng Kai-nam. Mignonne Cheng, Cheng Yiu Tong. Cheng Yu-tung, 
Stephen Cheong, Cheung Chun-kwok, Cheung Lun, Cheung Pak-chi, Cheung Sai-lam, 
Tommy Cheung. Cheung Yau-kai, Ching Yuen-kai, Kenneth Chow, Chow Wing-sun, 
Choy Tak-ho. Aloysius Chu. Lawrence Chu. Andrew Chuang, Chung Chi-yung, Chung 
King-fai, P.S.C. Deveson. Fok Tsun-ting. Fok Wah-pun. Daniel R. Fung, Fing 
Ho-keung. Fedreich Fung, Fung Wai-kwong. William Fung, Tony Fung, David Wylie 
Cairns, Nick Griffin. Louis E. Keloon Ha. Ha Man-ho, Hari N. Harilela, Edward Ho, Ho 
Man-fat, Raymond Ho. Stanley Ho, Ho Ting-kwan, Hu Chu-jen, Hu fa-kuang. Raymond 
Huang. Rayson Huang. Henrietta Ip, Ip Yuek-lam, Lawrence Kadoorie, Kan Fook-yee, 
William Ko. Ko Gra-yee. Ko Siu-wah, Kong Tak-yan, Ku Sze-chung, Kung Chi-keung. 
M.C. Kwok, Philip Kwok, Kwok Yuen-hon, Peter Kwong, Larn Kwong-yu, J.S. 
Lambourn, Lau Nai-keung, Peter Lee. Lee Jung-kong, Lee Kai-ming, Paul Lee. Lee 
Lin-sang. Lee Wing-tat,  C.H. Leong, Leung Chun-ying, Leung Lam-hoi, Leung Siu-tong,
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Arthur Li, Richard Li, Ronald Li, Li Siu-kei, Liu Ching-leung, Liu Lit-man, Liu 
Yong-ling, Vincent Lo, Lo King-man, Lo Tak-shing, John Lok, Anthony Luk, Joseph 
Ma, lan MacCallum, Mak Chan, Mak Hoi-wah, Man Hon-ming, Man Sai-cheong, 
Michael Miles, Moa Junian, William Mong, Agnes Ng, Ng Hong-mun, Ng Kam-tsuen, 
Steve Ng, Ng Tor-tai, Ng Yiu-tung, Pun Chiu-yin, Poon Chun-leung, Poon 
Chung-kwong, Pun Kwok-shing, Anthony Gordon rogers, A. de O. Sales, Shao You-bao, 
Shek Wai, Shen Peng-ying, Shu Tse-wong, Shung Jih-chong, Helmet Sohmen, Michael 
Neale Somerville, Shum Choi-sang, Samson Sun, Sun Sheng-tsang, Szeto Fai, Tarn 
Ling-kwan, Tang Hing-yee, Tang Hsiang-chien, Edwin Tao, James Tien, Brian Tisdall, 
To Shui-moon. Tsang Hin-tse, Jeffrey Tsang, Tsang Kwong-to, Daniel Tse, Jacob Tse, 
Tsin Sai-nin, Tso Wung-wai, Tsui Sze-man, William Tsui, Elsie Tu, Wilson Tuet, Tung 
Chee-hwa, Van Lau, Wan Kwok-shing, David Edward Leslie Wong. Wong Hong-yuen, 
Wong Kon-hon, Wong Kwan-cheng, Wong Lai-chuen, Philip Wong, Wong Po-yan, 
Ronnie Wong, Wong Wan-tin, Wilfred Wong, Peter Woo, Peter Wrangham, Annie Wu, 
Harold T. Wu, Raymond Wu, Wu Chiu, T.L. Yang, Eddy Yau, Ewan Yee, Yeung 
Yue-man, Luke Yip, Howard Young, Christina Yu, Philip Yuen, Lincoln Yung, Zee 
Kwoh-kung, Zee Sze-yong
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Appendix I
GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL A N D  OPINION  
G ROUPS A N D  THEIR MEM BERS  
(as in 1984-85) in Alphabetical Order
T H E  P R O - E S T A B L I S H M E N T
C iv ic  A sso c ia t io n :  The Civic Association was founded in 1954 as a civic group, 
and from 1956 on, it began to prom ote candidates to run the Urban Council elections. 
Until 1983, the majority of the elected members representing the Urban Council were 
either members of the Reform Club or of the Civic Association. C hairm an  of the Civic 
Association, H ilto n  C h eo n g - lee n  (1922—), a businessman, was also cha irm an of Urban 
Council between 1981-86. In September 1985, he was elected to the Legislative Council 
through the electoral college (Urban Council Constituency). Secretary-general, 
E d m o n d  C h o w  (1925—), a solicitor, was also a member of the Urban Council between 
1973-86. The association was fairly well-established among the com m unity  groups and 
kaifong associations. During the Sino-British talks, the association did not have an 
official position regarding the future of Hong Kong, but Hilton Cheong-leen and Edmond 
Chow called for an extension of th ir ty  years1 British adm in is tra tion  after 1997. In 
1984-85, the two leaders also called for the maintenance of the s ta tu s  quo, greater 
par tic ipa tion  of the educated elite in the political processes and a m ixture of direct and 
indirect elections to the Legislative Council. In 1985, the association joined the 
Progressive Hong Kong Society as a sister organization.
H o n g  K o n g  B e lo n g e r s  A s s o c ia t io n  (H K B A ):  The HKBA was established in 
1978 as an opinion group. It was composed mainly of well-established professionals and 
senior civil servants. It was not until 1980-81 th a t  it s ta r ted  to take  a s tand  on certain 
public issues of general concern. Generally speaking, the association was conservative 
and pro-establishm ent, and favoured the maintenance of the s ta tu s  quo. It also 
undertook a more suspicious a t t i tu d e  tow ards the pressure-group m embers and was thus 
reserved abou t  the dem ocratization  of the existing system. Until 1985, it had no 
intention of becoming a political par ty ,  although two m em bers, P e g g y  L am  and 
C h u n g  P u i - la m ,  were elected to the d istrict boards in March. Peggy Lam, 
Executive-director of the Family P lanning Association of Hong Kong, became chairman 
of the W anchai District Board, and Chung Pui-lam (1938—). a solicitor and ex-civil
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servant, was elected by the Sham Shui Po District Board members to the Legislative 
Council in September 1985. Later, these two people also became members of the 
Progressive Hong Kong Society.
P r o g re s s iv e  H o n g  K o n g  Soc ie ty  (P H S ) :  The PHS was established in March 
1985 soon after the district board elections, consisting mainly of some appointed 
Legislative Council members, District Board members, Urban Councillors, professionals 
and businessmen. Its Chairman, M a r i a  T a m  (1945—), a lawyer, had once been elected a 
member of the Urban Council and Central <V Western District Board, as well as an 
appointed member of the Executive Council and Legislative Council. In June 1985, she 
was also appointed as a member of the BLDC. Its Vice-chairman, P h i l i p  K w o k  
(1938—), was the Director of the Wing On (Holdings) Company and was appointed to 
the BLCC in November 1985. Although the PHS consisted of both grassroots members 
and establishment and pledged the co-operation of all classes in society, it was generally 
considered as a pro-establishment group and was distrusted by the pressure-group 
members. The group extended its connections quickly among various district boards, 
community organizations, kaifong associations, the Heung Yee Kuk and the Civic 
Association.
R e fo rm  C lu b :  The Reform Club was established in the 1940s as a political group, 
which called for the introduction of elected elements to the Legislative Council. In 
1983-84, it claimed to have a membership of 45,000 and was particularly influential 
among the lower-income classes such as the fishermen, hawkers and labourers in some 
old urban areas, such as the eastern part of Hong Kong Island. Like the Civic 
Association, the Reform Club promoted members to run the Urban Council elections in 
the past three decades. Its chairman, B ro o k  B e rn a c c h i  (1922—). a lawyer, and an 
active member, K w a n  L im -h o  (1947—), also a lawyer, had been members of the Urban 
Council. The Club had connections with some Liberal Party members in London, and 
through this connection, sent a delegation to London in April 1982, suggesting that 
Hong Kong could become a trust territory under the British administration for a term of 
20 years after 1997 and China should gave at least 10 years' notice before it resumed 
administration over Hong Kong. In 1984-85, the club supported the call for direct 
elections to the Legislative Council and actively supported 35 candidates to the district 
board elections in March, of which 17 were elected. But in January 1985, Bernacchi was 
reported to have said that it was unrealistic for the Reform Club to develop into a 
political party because China, a one-party system, would not tolerate the existence of 
political opposition. In January 1986, Kwan Lim-ho called for the preservation of the 
best features of the existing socio-political system. He also said that the stability and 
prosperity of Hong Kong would not be maintained if direct elections were implemented 
too early.
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Y o u n g  P ro fe s s io n a ls :  The Young Professionals originated in a delegation led by 
three Legislative Council members, namely A llen  Lee (1940—), Se l ina  C h o w  (1945—) 
and S te p h e n  C h e o n g  (1941 — ), who went to Beijing in May 1983 to express the lack of 
confidence among the businessmen and professionals about the future of Hong Kong and 
in particiular, China’s proposal for ‘ganreng zhigang’. These three members were 
subsequently referred to as the Young Professionals in the Legislative Council. In 1984, 
both Allen Lee and Selina Chow called for the democratization of the political system 
and active participation of local people in the political processes. In March 1985, it was 
reported in the media that the trio was joined by four other young Legislative Council 
members, namely Chan Ying-lun, Karl Tong, Hu Fa-kong and Rita Fan, to study the 
feasibility of establishing political parties in Hong Kong. In September 1985, Allen Lee 
was also said to have supported a number of candidates standing for the Legislative 
Council elections, M a r t i n  Lee being one of them. But between .July and November, 
members of the Young Professionals began to split over the question of direct elections 
and Hong Kong’s relations with China, with Stephen Cheong expressing his reservations 
about, direct elections. In December, Allen Lee openly admitted tha t  his political plans 
were shelved because of Beijing’s displeasure. In 1986, both Selina Chow* and Allen Lee 
were reported to have changed their stand towards direct elections, but in July 1987 
Allen Lee again declared his support for the implementation of direct elections in 1988.
M ID D L E -C L A S S  G R O U P S
H ong K ong Affairs Society  (H K A S): The HKAS was established in February 
1984 by a group of professionals who were in their 40s. Its chairman, H u an g  Chen-ya, 
was a professor at the Medical School of the University of Hong Kong. Its 
Vice-chairman, N elson  C how , was a lecturer at the Sociology Department of the 
University of Hong Kong. Other members, such as H o C h u n -yen  and M an  
Sai-cheong. were lawyers, being elected to the Urban Council in March 1986. The 
society began as a group of friends discussing regularly among themselves about the 
future of Hong Kong. While they expressed their confidence in ‘gangren zhigang’, they 
called for the democratization of the existing system and the active participation of the 
people of Hong Kong in preparing for self-government. In March 1985, 3 members were 
elected to the district board elections. In 1986 it came up with a political proposal which 
favoured a two-party system and a wholly elected legislature. In 1986-87, the society 
came to co-operate with the grassroots members in the campaign for direct elections, 
and thus became a member of the Joint Committee on the Promotion of Democratic 
Government in November 1986.
H on g  K ong Observers: The Observers w'as established in 1975 as an opinion 
group, which called for greater responsiveness of the Hong Kong government towards
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public opinion. Until 1983-84, it had only about 40 members and was not intended to 
expand its membership, nor did it expect to become an active political group. Thus, 
members standing for the 1985 district board elections ran the campaign in their 
individual capacities. Since the members of the group consisted mainly of professionals, 
it had an elitist image; but it was also a well-respected intellectual group. The Observers 
also supported democratic self-government, the maintenance of the sta tus quo in Hong 
Kong and greater public participation in the political processes.
H ong K on g  P rosp ec t  In s t i tu te  (H K P I):  The HKP1 was established in 
September 1981 by 9 people with the aim of expressing their opinions on Hong Kong's 
future. Its chairman, Lo Sze-kw ong, was a professor at the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong. Other members were mainly newspaper columnists and editors of some 
Chinese-language magazines, such as the Pai Shing  and The N ineties. One founding 
member, Joseph Cheng, a political science lecturer at the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, was also a member of the Hong Kong Observers, but withdrew his membership in 
1984. In general, the group represented the views of various Chinese intellectuals of an 
older generation who tended to be suspicious of Communism and thus distrusted 
Beijing's proposal for ‘gangren zhigang'. The group became inactive by the end of the 
Sino-British talks and was defunct after the signing of the Joint Declaration.
H ong K ong P e o p le ’s A ssoc ia t ion  (H K P A ):  The HKPA began with the 
publication of 132 signatures of various professions in the newspaper who showed their 
confidence towards Hong Kong’s future in August 1984, a month before the conclusion of 
the Sino-British talks on Hong Kong’s future. In November the HKPA was officially 
established by 12 core members, most of them being academics and graduates of the 
Hong Kong University in the late 1960s. The HKPA did not have a platform of any 
kind, but it called for the active participation of local people in public affairs. It also 
supported 9 members to stand for the 1985 district board elections. The group became 
inactive by 1985-86.
N e w  H ong K ong Researchers: (generally known as the H ong K ong
R esearchers A ssoc ia tion) The association was established in October 1984 by about 
30 people, who wrere mainly professional and commercial elite. In 1985 the group 
expressed its confidence towards the future of Hong Kong and supported greater public 
participation in government affairs. In general, the association did not differ much from 
such groups as the HKPA and the HKAS, but its members were more conservative in 
their a tt itude  about political reforms. The group also kept a low' profile in public debates 
on major issues.
G R A S S R O O T S  O R G A N I Z A T I O N S /P R E S S U R E  G R O U P S
A ssoc ia t ion  for D em o cra cy  and Just ice  (A D J):  The association was
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established in March 1985 by a group of social workers and pressure group members, 
who favoured direct elections to the Legislative Council. Founding members included 
Reverend Lo L u n g -k w o n g  and Dr D in g  L ik-k iu , the latter also chairman of the 
Christian Industrial Committee. The ADJ was the First political group consisting of 
leaders of different pressure groups who hoped to be involved actively in the political 
campaign for democratic self-government and direct elections.
A s s o c ia t io n  for D e m o c ra c y  a n d  P e o p le ’s L ive lihood  (A D P L ) :  The ADPL 
was established in April 1986 by Dr D in g  L ik -k iu  of the ADJ, F u n g  K in -k ee  of the 
People’s Council. C h a n g  K a - m a n  of the New Hong Kong Society and Lee Wing-tat of 
the Society for Social Research. It advocates direct elections, human rights, individual 
liberty and more reasonable allocation of social and economic resources in society. It 
argued tha t  prosperity and stability could only be maintained by the improvement in 
the quality of life of the lower-income groups in society.
A s s o c ia t io n  for P r o m o t i o n  o f  P u b l ic  J u s t ic e  ( A P P J ) :  The APPJ was 
founded in February 1980 as an opinion group with the aim of promoting human rights, 
social justice and people’s welfare. In the main, it handled individual cases of the poor in 
their grievances towards government policies. Its chairman. E ls ie  E l l io t t  (1913—), a 
school supervisor, comes from a British missionary background and has been elected a 
member of the Urban Council since 1963. She was defeated by Hilton Cheong-leen, 
chairman of the Civic Association, in her campaign in the Legislative Council elections 
(Urban Council Constituency) in September 1985 by a narrow margin.
C h r i s t i a n  I n d u s t r i a l  C o m m it te e  (C IC ) :  The C1C was founded in the 1960s as 
an independent trade union organization but it was in fact a pressure group, being 
sponsored by overseas churches. Its chairman, Dr D in g  L ik-k iu  (1921 — ), is a Malaysian 
Chinese and a medical practitioner in Hong Kong for more than 20 years. Its 
Executive-director, L au  C h in -se k .  is an active unionist since the 1970s. In general, the 
CIC is anti-establishment, calling for political reforms and the improvement of the 
quality of life. The CIC did not have an official position towards the future of Hong 
Kong, nor did it support any candidate in the campaign for the 1985 district board 
elections, but its individual members such as, Dr Ding Lik-kiu and Lau Chin-sek, 
established other political groups in 1985-86 with a view of promoting democratic 
self-government and direct elections to the Legislative Council.
H o n g  K o n g  F o r u m  (H K F ) :  The HKF was established in October 1984 by a 
group of 20 people, most of them graduates of the University of Hong Kong in 1980. The 
forum identified itself as a group of non-partisan young intellectuals and students in 
Hong Kong who gathered together with a view of articulating their opinion towards the 
future of Hong Kong. In the main, members of the group believed in maintaining the
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existing freedom, liberty and the rule of law and called for the development of a 
democratic government, i.e. an elected legislature accountable to the people of Hong 
Kong.
H o n g  K o n g  P o l ic y  V iew ers  ( H K P V ) :  The Policy Viewers was established in 
1983 by a group of fresh graduates of the post-secondary institutions in Hong Kong. It 
supported direct elections to the Legislative Council, democracy, social justice and more 
equal distribution of w’ealth in society.
J o i n t  C o m m it te e  on th e  P r o m o t i o n  o f  D e m o c ra t ic  G o v e r n m e n t :  It was 
first made known to the public in November 198G, w'hen 130 political and community 
groups allied in a Kao Shan Rally (see Chapter 9) to call for direct elections to the Hong 
Kong legislature. Members of the Joint Committee included such groups as the People’s 
Council, Association for Democracy and Justice, Hong Kong Affairs Society, Association 
for Democracy and People's Livelihood, Hong Kong Policy Viewers, Society for 
Community Organizations, various residents’ associations, Christian groups, social 
workers’ unions and members of the Urban Council and district boards.
M e e t in g  P o in t :  The Meeting Point was inaugurated in January 1983 wdth about 
190 members. It was initiated by a group of young social workers, student activists, 
teachers and journalists. Its chairman, L au  N a i-k e u n g .  was a businessman; 
vice-chairman, Y e u n g  S u m . was a social work lecturer at the University of Hong Kong. 
The group identified strongly with Chinese nationalism and was the first non-leftist 
group to support Beijing’s claim for sovereignty over Hong Kong. It was also the first 
group to promote ‘gangren minzu zhigang’. In 1985. it supported 4 members to run the 
district board elections and most of them were elected with a high percentage of votes. 
By 1985-86. the Meeting Point had become one of the most active grassroots 
organizations calling for direct elections to the Legislative Council and more even 
distribution of social and economic resources in society.
N e w  H o n g  K o n g  Socie ty  (N H K S ) :  The NHKS was set up in February 1983 by 
about 22 people, most of them being graduates of the Chinese University of Hong Kong 
between 1980-83. In Spring 1983, it sent a delegation to Beijing suggesting ‘gangren 
minzu zhigang'. In mid-1984. it also called for the setting up of a wholly elected 
municipal council in the post-1997 government. Yet up to 1985-86. only its chairman, 
C h a n g  K a - m a n .  appeared to involve himself actively among the grassroots 
organizations and on various other social issues (for further details, see Chapter 5. uCase 
Study: the Campaigning Strategies of Chang Ka-manr ).
P e o p l e ’s C o u n c i l  on  P u b l ic  H o u s in g  P o l ic y  ( P e o p le ’s C o u n c i l) :  The
People’s Council was set up in 1979 by members of the Society for Community 
Organization, who helped the public housing residents to organize and redress their
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com m on grievances. Like the Society for C om m unity  Organization  and the CIC, the 
P eop le’s Council began with financial support  from overseas churches and adopted the 
s tra teg ies  of social protests  and com m unity  mobilization. In general, it was 
an ti-estab lishm ent and thus aimed a t  exerting pressure on the governm ent to  improve 
the  quality  of life am ong the poor. F u n g  K in -k e e  (1953—), a g radua te  of a British 
un iversity ,  became the Director of the People’s Council in 1982. In the same year, the 
council promoted two public housing candidates, W o n g  C h e e -k w a n  and C hui  
K im - l in g ,  to the Sham  Shui Po district board elections. In 1983, the council supported 
two o ther candidates. F u n g  K in -k e e  and L am  C h a k -p iu ,  to the  Urban Council 
elections. After they were elected, they also represented the  Urban Council to sit in the 
Sham  Shui Po District Board meetings. T hus the group became most influential in the 
Sham  Shui Po district. In 1985, the council promoted 11 candidates to  the  district board 
elections, most of them  being in the Sham Shui Po district.  Its leaders such as Fung 
Kin-kee, became involved actively in other political organizations in the campaign for 
direct elections and democratic reforms. In November 1985, Fung was also appointed to 
the BLCC.
S o c ie ty  for C o m m u n i ty  O rg a n iza t io n :  The society was founded in 1971 by a 
group of CIC staff, social workers and church sisters. The society adopted the 
Alinsky-style of organizing social actions and encouraged the d isadvantaged  to organize 
am ong themselves to  address their grievances. In the 1970s, the society, under the 
leaderhsip of its Director, F u n g  H o - la p ,  partic ipated actively in various social 
m ovem ents  and was thus well-established among various residents ' associations and 
pressure groups. It also co-operated closely with many active s tuden ts  unions, social 
welfare agencies and journalists. Like the CIC. the group did not express its views 
tow ards  the 1997 issue but in general it supported democracy and direct elections.
S o c ie ty  for S oc ia l  R esea rch :  The society was established in 1981 as an opinion 
group by about 20 young people who were studen t activists a t  the University of Hong 
Kong in the 1970s. Members of the group felt th a t  the lower-middle income classes were 
economically and politically deprived. Its chairm an, Lee W in g - ta t  and some other 
m em bers, were involved in various social movements, and in 1985. 3 candidates ran 
successfully for the d istrict board elections. In November 1985, Lee was appointed  to the 
BLCC. He was also a founding member of the Association for Democracy.
P R O - G M D  G R O U P S
A s s o c ia t io n  for D e m o c r a c y  (A D ):  The AD was established in 1980-81 with 
about 500 members. The group was supposed to be pro-G M D  mainly because its 
cha irm an , C hin  S a i-n in  (1922—), a school supervisor, was known to have some 
connections with Taiw an officials and rightis ts  in the education profession. But the
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association was not registered in Taiw an and thus it was not sponsored officially by the 
Taiwan government. The group also had connections with some Labour members of 
Parliam ents .  In general, it called for prom oting democracy and direct elections.
A ll ia n c e  for D e m o c r a c y  a n d  F r e e d o m  o f  H o n g  K o n g  P re p a r a to ry  
C o m m it t e e  (A D F ):  The ADF w'as established in M arch 1984 by T sin  Sai-nin,  
chairm an of the AD. Its position did not differ from the AD, but it aimed a t  recruiting 
m embers from the lower-income groups. The group called for respect of human rights 
and a united effort of the people of Hong Kong to prom ote democratic self-government.
H o n g  K o n g  D e m o c r a t ic  S e l f -g o v e r n m e n t  P r o m o t io n  A sso c ia t io n :  The
association was established in mid 1985 by the former Vice-chairman of the AD, P a n g  
W a h -k e u n g .  It called for 'prosperity  and stability , democracy and freedom ’. While it 
expressed its d is trust towards C h in a ’s promises for ‘gangren zhigang’, it emphasized 
itself as a ‘neutral and gentle’ political body aiming a t  p rom oting democratic 
self-government.
T h e  “I L ove F ree  H o n g  K o n g ” C a m p a ig n  C o m m it te e :  The committee was 
founded in September 1983, claiming to reflect the worries of those who came to Hong 
Kong as refugees. It called for the protection  of hum an freedom and dem ocratic rights in 
Hong Kong. While it crilicized the British for selling out the interests of the people of 
Hong Kong, it also distrusted the P R C  in its promises for ‘gangren zhigang’. Thus it 
called for the promotion of dem ocratic  self-government as a means of safeguarding 
against Chinese intervention.
H o n g  K o n g  S e l f -S a lv a t io n  A c t io n  W o r k in g  C o m m it te e :  The committee was 
established in 1982, claiming to represent the worries of the illegal im migrants  from 
China regarding returning Hong Kong to  Com m unist rule. The movement criticized the 
British return  of Hong Kong to C om m unist  ty ranny but supported democratization of 
the political system in Hong Kong.
M A R X I S T  G R O U P S
T h e  O cto b er  R e v ie w  (T r o t s k y i t e )  an d  R e v o lu t io n a r y  M a r x is t  League:  
The T ro tskvites  and the Revolutionary M arxists  did not differ much from each other. 
While the former was registered as a magazine, consisting of younger people in their 30s 
and 40s, the  latter  were mainly veteran  Chinese Revolutionaries living in Hong Kong in 
the post-1949 period. Neither of them  had widespread support at the grassroots, 
a lthough they claimed to organize social actions and mass movements.
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Appendix J
LIST OF INTERVIEW EES AND THEIR  
POLITICAL ROLES (in Alphabetical Order)
N a m e P o l i t i c a l  R o l e s
C h a .  L o u i s ( M e m b e r  o f  b o t h  t h e  B a s i c  L a w  D r a f t i n g  C o m m i t t e e  a n d  
t h e  B a s i c  L a w  C o n s u l t a t i v e  C o m m i t t e e ) .
C h a n ,  C h e e - s h i n g ( E l e c t e d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  S h a m  S h u i  P o  d i s t r i c t  b o a r d ,  
1 9 8 2 - 8 8 ) .
C h a n ,  C h e o n g ( E d i t o r  o f  t h e  T r o s k y i t e  m a g a z i n e  O c t o b e r  R e v i e w  a n d  
e l e c t e d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  K w u n  T o n g  d i s t r i c t  b o a r d ,  
1 9 8 5 - 8 8 ) .
C h a n ,  E s t h e r ( E l e c t e d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  a n d  W e s t e r n  d i s t r i c t  
b o a r d ,  1 9 8 5 - 8 8 ,  a n d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  N e w  H o n g  K o n g  
R e s e a r c h e r s ) .
C h a n ,  F o o - l e u n g ( E l e c t e d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  S h a m  S h u i  P o  d i s t r i c t  b o a r d  a n d  
m e m b e r  o f  t h e  S h a m  S h u i  P o  K a i f o n g  A s s o c i a t i o n ) .
C h a n .  K a r - c h u n g ( E l e c t e d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  S h a m  S h u i  P o  d i s t r i c t  b o a r d ,  
1 9 8 5 - 8 8 .  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  C i v i c  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  a n d  m e m b e r  o f  
a  S h e k  K i p  M e i  M u t u a l  A i d  C o m m i t t e e ) .
C h a n .  K u n - w a h ( C h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  ‘ 1 L o v e  F r e e  H o n g  K o n g '  C a m p a i g n  
C o m m i t t e e ) .
C h a n .  K w o k - k w o n g ( A p p o i n t e d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  S h a m  S h u i  P o  d i s t r i c t  b o a r d ,  
1 9 8 5 - 8 8 ) .
C h a n .  M o - p o w ( E l e c t e d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  T u e n  M u n  d i s t r i c t  b o a r d ,  1 9 8 5 - 8 8 ,  
m e m b e r  o f  b o t h  t h e  M e e t i n g  P o i n t  a n d  t h e  T u e n  M u n  
F o r t h  v i e w e r s ) .
C h a n ,  P e t e r ( E l e c t e d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  U r b a n  C o u n c i l .  1 9 8 3 - 8 6 ,  m e m b e r  
o f  t h e  K o w l o o n  C i t y  d i s t r i c t  b o a r d ,  a n d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  
B a s i c  L a w  C o n s u l t a t i v e  C o m m i t t e e ) .
C h a n ,  W u - c h i n g ( A p p o i n t e d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  T u e n  M u n  d i s t r i c t  b o a r d ,  
1 9 8 5 - 8 8 ) .
C h a n .  Y a t - t u n g ( E l e c t e d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  Y u e n  L o n g  d i s t r i c t  b o a r d ,  m e m b e r  
o f  t h e  S o c i e t y  f o r  E d u c a t i o n ,  a n d  c a n d i d a t e  s t a n d i n g  f o r  
t h e  e l e c t i o n s  t o  t h e  F u n c t i o n a l  C o n s t i t u e n c y  ( E d u c a t i o n a l )  
f o r  t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l  in  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 8 5  | d e f e a t e d | ) .
C h a n ,  Y i n g - l u n ( E l e c t e d  t w i c e  t o  t h e  E a s t e r n  d i s t r i c t  b o a r d ,  1 9 8 2 - 8 8 ,  
a p p o i n t e d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l ,  1 9 8 4 - 8 8 ,  
m e m b e r  o f  t h e  y o u n g  p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  a n d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  
B a s i c  L a w  C o n s u l t a t i v e  C o m m i t t e e ) .
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Chang. Ka-man
Chang, Yau-hung 
Cheng, Joseph 
Cheng, Kam-wah
Cheng, Po-hong 
Cheng, Stephen 
Cheng, Yiu-tong 
Cheong, Stephen 
Cheong-leen, Hilton
Cheung, Chor-yung 
Cheung. Kin-chung
Cheung, Wing-sum 
Choi, Cheung Yuet-lan
Choi, Wai-sek 
Choi, Wang-hoe 
Chou, Hing-chuen
Chow. Edmond
Chow, Kwen-lin 
Chow, Nelson
(Elected member of the Kwun Tong district board, 
1985-88, Chairman of the New Hong Kong Society, 
member of the People’s Council on Public Housing Policy, 
and member of the Basic Law Consultative Committee).
(Elected member of the Central and Western district 
board).
(Member of the Hong Kong Observers and the Hong Kong 
Prospect Institute).
(Elected member of the Sham Shui Po district board, 
1985-88, and member of the Sham Shui Po Kaifong 
Association).
(Appointed member and chairman of the Sham Shui Po 
district board, 1985-88).
(Elected member of the Eastern district board, 1985-88, 
and member of the Basic Law Consultative Committee).
(Member of the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions, 
and member of the Basic Law Consultative Committee).
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(Elected member of the Sham Shui Po district board, 
1982-88).
(Appointed member of the Tuen Mun district board, 
1982-88).
(Member of the Basic Law Consultative Committee, and 
candidate standing for the elections to the Functional 
Constituency (Commercial) for the Legislative Council in 
September 1985 [defeated ).
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m e m b e r  o f  t h e  C o n c e r n e d  G r o u p  f o r  t h e  S h a m  s h u i  P o  
P e o p l e ' s  L i v e l i h o o d ,  a n d  c a n d i d a t e  s t a n d i n g  f o r  t h e  
e l e c t i o n s  t o  t h e  S h a m  S h u i  P o  d i s t r i c t  b o a r d  in  M a r c h  
1 9 8 5  i d e f e a t e d j ) .
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